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Abstract 
Shipshaped is a thesis on the emergence of an innovative offshore supplier 
industry. Multiple influences combined to the success of various techniques 
to extract oil and gas without fixed platforms; this thesis put particular 
emphasis on the relaxation of hierarchies in fostering innovation. Such 
disintegration occurred within firms in which empowered employees took on 
larger responsibilities and between firms. The pace of innovation accelerated 
where people were allowed to sort out things themselves rather than 
conforming to directions from above. Initially these conditions were more 
evident in offshore support services serviced by shipping companies, but 
practices pioneered in shipping eventually spread to the proper offshore oil 
industry.  
 
Two business units at Kongsberg, Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore, serves 
as a vantage point for this thesis. Kongsberg Offshore pioneered production 
systems that help oil companies control the flow of petroleum from a valve 
tree on the seabed rather than on fixed platforms. Albatross pioneered 
dynamic positioning, a technique that helps shipping companies maintain 
their position using propellers rather than mooring lines and anchors. In the 
1970s, dynamic positioning rapidly gained a market whereas the oil industry 
hesitated to introduce subsea production systems. In each case, qualities 
related to demand for technology as opposed to supply of technology, are 
central to the conclusions in the thesis. 
 
Eventually, oil companies went through a number of changes that aligned 
the practices of shipping and the practices of oil. These changes in 
procurement practices, management and institutional framework helped 
develop an innovative Norwegian supplier industry. The effects showed in 
profitability, global expansion and the development of advanced capabilities. 
As of 2007, this thesis argues, supplier industries can combine to handle 
most tasks associated with an oil company. Their growing capabilities permit 
innovative and entrepreneurial ways of exploiting oil offshore. 
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1 Introduction 
In the 1970s, when Norwegians first encountered petroleum, large oil 
companies knew how to exploit the fields. They hired help to execute plans, 
they built huge islands of concrete, and they extracted oil and gas in a 
manner that resembled how oil companies operated onshore. Thirty years 
later, supplier industries had acquired capabilities that rivalled the oil 
companies. They were instrumental in changing the technological basis of 
the industry and helped introduce various techniques to extract oil and gas 
without fixed installations, from greater depths and at a lower cost than 
gravity platforms. I call these deepwater technologies and they are the 
subjects of this thesis. I ask how these techniques came into being, why they 
became successful, and why independent suppliers rather than oil companies 
came to master such techniques. 
 
In order to study how deepwater technology moved from the margins of the 
Norwegian oil industry into the core in the course of some 35 years, I use the 
supplier industry at Kongsberg as a vantage point. Unless clarity requires the 
use of legal company names, I refer to Albatross1 and Kongsberg Offshore. 
The official names have changed several times, 2  but their core business 
remains the same. Kongsberg Offshore pioneered subsea production systems 
that help oil companies control the flow of petroleum from a well based on 
the seabed, rather than on fixed platforms. Albatross pioneered dynamic 
positioning, a technique that helps shipping companies keep a vessel in 
position above subsea equipment using propellers rather than mooring lines 
and anchors.  
 
Although the narrative centres on Kongsberg, its implications are wide 
enough to include a basic transformation of the Norwegian oil industry and 
by implication the Norwegian economy. I start out in an age of oil 
companies and fixed platforms, and finish in an age of outsourced 
knowledge and moveable equipment. It is helpful to think of the shift as 
shipshaped, partly because some of the new equipment was floating and 
moveable, but also because the offshore industry increasingly 
commissioned, managed and traded equipment and services in a fashion that 
                                                     
1 To emphasise detachment from mooring lines and firm ground, the system was 
named Albatross in honour of the sea bird that never lands except for nesting. A 
secretary working at the KV Oil Division, Kari Paulsen, came up with the name, see 
Unn Kristin Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg: This is the story of Kongsberg 
offshore's first 25 years in the oil business (Familievennen, 1999). 
2 Appendix 11.1 provides an overview of names and legal structures. 
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reminds one of practices in shipping. With each passing decade, the 
differences between the oil industry and the shipping industry became less 
profound. Both industries converged, but the more noticeable change was 
the oil industry’s adoption of practices from shipping. The title of this thesis, 
Shipshaped, reflects the direction of the shift, at times the inspiration that 
triggered the shift, and frequently its neat consequences.  
 
One broad change affected industry architecture. In the 1970s, the oil 
industry relied on extensive vertical integration. The parts of the industry 
that operated offshore sourced more equipment and services from 
independent suppliers than was the case in the onshore oil industry, but oil 
companies were very much in command.3 In Norway, the division between 
suppliers and oil companies was blurred. Statoil ventured into exploration, 
production, refining and retailing, but mostly stopped short of direct control 
of the supplier industry. The state oil company orchestrated a supplier 
industry, however. We shall return to this division of labour in chapter 2. 
Shipping companies, by contrast, rarely attempted extensive vertical 
integration but rather relied on specialization. One specialist might focus on 
fleet ownership, another on operations; a third brokered the terms of cargo 
while a forth insured that cargo. Ship owners also relied heavily on third 
parties for design and manufacturing of vessels and equipment. Initially, that 
is, the world of shipping differed considerably from the world of oil. 
 
Starting in the 1980s, oil companies on the Norwegian shelf increasingly 
asked their suppliers to deliver turnkey systems rather than fabrication 
according to specifications. Oil companies supplied functional descriptions 
rather than blueprints and began trusting their suppliers in the same fashion 
that shipping companies trusted their yards. In the process, oil companies 
became somewhat less attached to a business model of vertical integration 
and somewhat more attracted to specialization. Several sections in this thesis 
track developments in industry architecture, most notably chapter 5. This 
gradual shift towards vertical specialization gathered pace as the supplier 
industry enhanced its capabilities (cf. chapter 7 and 8).  
 
A second shift affected the principles for allocating resources. In the mid-
1970s, Statoil and the Norwegian authorities preferred to manage the 
emerging oil economy in quite minute detail. In due course, more aspects of 
capitalism took hold. The 1986 oil price fall and a liberal shift in the general 
economy crippled most dirigiste ambitions and forced a businesslike attitude 
to earnings and transactions – much like the sentiments that were 
                                                     
3 Hans Veldman and George Lagers, 50 years offshore (Delft: Foundation for 
Offshore Studies, 1997). 
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predominant in the shipping industry. I should hasten to add that there was 
no direct attraction between the two in this respect. Chapter 6 in particular 
provides insight in aspects of the transformation. The crisis helped shape a 
political climate where change was possible and where cost-efficient 
technologies and organization gained ground. 
 
A third shift related to management practices and business culture – the 
balance between centralized decision-making and reliance on the discretion 
of subordinates. The long-term trend was one away from hierarchal 
organization directed from the top in an army-like fashion, towards self-
contained business units with goals and strategies in their own right. 
Everywhere, managers, owners and management thinkers started to question 
the logic of company bureaucracies and omnipotent management. Focus 
shifted onto communicating goals, motivating those that were to execute on 
them, and having people contribute to the common good. Such thinking 
emphasized buy-in from employees and the establishment of independent 
business units organizing employees and resources around a customer 
segment and a business idea, hoping to make achievements more transparent 
and getting increased commitment.4 We witness the shift most evidently in 
the management philosophy of Albatross (chapters 4.5 and 4.6) and in the 
disintegration of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (chapter 6). Albatross emulated a 
culture of empowerment that they associated with (some) shipping 
companies – in certain contrast to the centralized decision-making practices 
of (some) oil companies. I imagine the picture would change depending on 
the manager in question, but oil companies covered in this thesis relied on 
more extensive central control than contemporary shipping companies. 
 
Finally, and most basically, technology shifted. Initially, operators on the 
Norwegian shelf applied almost nothing but huge, integrated gravity 
platforms made of concrete. The offshore oil industry sported fixed means of 
production, built to last, and integral to the company in much the same 
manner a farmer would think the barn integral to the farm. Specifying, 
designing and operating a platform were core tasks seemingly inseparable 
from the core business of an oil company. Gradually, and particularly in the 
aftermath of the oil price fall in 1985-86, the field development style became 
                                                     
4 The shift is frequently associated with the works of Peter Drucker, e.g. Peter F. 
Drucker, The practice of management (New York: Harper, 1954). Drucker 
advocated divisionalization the way of General Motors as opposed to centralized 
control the way of Ford and argued the merits of managing by objectives rather than 
orders. Drucker’s writing is extensive, but consistent in its themes; Wikipedia – a 
free and collaborative dictionary – contains a useful summary of concepts from his 
writing, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Drucker. 
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unsustainable and yielded to agile field developments based on deepwater 
technology. The new style somewhat resembled the world of shipping with 
movable, reusable and tradable means of production – vessels that were not 
necessarily owned by the company that employed them. The shipping 
industry kept a somewhat larger distance from the means of production and 
incurred experimentation and risk taking – or at least a willingness to 
question the appropriateness of a particular solution.  
 
Rather like a contrast agent, dichotomies make for easy observation. I 
compare historic practices in the shipping industry and historic practices in 
the oil industry – for lack of a better term - a shipping paradigm vs. an oil 
paradigm. The table below highlights major differences between the two.  
 
Figure 1) Schematic outline of differences between oil and shipping 
 Oil paradigm Shipping paradigm 
Technology  Technology integral to 
operations – frequently as 
infrastructure (e.g. fixed 
platforms and pipelines) 
Technology external to 
the business – moveable, 
tradable and not 
necessarily owned by the 
user (e.g. ships) 
Industry 
architecture  
Vertical integration allowing 
control of technology 
development and resources 
Highly specialized 
companies in a value 
chain 
Coordinating 
principles  
Corporatism, plans to ensure 
the different parts work in 
concert 
Prices allocate resources 
in a market; volunteer 
cooperation and networks  
Management & 
organization  
Command to ensure the 
proper execution of plans; 
risk aversion 
Empowered employees; 
risk tolerance 
 
If the table above trades accuracy for simplicity, subsequent chapters in this 
thesis will strive to recapture the complexity of what went on. Influences 
were intertwined; technology rubbed off on industry architecture; 
institutional change affected management decisions, and so on. Besides, the 
distinction between oil and shipping sometimes dissolved. Some shipping 
magnates extended into other stages of the value chain, felt a strong 
attachment to their ships and held opinions about their design and 
operations. 5  Similarly, some oil executives encouraged suppliers to act 
                                                     
5 Fred Olsen’s stake in Aker (an engineering and shipbuilding company) and Sigvald 
Bergesen d.y.’s stake in Rosenberg mekaniske verksted are examples. Both shipping 
17 
 
independently. Rather like ideal types, the distinctions remain useful in 
discussing a wide-ranging change. Nevertheless, the main thrust of my work 
is holistic. In a somewhat eclectic fashion, I included those facts that seemed 
most relevant for a reader. Because the subject is complex, I opted for a 
rigorous narrative where numerous causes formed a chain of events that 
established new technologies and a new industry. That chain of events was 
specific to its time and its circumstances. In short, I apply the same approach 
as most historians have done. 
 
1.1 Innovation: a history of technology and business 
What a man can achieve depends on his abilities and the constraints placed 
upon him by his contemporaries. 6  The same basic observation goes for 
entrepreneurs who strived to establish deepwater technology. At KV and the 
various companies that replaced the engineering conglomerate, people 
showed great abilities, but circumstances sometimes prevented them from 
taking on responsibility and from reaping the rewards. Innovative 
technology would sometimes be slow to catch on, or fail to catch on entirely, 
due to the prevalence of structures that favored continuity.  Philosophically 
speaking, the development and diffusion of deepwater technology is a story 
about agency that sought change in the face of structures that favored 
continuity. 
 
The notion that structures limit or influence individuals originates with 
sociology, but affects history and the humanities as well.7 A strict Marxist 
interpretation of history would tend to allow individuals little discretion, but 
rather focus on class and relations of production, while historians that adhere 
                                                                                                                            
companies placed orders with ”their” yards, cf. Hans K. Mjelva, "Tre storverft i 
norsk industris finaste stund: Ein komparativ studie av stord verft, rosenberg mek. 
Verksted og fredrikstad mek. Verksted 1960-1980", (Ph.D., University of Bergen, 
2005), p. 221. 
6 The approach resembles the basic framework of competitive strategic analysis 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats), but the inspiration originates with 
Jens Arup Seip’s philosophical introduction in his biography of Ole Jacob Broch, a 
technology pioneer, cf. Jens Arup Seip, Ole jacob broch og hans samtid (Oslo: 
Gyldendal, 1971). 
7 In positioning my work, I have frequently turned to Mark J. Smith, Social science 
in question (London: Sage, 1998). Mr. Smith’s instructive lecturing at the 
Norwegian School of Management has added further to the subject. On the 
relevance for history, I trust the pedagogic approach in Knut Kjeldstadli, Fortida er 
ikke hva den en gang var: En innføring i historiefaget (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1992). 
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to methodological individualism will emphasize society as an aggregation of 
individual choices. Like many historians, I resist the idea that structures 
determine an individual’s behavior, but find it difficult to argue human 
agency rules supreme. I generally seek some middle ground where structure 
influences human behavior, and humans are capable of changing the 
structures they inhabit if only to a degree. Put differently, successful 
businesses evolved at Kongsberg not least because of favorable 
circumstances. 
 
Past technology shapes present technology and forces this thesis to adhere to 
schemes pioneered by historians of technology. The graph depicts how 
exploration (drilling) progressed to deeper waters due to advances in 
dynamic positioning and a host of other techniques. For a while, advances in 
drilling outpaced the industry’s ability to set up a production facility, but 
eventually production techniques began to catch up. Since the mid-1990s, 
techniques based on subsea trees (valve trees on the seabed) and floating 
production improved much more rapidly than techniques based on dry trees 
and fixed platforms. Obviously, my account of deepwater technology would 
be incomplete without an account of how engineers and businesses worked 
to improve these techniques. 
 
19 
 
Figure 2) Race to the bottom: deepest recorded drilling, wet tree and dry tree, 
1960-20058 
 
While the engineers’ perspective is useful, other influences helped shape 
deepwater technology as well. The figure above shows the output of 
engineers and inventors, but it might just as well depict the oil companies’ 
desperation. When tracing the advance of deepwater technology, I also trace 
sentiments in the oil industry such as agony and promise. Ultimately, the 
decisions to explore deep waters depended on the oil companies’ 
calculations of risk and reward. Having explored shallow waters in stable 
                                                     
8 The figure is assembled from a variety of sources, most importantly Mike Utt, The 
offshore industry - middle-aged, but still learning (Society of Petroleum Engineers, 
2004 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.spe.org/specma/binary/files/2657688MUttOffshoreIndustry.pdf. and 
M.W. Krall, "Keynote speech from Exxonmobil development company" (paper 
presented at 2002 Dynamic Positioning Conference, Houston, 17 September 2002). 
Some additional information appears in John Reed, "Innovative approaches to 
gathering systems for producing wells in deep water" in Offshore Technology 
Conference (Houston: 2005); Asle Solheim, "Riserless light well intervention & 
through tubing rotary drilling" in Subsea Technology Conference (Esbjerg: 2005); 
Barba Wallace, John Duberg, and James Kirkley, "Dynamics of the oil and gas 
industry in the gulf of Mexico: 1980-2000: Final report", OCS Study MMS 2003-004 
(New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf 
of Mexico OCS Region, 2003). 
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regions, the industry moved on to rougher climates, more challenging 
political regimes, smaller fields – and deeper waters. In this respect, the race 
towards deeper waters depicts the increasing anguish of the oil industry in 
the absence of easily accessible reserves and the increasing willingness to 
tolerate risk in search of reward. Economic and business history offers an 
approach to such inquiries and a corrective to technological perspectives. 
 
* * * 
  
A new technology of economic importance is analogous to innovation. 
Always an elusive quality, innovation underpins economic development. 
Charles Edquist, for example, refers to an “almost universally accepted” 
claim that “technological change and other kinds of innovations are the most 
important sources of productivity growth and increased material welfare”.9 
Some make the point poetically claiming that a study of economy without 
innovation is similar to playing Hamlet without the prince.10 The importance 
of innovations for the economy was forcefully emphasised in two papers by 
Moses Abramowitz (1956) and Robert Solow (1957).11 Both explored the 
importance of technical progress to the long-term economic growth of the 
American economy. Both identified an unexplained growth in resource 
productivity that Abramovitz dubbed a “measure of our ignorance”, and 
found this residual to be surprisingly large. Additional labour, raw materials 
and capital tend to matter less than improved technology, better processes 
and organization.  
 
Some apply the term innovation broadly enough to include invention or 
indeed acts of creativity such as design. I use the term rather narrowly in 
much the same fashion as Joseph Schumpeter, the Austrian economist who 
                                                     
9 Quoted from the first paragraph in Charles Edquist, "Introduction" in Systems of 
innovation: Technologies, institutions and organizations (London: Pinter, 1997). 
10 The reference to Shakespeare appears among other places in Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism & democracy (Routledge, 1996), p. 86; Nathan 
Rosenberg, Inside the black box: Technology and economics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 4, Kristine Bruland, "Comparative studies in 
European history of technology" (paper at Historiography and National Histories of 
Technology, Roskilde, February 1992 1993) p. 8, and in William J. Baumol, The 
free-market innovation machine (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 9. 
11 M Abramovitz, "Resource and output trends in the united states since 1870", 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (1956); Robert Solow, 
"Technical change and the aggregate production function", Review of Economics 
and Statistics  (1957). 
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identified the importance of innovations in the working of the economy and 
broadened the outlook of neo-classical economists.12  
 
The first defining characteristic in Schumpeter’s concept of innovation is 
disruptive novelty. In the words of Schumpeter, “innovations are changes in 
production functions which cannot be decomposed into infinitesimal parts. 
Add as many mail-coaches as you please you will never get a railway so 
doing”.13 Innovations may be brand-new, but frequently they originate with 
new combinations of existing elements. Like Schumpeter, my interest is in 
innovations that broke radically with practices of the past. Conservative 
innovations, by contrast, serve to improve and prolong existing practices.14 
For example, the use of concrete to build large gravity platforms (Condeeps) 
may have been innovative, not by virtue of the huge size of these platforms, 
but because the massive foundations withstood very harsh weather. Like a 
cliff or an island, they formed an immovable foundation from where oil 
companies could drill, process and control the flow using equipment that 
was first pioneered on dry land at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Deepwater technology, by contrast, can do without fixed platforms. 
 
                                                     
12 Entrepreneurs innovating to escape hardship are encompassed in the term 
“creative destruction”, cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, "A process of creative destruction" 
in Capitalism, socialism & democracy, ed. Joseph A. Schumpeter (Routledge, 
1996), pp. 81-86. The text inspired others, e.g. a classic study on the entrepreneurial 
reorientation of Norwegian industry in the wake of the 1930s depression, cf. Francis 
Sejersted, Vekst gjennom krise : Studier i norsk teknologihistorie (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1982). 
13  Joseph A. Schumpeter, "The analysis of economic change", The Review of 
Economic Statistics  (1935) quoted from Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the black box: 
Technology and economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 6. 
14 On the common division of radical vs. incremental innovation, and how this fits 
with Schumpeter’s thoughts, cf. Jan Fagerberg, "Innovation: A guide to the 
litterature" in The Oxford handbook of innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David C. 
Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Schumpeter argued the economy progressed not by “price-cutting among harness 
makers”; what mattered in the end were the innovative acts of automobile 
manufacturers eventually abolishing harness-making as an economic activity, cf. 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Harper, 1942). My account of the work of Schumpeter draws on the interpretation in 
Rosenberg, Inside the black box and the reflections of Francis Sejersted, 
"Schumpeterforskningen i norge" (paper at Instituttseminar, Sandvika, Norway, 
2004). 
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Schumpeter’s second defining characteristic of innovation is economic 
importance. He was a pioneer in analysing innovations for their economic 
rather than scientific importance. According to this scheme, pure research 
and certain advanced technologies do not count as innovations. If scientific 
breakthroughs, such as mapping the human genome or designing the Apollo 
spacecraft, consume resources in excess of what they contribute to the 
economy, they fail the test - whereas humble creations such as discount 
retailing may count as innovations, not because they stretch the scientific 
frontier, but because they have significant, even disruptive, effects on 
business. Schumpeter’s approach encourages a focus on profitability – a 
criteria that many creative efforts at Kongsberg failed to meet. KV’s 
ventures into industrial gas turbines and jet engines were certainly advanced, 
but not innovative since these businesses have generated historic losses that 
far exceed revenues despite a return to profitability in the two decades since 
1987. 15  Although this thesis frequently quantifies savings made from 
deepwater technology, I do not include any effort to calculate total benefits 
for the oil industry. It is more straightforward to show how deepwater 
technology affected Kongsberg – cf. chapter 9.3. 
 
Schumpeter employed the term innovation in a broad term and included any 
“new form of organization such as a merger, of the opening up of new 
markets, and so on”. 16  In much the same fashion, we are interested in 
hardware improvements, but also changes in business practices, the 
introduction of simple cost accountability, market exposure, accountability 
and other changes that have affected the performance of deepwater 
technology.  
 
In asking what made deepwater technology feasible, the answer should 
include both a workable technology and companies willing and able to 
exploit that technology. There is no need to introduce any sharp analytical 
divide between technical innovations and business practices. Both deserve 
attention. In this approach, I draw inspiration both from historians of 
technology and business historians – and indeed from those who have sought 
to combine such perspectives.17 The combination allows a fuller and less 
                                                     
15 For an overview, cf. Figure 34) on page 181 and Figure 33) on page 179. 
16 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business cycles: A theoretical historical, and statistical 
analysis of the capitalist process (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, first published 
1939), quoted from Rosenberg, Inside the black box, p.6. 
17 For an example of a dual approach and the usefulness of studying business in 
relation to R&D, cf. Knut Sogner, "An innovative culture: Nyegaard & co, Norway 
and the environments of business", (PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 1996). 
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distorted understanding, albeit at the cost of some complexity – for example 
in the number of useful concepts that serve to illuminate the subject. 
  
1.2 On theories and concepts 
In the narrow interpretation, my work reads as a thesis about how innovative 
business evolved at Kongsberg. At first notice, what I portray was particular 
to Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore, their technology and the people they 
employed. At times, I propose a wider interpretation: the offshore oil 
industry as it emerged from the mid-1990s onwards was itself shipshaped 
because important developments seen at Kongsberg were general in their 
nature. Since my work does not cover any representative selection of the 
offshore industry, any claim to a wider interpretation rests on the nature of 
the cases I cover. 
 
There are reasons to suggest what went on at Kongsberg reflected a wider 
industry development. We can start from the observation that deepwater 
technology went to the core of their customers’ operations. Albatross 
controlled the manoeuvring of ships, a task otherwise entrusted to the 
captain; Kongsberg Offshore controlled the flow of oil and gas, a task that 
was critical to the operations of a field. Being central to their customers’ 
operations, the businesses I study had to internalize the qualities of the 
industries they served. Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore adapted their 
customers’ attitudes to outsourcing or in-sourcing, risk-taking or risk-
aversion, entrepreneurship or strategic planning, etc. Where the two 
businesses diverged, they diverged in much the same way the shipping 
industry stood apart from the oil industry. The thesis strives to identify 
people and circumstances that were particular to my objects of study, but 
enough remains to suggest a common link between the shaping of industry at 
Kongsberg and the shaping of the Norwegian oil economy.18 
 
If this thesis contributes to a wider understanding, the credit is widely 
shared. While a few twists are original, I have borrowed numerous useful 
concepts from scholars with an ability to point out the general nature of 
particular developments. The sections below identify the concepts I have 
found most useful. They cluster around four bodies of theory that deal with 
                                                     
18 The approach resembles varieties of case methods as applied e.g. in 
anthrophology. An anthropologist studying but one family or a few families may 
dare suggest that his findings apply to the culture in question since the family could 
not but internalize the values and habits of their society. For an introduction to case 
study methodology, cf. Svein S. Andersen, Case-studier og generalisering: 
Forskningsstrategi og design (Bergen-Sandviken: Fagbokforlaget, 1997). 
24 
 
technological change, with the integration and disintegration of business, 
with institutional change and with management. I return to each in turn. 
 
Historians of technology have gained significantly by applying concepts 
pioneered by Thomas Hughes. Hughes developed a theoretical framework to 
explain utilities such as electricity or telecommunications, but the framework 
fits reasonably well even for offshore petroleum. Like large technological 
systems in general, the nature of the business was systemic and involved not 
simply physical components but the enlisting of legislators, financiers, raw 
materials, etc. 19  Technological systems do not change easily. Although 
Hughes created a large room for people, in the shape of system-building 
entrepreneurs, he was equally explicit on the hard-to-change nature of 
mature, technological systems. When adapted to new circumstances, 
technological systems might acquire a distinct style, but their basic qualities 
did not change.20 When studying stand-alone technologies, it is common to 
observe how early variety yields to a dominant design.21 Large technological 
systems display a similar tendency towards technological lock-in. 
Momentum is the term used by Hughes to denote the inertia created by 
investments, identifiable interests – and social structures. Other historians 
more commonly use path dependency to identify the phenomenon. In this 
respect, social structures and technological systems seem analogues. The 
                                                     
19 Thomas Parker Hughes, "The evolution of large technological systems" in The 
social construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and 
history of technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parker Hughes, and Trevor J. 
Pinch (London: MIT Press, 1987). Similar perspectives were stated in the 
introduction to Thomas Parker Hughes, Networks of power: Electrification in 
western society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
20 Hughes, "The evolution of large technological systems".   
21 The notion of dominant designs occurs frequently in the literature on life cycles of 
products and industries, cf. Richard R. Nelson, "The co-evolution of technology, 
industrial structure, and supporting institutions" in Technology, organization and 
competitiveness: Perspectives on industrial and corporate change, ed. Giovanni 
Dosi, David J. Teece, and Josef Chytry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
Nelson discusses the reasons why a design becomes dominant. It may be better or, in 
case of cumulative technologies, it may gain an early advantage. A version of this 
relates to technologies that become entrenched out of habit or user patterns, for 
example our dysfunctional keyboards, as explained in an entertaining article by Paul 
A. David, "Understanding the economics of qwerty: The necessity of history" in 
Economic history and the modern economist, ed. William N. Parker (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986). 
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continued presence of either is no proof of superior functional qualities, but a 
pointer to the past.22 
 
Hughes’ framework provides a way of assessing change. Like Schumpeter, 
Hughes points to the role of entrepreneurs – system builders that invented, 
managed and financed technological systems. Since the technologies in 
question were systemic, shortcomings in one field might obstruct progress in 
another. Hughes refers to these issues as reverse salients – a term borrowed 
from the military to denote a section of a front that fails to progress due to 
e.g. difficult terrain or hard resistance, and consequently delays or halts the 
overall advance of an army.23 System-building entrepreneurs identified and 
overcame such reverse salients. 
 
Portraying the advance of deepwater technology as a long effort to overcome 
reverse salients provides a useful perspective. Unlike notions such as 
“bottleneck”, a reverse salient implies a constantly moving technological 
frontier. It emphasises the importance not of perfecting a particular 
component, but of working with any mundane issue that halted progress: the 
limited reach of divers, the shortcomings of position reference systems and 
computers, the limited durability of parts, or the limited ability to separate 
water and petroleum on the seabed, etc. Since dynamic positioning and, 
particularly, subsea production equipment were systemic in nature, they 
could not evolve in isolation. Subsea production systems relied on advanced 
maintenance and drilling techniques; deepwater drilling and maintenance 
would be less feasible without dynamic positioning – these and other 
deepwater techniques had to evolve in tandem and in concert with e.g. 
seismic technology and floating production.24  
 
The reverse-salient notion has been criticised for implying a degree of 
consensus as to the direction and nature of technological advance. 25  As 
                                                     
22 For a comparison of theory on institutions and theory on technological systems, 
cf. the introduction in Harald Rinde, "Kontingens og kontinuitet : Framveksten av 
stiavhengige organisasjonsmønstre i skandinavisk telefoni", (Ph.D., Det historisk-
filosofiske fakultet Universitet i Oslo, 2004). 
23 Cf. the introduction in Hughes, Networks of power: Electrification in western 
society, 1880-1930.  
24 Virginia Acha and John Finch, "Paths to deepwater in the international petroleum 
industry" (paper given at DRUID Summer conference on creating, sharing and 
transferring knowledge, Copenhagen, 18 May 2003). 
25 David Hounshell, ‘Hughesian History of Technology and Chandlerian Business 
History: Parallels, Departures and Criticis’, History and Technology, 12 (1995) 205-
224. 
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applied to deepwater technology, that is a fair criticism. Unlike Hughes’ 
system-building entrepreneurs, we encounter people with limited control of 
their environments although at times they managed to set developments in 
motion. Progress was uneven, often slow, and not necessarily part of any 
master plan. A hobgoblin of the mind sometimes suggests radical new 
practices must originate with spectacular leaps and conscious plans – that big 
effects must have big causes. Historians frequently find that technological 
development may be slow and decompose into a large number of 
unspectacular improvements. Nathan Rosenberg, for example, makes the 
point rhetorically by asking who invented the ship. 26  His inquiry into 
technological and economical change emphasises the cumulative effect of 
numerous incremental improvements. Similarly, in the case of deepwater 
technology there were certain big advances such as the research done by 
Shell Oil around 1960, but these breakthroughs were followed by a series of 
improvements. 
 
* * * 
 
Technology apart, this thesis traces the shaping and organization of a 
supplier industry.  When treating such topics, the works of Alfred Chandler 
are hard to ignore. 27 Even those critical of his work frequently gravitate 
towards his subject 28  – how the business dynamics within firms differ 
markedly from economists’ perception of the economy, how large 
centralized combines achieved economics of scale and scope in 20th-century 
American capitalism, how hierarchies and management rather than trading 
                                                     
26 Cf. Rosenberg, Inside the black box, who refers to S. Colum Gilfillan, Inventing 
the ship: A study of the inventions made in her history between floating log and 
rotorship: A self-contained but companion volume to the author's "Sociology of 
invention" (Chicago: Follett, 1935). 
27 The central works are Alfred D. Chandler, The visible hand: The managerial 
revolution in American business (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977); Alfred 
D. Chandler and Takashi Hikino, Scale and scope: The dynamics of industrial 
capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1990); Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy 
and structure: Chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1962). 
28 On the impact of Chandler and the critique, cf. Richard N. Langlois, "The 
vanishing hand: The changing dynamics of industrial capitalism ", Industrial and 
corporate change, 12, no. 2 (2003): 351-358. An early observation to the same 
effect, cf. Louis Galambos, "What have CEOs been doing?" The Journal of 
Economic History, 48, no. 2 (1988): 243-258. On how Chandler has affected 
Norwegian business history, cf. Knut Sogner, "Recent trends in business history", 
Scandinavian economic history review 45, no. 1 (1997): 58-69. 
27 
 
and contracting shaped outcomes. Chandler used the oil industry as a 
prominent example of vertical integration, from upstream exploration to 
downstream retailing.29 According to Chandler, superior coordination made 
vertically integrated companies more efficient than their smaller competitors. 
The work of Chandler broadly corresponds with transaction cost economics 
and the work of Oliver Williamson, who emphasised the ability of integrated 
firms to reduce transaction costs, e.g. the costs of specifying contracts, 
identifying suppliers, the risks of agency and other neglected costs of market 
transactions.30 Much the same argument appears in the work of David Teece 
on why firms that innovate may have to “secure a prior position in 
complimentary assets” if the nature of their innovation is systemic – where 
imitation is easy a competitor may well reap the benefits from the work of 
the innovator. 31  These and other influential scholars have provided 
influential theories to explain how integration made firms innovative and 
efficient. 
 
Since the 1990s, scholars writing in the Systems of Innovation (SI) tradition 
have continued to explore the role of non-market coordination in the 
economy. Work originating with this research programme looks to alliances, 
networks and industrial cooperation rather than actions of individuals and 
stand-alone companies. 32  SI stresses that companies do not innovate in 
isolation but are part of a system where companies, universities, banks and 
                                                     
29 The establishment of Standard Oil is a case used by Chandler, cf. Chandler, 
Strategy and structure.   
30 For Williamson’s original work, cf. Oliver E. Williamson, "The economics of 
organisation: The transaction cost approach", American Journal of Sociology, 87 
(1981): 548-577. For an assessment of how his work reflects on Chandler and vice 
versa, Charles Perrow, "Markets, hierarchies and hegemony" in The essential Alfred 
Chandler: Essays toward a historical theory of big business, ed. Thomas K. 
McCraw (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988), 432 ff.  
31 David J. Teece, "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for 
integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy", Research Policy, 15 (1986): 
285-305; David J. Teece, "Technological change and the nature of the firm" in 
Technical change and economic theory, ed. Giovanni Dosi, et al. (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1988), 256-288. 
32 For a principled discussion of the variance that exists in business organizations, 
whether they are labelled hierarchy or market, cf. Gary G Hamilton and Robert C. 
Feenstra, "Varieties of hierarchies and markets: An introduction" in Technology, 
organization and competitiveness: Perspectives on industrial and corporate change, 
ed. Giovanni Dosi, David J. Teece, and Josef Chytry (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998). 
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other components interact with each other and the wider environment. 33 
Innovative combinations frequently occurred, not in a given component of 
the system such as a firm, but where firms met to share qualitative 
information, not just information on price and volume. In the words of Bengt 
Åke Lundvall, innovating firms exchange visual handshakes – a paraphrase 
of Chandler’s visible hand and Adam Smith’s invisible hand.34  
 
The works of Chandler, Lundvall and others are less helpful in explaining a 
disappearing hand.35 The innovations traced by this thesis coincided with a 
shift towards more market coordination and less use of hierarchies within 
firms and between firms. If Chandler showed how managerial coordination 
could foster economic development, I am concerned with showing how the 
opposite could hold true, particularly how initiative migrated from 
governments and oil companies to the realm of independent suppliers such 
as Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (KV), a weapons and engineering conglomerate. 
KV then disintegrated into composite parts such as Albatross AS (dynamic 
positioning) and Kongsberg Offshore AS (subsea systems) that focused on 
control systems and systems integration. Numerous improvements occurred 
by replacing costly or sub-standard parts made at Kongsberg with better or 
cheaper parts made by sub-suppliers. In the industries we follow, the main 
thrust favoured the vertical disintegration of production or, much better, 
trading tasks.36 Our challenge is the opposite of Chandler’s task – to explain 
the favourable effects of less omnipotent management of businesses and 
industries. 
 
                                                     
33 Numerous articles attempt to summarize the essence of the systems of innovations 
approach, e.g. Charles Edquist, "The system of innovation approach and innovation 
policy: An account of the state of the art" (paper at DRUID, Aalborg, 2001); for an 
influential collection of works, cf. Richard R. Nelson, National innovation systems: 
A comparative analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
34 Bengt Åke Lundvall, "National innovation systems – theoretical foundations and 
implications for economic development" (paper presented at Globelics Academy, 
Lissabon, May 2004). Chandler, The visible hand. Strictly speaking, Adam Smith is 
out of context – his invisible hand did not coordinate business, but rather resolved a 
moral dilemma by turning selfish action into virtuous outcomes that emerged from 
selfish action – but the metaphor has caught on as symbol of the price-setting 
mechanism as well. 
35 Inspired by Langlois, "The vanishing hand".  
36 The term “trading tasks” and a broad account of increasing specialization, cf. 
Gene M. Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, "The rise of offshoring: It's not 
wine for cloth anymore" in The new economic geography: effects and policy 
implications (Jackson Hole, Wyoming: 2006). 
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I have drawn some inspiration from those scholars of competitive strategy 
that attempt to reconcile transaction cost economics (widely defined to 
include the work of Chandler), with a different line of thought that centres 
on capabilities and competences. Business is difficult, this line of argument 
goes; that is why firms rarely are good at many things. In principle, a 
company should centre on what it does best, but if the comparative 
(dis)advantage is tolerable, a business may still rely on hierarchy rather than 
contracting. That is because transaction costs moderate the calculation. Such 
considerations are time specific and may change. Transaction costs may 
diminish or increase; internal capabilities may improve or deteriorate, and; 
potential suppliers may get better or worse at their task. When conditions 
change, so eventually will the industry architecture. The works of Michael 
Jacobides and other researchers in this emerging research programme 
acknowledge that new industries are often initially more integrated. New 
industries may suffer from a lack of competent suppliers and subsequently 
opt for vertical integration. 37  In due time, integrated companies may 
disintegrate in the face of lower transaction costs or a more capable supplier 
industry. 
 
A great strength of this approach is that it does not presuppose a market – or 
rather another firm capable of supplying the product or service in demand – 
and offers a link between innovation and company structure. Unlike 
transaction cost economics, which takes markets as a starting point and 
strives to identify why businesses nevertheless create hierarchies, researchers 
that look into industry architecture take hierarchy as the point of departure. 
Similarly, the emergence of a well-functioning supplier industry allowed oil 
companies to source deepwater technology.  
                                                     
37 The implications are outlined in a rare field-defining article, Michael G. Jacobides 
and Sidney G. Winter, "The co-evolution of capability and transaction costs: 
Explaining the institutional structure of production", Strategic Management Journal, 
26, no. 5 (2005): 395-413. An illuminating case is the emergence of specialist firms 
in banking, cf. Michael G. Jacobides, "Industry change through vertical 
disintegration: How and why markets emerged in mortgage banking", Academy of 
Management Journal, 48, no. 3 (2005): 465-498. Only somewhat later did the term 
industry architecture appear to define the issues in question, as outlined in Michael 
G. Jacobides, Thorbjørn Knudsen, and Mie Augier, "Benefiting from innovation: 
Value creation, value appropriation and the role of industry architectures ", Research 
Policy, 35, no. 8 (2006): 1200-1221. The quotes are drawn from Michael G. 
Jacobides, What does my research examine? [Faculty home pages] (London 
Business School, 2008 [cited January 2008]); available from 
http://faculty.london.edu/mjacobides/Research.htm. The authoritative starting point 
of transaction cost theory is Williamson, "The economics of organisation: The 
transaction cost approach".  
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* * * 
 
Sometimes a commercial logic is sufficient to explain the emergence of new 
business practices, but frequently the choices are constrained. There are rules 
to the game and those rules occasionally change. In discussing such changes, 
I rely in part on insights inspired by Douglas North and institutional 
historians. Not to be confused with “organizations”, institutions are quite 
analogous to the formal and informal rules in competitive sports. They 
include property rights, codes of conduct, customs and other structures that 
influence economic performance. Frequently, institutions serve to rise or 
lower transaction costs, but they are equally instrumental in the distribution 
of resources and rewards, e.g. allowing entrepreneurs to keep their gains.38 
Institutions underpin the allocation of resources and rewards. Supported by 
habit and interests, institutions are a source of continuity and are not easily 
altered. Where institutions are shared in society at large, they create 
coherence in the economy, as observed in studies of business systems and 
varieties of capitalism.39 Several sections in this thesis aim to explain how 
institutions served to conserve technological choices and how the wide 
adoption of deepwater technology depended on institutional change. 
 
If shared institutions explain coherence, diverging institutions may explain 
variety. In Chapter 3 of this thesis I aim to show how the institutional 
framework differed between oil and shipping. Norwegian shipping 
companies provided the offshore oil industry services such as drilling, 
diving, construction and supply, but seemed to obey a different set of rules 
than oil companies. Shipping was a capitalist endeavour in the genuine 
                                                     
38 Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the nature of institutions, cf. 
pp. 3 ff; on institutions and economic change, cf. pp. 118 ff.  
39 In the work of Peter Soskice and David Hall, we learn how capitalism comes in 
two flavours: liberal and coordinated market economies. The liberal version is 
dominant in Anglo-Saxon countries, the coordinated version in e.g. Scandinavian 
countries, Germany and Japan. The first relies mainly on markets to allocate labour 
and capital, the second on negotiation, consensus and coordination among 
participant firms. The first kind is frequently credited with rapid response, the 
second with long-termism. Each generates wealth, but the strengths of one cannot 
easily be combined with the strengths of the other; each is supported by a set of 
complementary institutions that serve to reinforce each other. For example, a fluid 
capital market may not easily coexist with inflexible labour markets, cf. Peter Hall 
and David Soskice, "An introduction to varieties of capitalism" in Varieties of 
capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage, ed. Peter Hall 
and David Soskice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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meaning: “an economic system characterized by private or corporate 
ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private 
decision, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are 
determined mainly by competition in a free market.”40 Neither characteristic 
fitted the oil industry on the Norwegian shelf in the 1970s. 
 
When contrasting practices in the oil industry and the shipping industry I 
sometimes refer to a particular subset of institutions: mentalities (“systems 
of values, ideas and beliefs”) or business cultures complete with myths and 
symbols. The approach bears a resemblance to the recipe of Kenneth 
Lipartito, who stresses how culture is integral to decision making and 
correspondingly important when studying innovation. 41  The same basic 
observation is central to Amar Bhidé’s theory of venturesome consumption.42 
It is of lesser importance, the argument goes, who invents or manufactures 
this or any other piece of equipment; success occurs where people are 
inclined to buy and implement new ideas. These “downstream” activities are 
essential to economic progress. If the attitude of customers affects 
innovation, it may help explain why dynamic positioning quickly found 
applications among venturesome customers while subsea production systems 
met with concerns and risk aversion in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
  
                                                     
40 The term “capitalism” seems a little awkward when applied to a sector, but 
accurately captures the direction of the shift. Capitalism, according to Merriam-
Webster, is “an economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership of 
capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision, and by prices, 
production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition 
in a free market”. 
41 Kenneth Lipartito, "Culture and the practice of business history", Business and 
economic history, 24, no. 2 (1995). 
42 Amar Bhidé, "Venturesome consumption, innovation and globalization" (paper 
presented at ‘Perspectives on the performance of the continent's economies’, Venice, 
San Servolo, 2006). 
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Figure 3) Useful concepts – a summary 
 Oil paradigm Shipping 
paradigm 
Useful concepts 
Technology  Technology integral 
to operations – 
frequently as 
infrastructure (e.g. 
fixed Condeep 
platforms and 
pipelines) 
Technology 
external to the 
business – 
moveable, tradable 
and not 
necessarily owned 
by the user (e.g. 
ships and drilling 
rigs) 
Technological 
style, momentum, 
reverse salient 
Industry 
architecture  
Vertical integration 
allowing control of 
technology 
development and 
resources 
Highly specialized 
companies in a 
value chain 
Industrial 
architecture, 
transaction costs, 
firm capabilities, 
trading tasks 
Coordinating 
principles  
Corporatism, plans 
to ensure the 
different parts work 
in concert 
Prices allocate 
resources in a 
competitive 
market; volunteer 
cooperation 
Institutions, 
capitalism, 
venturesome 
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employees; risk 
tolerance 
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1.3 A select historiography 
If concepts sprawl, the volume of writing that in some way adds to our 
understanding of the oil economy is equally extensive. I have been able to 
rely on an extensive research literature on structural change in the economy, 
innovation, and developments in the oil and shipping industries. The 
selection referred below deals only with work that combines these three 
areas and how they relate to each other. 
 
There is a substantial body of prior research into the complex relationships 
between Statoil, Norwegian industry and the state – and its implications for 
such issues as labour relations and technological style. Moreover, this 
research is fairly coherent, not least because of the generalizing talents of 
Professor Francis Sejersted, a doyen of Norwegian economic history, and his 
ability to unite people who have diverse reasons to dislike the oil-industrial 
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complex – a large and powerful industry tightly connected to politics.43 The 
term captures an opaque institutional framework, partially market-oriented, 
partially government-controlled, and in many respects a law unto itself in the 
1970s and 1980s. Semantically, the notion of an industrial complex traces 
back to Dwight Eisenhower, who in his 1960 farewell address chose to make 
his compatriots aware of a close alliance between officers, politicians and 
industry. Eisenhower thought the military industrial complex was at odds 
with fundamental freedoms; it escaped control due to the magnitude of its 
tasks, the resourcefulness and determination of the industry, and the non-
transparent conditions in which it operated. The Norwegian oil economy 
sported similar qualities: tight alliances between oilmen, researchers, 
politicians and industry in pursuit of large-scale technological projects with 
strategic implications.44  
 
The industrial-complex school has delivered a set of useful studies of 
technological choices on the Norwegian shelf. Most strive to reclaim 
technology on behalf of the social sciences; their work shows a keen 
awareness of the interests that shaped technology and emphasize how 
technology does not appear in a fixed shape from above, nor from the 
laboratory, but is shaped by culture and society.45 As for specific studies, 
Sejersted is a prominent contributor, as is Odd Einar Olsen. Much work pays 
homage to Gunnar Nerheim’s detailed outline of various field developments 
in the 1970s. Nerheim is credited with coining the phrase “Norwegian Style” 
to describe a succession of large gravity platforms built in concrete, each 
                                                     
43 For an overview, cf. Francis Sejersted, Systemtvang eller politikk: Om utviklingen 
av det oljeindustrielle kompleks i norge (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1999). This 
essay elaborates on work published in Oljevirksomheten som 
teknologiutviklingsprosjekt, ed. Odd Einar Olsen and Francis Sejersted (Oslo: Ad 
Notam Gyldendal, 1997). The term ”oil-industrial complex” occurred in the late 
1980s in debate articles, cf. Yngve Nilsen, En felles plattform? Norsk oljeindustri og 
klimadebatten i norge fram til 1998, Acta humaniora nr 97 (Oslo: Senter for 
teknologi, innovasjon og kultur Unipub, 2001). 
44 Ben Baack and E. Ray, "The Political Economy of the Origins of the U.S. 
Military-Industrial Complex", Journal of Economic History (June 1985). 
45 For a philosophical comment on technological determinism, cf. Håkon With 
Andersen, "Manna fra himmelen: Om teknologihistorie og teknologideterministisk 
historie", Arbeidsnotat / Norsk elektronikkindustri 1945-1970; 25, (Oslo: 1986). For 
a particular study, cf. Odd Einar Olsen and Ole Andreas Engen, "Et teknologisk 
system i endring: Fra norsk stil til internasjonale ambisjoner" in Oljevirksomheten 
som teknologiutviklingsprosjekt, ed. Francis Sejersted and Odd Einar Olsen (Oslo: 
ad Notam Gyldendal, 1997). 
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large enough to be self-contained. 46  As for the decline and fall of the 
Norwegian Style platform, I have learned much from Ole Andreas Engen, 
who provides a very useful chronicle in the introductory chapters in his 
Ph.D. about the 1990s NORSOK programme.47 A sociologist by training, 
Engen fits in the broad tent of research that analyzes developments in the 
light of a Norwegian oil-industrial complex – as does the excellent work on 
labour relations offshore by Helge Ryggvik and others.48 
 
This author shares the same liberal concern that has troubled historians of 
business, economy, technology and politics. The only slight discomfort 
originates with the remarkable coherence of findings in the literature – a 
unity that partly reflects a shared institutional background and collaborative 
work on various oil-related projects where the works of one leans on the 
works of another to form a compact guard. I hope to add to this literature by 
going beyond the focus on institutional change and pointing to a creative 
response among large and small companies that sought a share in the oil 
bonanza. I point to an innovative undercurrent that ran contrary to 
mainstream initiatives pioneered by the government, Statoil and large oil 
companies – particularly how a shipping paradigm reshaped the oil industry, 
not only its technology but also its mentalities and organization. 
 
* * * 
 
The business-history tradition allows discretion for individuals and 
companies, although historians that treat oil-related business rarely fail to 
mention the tight institutional framework that shaped this sector of the 
                                                     
46 Gunnar Nerheim, cf. Tore Jørgen Hanisch and Gunnar Nerheim, Fra vanntro til 
overmot, vol. 1, Norsk oljehistorie (Oslo: Leseselskapet, 1992); Gunnar Nerheim, 
En gassnasjon blir til, ed. Francis Sejersted, vol. 2, Norsk oljehistorie (Oslo: 
Leseselskapet, 1996). 
47 The historical developments are captured in the work of a non-historian on 
(changing) development styles, cf. the introductory chapters in Ole Andreas Engen, 
"Rhetoric and realities: The norsok programme and technical and organisational 
change in the Norwegian petroleum industrial complex", (Dr. polit, University of 
Bergen : RF - Rogaland Research, 2002). 
48 With regard to labour related issues, the authoritative work is Helge Ryggvik, Else 
Wiker Gullvåg, and Marie Smith-Solbakken, Blod, svette og olje (Oslo: Ad notam 
Gyldendal, 1997). The subject is also covered in Marie Smith-Solbakken, 
"Oljearbeiderkulturen: Historien om cowboys og rabulister" (Dr.art. thesis, 
University of Trondheim, 1997). 
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economy. Alas, the official Statoil history forsakes this opportunity,49 but 
there is a substitute in three volumes about Norsk Hydro. This semi-private 
industrial conglomerate touched most major crossroads in the development 
of oil and gas offshore Norway, 50  frequently questioning the policies of 
Statoil. Consequently, Hydro’s history highlights the prevailing attitude on 
the Norwegian shelf. 
As with Hydro, shipping companies took part in the oil business without 
fully conforming to the common orthodoxy. There are numerous accounts of 
shipping companies, but the literature provides little in terms of synthesis. 
Anecdotal studies of individual shipping magnates and family-owned 
shipping companies flourish, many pointing to the entrepreneurial nature of 
the founders, but few attempt scholarly analysis. 51  The best single 
introduction to Norwegian shipping may be the history of a classification 
society, Det Norsk Veritas (DNV), written with a keen eye on the industry’s 
institutional framework.52 Some memoirs provide oversight.53 Furthermore, 
several useful studies from the Norwegian School of Economics and 
                                                     
49 Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of black gold : Statoil 1972-2002 (Stavanger: Statoil, 
2002). 
50 Einar Lie, Oljerikdommer og internasjonal ekspansjon: Hydro 1977-2005, vol. 3, 
Hydros historie 1905-2005 (Oslo: Pax, 2005) and Finn Erhard Johannessen, Asle 
Rønning, and Pål Thonstad Sandvik, Nasjonal kontroll og industriell fornyelse: 
Hydro 1945-1977, vol. 2, Hydros historie 1905-2005 (Oslo: Pax, 2005). 
51 For a review of the literature, cf. Arild Marøy Hansen and Atle Thowsen, 
Sjøfartshistorie som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt, vol. 3, Etterkrigshistorisk 
register (Bergen: LOS Senteret, 1994). Books written after 1994 seem to concur 
with the established pattern with rather few thorough business histories. A recently 
established programme for historical research headed by Professor Even Lange at 
the University of Oslo aims to provide synthesizing work. For some of the better 
shipping histories, cf. Tore Jørgen Hanisch and Liv Jorunn Ramskjær, Firmaet 
sigval bergesen, stavanger under vekslende vilkår 1887-1987 (Stavanger: Dreyer 
bok, 1987); Gunnar Nerheim and Bjørn Saxe Utne, Under samme stjerne rederiet 
peder smedvig 1915-1990 (Stavanger: Peder Smedvig A/S, 1990). 
52 Håkon With Andersen and John Peter Collett, Anchor and balance: Det norske 
veritas 1864-1989 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1989). 
53 A useful insiders’ account, but hardly unbiased, is John O. Egeland, Eventyr og 
virkelighet i skipsfartens tjeneste (Oslo: Stenersen, 1984); John O. Egeland, Vi skal 
videre norsk skipsfart etter den annen verdenskrig: Perioden 1945-1970 (Oslo: 
Aschehoug, 1971). 
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Business Administration in Bergen map the ups and downs of the industry 
from an economic perspective.54  
 
As for the supplier industries, there is an uneven picking. The shipbuilding 
industry – much of which later shifted to building oil installations – has been 
the subject of thorough and inspiring studies, although the best studies do not 
stretch much beyond 1980 and deal mainly with traditional shipbuilding.55 
As for the industry at Kongsberg, Kongsberg Gruppen ASA has initiated a 
history of the Kongsberg industry.56 The official inquiry into the troubles of 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk offers some useful information, 57  as do a few 
books written to celebrate anniversaries and achievements in the various 
companies that succeeded KV.58 Knut Sogner has studied marine electronics 
in general and the activities of Simrad in particular.59 These studies cover 
technological developments, but also wider changes in business, e.g. the 
perspectives of owners and managers respectively. As a background for 
Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore, these studies provide a valuable 
foundation. 
 
                                                     
54 For a useful point of departure, cf. Stig Tenold, "Skipsfartskrisen og utviklingen i 
norsk skipsfart 1970-91", SNF-rapport, 45, (Bergen: Stiftelsen for samfunns- og 
næringslivsforskning, 2001).  
55 Two studies that stand out, but only touch upon the issue of oil, cf. Håkon With 
Andersen, "Fra det britiske til det amerikanske produksjonsideal: forandringer i 
teknologi og arbeid ved Aker mek. verksted og i norsk skipsbyggingsindustri 1935-
1970" (Ph.D., NTNU, 1986); Mjelva, "Tre storverft i norsk industris finaste stund: 
Ein komparativ studie av Stord Verft, Rosenberg mek. Verksted og Fredrikstad mek. 
Verksted 1960-1980". A history of ABB’s Norwegian operations is forthcoming, 
authored by Harald Rinde and Sverre Christensen at the Norwegian School of 
Management (BI). 
56 Several volumes are expected by 2014. Knut Øyangen covers 1945-1987. He is 
employed at the Norwegian School of Management (BI). 
57 KV-utvalget and Andreas Arntzen, "Kongsberg våpenfabrikk", NOU, 2, (Oslo: 
Forvaltningstjenestene Statens trykningskontor, 1989). 
58 Daling et al., Offshore kongsberg ; Hans Christian Erlandsen, Flygende pingviner: 
Historien om sjømålsraketten penguin (Kongsberg: Kongsberg Defence & 
Aerospace, 2003). 
59 Knut Sogner, En liten brikke i et stort spill : den norske IT-industrien fra krise til 
vekst 1975-2000 (Bergen: Fagbokforl., 2002); Knut Sogner, Fra plan til marked : 
staten og elektronikkindustrien på 1970-tallet, TMV skriftserie; 9 (Oslo: TMV-
senteret, 1994); Knut Sogner, God på bunnen: Simrad - virksomhet 1947-1997 
(Oslo: Novus, 1997). 
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* * * 
 
Appendix 11.12 lists archives and other sources I have consulted in my 
work. Among these are several indexed libraries containing such sources as 
conference proceedings and articles on specific topics. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
The chapters in this thesis are chronological. A new chapter starts, roughly, 
where the previous one ends. At times, the chronology of two chapters may 
overlap to allow a comprehensive discussion of certain subjects, but nothing 
rivals time as an organizing principle. The main strength of this structure is 
to consider what went on at Kongsberg in the light of developments in the 
environment and to allow a comparison of Albatross and Kongsberg 
Offshore. The costs include a need for the reader to switch attention between 
several subjects in a single chapter and a certain unevenness in the 
composition. In some early sections, Albatross is covered in more detail 
because it quickly evolved into a complete business; in some late sections, 
focus shifts to subsea systems while dynamic positioning was increasingly 
sold as part of comprehensive offerings.  
 
Chapter 2 (1960-1974) covers the invention of deepwater technology – in 
which Kongsberg played no part – and the subsequent diffusion of the 
technology to Norway during the early years of the Norwegian oil bonanza. I 
also sketch the institutional setting that covered oil and how Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk and Statoil shared values and key personnel.  
 
Chapter 3 (1974-1976) explains why Albatross quickly found a market while 
Kongsberg Offshore struggled to find outlets. I link the asymmetry, not to 
technology and factors internal to Kongsberg, but to the different nature of 
the recipients: shipping customers and oil companies respectively. 
 
Chapter 4 (1976-1984) shows how wider industry sentiments spilt across to 
business at Kongsberg and how Albatross evolved into a distinct business. 
Its flat and responsive organization contributed considerably to Albatross’s 
rapid success. 
 
Chapter 5 (1979-1985) traces developments at Kongsberg Offshore, and 
particularly a shift in procurement practices. The use of Engineering 
Procurement Construction contracts strengthened the role of supplier 
industry and paved the way for innovative practices. 
 
Chapter 6 (1984-1987) covers a collapse in oil prices and a collapse at 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. The Norwegian oil industry changed in ways that 
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annulled some of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk’s previous advantages, but also 
created a market for innovative, cost-efficient deepwater technology. 
 
Chapter 7 (1987-1991) covers a set of technological refinements that paved 
the way for our subjects’ return to profitability in the 1990s. 
 
Chapter 8 (1991-1996) shows how deepwater technology succeeded on the 
Norwegian market when Norwegian style platforms became impossibly 
uneconomical. 
 
Chapter 9 (1997-2007) explains how the conditions that made Albatross and 
Kongsberg Offshore innovative in the first place (cf. chapters 5 and 7) also 
paved the way for international expansion – particularly when procurement 
practices pioneered on the Norwegian shelf became global.  
  
Chapter 10 recapitulates the transformation that took place with a particular 
eye on innovations. 
  
39 
 
2 Birth of an offshore supplier industry, -1974 
 
By 1974, deepwater technology had become part of Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk’s offerings. The decision emerged in part from foresight, in 
part from chance and in part from a set of conditions that offered Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk a decent hand and a promising opportunity. 
 
In outlining the opportunity, some issues require discussion. If today it 
seems natural that oil companies source technology and services from a 
supplier industry, this division of labour was not self-evident around 1970. 
Oil companies (indeed any company) might choose to handle most tasks in-
house, but the offshore industry became fairly specialized with distinct roles 
for such firms as drilling companies and oil tool manufacturers. When oil 
was discovered, KV was also able to seize upon various initiatives to secure 
a role for Norwegian industry – most noteworthy the procurement policy of 
the state oil company, Statoil. Norwegian politicians and captains of industry 
moved to establish control, not only of resources, but also of procurement 
practices. The people in charge probably foresaw an industry fully controlled 
by Norwegians, but intended to exploit foreign investments and expertise as 
far as possible while assisting and building a national supplier industry. 
 
If deepwater technology was an opportunity, what made it an opportunity for 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk? I address the post-war rebirth of Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk and the weapon factory’s move into advanced research-based 
projects. Furthermore, I point to the close connection between the people 
that ran KV and the people that ran the Norwegian oil establishment. Finally, 
I address the mindset that made people at Kongsberg think not only about 
contemporary needs, but also about what technology would eventually prove 
useful in order to exploit oil in deep waters. 
 
2.1 Oil in Norway: rules of the game 
Initially, the oil business on the Norwegian shelf was largely a business 
matter, not a public concern. When the extent of the riches became clear in 
the early 1970s, the state became heavily involved – and so did Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk. Kongsberg helps reveal the nature of the supplier business 
that emerged in the early 1970s. 
 
All things equal, offshore oil exploration has been more costly than onshore 
production. In periods of easy supply, offshore oil exploration lagged 
behind, for example during the two decades from the late 1930s to the late 
1950s when the Middle East provided a steady source of oil even as demand 
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grew in the industrialized countries. Gradually, exporting countries managed 
to secure a larger reward, Middle Eastern supplies looked less secure, and 
the oil majors began to look seriously at oil offshore.60  
 
In the 1960s, the offshore industry moved closer to Norway. Following the 
discovery of gas in Groningen in 1959, oil companies took an interest in the 
North Sea. Out of caution rather than expectations, the Norwegian 
government established an institutional framework for oil exploration, 
claimed any resources as public property, and negotiated a division of the 
continental shelf along the median line. In 1965, a few consortiums received 
concessions to explore parts of the Norwegian shelf. The Ministry of 
industry asked for, and received, assurances that the oil companies would 
work out of Norway and give preference to “competitive” Norwegian 
offers. 61  In practice, the oil companies could work with whomever they 
preferred in this initial stage. 
 
In 1969, Phillips Petroleum, an American oil company, struck oil at Ekofisk, 
almost half way between Norway and Denmark. Amongst the beneficiaries 
were Norsk Hydro, a large industrial firm with ties to French industry and 
Elf. Hydro participated in the Petronord consortium that, in 1967, had 
swapped concessions with Phillips Petroleum and gained a 20 per cent share 
in the block that contained Ekofisk.62 The newly discovered field was the 
largest known oil offshore reserve at the time and these riches helped change 
the political climate in favour of more assertive national control. A Labour 
                                                     
60 Possibly the most informative approach to the oil economy from a company 
perspective, cf. A history of Royal Dutch Shell  (Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Joost Jonker and Stephen Howarth, Powering the hydrocarbon revolution, 1939-
1973 (2007). With regard to shifts in the 1950s, cf. the tome by Jonker and Howarth, 
Powering the hydrocarbon revolution, 1939-1973.  
61 In the first round of concessions (1965), the national preferences were handled 
through a gentlemen’s agreement. Beginning with the second round of concessions 
(1969), preferred treatment of competitive Norwegian suppliers was listed as a 
condition when blocks were awarded, cf. Jan Thorsvik, "Politikk og marked: En 
studie av norsk leveransepolitikk for oljevirksomheten" (Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Bergen, 1990), p. 47. The formalized coupling between oil concessions and jobs for 
Norwegian industry was written into the Petroleum Law in December 1972 (§54), 
cf. Mjelva, "Tre storverft", pp. 214-215. Initially, the law was pursued with restraint 
for fear of evoking arguments about protectionism and retaliation, but following a 
shipping and ship-building crisis in 1975, the decisions were applied vigorously, cf. 
Nerheim, En gassnasjon blir til, pp. 81ff. 
62 On the deal, cf. Johannessen, Rønning, and Thonstad Sandvik, Nasjonal kontroll 
og industriell fornyelse: Hydro 1945-1977.  
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government replaced a fractured coalition in March 1971 and submitted a 
white paper to parliament that foresaw the creation of a public oil company 
(Den norske stats oljeselskap, also known as Statoil) with capabilities similar 
to the integrated, multinational oil giants.63 The proposal faced no serious 
objection, partly because the sentiment was widely shared, and partly 
because the exact nature of the future regime was neither conceived nor 
communicated.  
 
A number of developments then made the 1971 shift truly radical. First, a 
fresh string of discoveries raised expectations. Frigg, close to Ekofisk, 
contained more gas than any known offshore field at the time. The yield of 
these fields was excellent: a single well could produce almost as much as the 
best Saudi Arabian wells, the most productive in the world.64 The 1973 oil 
price shock then underlined the strategic importance of the oil industry and 
quadrupled the spot price of crude.65 At the same time, ideology had re-
emerged to shape the political climate in Norway and to some extent 
globally: everywhere people held multinationals in less high regard.66 In the 
autumn of 1972, Norwegian voters turned down membership in the 
European Economic Community and the Labour government resigned. A 
general election in the autumn of 1973 returned the social democrats to 
power with support from radical socialists and Prime Minister Trygve 
Bratteli moved sharply to the left and introduced a series of dirigiste 
economic policies.67  
 
                                                     
63 For the proposition, cf. Innst. S. nr. 294 (1970-71) which responded to the 
government white paper dated 14 June 1971. The principles set forward in the white 
paper (the “ten oil commandments” are available on Wikipedia, cf.  
http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_10_oljebud. 
64 Svein A. Andersen and Øystein Noreng, "Industriell organisering i nordsjøen: 
Utfordringer i norsk petroleumvirksomhet", (Oslo: BI, 1997). 
65 For an excellent way of assessing nominal and inflation adjusted oil prices, cf. 
Tim McMahon, Historical crude oil prices (Financial Trend Forecaster, 2007 [cited 
April 2007]); available from 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp. 
66 Thorsvik, "Politikk og marked: En studie av norsk leveransepolitikk for 
oljevirksomheten". 
67 For three comprehensive accounts, cf. Harald Espeli, Industripolitikk på avveie : 
Motkonjunkturpolitikken og norges industriforbunds rolle 1975-1980 (Oslo: Ad 
Notam Gyldendal, 1992); Per Kleppe, Kleppepakke: Meninger og minner fra et 
politisk liv (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003); Francis Sejersted, Opposisjon og posisjon 
1945-1981 (1984). 
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One of the missions of Bratteli and Statoil was to ensure a role for 
Norwegian industry in the North Sea. In the early 1970s, when Ekofisk and 
Frigg were developed, Norwegian suppliers secured few assignments. A 
continuous boom in shipbuilding kept the engineering industry occupied. 
One may argue the industry lacked relevant skills to work offshore, but 
Norwegian suppliers also suffered from being outsiders amongst oil 
companies married to established procedures. New suppliers struggled to 
penetrate the hierarchal and centralized decision-making processes oil 
companies had erected to ensure professionalism - and avoid the risks of 
using untested local suppliers. The oil companies tended to make 
procurements based on closed bidding between pre-qualified suppliers, a 
procedure that required a considerable effort from any prospective bidder.68 
Norwegian politicians ached to address this handicap and Statoil possessed 
every means necessary to implement whatever the politicians wanted or 
whatever Statoil wanted. 
 
Statoil had a range of formal and arbitrary powers to orchestrate a supplier 
industry. The state-owned company got at least 50 per cent in every 
promising concession.69 These stakes allowed Statoil to act as principal and 
influence acquisition policies. Meanwhile, a set of special privileges 
protected the company from any downside and increased its potential upside. 
Statoil was exempt from paying the costs of exploration and, in concessions 
granted from 1974 to 1985, enjoyed the right to increase its share of a field 
in line with increases in production. In a very rich reservoir, Statoil could 
increase its share of investments and returns up to 80 per cent and the 
company looked set eventually to control a cash flow that equalled 30-50 per 
cent of Norwegian exports, 20-30 per cent of Norwegian investments, a fifth 
of state revenues and some 10-20 per cent of GDP.70 Besides, Statoil enjoyed 
excellent political connections. 
 
                                                     
68 Smeby’s private papers, Nils H. Lundberg and Tom Friedrich, 
"Petroleumsaktiviteter i norge: Behov for varer og tjenester", (Oslo: 
Industriforbundets Servicekontor, 1972), p. 12. 
69 On the power broking abilities of Statoil, see Hilmar Rommetvedt, Butikk eller 
politikk? Statoils roller i norsk oljevirksomhet, Rapport rf 24/91 (Stavanger: 
Rogalandsforskning, 1991). 
70 Figure 4) places the industry that Statoil looked set to control in perspective. For a 
contemporary observation, cf. Terje Osmundsen, Gjøkungen: Skal statoil styre 
norge? (Oslo: Dreyer, 1981). 
43 
 
Figure 4) Heartbeats: the impact of oil and gas on the Norwegian economy71 
 
2.2 Kongsberg moves into oil 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk had little experience in offshore, but the 
company’s manufacturing and engineering operations drew on a very wide 
range of skills and capabilities. The company had a certain foothold 
businesses as varied as machine tools, missiles, guns, automotive parts, 
computers and gas turbines. 
 
Many initiatives relied on Jens Christian Hauge, a lawyer with impeccable 
credentials from the armed wartime resistance. He became minister of 
defence in 1945, at the age of 30, and helped establish KV as a legal entity 
separate from the army.72 In 1952, upon leaving the Ministry of defence, Mr. 
Hauge joined the board of KV. He found a confidant in Bjarne Hurlen, an 
                                                     
71 The data behind this graph and a wealth of useful information about the 
Norwegian oil economy is available from Facts 2007 - the Norwegian petroleum 
sector (Ministry of petroleum and energy, 2007 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.npd.no/English/Produkter+og+tjenester/Publikasjoner/Faktaheftet/Fakta
heftet+2007/coverpage.htm. 
72 On the general sentiments that spurred the incorporation, see Olav Wicken, 
"Avslutning" in Elektronikkentreprenørene : Studier av norsk elektronikkforskning 
og -industri etter 1945, ed. Olav Wicken (Oslo: Ad notam Gyldendal, 1994); on the 
actual incorporation, cf. KV-board, box 1. 
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artillery captain who rose to become head of sales in 1953 and managing 
director three years later.73 In companionship with Hauge, he continued to 
dominate Kongsberg for more than 30 years. Hauge remained deputy 
chairman from 1953 to 1983 and legal council until 1987.74 Hurlen stayed on 
as managing director from 1955/56 until 1975 and then as working chairman 
until 1985.  
 
Turning KV into an advanced engineering firm was a momentous task. After 
the immediate post-war recovery, continuing production at the workshop 
was not an obvious choice, but Marshall Aid and the prospect of NATO 
assignments induced the government to invest in new equipment. The 
turnaround that followed relied on powerful personalities such as Hauge. 
 
In the first post-war decades, KV became part of a conscious effort to 
modernize Norwegian industry and the Norwegian armed forces. Hauge and 
Hurlen sought projects that fitted the vision of building an advanced machine 
tools industry. Such businesses, Hurlen believed, explained the success of 
advanced industrial economies such as Sweden, Germany and the United 
States. Conversely, the lack of a decent machine tool industry contributed to 
Norway’s comparative backwardness.75 The circle of modernizers to which 
they belonged tended to believe private industry could not be trusted to 
know their best interests with regard to investments in new technologies and 
modernization. Experience had told them that success and progress followed 
from consorted development efforts.76 
                                                     
73 Hurlen’s ascent is shown in the board minutes, cf. KV-board, box 2. On 10 
September 1953, the board involved the Ministry of defence to prevent his transfer 
to operative duty; on 30 October 1953, the board made him head of sales – against 
the votes of the employees’ representatives who considered sales a drain on the 
company’s resources. 
74 Hauge’s attachment to KV was evident, not only from his 30 years of service, but 
from his affectionate portrait of the company’s managing director, Bjarne Hurlen, 
see Jens Chr Hauge, Mennesker (Oslo: Tiden, 1989). 
75 The subject appear in a number of Hurlen’s speeches and articles, for example 
Næsset’s private papers, “Perspektiver i verkstedsindustrien”, speech by Bjarne 
Hurlen, at NTH, 30 October 1967.  
76 The sentiments of the modernizing politicians are a recurrent theme in the writings 
of Olav Wicken, see also Tore Grønlie, Statsdrift: Staten som industrieier i norge 
1945-1963 (Oslo: Tano, 1989). Hauge’s belief in planning industries is treated 
briefly in Olav Njølstad, Jens chr. Hauge: Fullt og helt (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2008), 
pp. 603 and 639. 
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During the long Labour reign from 1945 to 1965, Hauge gained key roles in 
strategic industries that caught his and the government’s attention - airlines, 
nuclear power, electronics and automotive. As minister of defence, he helped 
establish the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE) and the 
Institute for Atomic Energy (IAE), two institutions that sought to build on 
the rapid advances in military technology during the Second World War.77 
At the time, the main current of economic thinking in Norway centred on 
labour-, capital- and resource-based industries – in some contrast to those 
who argued the case for building research-based industries. 78 Hauge and 
Bjarne Hurlen, the officer he recruited to run KV, belonged to the latter 
camp. So did the technologically versatile director of NDRE, Finn Lied. 
 
Due to political privilege, and the industrial policy instigated by people close 
to Jens Christian Hauge, Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk built scale and scope. A 
number of new products arrived at KV from the United States, frequently by 
way of the defence research establishment, in what Njølstad and Wicken 
refer to as a “system of innovation”.79 Diffusion may be a better term for 
what went on in the initial search for new products. Hurlen opted for 
advanced projects, and the early post-war decades played to the strengths of 
companies with sufficient skills to act as agents of diffusion. Although we 
obviously risk belittling their effort – adapting American heat-seeker 
technology for the Penguin anti-ship missile, for example, required 600 man-
years at KV and NDRE80 – there is no denying the advantage of access to 
rockets, computers, inertial navigation and various oil-related technologies. 
At a micro level, KV displayed what economists frequently observed on a 
macro level: less advanced economies rapidly catching up by adopting and 
adapting technology and management techniques from more advanced 
economies. Economists believe the ability to capitalize on technology 
diffusion from the United States was the single most important contribution 
to growth in the Norwegian economy between 1950 and 1973.81 In 1960, the 
                                                     
77 Several essays by Olav Wicken cover the technology transfer, but the single best 
source is Olav Njølstad and Olav Wicken, Kunnskap som våpen: Forsvarets 
forskningsinstitutt 1946-1975 (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997). 
78 The macro-economist, of course, had no objections to advanced industry – the 
contrast was one of perspective. For a brief introduction, see the concluding chapter 
of Andersen and Collett, Anchor and balance: Det norske veritas 1864-1989, pp. 
253 ff. 
79 Njølstad and Wicken, Kunnskap som våpen.  
80 Ibid.  p. 137. 
81 Sverre Knutsen, "Staten og kapitalen i det 20. Århundre: Regulering, kriser og 
endring i det norske finanssystemet 1900-2000" (Oslo: 2005). Knutsen refers to a.o. 
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Norwegian GNP per capita was but 60 per cent of American levels, and 
labour was correspondingly affordable. 
 
Engineers gradually swamped KV’s organization from the late 1950s. They 
brought a set of values: engineering excellence became a value that 
“informed every single allocative decision taken within the firm. 
Engineering excellence was pursued strenuously, sometimes irrespective of 
time and cost constraints.”82 The general attitude that radiated from Hurlen 
down was one of technological risk-taking. KV did not perceive problems, 
or rather did not see problems as a reason to stop. Nobody was paralysed 
when a problem arose one could not immediately solve.83 People learned to 
settle everything apart from the actual novelty. When working with dynamic 
positioning, for example, the general thoroughness at KV helped to establish 
a proper running environment for the computer (back up, power supply, 
emergency power, cooling, etc) and an array of project management skills 
such as documentation routines and quality assurance routines. Besides, the 
engineers and technicians at KV maintained a rather generous and open 
attitude and there were few inhibitions to sharing information and 
experience.84 
 
In the early 1970s, the people that moved to secure the state’s interests in oil 
were the exact same crew that had previously worked to establish an 
advanced, research-based industry founded on military procurement. In 
1972, Finn Lied served as minister of industry. He chose Hauge as Statoil’s 
first chairman. Hauge hired Lied’s deputy, Arve Johnsen, as managing 
director. Everywhere, there were connections between the defence 
establishment and the new oil establishment. The people involved believed 
in similar ideals and probably drew similar conclusions as to what strategy, 
management and organization were suitable for the state oil company. 
 
                                                                                                                            
Anders Skonhoft, "Norsk vekst i internasjonalt lys: Etterkrigsperioden 1950-1988", 
Historisk tidsskrift, no. 2 (1994): 179-204. 
82 The quotation relates to another troubled engineering firm, the Rolls-Royce 
turbofan factory, but is equally fitting for KV. Olav Wicken, "Stille propell i 
storpolitisk storm: KV/Toshiba-saken og dens bakgrunn", Forsvarsstudier, 1, (Oslo: 
Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 1988). 
83 Interviews with Sælid, 12 October 2004, and Mr. Mathiesen, 13 October 2004. 
84 Interview with Corneliussen, 19 October 2004. 
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Figure 5) Liaison officers: defence figures in the oil industry 
 Role in the military 
industrial complex 
Role in the oil 
industrial complex 
Other connection 
Jens Chr. 
Hauge 
Minister of defence, 
1945-52; KV vice 
chairman, 1953-82, 
KV legal council, 
1955-87, founded 
NDRE and IAE 
Statoil chairman, 
1972-74 
Numerous tasks 
related to industrial 
policy; negotiated 
Volvo agreement85 
Bjarne 
Hurlen 
KV Managing 
director, 1955-75, KV 
chairman, 1975-85 
Entered into a 
number of 
businesses in the 
alliance between 
KV and Statoil 
Headed effort to 
establish a holding 
company for all 
state-owned 
enterprises; 
Chairman ÅSV 
Finn Lied Head of NDRE, 
1957-1971 and 1972-
1983. 
Minister of 
industry, March 
1971 - October 
1972, Statoil 
chairman, 1974-84 
Author of various 
government white 
papers; minister of 
industry, 1971-72. 
Arve Johnsen  Statoil managing 
director, 1972-87; 
Hydro manager 
before 1971 
Deputy to Lied at 
the Ministry of 
industry  
Henrik J. 
Ager-
Hanssen 
KV deputy chairman, 
1986-87; researcher 
and director at IAE, 
1957-71 
Statoil’s deputy 
managing director, 
1977-89 
 
Rolf Qvenild KV head of planning, 
1969-75; KV 
managing director, 
1979-87 
Head of KV’s Oil 
Division, 1975-79 
Nephew of Finn 
Lied 
Haakon 
Sandvold 
First employee at 
IFA; KV board 
member, 1968-81 
Hydro board 
member, 1977-89 
Managing director at 
ÅSV 
 
  
                                                     
85 An agreement to allow Volvo an important role on the Norwegian continental 
shelf in return for a stake in the car company. The Swedish shareholders rejected the 
agreement in January 1979. For details, cf. Olav Njølstad, Jens chr. Hauge fullt og 
helt (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2008). 
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In 1973, Hurlen announced his decision to seek business offshore. Other 
Norwegian engineering firms, most notably Aker and Kværner, made similar 
decisions years earlier.86 KV had a rather large portfolio of products even 
without an offshore branch – something that may have delayed the decision. 
Besides, Labour was back in government by 1973 with an ambitious 
programme that offered KV and Statoil a wide range of opportunities.87 
 
In the mid-1970s, there were few signs the people that governed KV and 
Statoil contemplated any natural limit to how extensive the state’s ambitions 
in industry should be. The impetus was on strengthening the state’s 
involvement as manifested in plans to establish a joint management structure 
for all publicly owned companies (Statlig forvaltningsselskap for industrien). 
Hurlen led the task force; Finn Lied participated and the retired Erik Brofoss 
(born at Kongsberg) worked behind the scenes alongside Jens Christian 
Hauge. Tonje Tveite, a historian who has researched the attempt, remarked 
on the outlook of this entourage. They saw the government as a perfectly 
normal industrialist. To them, state ownership and involvement was not 
good or evil, but natural. The question was a neutral one: what state 
intervention was the most efficient and rational. They did not think that 
state-owned companies would pursue interests and agendas of their own.88 
They did not think that national preferences might reduce the overall value 
of the Norwegian resource base, but rather believed exploitation 
presupposed a strong national presence. The people that ran Statoil probably 
foresaw an oil industry and a supplier industry fully controlled by 
Norwegians.89  
 
2.3 A peculiar industry architecture for offshore 
A number of concerns served to shape the offshore industry as it emerged in 
the early and mid-1970s. Political power rested with people that preferred an 
extensive role for public industry, but state companies lacked experience and 
trained men. At first sight, the division of labour between oil companies and 
suppliers on the Norwegian shelf came to resemble the practice in other 
                                                     
86 Interview with Qvenild, 29 September 2004. 
87 The ambitions were most explicitly stated in St.meld. 25 (Oljemeldingen), 
published in February 1974. 
88 Cf. Tonje Tveite, "Løve og skinnfell : En analyse av forsøket på å etablere et 
statlig forvaltningsselskap for industri 1967-1981", LOS-senter rapport, 6, (Bergen: 
LOS-senteret, 1993), pp. 103-105, 119-122. 
89 On the tactical considerations, cf. Helge Ole Bergesen and Anne Kristin Sydnes, 
Naive newcomer or shrewd salesman? (Bergen: Fritjof Nansen Institute, 1990). 
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offshore oil provinces – one where oil companies bought services from 
private businesses rather than relying on extensive vertical integration for 
numerous upstream activities. 90  However, while the industry architecture 
resembled a market for offshore goods and services, the practice was 
blurred. From 1973 onwards, Statoil became the mechanism for allocating 
resources and for building a national supplier industry. Competencies and 
cost-effectiveness counted, but less than nationality (being Norwegian) or 
affiliation (being close to Statoil and KV) or deprivation (having suffered 
setbacks that could lead to unemployment).91  
 
The large global oil companies, sometimes called the seven sisters, were 
vertically integrated businesses. They handled most tasks in-house, from 
exploration to the eventual retailing of gasoline. Offshore, however, the 
picture was more blurred. In the 1950s, oil companies working offshore 
shred some tasks and began buying services. An excellent study by Veldman 
and Lagers observes how it “became rare that an oil company would take 
responsibility for the construction of installations. Generally, they were 
merely concerned with the strategic development of know-how.” 92  Oil 
companies retreated somewhat from construction and a new sector of 
industry emerged, consisting of shipyards, engineering firms, seismic 
surveyors, pipe-laying firms, tugs, consulting engineers, etc. Offshore 
became a term that encompassed a set of tasks from geological and 
geographical surveys to exploration, production, infrastructure, and support. 
These operations were left to (sub)contractors that rarely operated in more 
than one subsector. This approach, which also became the norm in Norway, 
was remarkable: during the 1960s, other industrial sectors saw a shift 
towards vertical integration, and the onshore oil business performed an 
extensive set of tasks in-house.93 
 
The 1970s saw a reversion to more hierarchy in the offshore industry. 
Having come to rely excessively on external suppliers in the 1950s and 
1960s, the offshore oil industry began employing extensive internal 
bureaucracies to plan and oversee field developments. In Norway, field 
developments had just begun, and there was no useful comparison with early 
practices; the international engineering industry, on the other hand, noticed 
                                                     
90 On the established practice, cf. Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore.  
91 The practice is discussed in detail both in Nerheim, En gassnasjon blir til and 
particularly in Mjelva, "Tre storverft".  
92 Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore.  
93 Ibid.  pp. 86-89. 
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how oil companies became more risk-aversive in the face of rising oil prices. 
After the 1973 oil price hike, oil companies could afford more expensive 
field developments and the cost of potential mistakes multiplied.94 However, 
although oil companies working offshore reined in control in the 1970s, they 
continued to rely on a supplier industry for numerous tasks related to service 
and manufacturing. 
 
The foundation of a specialized Norwegian supplier industry had emerged 
before anybody had discovered oil on the Norwegian shelf. By 1969, various 
nascent industries had come forward to support the oil industry. Certain 
shipping companies had been pursuing offshore opportunities for almost a 
decade. They attempted to earn money in drilling and supply even before the 
North Sea countries agreed on how to split the continental shelf (in 1965). 
Although Norwegian firms had no privileged access at the time, 95  and 
although oil failed to raise high expectations, the shipping industry sensed an 
opportunity. A shipping magnate, Fred Olsen, went into drilling in the early 
1960s followed by colleagues Odfjell, Smedvig and Ugland. 96  These 
shipping companies, usually controlled by a magnate, had a knack for 
entrepreneurship. Risks and fluctuations were inherent in their business – 
besides, in the long post-war boom, being hesitant had been a losing 
proposition.97 In the 1960s, the main thrust of the business went into drilling 
and various activities that supported drilling, e.g. supply bases and 
                                                     
94 Concerns about increasingly centralized planning are cited in Joseph A. Pratt, 
Tyler Priest, and Christopher J. Castaneda, Offshore pioneers: Brown & root and the 
history of offshore oil and gas (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1997), p. 88. 
The authors link the new practices to high oil prices. 
95 Because of the impetus of attracting risk capital rather than allocating scarce 
Norwegian resources to a venture with substantial perceived risks, offshore profits 
were initially taxed more leniently than profits from onshore industry and the 
concessions were offered free of charge. Sejersted invites us to think of this early 
model as non-discriminatory. If there was any bias, it was foreigner-friendly. Cf. the 
chapter on a Norwegian “Sonderweg” in Francis Sejersted, Demokratisk 
kapitalisme, Det blå bibliotek (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1993). 
96 I trust the brief outline in Hanisch and Nerheim, Fra vanntro til overmot, pp. 231 
ff. 
97 There are many historical studies of individual shipping companies, but very little 
decent industry-level analysis. A good starting point would be Tenold, 
"Skipsfartskrisen og utviklingen i norsk skipsfart 1970-91", pp. 11, 38 and 55-57. 
Tenold reflects on risk taking and argues that the Scandinavian (and particularly the 
Norwegian) shipping industry had a high appetite for risk; many preferred short-
term contracts and markets with large fluctuations. 
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maintenance.98 In the actual oil industry, shipping companies played a less 
prominent role. Shipping magnates helped establish NOCO, a consortium 
aiming to work alongside experienced oil companies, but the venture failed 
to come across a viable find. Undeterred, the NOCO partners helped 
establish Saga Petroleum (1972), a privately held Norwegian oil company 
that eventually gained a role on the Norwegian shelf. 99 The foundation for 
an offshore industry was in place even before anybody had drawn oil from 
the Norwegian continental shelf. 
 
This specialized supplier industry gained some early successes. Aker, an 
engineering company in which Fred Olsen held a substantial stake, began 
building semi-submersible rigs according to specifications from oil 
companies in the early 1960s. Around 1970, the company designed a 
proprietary rig, the H3, with catamaran-type floaters and columns to support 
the drilling deck.100 The design did not depart considerably from existing 
gear; the novelty was rather in the fact that this design was “being offered by 
a group of shipyards and available to every interested contractor,” according 
to Veldman and Lagers. 101  In this perspective, success originated not as 
consequence of research and development, but as consequence of a 
productive division of labour between oil companies and suppliers. 
 
When Statoil became involved, the company seemed to expand into every 
step in the value chain including downstream. Initially, Statoil considered 
involvement in the supply industry and exploration in alliance with KV. By 
the early 1970s, seismic surveys had greatly improved the prospects of oil 
exploration. By analysing the echo from an explosion (onshore) or an air gun 
(offshore), seismic surveys revealed possible pockets of oil and gas deep 
below the surface. KV had a certain computer experience useful for 
analyzing data. Statoil and KV proceeded to set up a seismic company, 
Statex, in which each held 50 per cent of the shares. This company acquired 
technology and assignments from Geophysical Service Incorporated, a 
subsidiary of Texas Instruments.102 One problem for Statex was competition 
                                                     
98 The best documented is probably the effort of Smedvig, cf. Nerheim and Utne, 
Under samme stjerne rederiet peder smedvig 1915-1990.  
99 Egil Helle, "Saga i norsk oljehistorie" in Sagaen om saga, ed. Bjørn Glenne (Oslo: 
Saga Petroleum, 1997), p. 9 ff.  
100 The design was novel in 1971, according to Nerheim, En gassnasjon blir til, p. 
81. 
101 Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore, pp. 118-119. 
102 RA-Arntzen-Oil, Board reports dated 10 September 1973, 23 November 1973, 13 
May 1974 and 1 November 1974. 
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from Geco, a Norwegian company established in 1972 with computing 
experience from Computas and geophysics from Geoteam AS. 103  Hurlen 
apparently decided to brush the competitor aside. In December 1973, KV 
wrote a letter to Geco stating that Statoil and KV, acting in the best interests 
of the nation, intended to create a separate seismic company and that there 
would be no use for the services of Geco in seismic data processing, data 
mapping or data storage – but Statex would be interested in hiring its seismic 
vessel. Geco realized its exposed position, decided to negotiate, and 
eventually gained a share in a merged company.104 
 
For a few years, roughly from 1973 to 1975, KV enjoyed a right of first 
refusal when Statoil acted to establish Norwegian suppliers. The weapons 
factory regarded itself as a special partner of Statoil and the government – a 
player whose public ownership allowed a part in particularly delicate matters 
of great national importance. KV hoped eventually to become as 
instrumental to the Norwegian supplier industry as Statoil would be to the oil 
industry.105 A 1974 planning procedure at KV offered some insights into the 
sentiments of KV’s management. When contemplating opportunities in the 
oil business, KV mapped capabilities and deduced what products KV could 
supply to the offshore industry somewhat irrespective of competitors. 
Implicitly the planners assumed Statoil would brush aside or coerce 
domestic and foreign competition and invite KV to enter any markets in 
which its productive resources could be put to intelligent use.106 Supply and 
demand of products was only an implicit consideration – probably because 
these were within the control of Statoil and the authorities. This is not to say 
KV’s planning lacked any reference to what economists today call 
competitive advantage. Rolf Qvenild, the head of planning, did not intend to 
compete on fixed and floating structures – numerous yards were already in 
                                                     
103 Andersen and Collett, Anchor and balance: Det norske veritas 1864-1989, pp. 
32-33. Computas was the computing arm of a Norwegian classification society, Det 
Norsk Veritas. 
104 Olsen and Engen, "Et teknologisk system i endring: Fra norsk stil til 
internasjonale ambisjoner",  pp. 37-42. 
105 KV-Cor, box 242, Qvenild (KV) and Tømmeraas (Raufoss), 1974-78 long-term 
plan, revision dated 13 August 1974. The Norwegian text runs: “Bedriftene kan på 
utstyrssiden industrielt spille en like aktiv rolle som STATOIL kan på operatør og 
oljeselskapssiden.” 
106 KV-Cor, box 242, Qvenild (KV) and Tømmeraas (Raufoss), 1974-78 long-term 
plan, revision dated 13 August 1974. 
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this business, Kongsberg was far from the ocean, and he realized KV had a 
cost handicap that excluded the company from certain markets.107 
 
* * * 
 
KV and other prospective suppliers frequently found that advisory engineers 
working for the oil companies made crucial decisions that affected 
procurement practices. The oil companies that Statoil sought to copy 
employed large in-house engineering departments that worked in concert 
with independent engineering firms acting as main contractors for specific 
field developments. Many strategic decisions rested with the main contractor 
who made detailed designs and specifications for a presumably dumb 
manufacturer to perform.108  
 
Because the main contractor had considerable influence on procurement, 
Statoil and KV were intent on gaining a say. Alas, neither company had the 
necessary skills. Statoil’s need for technical consultants became particularly 
acute when planning for the Statfjord field began in late 1974. In Norway, 
there were few engineers with relevant experience and Statoil realized it 
would be impossible both to establish a large in-house engineering 
department and find a competent external contractor.109  
 
The international oil industry employed large engineering firms such as 
Brown & Root to devise field developments. Decisions made by these 
technical consultants, e.g. how to generate power, affected suppliers such as 
KV. Ideally, KV hoped to combine the role of supplier and technical 
consultant. More importantly, Hurlen loathed the thought of somebody else 
in this strategic position. 110  Alas, KV lacked the necessary skills and 
resources. KV employed fewer than ten engineers with relevant experience. 
Aker and Kværner had more offshore experience and employed 100 and 150 
qualified engineers respectively. 111   In December 1974, Hauge, Hurlen, 
                                                     
107 RA-Arntzen-Oil, KV board minutes, 10 October 1974. 
108 On the limited role of suppliers, cf. Nerheim, En gassnasjon blir til.  
109 The considerations are explained in some detail in Sveinung Engeland, 
"Ingeniørfabrikk på norsk: Oppbygginga av norsk petroleumsrelatert 
engineeringkompetanse" (Hovedoppgave, Universitetet i Oslo, 1995), pp. 86, 104-
115. 
110 KV-Cor 245, Qvenild, minutes from 5 December meeting with AS Raufoss 
ammunisjonsfabrikker and Statoil, 10 December 1974. 
111 Engeland, "Ingeniørfabrikk på norsk".   
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Johnsen, Qvenild and Lied met privately and decided KV would not become 
engineering contractor in its own right, but participate in a consortium of 
capable Norwegian engineering firms.112  
 
Securing a role for KV meant taming the ambitions of Aker and Kværner. 
Both were big in shipbuilding and both became more attracted to oil and gas 
when a shipping crisis hit Norwegian yards in the winter of 1974-75. The 
two had sufficient resources to act as a main contractor, and considered 
establishing a consultancy. For political reasons, Aker was intent on 
including KV, and the three companies discussed the establishment of a 
technical consultancy during the winter of 1975. When they failed to agree, 
Statoil refocused their minds by promising to make a national engineering 
champion main contractor for a second platform on the Statfjord field – a 
task that presumably would involve three to four million hours of 
engineering work, handsome margins and a great deal of learning. Statoil 
then retreated from the scene, while KV became correspondingly active.113  
 
The outcome of these deliberations was Norwegian Petroleum Consultants, a 
public-private partnership with ten equal partners.  Half the participants were 
aligned with KV, including Norsk Jernverk A/S and A/S Årdal og Sunndal 
Verk, in which Hurlen was chairman and Norconsult, a coalition of 
independent advisors. Aker, Kværner and associated companies joined 
hesitantly, recognizing how power was allocated. This was abundantly clear 
at the first general meeting of shareholders on 27 November 1975, where 
Hauge overruled objections to the participation of Norconsult. Hauge 
advised the people in the room to be “practical” – KV and Aker supported 
Norconsult, he assured, and for the rest he did not “give a damn”.114 He then 
called the minister of industry, Ingvald Ulveseth, and had him come over to 
sign the papers.115 
 
                                                     
112 KV-Cor 245, Qvenild, minutes from 5 December meeting with AS Raufoss 
ammunisjonsfabrikker and Statoil, 10 December 1974. 
113 Noted by Engeland, "Ingeniørfabrikk på norsk",  pp. 33-34. 
114 Ibid., p. 50, with reference to the notes of Kristian Walentin (Kværner). The 
objections were voiced by Høyer-Ellefsen, a construction company that had enlisted 
Norconsult in the planning of concrete structures for Ekofisk, Brent and Beryl, and 
feared Norconsult would share confidential information about Condeeps with the 
broader engineering community. Norconsult was a collection of independent 
advisors that had problems gaining business on their own and a matching interest in 
coordination. 
115 Interview with Bjørn Barth Jacobsen, 9 September 2004. 
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* * * 
 
The control of design was important to secure a field development style 
that required particular deliveries. As for procurement decisions, KV 
gained considerably from Statoil’s direct influence. Statoil repeatedly 
assisted KV in selling products that struggled to find applications offshore, 
for example the KG 2. This radial gas turbine yielded 1600-2200 
horsepower, insufficient for most industrial applications, particularly large 
offshore platforms that required as much power as a city. 116 Usually, the 
platforms employed turbines with high efficacy, usually aircraft-derived 
turbines that burned fuel at very high temperatures and required less space 
than conventional gas turbines. Nevertheless, applying proper pressures, KV 
managed to sell 60 low efficacy KG2 gas turbines to Phillips for use chiefly 
at the Ekofisk field. 117 Statoil also helped KV establish a control system 
business with a solution named SCADA (supervisory control and data 
acquisition). Around 1970, KV had developed some applications for 
Norwegian electrical power transmission. Drawing on this experience, KV 
offered to develop a control system for Frigg, but Elf rejected the offer; the 
price for this untested product was 50 per cent above what the competition 
could offer.118 On Statfjord, the operator (Mobil Petroleum Company) asked 
for a solution to collect key data on the platform, convey these to the 
control room operators, and submit status reports and statistical analysis to 
a headquarters onshore in real time. Siemens had the expertise, but Statoil, 
which owned a majority stake, pushed to split the task between KV and 
Siemens. 119 KV was to handle tasks in the control rooms offshore and 
onshore, while Siemens handled decentralized monitoring and data 
                                                     
116 As of 2005, the declining production on Ekofisk and adjacent fields in the 
southern parts of the North Sea required 1 TWh of energy, mostly electricity 
generated on the platforms, while offshore oil in general required 17 TWh 
(Fellesrapport Oljediretkoratet-NVE, Kraftforsyning fra land til sokkel: muligheter, 
kostnader og miljøvrikninger, Oslo, November 2002). In 2005, Norwegian 
households and farms consumed approximately 35 TWh (NVE, Kraftbalansen i 
Norge mot 2020, Oslo, June 2005). Ekofisk, in proportion, consumed as much 
power as a population of 128,000. 
117 KV-Cor 245 Qvenild, minutes from 5 December meeting with AS Raufoss 
ammunisjonsfabrikker and Statoil, 10 December 1974. 
118 RA-Arntzen-Oil, Q3 report, 1 November 1974. 
119 On the Scada development, cf. Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg, chapter 11. On 
the sale, see RA-Arntzen-Oil, Board report dated 7 November 1975. 
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gathering.120 Both in gas turbines and control systems, KV had considerable 
background, but Statoil’s assistance was nevertheless essential. 
 
In some cases, KV used its political contacts to secure a presence. 
Maintenance was one example. Statoil was being groomed to become the 
field operator one day, which meant the company needed maintenance 
services and thus enlisted KV. In 1974, KV established a small electronics 
workshop at the Costal Center Base (CCB) near Bergen in which Statoil 
bought the majority of the shares the following year. The base already 
housed a maintenance operation, a small yard run by Wisbech Refsum, a 
Finnish company. KV thought this operation would be useful and got in 
touch with the Ministry of industry. The ministry duly denied Kone OY, 
the parent company of Wisbech Refsum, a concession to run the workshop 
and forced the Finns to sell the yard to KV.121  
 
Although it was common for multinational oil companies in the 1970s to 
court trusted suppliers, Statoil’s relations with KV were of a particularly 
close nature. With Statoil’s backing, KV coerced and replaced domestic and 
foreign competition in fields such as maintenance, seismic surveys and 
engineering. On the supplier market that emerged, success and failure were 
not necessarily a product of price and quality. Statoil, the state oil company 
that took upon itself to implement a policy of national preferences, held 
extensive formal and arbitrary powers and a corresponding discretion in 
deciding which suppliers would succeed and which would fail. Particularly 
in the aftermath of the 1974-75 shipping crisis, Statoil and the public 
authorities channelled orders to Norwegian yards in need of employment. 122  
 
One part of the offshore industry remained largely unaffected by Statoil and 
public policy. The shipping companies that began supplying services such as 
drilling, tug boats and anchor handling in the 1960s continued their thriving 
business. Shipping apart, much of the nascent Norwegian supplier industry 
relied heavily on a political economy orchestrated by Statoil. 
 
                                                     
120 Smeby’s private papers, SCADA brochure dated April 1977 in marketing folder 
dated September 1977. 
121 Interview with Leif Fjellin, 4 October 2004. Mr. Fjellin, who worked with 
Wisbech Refsum prior to the acquisition, stayed on as KV’s local manager. 
122 The practice is discussed in detail both in Nerheim, En gassnasjon blir til and 
particularly in Mjelva, "Tre storverft". 
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2.4 Two technological systems at odds 
When Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk entered the offshore industry, most of the 
initiatives originated with the company’s partnership with Statoil and various 
attempts to leverage existing products and services. Statex and Norwegian 
Petroleum Consultants were examples of the former, gas turbines and 
SCADA of the latter. In addition, Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk made a couple of 
technology bets on its own account. These related to deepwater technology. 
 
Initially, offshore oil exploration was but the continuation of onshore oil 
exploration. The first recorded attempt is instructive. It took place in 1887 
outside California, where oil surfaced on the ocean. A wildcatter noticed the 
spill, built a wharf, placed a drilling rig on the pier, and struck oil. Before the 
age of decent seismic surveys, oil companies sunk offshore wells where an 
onshore field met water, for example along the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Gradually oil exploration crept further ashore and piers gave way to fixed 
platforms. In 1947, Kerr-McGee built the first platforms out –of sight of dry 
land. Many more followed where the water was comparably shallow.123 The 
offshore procedure resembled the onshore procedure with fixed installations 
playing a crucial role. These platforms acted as a miniature island. 
 
Exploratory drilling was a particular challenge when working offshore. Until 
the 1950s, exploratory drilling required a fixed platform whether the well 
was dry or not. This changed in the 1940s and 1950s with the invention of 
floating and movable drilling rigs.124 The reach of these rigs was limited, in 
part because heave (vertical wave-induced movements) frustrated the 
working of blowout preventer (BOP) equipment. These stacks played a 
critical role. If in heavy drilling mud could not keep the pressurized oil and 
gas from forcing their way towards the surface, the BOP would choke the 
stream. In worst case, the BOP could ram a plate of steel through the well 
like a guillotine. In the late 1950s, engineers working with Shell devised a 
BOP stack for use on the seabed. Using hydraulic cables, a floating rig 
would be capable of closing down a well regardless of waves and weather. 
Consequently, subsea BOPs enabled oil companies to drill at much greater 
depths. 
  
                                                     
123 Acha and Finch, "Paths to deepwater in the international petroleum industry". In 
the late 1960s, more than 800 platforms were deployed in the Gulf of Mexico. 
124 Floating barges with rotary rigs data back to the early 20th century, but the more 
capable jack-ups arrived only in the 1940s and semi-submersibles in the late 1950s; 
cf. Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore.  
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It took only a small step of imagination to realize that if BOPs would work 
on the seabed, so might a Christmas tree. A Christmas tree is a stack of 
valves that control the flow of oil and gas from a working well – somewhat 
like a tap on a volcano. Such pressure-containing equipment is essential to 
oil production. In the early 20th century, oilmen in Louisiana would 
occasionally place a Christmas tree in a swamp and the valves could in 
principle work underwater. Another early subsea development (1943) 
involved a gas field beneath Lake Erie where ice formation frustrated the 
working of fixed platforms. Rather, the field developer chose to place valve 
trees on the seabed ten metres below the surface and let divers open and shut 
the valves that governed production.125 In 1961, Shell devised a Christmas 
tree that could be remotely controlled using hydraulic pressure. At about the 
same time some 20 subsea-completed wells were being installed offshore 
California as tiebacks to the Conception field platform. 126  By the early 
1960s, oil companies were capable of exploring and producing oil without a 
fixed platform placed directly above the well. 
 
Blowout preventers and subsea Christmas trees were important components, 
but oil exploration in deep waters required much more. It is probably fruitful 
to think of the field as a technological system consisting of a host of 
interdependent components. Within this system, Shell played a central role. 
Applying the language of Thomas Hughes, we might say Shell acted as a 
system builder or an inventor-entrepreneur.127 The company worked in every 
offshore oil province apart from the Gulf of Mexico: Lake Maracaibo 
(Venezuela), off the Californian coast, in Cook Inlet (Alaska), outside 
British Borneo and Brunei, in the Gulf of Paria (between Venezuela and 
Trinidad), off Nigeria, and in the Persian Gulf near Qatar. Shell’s engineers 
collected experience from numerous operations and particularly the CUSS 
consortium (an acronym for Continental, Union, Shell and Superior – four 
oil companies). Based on this experience, Shell gathered or applied for 160 
                                                     
125 Smeby’s private papers, ”Subsea oil well completion and production systems: a 
current evaluation”, Dixon Associates, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. 
126 The single most informative text is Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore. 
Developments are also cited in various accounts of early subsea developments, e.g. 
Underwater wellheads (Offshore Energy Center, 2006 [cited April 2007]); available 
from 
http://www.oceanstaroec.com/fame/1999/underwaterwellheads.htm.Fitzsimmons, 
Ian. Sizing up the next 25 years Atlantic Communications, 2004 [cited April 2007]. 
Available from 
http://www.oilonline.com/news/features/oe/20040801.Sizing_u.15509.asp.   
127 Cf. footnote 19 on page 19. 
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patents covering basic innovations such as a semi-submersible drilling rig, a 
dynamic positioning system, a sea-floor wellhead and guide base, a mooring 
system for drilling rigs, and remotely controlled blowout preventers. Some 
concepts were entirely new such as an underwater “manipulator”, today 
called a remotely operated underwater vehicle (ROV); such free-swimming 
robots were first used to operate connectors and override valves at the 
seafloor outside Santa Barbara, California.128 Shell also introduced through-
flow-line (TFL) well service – the practice of pumping tools down to the 
well in order to perform maintenance operations.129 By 1961, Shell knew 
how to build every component of a technological system capable of draining 
oil and gas without the depth limitations of fixed platforms.  
 
For a while, Shell kept its deepwater technology secret. At the time, the most 
promising area for deepwater development was the Gulf of Mexico. In 1962, 
the US government opened large tracts of the Gulf to the oil companies. 
Shell bid for much deepwater acreage, but Shell was frequently the only 
bidder, which meant the government could exercise an option not to honour 
these bids. This triggered a rethink in Shell. The company decided 
competition was necessary for future prospects; besides, the company 
believed real money rested with figuring out where the oil was, not figuring 
out how to produce it.130  Hence, in 1963 the company changed tracks and 
decided there was more to earn from licensing than from attempting to 
maintain a monopoly on deepwater technology. Shell offered to share its 
insights in a three-week course. Despite an entry ticket of USD100 000, 
Exxon sent ten and Mobil twelve participants. According to one participant, 
the perspectives were “overwhelming”.131 
 
Subsea processing was still not in place. In some cases, as with the gas from 
below Lake Erie, little processing was required. Elsewhere, oil companies 
had to install compressors, pumps, metering systems and storage tanks to 
separate oil, gas, sand and water. Because such operations could not be done 
underwater in the 1960s, output from most subsea wells was connected (tied 
back) to a nearby platform.  
 
                                                     
128 Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore, pp. 86-89. 
129 Derrick Booth, "North Sea: Testbed for advanced subsea production", Noroil, 
June 1983, 37-49  
130 Tyler Priest, The offshore imperative: Shell oil's search for petroleum in postwar 
America, vol. 19, Kenneth e. Montague series in oil and business history (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), p. 96. 
131 Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore, pp. 83-86. 
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Figure 6) Options for the offshore oil industry, 1960-75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the fixed platform remained the natural choice 
for the great majority of offshore field developments. Platform technology 
improved and offset the need for subsea systems. 132  Their one great 
drawback, however, was the ability to exploit oil in very deep waters. Fully 
two-thirds of the Norwegian Shelf lay in depths in excess of 200 metres. By 
1973, nobody had developed any field at such depths. 133  Although oil 
companies and their suppliers devised very large platforms to handle 
deepwater, there was a limit to how deep the platforms could reach – at least 
if economy was part of the equation. Around 1972, Shell - the company that 
most actively pursued new approaches offshore - accurately predicted that 
fixed platforms would be able to handle 1000 feet (300 metres) of water by 
1980 and then level off (see figure below).134 To explore and extract oil from 
beyond this limit, oil companies had to think differently. Looking thirty 
years ahead, Shell (again accurately) predicted oil production from below 
2500 metres of water with the assistance of subsea systems. 
 
                                                     
132 Priest, The offshore imperative: Shell oil's search for petroleum in postwar 
America.  
133 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby, ”A Norwegian activity on subsea completion / 
deep water production systems”, 11 November 1975. 
134 Smeby’s private papers, Dixon Associates to KV, ”Subsea oil well completion 
and production systems: a current evaluation”, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. 
The sketch from Shell Development Company referred on the figure is drawn from 
this document. 
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Figure 7) Shooting stars observed in 1972: projected capability135 
 
While Shell first shared knowledge with competing oil companies, their 
patents and technology soon disseminated to independent suppliers. 
Aerospace companies were among the first to explore deepwater technology. 
In the 1960s, subsea systems looked set to evolve rapidly. Naïve optimism 
surrounded subsea oil production: man had flown to the moon, so why not 
conquer the deep? 136  A number of the companies that developed subsea 
technology around 1970 had been working on the Apollo project: Raytheon, 
Hughes, Boeing and Lockheed all looked into subsea systems. They were 
attracted to the prospect of sponsors as rich as the US government and the 
opportunity to apply hydraulic controls and advanced engineering in a new 
field.137 The design and manufacturing of subsea Christmas trees seemed to 
fit their capabilities. The weapons factory at Kongsberg shared these 
sentiments. 
                                                     
135 Ibid. 
136 "Subsea technology into the realistic years: The contemporary era of subsea 
production", Noroil, 1981, p. 31 ff. 
137 Ibid. 
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2.5 California to Kongsberg: the diffusion of deepwater technology 
At the onset of the Norwegian oil age, Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk was 
nowhere close to inventing radical new technology, let alone technological 
systems. The weapons factory was at ease with complex technology, 
however, and its engineers reasoned there would be multiple applications for 
deepwater technology. With regard to subsea systems, this realization was 
homegrown and pursued with insights from well-placed advisors. With 
regard to dynamic positioning, KV’s eventual interest owed a lot to a 
crusading professor of cybernetics, Jens Glad Balchen.  
 
In the early 1970s, it seemed quite likely there would be a market for subsea 
systems on the Norwegian shelf. The first oil to reach the market from 
Ekofisk flowed from four subsea wells. Phillips Petroleum had hooked these 
on to a jack-up rig with some processing equipment and used the subsea 
system to gain experience with the field and to earn badly needed cash for 
the forthcoming field development. The wells produced a total 28 million 
barrels of crude and a tidy profit. When proper platforms arrived, Phillips 
Petroleum shut down the subsea wells and freed the jack-up for other 
assignments.138  
 
While the subsea system was still operating at Ekofisk, KV got in touch with 
Lockheed Petroleum Services. Both companies were defence contractors and 
had joined forces to deliver command and control systems for the Norwegian 
armed forces in the 1960s.139 KV hoped to license Lockheed’s technology 
for dry subsea systems - systems that allowed submarine-borne technicians 
to work in atmospheric chambers on the seabed.140 Dry systems never gained 
a wide following, but raised high expectations in the early 1970s. 
 
KV failed to reach agreement with Lockheed, but continued to investigate 
subsea technology. In the summer of 1973, KV commissioned a report from 
                                                     
138 T.I. Pedersen et al., "Introduction to subsea production systems" in Subsea 
Completion systems (Kristiansand: Norwegian Society of Chartered Engineers, 
1983). The technological choice is outlined in Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore 
pioneers, p. 226. 
139 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild to Hurlen (copy Aasland), 1 July 1976; KV-board, 
minutes, 23 November 1973. 
140 Smeby’s private papers, Dixon Associates, ”Subsea oil well completion and 
production systems: a current evaluation”, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. The 
only operational dry well at the time was a Lockheed system operated by Shell Oil 
offshore Louisiana. A competitor, Subsea Equipment Associates Limited (SEAL) 
was about to launch another solution. 
63 
 
Don E. Dixon, a firm of consultants that greatly improved the Norwegians’ 
understanding of subsea systems. 141  Dixon advised against building 
proprietary technology and argued in favour of working with an established 
supplier. Oil companies, Dixon argued, held an aversion to unproven 
equipment and suppliers. This conservatism stemmed partly from the dire 
consequences of failure and partly from an inability to make informed 
decisions: procurement people usually had extensive field experience, but 
insufficient theoretical knowledge to assess new and unproven products.142  
 
Just as KV was considering Dixon’s recommendations, Ole Magnus Smeby, 
the appointed product manager for subsea systems, received a phone fall 
from Cameron Iron Works Inc. In 1922, the founder of this Houston-based 
company had invented the blowout preventer.143 The company expanded into 
valve trees and became a recognized leader with some 50 per cent of the 
market for pressure-containing oil equipment, critical components that 
fetched a high price in the market. Cameron needed more capacity to supply 
wellheads for new rigs during the 1973-74 building boom and considered 
enlisting KV as a contract manufacturer.144 For KV, the real attraction with 
Cameron was not the prospect of some lucrative fabrication assignments, but 
the opportunity to form a partnership with a leading supplier of subsea 
equipment – including blowout preventers mounted on the seabed. 
Cameron’s global market share loomed above 40 per cent. 145  Smeby 
travelled to Houston, visited five leading subsea providers, and eventually 
                                                     
141 Smeby’s private papers, ”Subsea oil well completion and production systems: a 
current evaluation”, Dixon Associates, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. This 
document also provided insights in the thinking of Shell and other forward-looking 
oil companies; cf. p. 57. 
142 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to KV Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: 
activity status and future prospects”, 29 June 1981; the same observation can be 
found in Hanisch and Nerheim, Fra vanntro til overmot.  
143 Shantell DeHart, “Cameron: A humble philosophy, a company growing,” 
Business News, 15 December 1997, accessible at www.businessnewsonline.com. 
144 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby, memorandum on 28-31 January visit to US oil 
equipment manufacturers, 15 March 1974. 
145 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby, ”A Norwegian activity on subsea completion / 
deep water production systems”, 11 November 1975. 
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concluded Cameron was the best partner available.146 Besides, Cameron was 
not yet committed to work with any of KV’s engineering rivals.147 
 
Like KV, Cameron was bureaucratic and conservative, somewhat unused to 
cooperation, and held its proprietary capability in high regard. Despite these 
similarities, or maybe because of them, the two parties signed a 
memorandum of understanding. 148 KV started out as a sales channel and 
contract manufacturer of wellhead equipment while pursuing additional 
opportunities. In 1976, Cameron agreed in principle to let KV serve as a 
“contractual partner” if Cameron sold subsea equipment to Norwegian 
customers or customers on the Norwegian shelf.149  
 
* * * 
 
The diffusion of dynamic positioning took a different path, but the 
application of basic military technology offers a link of sorts. Dynamic 
positioning builds on the theories of Norbert Wiener who, during the Second 
World War, worked on ways to let radar systems automatically aim anti-
aircraft artillery. The thought struck him that these systems resembled the 
working of a nervous system, and he was inspired to formulate a general 
theory (cybernetics) on processes that interact with themselves. In effect, he 
broadened people’s perspective on matter; prior to Wiener, engineers 
focused almost exclusively on solids, energy and mechanics.150  
 
Dynamic positioning was invented to solve a particular problem relating to 
Project Mohole. In 1960, nobody had sunk a well at water depths beyond 
200 feet (ca 70 metres). American scientists nevertheless proposed to drill a 
hole 151  in the middle of the Pacific Ocean where the Earth's crust was 
                                                     
146 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to KV Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: 
activity status and future prospects”, 29 June 1981. 
147 Interview with Qvenild, 29 September 2004. 
148 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to KV Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: 
activity status and future prospects”, 29 June 1981.  
149 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report, 26 April 1976.  
150 For an introduction, I trust http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics and another 
Internet based encyclopaedia: J Rosnay, History of cybernetics and systems science 
(Principia Cybernetica, 2000 [cited October 2005]); available from 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBSHIST.html. 
151 Some of the challenges are described in Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore 
pioneers.  
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comparably thin. They hoped to collect a core sample from the intersection 
between the crust and mantle (the Mohorovičić Discontinuity) near Hawaii 
where the water was 15,000-18,000 feet deep. When the project got going, 
with American public funding, pundits dubbed it “geology’s moon 
landing”. 152  The attempt itself was discontinued after some years, but 
nevertheless succeeded in boosting offshore drilling. 
 
One pressing challenge faced by Project Mohole was to keep its drillship 
(CUSS I) in position. Anchors would not work because the length of the 
mooring lines allowed for intolerable drift due to wind, current and waves. 
Drifting while drilling risked losing the equipment, and the Mohole team had 
to find a way to stay in position. Using four directional propellers (thrusters), 
the crew attempted to manoeuvre the CUSS I in relation to radio buoys and 
subsea beacons positioned around the drillship; each submitted signals. 
When the signals appeared equally strong, the CUSS I was in exact position. 
Since navigation was difficult and tedious, somebody thought of letting a 
computer detect the signals and guide the thrusters. Although the attempt 
failed, Shell Oil learned from the experience and decided to attempt 
computer-aided dynamic positioning on its Eureka coring vessel. In 1961, 
the company introduced an analogue automatic position controller able to 
retain a ship’s position and heading. It worked, more or less.153 
Figure 8) Cuss Control: how dynamic positioning works154  
 
                                                     
152 Project Mohole, 1958-1966 (National Academy of Sciences 2005 [cited 
November 2005]); available from http://www.nas.edu/history/mohole/. 
153 Hubert Faÿ, Dynamic positioning systems: Principles, design and applications 
(Paris: Éditions Technip, 1990), pp. 7-8.  
154 Ibid., p. 52. 
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KV pursued subsea systems, but with regard to dynamic positioning, the 
company itself was being pursued. Jens Glad Balchen was a professor of 
technical cybernetics at NTH155 (the Norwegian Institute of Technology in 
Trondheim), and a firm believer in dynamic positioning. His conviction 
dated from 1967-68. At the time, he spent his sabbatical at his Alma Mater 
in Santa Barbara. While teaching a class, he encountered two students 
involved in a project to equip the Glomar Challenger with dynamic 
positioning. The ship was being equipped to collect core samples and 
eventually provided substantiating proof of plate-tectonics theory. 156 
Professor Balchen became convinced a similar technology could be useful in 
the North Sea and that the concepts for dynamic positioning could be 
improved upon.157 
 
Professor Balchen thought he could improve upon the approach of the 
Challenger, but he also borrowed extensively. AC Electronics, a research 
branch of General Motors later known as Delco, considered using inertial 
navigation to get a position reference for the ship. First developed to guide 
the flight of intercontinental missiles, inertial navigation relies on spinning 
discs manufactured with immense accuracy to calculate the impact of forces 
upon an object. 158  The task resembles somewhat the effort involved in 
assessing the acceleration of a car by watching the surface of a coffee mug; 
if one were able to measure the tilt of the surface, one could decide whether 
the object was accelerating or decelerating, in what direction, for how long 
and at what speed. Knowing where one started out, one should then be able 
to calculate one’s present position. In principle, the same approach would 
work on a boat. Although Balchen was no strong advocate of inertial 
navigation, he argued the case for Kalman filtering, a novel statistical 
technique for such advanced tasks as improving the navigation systems on 
                                                     
155 The Norwegian Institute of Technology is referred to by its Norwegian acronym 
NTH (Norges Tekniske Høgskole) was established as an independent technical 
univsersity in 1910. Following a merger in 1996, the institution was renamed 
University of Science and Technology (Norwegian acronym NTNU). 
156 Max J. Morgan, Dynamic positioning of offshore vessels (Tulsa, Oklahoma: The 
Petroleum Publishing Company, 1978). 
157 Interview with Balchen, 15 September 2004; interview with Sælid, 12 October 
2004 
158 For a fascinating introduction, cf. Donald Mackenzie, Inventing accuracy: An 
historical sociology of nuclear missile guidance, Inside technology (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). 
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board the Apollo shuttle. 159   A Kalman filter is an algorithm, for most 
practical purposes a piece of software designed to provide accurate 
information out of inaccurate data and update a "best" estimate for the state 
of a system as new, but still inaccurate, data pour in (see Appendix 11.5. on 
page 301).160  
 
Back in Trondheim, the Californian ideas reached an unusually vibrant 
scientific community at the institute of technical cybernetics. Professor 
Balchen, who headed the institute, focused on the application of technology. 
In this, he differed from most European Universities in which the 
cybernetics faculties focused on theory, 161  but resembled the outlook of 
enterprising researchers, the “electronics entrepreneurs” that frequently had 
had their sentiments shaped by participation in British defence-related 
research.162  His knowledge of cybernetics was undisputed, but there were 
better theoreticians around him and people more adept at coding an 
application. Professor Balchen’s undisputable talent, however, was his 
ability to inspire students and emphasise the need to get things done. In 
short, he was an arch-typical entrepreneur. With creativity and authority, but 
not necessarily a corresponding instinct for profit, his ventures were a 
“delightful way of losing money” according to one sympathetic follower.163 
 
In the early 1970s, Balchen made repeated attempts to commercialise 
dynamic positioning. He got several students to write their diplomas on 
Kalman filtering and other issues relevant to dynamic positioning. 164  He 
                                                     
159 Kalman filtering was a technique first outlined in a famous 1960 paper Rudolf E. 
Kalman, "A new approach to linear filtering and prediction problems", Transaction 
of the ASME - Journal of Basic Engineering (1960): 33-45. For a thorough 
mathematical introduction, cf. Greg Welch and Gary Bishop, "An introduction to the 
Kalman filter" (Chapell Hill, North Carolina: 2004). Laymen will be better off 
reading Peter S. Maybeck, Stochastic models, estimation, and control, ed. Richard 
Bellman, vol. 141, Mathematics in science and engineering (San Francisco: 
Academic Press, 1979). 
160 Barry A. Cipra, "Engineers look to Kalman filtering for guidance", SIAM News 
26, no. 5 (1993). 
161 On the distinguishing features of cybernetics at Trondheim, cf. interview with 
Nils Albert Jenssen, 14 October 2004.  
162 Stig Kvaal, "-og vi var alle frelst på den nye teknikken" : Servoentusiastene og 
visjonen om et moderne norge, Ifim-paper ; 1994:13 (Trondheim: Sintef Ifim, 1994). 
163 Interview with Jacobsen, 9 September 2004.  
164 Arne Asphjell and Anne Kristine Børresen, Institutt for teknisk kybernetikk: 50 år 
(Trondhjem: NTNU, 2004). 
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visited KV with plans to manufacture dynamic positioning from 1971 on, 
but felt “rejected by way of committee”.165 Not easily deterred, he came back 
to KV and kept marketing dynamic positioning through meetings and 
conferences. Somehow, eventually, a pre-project emerged, officially from 
January 1974.166 At the time, the initiative was a joint effort that involved 
two research institutes (the institute of technical cybernetics in Trondheim 
and scientists from Christian Michelsen’s Institute in Bergen) and two 
marine electronics companies (Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk and Simrad, a 
Horten-based company where Kåre Hansen led a team that worked on a 
hydroacoustic position reference system). The most competent potential 
supplier was not part of the effort: Norcontrol in Horten. Norcontrol had 
delivered some 400 ship-automation projects between 1965 and 1976 and 
had been exploring dynamic positioning in more minute detail than KV had 
been. Norcontrol aimed to develop a proprietary dynamic positioning (DP) 
system.167 
 
In September 1974, none of the parties had yet to assume ownership of 
dynamic positioning; the modus was one of burden sharing rather than the 
pursuit of opportunities. They met as equal partners in an unfunded project. 
They agreed to exchange information and knowledge, sketch a pre-project, 
and continue seeking out sources of finance from public funds. Both KV and 
Simrad were potential manufacturers of various pieces of hardware. Both 
NTH and CMI were interested in the software components of the system. 
KV assumed responsibility for the mapping of resources and overall project 
administration, but throughout the meeting, Balchen spoke of the 
competencies of “Norway Inc.” and on the need of the parties to make 
decisions and work as if they were a company.168  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
KV pursued products and services with Statoil, on behalf of Statoil or with 
the support of Statoil. By 1975, KV’s portfolio of oil-related products and 
services ran like a list of concessions from Statoil and public agencies. If KV 
and Statoil were ever concerned about the absence of a market and the 
danger of misallocating resources, such concerns failed to materialize in 
                                                     
165 Interview with Balchen, 15 September 2004. 
166 KV-Cor 239, KV to Utviklingsfondet, request for grants, 10 November 1975. 
167 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
168 KV-Cor, box 136, Jahnsen to various recipients, meeting minutes, 30 September 
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writing. Probably, the people in charge at Statoil and KV saw no distinction 
between the interests of Statoil, the interests of KV and the interests of the 
country. It was difficult and maybe futile to identify who acted on behalf of 
whom; the connections between the two were very close and the people in 
charge frequently held overlapping roles. Many of KV’s initiatives involved 
advanced technology, but rarely innovative technology.  
 
In the 1970s, the industry architecture of the Norwegian supplier industry 
resembled the market-based approach seen elsewhere – where offshore oil 
relied on independent suppliers. Procurement was tightly controlled, 
however. Statoil was in a position to influence procurement directly, and 
used this opportunity extensively. Industry building and political 
constituencies played a larger role in determining the allocation of tasks than 
technical prowess and ingenuity.  
 
While most of KV’s oil ventures originated in an alliance with Statoil, 
dynamic positioning and subsea systems were based on a belief that North 
Sea oil exploration required novel techniques. As a point of departure, it is 
useful to reflect on similarities between the two techniques. Neither 
originated at Kongsberg. Both relied on American inventions pioneered by 
Shell outside California in 1960-61, both were unproven in the markets and 
both faced competition from established technologies (mooring and fixed 
platforms). The young engineers at Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk who worked on 
these deepwater technologies had a broadly similar background and a joint 
management. Both technologies were attractive, from an engineer’s point of 
view – they triggered the imagination and pointed to new ways of extracting 
oil from the deep oceans. Both technologies seemed to fit the capabilities of 
the defence industry. The two business lines originated at the same time, 
from the same town and the same corporate structure. Both technologies 
were systemic in the sense they worked not on their own but in interaction 
with a technological system.  
  
The most remarkable difference related to initiative. If anything, managers at 
the defence and engineering conglomerate believed subsea production 
systems looked set to find many applications; the interest in subsea 
technology seemed home-grown while dynamic positioning was pushed by 
people outside KV. Apart from that, there is little in the early history of 
either initiative to indicate these two initiatives would evolve in very 
different directions – that is before we take into account the very different 
nature of the shipping and oil paradigms. 
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3 Slow track and fast track, 1974-1976 
Deepwater technology diverged from the various products that KV pushed 
with Statoil’s assistance: these business lines required innovative customers 
that applied unproven technology in search of excess revenues or cost 
savings.  
 
Subsea systems looked very promising from an engineer’s point of view, but 
functionality was not the only concern that shaped field developments. 
Statoil favoured concrete deepwater structures (Condeeps) that allowed the 
use of (comparably) conventional technology from established Norwegian 
suppliers. When the Condeeps had secured a following, advisory engineers, 
shipyards, unions, regulators and politicians worked to preserve their stake 
in the dominant design. The concept was copied from field to field with only 
slight modification. No other style of field development managed to draw 
attention – and subsea technology lingered. In this setting, KV’s relationship 
with Statoil was of less assistance. Statoil pushed for Condeeps on every 
field, with little time to spare for subsea solutions; the 1970s went by 
without a single attempt at subsea completions.  
 
Dynamic positioning, however, soon found a market. Albatross dynamic 
positioning found customers in the shipping industry among the various 
offshore companies that provided drilling, maintenance, service and support. 
These firms embraced dynamic positioning. Most suppliers originated with 
shipping companies whose attitude to experimentation, sourcing and risk 
stood apart from the oil industry. They adopted innovation quickly and 
embraced experimentation wholeheartedly. 
 
The slow adoption of subsea technology and the speedy acceptance of 
dynamic positioning resembled the modus operandi of their respective 
customers. 
 
3.1 A slow start to subsea sales 
On 1 January 1975, KV set up a separate oil division.169 Unlike other 
divisions at KV, the Oil Division lacked a portfolio of products. It was an 
almost empty shell set up to pursue emerging opportunities. Its first head 
was Rolf Qvenild, a calm, aloof and analytical man. He started out with 
nothing but a few offices in the KV headquarters and three product 
                                                     
169 For an overview of KV’s divisions and changes in the corporate structure, 1973-
86, cf. appendix 11.3. 
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managers: Ole Magnus Smeby in charge of O-3 Marine Systems (subsea), 
Bjørn Jahnsen at O-6 Vessel Automation (dynamic positioning) and Bjørn 
Barth Jacobsen in a freelance position. Subsea systems seemed to have the 
brightest future.  
 
KV soon got started making subsea components for drilling rigs. In this line 
of work, KV simply rented its production capacity to Cameron. Cameron 
priced its products somewhat higher than the competition, preferred quality 
to costs and was unconcerned about productivity at KV.170 KV gained some 
research and development contracts, and Cameron was generally supportive 
of these, particularly when the development in question could enlarge the 
market for Cameron equipment.171 In 1975, KV made 25 valve blocks and 
foundations for BOPs and dry trees. KV shipped these huge parts to Leeds 
where Cameron’s British factory assembled valve trees. 172 Because many 
wellheads failed quality control and were discarded, KV decided to invest in 
a new lathe. Either way, exceptional costs swallowed the exceptional 
margins.173 The main promise of this venture was to position KV for work 
on subsea production systems. 
 
Industry experts believed the capabilities of the subsea production systems 
were set to improve rapidly. The technology to install and operate a subsea 
system in water depths of up to 1000 metres seemed reasonably close in 
1973. If the rewards were high enough, several oil companies could pull 
through such developments. 174 The technology received a boost from the 
1973 oil price shock, which made subsea production cost efficient under 
certain conditions, particularly by reducing time-to-market. 
 
One reason to be optimistic on behalf of subsea systems was the high costs 
of conventional field developments in the North Sea. In the 1970s, offshore 
fields in the North Sea were roughly 25 times more expensive to develop 
                                                     
170 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to KV Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: 
activity status and future prospects”, 29 June 1981. 
171 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to KV Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: 
activity status and future prospects”, 29 June 1981. 
172 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby, proposal for long-term cooperation with 
Cameron Iron Works Inc, 5 February 1975; RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report, 9 
September 1975. 
173 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board reports dated 24 April 1975, 1 March 1977, 10 May 
1977, 24 February 1976, and 26 April 1976. 
174 Smeby’s private papers, ”Subsea oil well completion and production systems: a 
current evaluation”, Dixon Associates, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. 
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than onshore fields in the Middle East – and the deeper the water, the more 
voluminous the foundation. Rather like a pyramid or a cone, the volume of a 
gravity platform grew exponentially in relation to its height and made fixed 
platforms on deep waters costly. The figure below depicts the relationship 
between water depth and investments based on data mostly from the British 
shelf. There was no correlation between the richness of the find (large 
bubbles) and the cost of extracting an extra barrel of oil – but there was a 
distinct correlation between extraction costs and water depth.  
Figure 9) A sinking feeling: cost increase with water depth, 1975175 
Statfjord A
Argyll
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 6 000
GBP invested for each barell of daily (peak) production
W
at
er
 d
ep
th
 (m
et
er
s)
 
Interestingly, the most cost-efficient field development on the British shelf 
was a subsea completion on the Argyll field (the small bubble in the lower 
left-hand corner of the figure). The subsea wells fed oil onto a semi-
                                                     
175 The figures are cited from Economist, July 1975, referred to in Smeby’s private 
papers, Smeby, “A Norwegian activity on subsea completion / deep water 
production systems”, 11 November 1975. The figure shows UK fields as of 1975 – 
the size of the bubbles indicate the fields’ estimated peak output. Statfjord A (1979) 
was not in the original material, but has been added for reference – its peak capacity 
was estimated at 40,000 barrels a day; costs as estimated by Styringsgruppen for 
kostnadsanalysen - norsk kontinentalsokkel and Johannes Moe, "Rapport fra 
styringsgruppen oppnevnt ved kongelig resolusjon av 16. Mars 1979", 
Kostnadsanalysen norsk kontinentalsokkel, Volume 2, (Oslo: Ministry of oil and 
energy, 1980) All costs are investments only, not operating costs, and given in 
nominal currency. 
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submersible rig deployed in 1975 by a small oil company, Hamilton 
Brothers. The company used field-proven equipment that may not have been 
ideally suited to the local circumstances. They worried less about fine-tuning 
their systems, and did not attempt to circumvent divers. Mooring lines kept 
the rig in position above plain subsea wells with standard Christmas trees not 
much different from those used topside albeit with a down time of close to 
20 per cent. 176  Without the excessive technology focus, their operation 
extracted oil far more economically than fixed platforms. The entrepreneurs, 
tellingly, had a background in the drilling industry rather than the oil 
industry proper.177 
 
Some Norwegian engineering companies took notice of what went on. 
Probably inspired by this precedence, Aker proposed floating production on 
the Norwegian shelf arguing this would be particularly economical on deep 
water.178 At the time, KV proposed a desktop study into subsea completions 
that might fit Aker’s plans.179 Norsk Hydro, a semi-private Norwegian oil 
company that gained a foothold in the 1960s, sponsored the study. In late 
1975, KV’s head of subsea systems hoped to install multiwell projects by the 
early 1980s and subsea satellites by 1978. Satellites were single Christmas 
trees that fed oil and gas to a nearby platform without manifolds.180 Several 
fields could benefit from the use of satellites, including a dozen pockets 
around Statfjord and East Frigg.181  
KV spent the year 1976 petitioning Statoil and Hydro to try out subsea 
systems. 182  When Statoil discovered Tommeliten in 1976, a smallish 
                                                     
176 Ben Van Bilderbeek and L.E. Reimert, "Early subsea production systems: 
Advance in the state-of-the art" (paper presented at Offshore Technology 
Conference, Houston, 1978), 789ff. 
177 M.R. Williams et al., "Simple subsea trees for shallow water: An economical 
alternative" (paper presented at Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 27-30 
April 1987), 107 ff. For an investment cost comparison, turn to the figure on page 
70. The Argyll field is the smallish bubble in the lower left section. 
178 Smeby’s private papers, “Proposal for long term production and engineering 
cooperation between Cameron Iron Works Inc. and A/S Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk”, 
28 February 1975. 
179 RA-Artnzen-Oil, board reports, 24 February 1976 and 24 August 1976.  
180 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby, ”A Norwegian activity on subsea completion / 
deep water production systems”, 11 November 1975. 
181 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild to Hurlen, memorandum on subsea technology, 1 July 
1976. 
182 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report on activities in 1976, 1 March 1977.  
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reservoir by contemporary Norwegian standards in 83 metres of water, the 
state oil company considered using subsea wells tied to a converted jack-up 
in the same fashion Phillips had done on Ekofisk.183 In the summer of 1977, 
Statoil asked KV and Cameron to submit an offer for Tommeliten,184 and the 
Oil Division was greatly encouraged. 185 KV and Cameron proposed four 
single-well satellites and a straightforward development that resembled a 
solution Cameron had supplied to Shell. The system included valve trees 
with individual controls, flowlines from the valve trees to the riser base, a 
pipeline from the riser base onto the deck of the jack-up, and some 
equipment on the jack-up to steady the oncoming pipeline. Cameron and KV 
offered the package for NOK 55 million, of which 85-70 per cent related to 
equipment supplied by Cameron.186 
Figure 10) The Tommeliten proposal, 1977187 
 
 
Statoil continued drilling exploratory wells, but was unable to decide on the 
economic viability of Tommeliten.188 The rewards could not justify a regular 
                                                     
183 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild, letter to Statoil, 10 June 1977. Phillips Petroleum was 
Statoil’s technology partner at Tommeliten. 
184 KV-Cor 245, Qvenild to Hurlen and Aasland, minutes from meeting with Statoil 
(Ager-Hansen), 23 June 1977. 
185 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report dated 25 August 1977. 
186 KV-Cor 248, KV board proposal, 12 August 1977; KV-Cor 248, Qvenild, letter 
to Aasland, 7 July 1977. 
187 The illustration was attached to KV-Cor 248, Aasland, proposal, 12 August 1977. 
188 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report, 17 November 1977. 
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gravity platform, but Statoil was unable to assess the pros and cons of a 
subsea solution. Elsewhere on the continental shelf, Mobil looked into 
subsea satellites for Statfjord, and Elf considered subsea completions around 
Frigg.189 Nevertheless, none of the oil companies asked for subsea systems. 
The question that comes to mind is why subsea systems progressed so 
slowly. 
 
3.2 The conserving effect of field development styles 
Possibly, KV had bought into a hyped technology; subsea was a “‘glamour’ 
phrase” in the early 1970s. Although there had been approximately 75 
underwater well completions in 1973 and the number grew by a dozen each 
year, most systems were experimental and few had withstood the wear and 
tear.190 In 1973, KV’s advisors admitted there “does not appear to be enough 
practical field experience to allow any meaningful equipment evaluation to 
be made”. None of the subsea systems available to the industry was reliable, 
and, based on progress to date and contemporary efforts, none would work 
in a “’normal’ manner” for at least another five years.191 
 
The main difficulty for those that advocated subsea systems, however, was 
the rapid ascendancy of a competing field development style. Oil companies 
on the Norwegian shelf were simply too preoccupied developing fields in the 
Norwegian Style 192  – self-contained gravity platforms with a concrete 
foundation to support the deck. A desire to utilize a few early experiences 
with gravity platforms, and the need to keep thousands of blue-collar 
workers occupied, formed an efficient block against more agile field 
development styles. 
 
The use of concrete structures in the North Sea was not an invention of 
Statoil’s. In 1973, Phillips Petroleum installed a storage tank built of 
concrete built by the construction company Høyer-Ellefsen. Phillips 
Petroleum thought it advantageous for political reasons to go with a 
Norwegian firm – besides, the income from the field was such the issue 
                                                     
189 KV-Cor 248, Smeby, minutes from 5 May meeting with Cameron in Houston, 20 
June 1977. 
190 Smeby’s private papers, ”Subsea oil well completion and production systems: a 
current evaluation”, Dixon Associates, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973 
191 Smeby’s private papers, ”Subsea oil well completion and production systems: a 
current evaluation”, Dixon Associates, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. 
192 A term coined by Gunnar Nerheim, according to Francis Sejersted in Hanisch 
and Nerheim, Fra vanntro til overmot.  
77 
 
hardly mattered. Elf employed a similar reasoning when the company placed 
a Condeep on the Frigg field alongside an anchored steel structure: the 
technological risk seemed small compared to the political gain.193  
 
In 1974, when Statoil’s focus turned to the Statfjord field, Norwegian 
construction firms had already gained some experience of building concrete 
structures. Drawing on this experience seemed natural, particularly since 
Statoil and Mobil (the operator) felt compelled to make a rapid decision. 
Across the median line towards Shetland, the British had found a huge field 
and the geological structures at Brent seemed to continue across the median 
line - Statfjord looked like an extension of the Brent reservoir and the Brent 
development looked set to drain the adjacent blocks across the sea border. 
Statoil and Mobil rushed to place an order with Norwegian Petroleum 
Contractors for a Condeep, resembling one that Mobile had ordered for 
Beryl (operational 1975), only larger.194  
 
The structure used on Statfjord stood apart because of its sole reliance on 
concrete foundations. The concrete installations at Ekofisk (from 1971 
onwards), Frigg (1977) and Brent (1975 and 1976) coexisted with other 
installations, whereas Statfjord was made up of self-contained concrete 
platforms. Each contained living quarters, a chemical plant processing 
highly flammable and pressurized raw materials, a drilling rig, a power 
plant, a hotel with hundreds of workers, a heliport, and a small harbour. 
All this rested on an extensive deck 30 metres above the sea level supported 
by four shafts that stretched down to a gravity base. This base doubled as a 
storage tank.195  
 
The approach at Statfjord A became the default approach elsewhere on the 
Norwegian shelf. The Statfjord A design was copied onto Statfjord B and 
then Statfjord C with few alterations. Then followed Gullfaks A, Gullfaks B, 
Gullfaks C, and so on. Engen observes how it was important for Statoil that 
“the small amount of competence they had gained with large offshore 
production plants could be utilised to the fullest. At that time, Statoil’s only 
                                                     
193 Ibid.; Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", based on interviews with Phillips 
Petroleum Company Norway, 22 December 1994 and Elf Norway, 14 December 
1994. 
194 Hanisch and Nerheim, Fra vanntro til overmot. Gunnar Nerheim, Det norske 
olje-eventyret 1965-2000 (Norsk Teknisk Museum, [cited April 2007]); available 
from http://www.tekniskmuseum.no/no/utstillingene/Jakten_oljen/historie.htm.. 
195 Deplyment, see Nerheim, Det norske oje-eventyret ([cited). 
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experience was with that type of production design.” 196  Statoil was the 
operator on every field where the integrated Condeep design was applied 
exclusively. Almost every field Statoil developed between 1979 and 1993 
made use of huge concrete platforms and there were “certain divisions in 
Statoil which proclaimed that everything had to be constructed in 
concrete”.197  
 
Figure 11) Condeep installations on Statfjord198 
 
 
Statoil took upon itself to secure orders for Norwegian industry. When the 
shipbuilding industry turned from boom to bust in the winter of 1974-75, the 
Norwegian shipbuilding industry, possibly bloated in the first place, lost 
most of its traditional market and turned with some desperation to the 
                                                     
196 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities".  
197 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", chapter 6 with reference to an interview with 
Nils Gulnes, executive president of Amerada Hess on 24 September 1997. 
198 Drawing, slightly modified, from St.mld. 8, 1984-85, 1983 Annual report of the 
Norweigan Petroleum Directorate, p. 54. 
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offshore market. Norwegian authorities facilitated this search for new 
markets with a hands-on approach, not least through Statoil.199 A policy of 
national preferences, and the procurement policies of Statoil, did succeed in 
diminishing the role of foreign suppliers on the Norwegian shelf. Statoil 
channelled orders for large structures to Norwegian industry and usually 
supported a few suppliers in each segment. The proportion of Norwegian 
content rose and soon accounted for two-thirds of the volume although the 
industry continued to rely on Houston-based oil tool manufacturers for 
mission-critical drilling equipment and pressure-containing equipment.200  
 
The use of Condeeps simplified the concern about Norwegian content. Huge 
concrete foundations had to be built in Norway almost by default; their 
construction required a very deep fjord. Such massive foundations allowed 
Statoil to fit a deck large enough to assemble several individually 
manufactured modules into a topside structure; the approach allowed for 
work to be divided among the numerous and small Norwegian engineering 
companies and yards. Such extensive modularisation was a brainchild of 
Aker, which pushed the concept with support from Statoil and the 
government because it allowed Norwegian engineering companies to 
compete for more of the tasks.201 Indeed, spreading the supply business and 
localising operations became an important goal of domestic policy. 
 
In some respects, subsea development became a victim of the concrete 
platforms. Although subsea satellites could work with Condeeps, the focus 
on building huge self-contained structures for every purpose removed 
attention from more agile field development - as evident in the Tommeliten 
case. Besides, Statoil had come across fields that were sufficiently prolific to 
support several Condeeps and economy allowed the company to rely on 
fixed platforms only. 
 
                                                     
199 For a detailed study, cf. Thorsvik, "Politikk og marked: En studie av norsk 
leveransepolitikk for oljevirksomheten", Particularly pp. 55, 84. 
200 On Statoil’s policy towards competition, cf. Hanisch and Nerheim, Fra vanntro 
til overmot.  
201 Ibid., pp. 386-387; Thorsvik, "Politikk og marked: En studie av norsk 
leveransepolitikk for oljevirksomheten", pp. 68-69, with reference to an interview 
with Statoil who emphasised the choice of concept design in securing a high 
percentage of Norwegian content and a 1985 report by Norwegian Petroleum 
Consultants, cf. Norwegian Petroleum Consultants, "Vurdering av anbudstyper, 
innhold og vurderingspraksis ved leveranser til virksomheten på 
kontinentalsokkelen", 1-6, (Bergen: Ministry of oil and energy, 1983). 
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3.3 Meanwhile, in the sea off Brazil… 
We may question whether subsea systems really were reliable at the time 
and appropriate for the tasks. Could the Norwegian shelf have seen field 
developments based on deepwater technology? Oil companies on the 
Norwegian shelf had their qualms. Maybe the technology was still immature, 
but the Brazilian example suggested otherwise. 
 
In the early 1970s, Brazil’s onshore production was declining. The country 
imported oil and the 1973 price hike upset the country’s unbalanced external 
payment account forcing a shift to alcohol-powered vehicles. Then, in 1974, 
oil was discovered in the Campos Basin not far from Rio de Janeiro. The 
military government opted against foreign involvement and granted the 
state-owned Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) a monopoly on upstream 
activities. Conventional development using fixed platforms was technically 
and economically feasible, but would take between four and eight years and 
require a lot of capital - which the company lacked. 202  Using subsea 
techniques and floaters, in the same fashion Hamilton Brothers had done, 
Petrobras cut back cash requirements and managed to get a well on stream in 
August 1977. 
 
First perceived as a solution to cut development times, Petrobras discovered 
the subsea systems and the floating production facilities were reliable and 
cost-efficient. Consequently, the company employed subsea techniques on 
successively larger fields and deeper waters as an alternative to fixed 
platforms.203 Besides, such early production systems offered clues as to the 
best field layout. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, seismic surveys were still 
crude tools and the information from early production systems 
correspondingly valuable in determining the best field layout.204 
 
The Campos Basin became a laboratory for deepwater technology – 
arguably the most innovative region in offshore oil. On the Enchova field, 
Petrobras combined subsea trees, flexible production risers, a mono-buoy 
tanker facility and new techniques quickly to disconnect the semi-sub from 
the subsea wells in case of emergency. By 1983, three-quarters of the 
Brazilian offshore output (145,000 barrels per day) poured from subsea 
                                                     
202 L.P. Ribeiro, C.A.S. Paulo, and E.A. Neto, "Campos basin subsea equipment: 
Evolution and next steps" in Offshore Technology Conference (Houston: 2003). 
203 "Subsea technology", Noroil, June 1983, pp. 27-36. 
204 Salim Armando, "Petrobras experience on early production systems" (paper 
presented at Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 2-5 May 1983), p. 289ff. 
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systems, 205  but in the shallow part of the basin, Petrobras built steel 
platforms and used these to host infrastructure for a wider network of subsea 
satellites and floating production systems.206 
 
This is not to say the Brazilian experience with subsea systems was a 
continuous success. It was not. Some attempts, like the dry trees installed at 
Garoupa in 1979, clearly did not work according to plan (Petrobras installed 
a Lockheed system with subsea atmospheric chambers). The dry system 
itself worked, but intervention and maintenance were expensive and the 
electro-hydraulic controls failed repeatedly – it was decommissioned in 
1984. 207  Regardless of such setbacks, the Brazilians continued to deploy 
subsea systems – preferably proven techniques and equipment. 
 
In one respect, however, the Brazilian experience and the Norwegian 
experience converge. Both countries aspired to build a national offshore 
industry centred on state-owned oil companies, both had a narrow range of 
previous offshore experience, and both oil companies settled for a particular 
development style - which they then applied somewhat irrespective of the 
circumstances. Petrobras arguably chose the more innovative approach. 
 
3.4 Shipping customers and a rapid start to DP sales 
When engineers assessed the North Sea offshore market around 1973-1975, 
subsea systems seemed quite a promising option, whereas dynamic 
positioning could be a tough sell. Demand for dynamic positioning was low, 
but rising. In the 1960s, dynamic positioning was applied about once a year 
and almost exclusively on drillships. Because the likelihood of failure in a 
DP system was higher than with a mooring system, DP found applications 
mostly where one could not do without, e.g. when drilling at depths of more 
than 200 metres, in situations were mooring was very time consuming or 
where the customer had to maintain a very exact position.208 A famous case 
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was the Glomar Explorer, which spent the early 1970s trying to salvage a 
sunken Russian submarine from below 5000 metres of water near Hawaii 
under the pretext of mining minerals on the seabed.209 In the mid-1970s, 
there were three or four installations each year, mainly on drillships, semi-
submersible exploratory rigs and pipe-lying vessels. Few service vessels 
employed dynamic positioning, although the technology was quite handy for 
e.g. diving support - a morbid clue to the relative cost of losing drill bits and 
divers respectively.210 
 
Considering the limited size of the market, the number of competitors in the 
market for dynamic positioning was quite remarkable. Eight companies had 
experience in the field: General Electric, General Motors (AC 
Electronics/Delco), Baylor Company, Edo Western, Ocean Research 
Equipment, Honeywell, CIT Alcatel and Thomson CSF. 211 Most of them 
attempted only once, and as of 1975 Honeywell enjoyed an 80 per cent 
market share with Thomson a distant second picking up mostly French 
military orders. For those able to compete, DP systems fetched a premium 
price. Systems sold at NOK 6-8 million (NOK 28-28 million at present day 
purchasing power), not counting costs of another NOK 7-11 million for extra 
thrusters, engines and transmission.212 
 
* * * 
 
A large number of competitors and few areas of application made it unlikely 
that KV would manage to push DP technology. Surprisingly, the first order 
arrived without any marketing and without anything that remotely resembled 
a working product. 
 
A former employee named Bjørn Bendigtsen connected KV with the 
shipping industry. Bendigtsen had left KV in disgust back in 1968 thinking 
the environment was suffocating and ignorant about ideas from anybody but 
graduate engineers, not mere engineers like himself. After business studies, 
he became head of sales at Aukra Bruk, a yard, and in 1973 went on to 
manage the offshore business of Stolt-Nielsen, a shipping company. In the 
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fall of 1974, he worked on a concept for the Seaway Falcon, a vessel capable 
of maintenance, diver support and fire extinction. 213  The vessel sported 
dynamic positioning from Honeywell, but Bendigtsen wanted to add yet 
more refinement. He recalled how KV had made L-70 anti-aircraft guns. 
Their barrels would follow the trajectory of a passing aircraft and fire 
automatically guided by radar. The idea struck him his fire-extinguishing 
vessel could apply the same basic approach, only this time the burning target 
would be stationary while the water cannon surged, swayed, rolled and 
drifted in troubled waters.214 Bendigtsen placed a NOK 11 million order to 
equip the Falcon with fire extinguishing technology, the most substantial 
task of the Oil Division during 1975.215 Bendigtsen also learned that KV had 
taken an interest in dynamic positioning. 
 
The next challenge Bendigtsen faced was a collapse in the drilling market. 
Starting in the early 1960s, a number of Norwegian shipping companies had 
invested in rigs for oil exploration. A decade later the market for drillships 
and drilling rigs collapsed due to excessive building. Some 16 semi-
submersibles had entered the market in 1975 and 36 in 1976, but the next 
couple of years saw only one or two additions.216 The slump was evidence of 
a dynamic industry; shipping companies had saturated the market for drilling 
vessels before the bulk of Norwegian industry managed to gain a foothold in 
oil. 
 
One of the vessels left redundant was the Seaway Swan, an aging H4 drilling 
rig owned by Stolt-Nielsen Seaways. Bendigtsen, who had made a habit of 
including advanced technology to secure a competitive advantage, hoped 
advanced electronics could turn the old rig into an advanced maintenance & 
repair vessel capable of servicing pipelines and other underwater 
structures.217 Such vessels were in short supply and commanded a high price. 
Although equipping a small support vessel might cost a hefty NOK 50 
million in 1975 (four times more in current denomination), the initial 
investment could be recovered in a couple of years because day rates ran at 
NOK 100,000 on long-term contracts and substantially more on short-term 
contracts. 
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In the mid-1970s, there was still no consensus on what capabilities a 
petroleum support vessel should have. In more mature markets, standards 
evolve due to public regulation or simply habit and experience. In the 
process, solutions become commoditized – cheaper to build and definitely 
easier to procure. For an oil company in the North Sea around 1975, there 
was no recipe as to what constituted a fire extinguisher or a diver support 
vessel. It was for shipping companies to suggest a service package and ask a 
price - and the market conditions generally allowed the shipping companies 
to recoup on their gamble if they managed to deliver a working solution on 
time. Bendigtsen assumed the Swan would benefit from dynamic positioning 
because anchors easily damaged pipelines and other subsea structures. On a 
previous occasion, Bendigtsen had bought dynamic positioning from 
Honeywell for use on the Seaway Falcon, but he was unimpressed by their 
Automatic Station Keeping (ASK) solution. The Americans were slow to 
recognize the North Sea as an emerging market. Their solution was not 
cheap and service was done out of Seattle – a costly drawback. ASK 
required separate quarters for computers and equipment, which was 
acceptable on drillships and rigs, but impractical on smaller vessels. 
Dissatisfied with Honeywell, Stolt-Nielsen asked KV for a proposal. On 24 
November 1975, he signed a contract for a redundant DP system from KV.  
 
The Swan was one big technology gamble and a new DP system served only 
to raise the stakes a little. Bendingtsen had already ordered heave-
compensated derricks and other novelties.  In one sense, the gamble 
backfired. The rebuilding ran into delays and the delivery was postponed 
until 1978. As a replacement, Bendigtsen offered KV the opportunity to 
supply a non-redundant system for the Seaway Eagle, a support vessel 
scheduled for delivery in the spring of 1977. KV agreed. Whereas the Swan 
required three computers (two computers working in parallel with a third 
computer to survey the two), the Eagle could do with one computer and 
somewhat less complex software. 218  On the other hand, fitting but one 
computer into a small vessel involved a set of challenges. The KS 500 had to 
be installed through a torched opening in the hull; once inside it could not be 
removed. Because of the space constraints, Albatross had to buy memory 
from Intel and abandon KV’s proprietary memory modules – the Kongsberg 
computer employed 64 kilobytes of memory composed of four kilobytes 
modules each the size of a beer cage.219 Nevertheless, the change made the 
task of developing dynamic positioning somewhat less daunting. 
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Possibly, Stolt-Nielsen underestimated the risk of buying something new, 
but KV had a reassuring image of reliability; one would think that someone 
capable of designing anti-ship missiles could deliver regulatory software. 
Correspondence between KV and Stolt-Nielsen hinted at a political reason 
for buying a KV product. Stolt-Nielsen hoped to employ the Swan in work 
for Statoil. Qvenild told Stolt-Nielsen the company would meet with “greater 
understanding” at the customer’s premises if the Swan employed 
Kongsberg’s DP; conversely, if Stolt-Nielsen bought dynamic positioning 
from anyone but KV, it would be “more difficult” to recommend Stolt-
Nielsen – a subtle reminder about KV’s power relations with Statoil.220  
 
Were Stolt-Nielsen an atypical customer, the history of Albatross would 
have ended some time in the 1970s. Albatross was fortunate, however, to 
address a market in which numerous companies were willing to take risks 
and experiment with new technology in search of extra profits. Many more 
followed. It seemed shipping customers offered a more forgiving market for 
new technology than oil. The difference rested not with technical prowess – 
oil people were as advanced – and the early customers of dynamic 
positioning might not even have understood what they were buying. Rather 
the difference rested with a reward structure that heaped money on 
calculated risk-takers – or those fortunate enough to initiate a successful 
experiment. 
 
As a malapropos, the shipping culture was manifest even in the ideology of 
managers. The international and profit-conscious Norwegian shipping 
industry fostered some principled economic liberalists. 221  The first two 
people to invest in dynamically positioned vessels were both standard-
bearers for economic liberalism. Odd Berg, the Tromsø-based shipping 
magnate who ordered DP from Honeywell in the early 1970s, founded 
Libertas, a liberalist think tank. 222  Jacob Stolt-Nielsen, the second ship-
owner to order a dynamic positioning system, held similar opinions on the 
                                                     
220 KV-Cor, box 136, letter, Qvenild to Stolt-Nielsen, 22 October 1975.  
221 Two books provide an insider’s account of the shipping milieu and the outlook of 
the ship-owners, including the Libertas involvement, cf. Egeland, Vi skal videre 
norsk skipsfart etter den annen verdenskrig: Perioden 1945-1970, particularly p. 
238. Egeland, Eventyr og virkelighet i skipsfartens tjeneste. 
222 On shipping’s almost complete adherence to economic liberalism, cf. Sejersted, 
Opposisjon og posisjon 1945-1981, pp. 52-53. 
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role of government in the economy.223 In contrast, Statoil initially drew its 
top management from circles close to the Labour Party. In each case, 
managers probably saw the way they did business as natural, right and just.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Unlike KV’s traditional customers in defence, automotive and oil, shipping 
companies were prepared to gamble on technology, particularly in the 
aftermath of the 1975 shipping crisis. Whether or not shipping companies 
like Stolt-Nielsen knew the risks they were running, we may at least notice a 
marked difference between the shipping companies and the more 
conservative oil industry in terms of risk taking. In the 1970s, oil companies 
working out of Norway (and possibly everywhere) were part of an “elite 
offshore club” with large budgets and elaborate decision-making designed to 
reduce risk. 224  Smaller companies might sport more entrepreneurial flair, 
particularly when faced with a crisis such as the one that hit the shipping and 
drilling companies around 1974-75.  
 
Mostly, the planned developments offshore suited KV well, but in one area 
the company seemed to be getting nowhere: despite repeated efforts, subsea 
systems failed to find customers on the Norwegian shelf. Arguably, subsea 
systems were somewhat hyped in the early 1970s, and both technological 
and psychological issues served to undermine their wider application. We 
have argued the dominant development style, the ever-present Condeeps, 
obstructed more agile field development styles. In contrasting Norway with 
Brazil, one gets an impression the slow ascent of subsea systems on was not 
inevitable. At a time when only Condeeps seemed permissible on the 
Norwegian shelf, innovative oil companies began experimenting with 
floating production and subsea systems. A hint to the entrepreneurial effects 
of deprivation, small and less wealthy operators went ahead and 
experimented with floating production and subsea production systems. 
Below the horizon, maverick companies developed offshore oil using subsea 
systems. Petrobras was a case in point. In 1975, Hamilton Brothers, an 
                                                     
223 On the political outlook of Stolt-Nielsen, cf. interview with Qvenild, 29 
September 2004; with Barth Jacobsen, 31 March 2005. For a sense of the family’s 
unapologetic right-wing sentiments, cf. the anecdotal Tor Inge Vormedal, B. Stolt-
nielsen : Den glemte pioneren (Haugesund: T.I. Vormedal, 2001). 
224 A comment on the slow emergence of subsea technologies, cf. Booth, "North 
Sea: Testbed for advanced subsea production". Derrick Booth was a veteran 
observer and founder of the most comprehensive subsea industry database, cf. Quest 
offshore resources (Quest Offshore, 2007 [cited November 2006]); available from 
http://www.questoffshore.com/Home/. 
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independent oil company, developed the Argyll on the British Shelf using a 
semi-submersible drilling rig with refitted processing equipment.  
 
Shipping companies asked for dynamic positioning while the oil companies 
on the Norwegian shelf seemed to think subsea production was unreliable. 
Subsea production was unreliable, but that is beside the point. Albatross 
dynamic positioning was hardly reliable either. Hence, when one was sold 
and the other struggled to find applications, the single most important reason 
originated with the willingness of the shipping industry to accept 
technological risks and the speed in which the industry exploited business 
opportunities. The venturesome approach of the shipping companies 
contrasted with the careful, risk-averse approach of the big oil companies. 
The two industries at times seemed diametrically opposed. In the next stage, 
the differing business environments of customers spilt across to the suppliers 
at Kongsberg.  
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4 Venturesome consumption and company 
culture, 1976-84 
In the second half of the 1970s, Kongsberg Albatross developed a particular 
culture distinct from that of KV proper. There is a maxim with few 
exceptions that people define their culture in relation to others. Strong 
cultures need distinct others. Being Canadian, I understand, is partly about 
not being a citizen of the United States. Belonging to Albatross was about 
denying the ways of KV and particularly the structured, long-term, sure-
footed Defence Division.  
 
I suggest company culture made Albatross innovative. Kenneth Lipartito 
remarks on how culture serves as a “mental apparatus for grasping reality 
[…] limiting and organizing concepts that determine what is real or rational 
for management […]. When firms project beyond what is known, as they 
must when innovating, they inevitably encroach on the boundaries of 
rationality.”225 To no small extent, the success of its dynamic positioning 
rested on a business culture that fostered entrepreneurial energy. The 
albatrosses developed a peculiar company culture with wide-ranging 
freedom of action for its engineers and salespeople. This helped the 
company innovate. 
 
Apart from being a mere reflection of shared attitudes in an industry, this 
chapter also encounters culture as a management technique. At Albatross, 
for example, culture was part of a conscious effort to set expectations and 
guide behaviour. Bjørn Barth Jacobsen and later managers at Albatross 
turned the product group into a believing, zealous and very productive 
organization. Through institutionalization, the peculiar culture survived a 
period of rapid expansion. 
 
While Albatross contributed by making dynamic positioning a fun and 
reliable product, a certain standardization also served to cut transaction costs 
and simplify the ordering of dynamic positioning. Institutions such as 
Lloyd’s Register, American Bureau of Shipping and Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV) took upon themselves to articulate technical standards for the design 
and construction of vessels and list vessels that complied with the standards. 
Once classification societies had spelt out a desirable standard, oil 
companies tended to opt for this – if for no other reason then as an additional 
insurance against bad publicity. The introduction of a DP class regime in the 
                                                     
225 Lipartito, "Culture and the practice of business history". 
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late 1970s simplified the process of ordering dynamic positioning and 
spurred sales of advanced systems.  
 
4.1 Dynamic positioning in theory 
Initially, nothing much separated dynamic positioning from any number of 
technology-centric projects at KV. The Oil Division had no proprietary 
development resources. Rather Olav Berdal, who headed R&D in the 
Defence Division, assembled a development team headed by Thor Skoland. 
Together with a dozen engineers, he mapped whatever knowledge was 
available. He looked at Honeywell’s system on board the Falcon, established 
some grasp of what to do, helped sketch a hardware solution, and hired two 
young scientists from Trondheim to transform Professor Balchen’s concepts 
into a high-level software model.226 That task fell on Steinar Sælid and Nils 
Albert Jenssen, two young researchers at the Norwegian Institute of 
Technology (NTH). 
 
Albatross dynamic positioning employed a few novelties. KV planned to use 
Kalman filtering, an advanced statistical technique to update a "best" 
estimate in the face of new, but still inaccurate, data (cf. appendix 11.5). 
More fundamentally, the system relied on forward coupling, a predictive 
rather than responsive regulatory strategy. Existing DP systems detected a 
drift, and manoeuvred the vessel back to the desired position (measure, 
calculate gap from desired state, adjust). Like a hotel guest in an unfamiliar 
shower, who suffers successive eruptions of hot and cold water before 
eventually finding a balance, old dynamic positioning systems required time 
to find equilibrium. When the impact of wind or stream changed, the ship 
would experience bursts of thruster action.  
Figure 12) Schematic draft of the behaviour of a retrospective DP system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
226 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004, with Jenssen, 14 October 2004, and 
Mathiesen, 13 October 2004. 
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The strength of forward coupling, and the weakness of retrospective 
regulation, is stability. Forward coupling attempts to predict a disturbance in 
advance by modelling how a change in input will affect the outcome of a 
process. In principle, the procedure resembles what a person goes through 
when learning to ride a bike. A youngster without such a model rides into the 
gutter before abruptly turning towards the opposite gutter. A trained cyclist 
foresees how the bike will behave, pre-emptively changes his balance and 
rides straight.227 Dynamic positioning without forward coupling, Professor 
Balchen insisted, was like steering a car by watching the mid-line through a 
hole in the floor.228 
 
To accomplish forward coupling, the Albatross dynamic positioning 
employed four basic models: a wind force model, a surge model, a sway 
model and a yaw model. These algorithms mimicked the calculations of a sea 
captain trying to manoeuvre a ship against wind, waves and stream. The 
calculation depends not only on the strength of the wind, but also on the 
vessel’s bulk (the area exposed to wind) and inertia. Inertia depends on load 
(weight) and drag, the quality that makes a one-tonne canoe more agile than 
a one-tonne raft. With such a model in place, a DP system could measure the 
strength and direction of the wind and counteract these forces with a burst of 
the thrusters before the vessel started drifting.  
 
                                                     
227 For a general introduction to regulatory strategies, see Jens G. Balchen, Trond 
Andresen, and Bjarne A. Foss, Reguleringsteknikk, 5. utg. ed. (Trondheim: Institutt 
for teknisk kybernetikk, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, 2003). 
228 Balchen is quoted from Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg, p. 23; for the biking 
example, interview with Steinar Sælid, 12 October 2004. 
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Figure 13)  The terminology of seasickness229 
 
To see how the Albatross software worked, consider the sketch above. Put 
simply, the software checked the location of the vessel, measured what 
forces affected the vessel, and calculated a new present position. The 
algorithm that handled surge (the Surge model) estimated forwards and 
backwards movements. This algorithm received four inputs: a) the previous 
best estimate or Coordinate transformation, b) the strength and angle of the 
wind from the Wind force model, c) information about which thrusters were 
working in what directions, i.e. Thrust measurements, and d) actual 
observations about movements, i.e. Surge measurements from a position 
reference systems fed through a Kalman filter (KSU).230 
 
                                                     
229 Copied from Faÿ, Dynamic positioning systems: Principles, design and 
applications, p. 27. Roll, heave and pitch are irrelevant to dynamic positioning since 
the vessel’s position and heading remain unchanged. 
230 The principle remains unchanged from the 1970s until today, cf. Jens G. Balchen 
et al., "A dynamic positioning system based on Kalman filtering and optimal 
control", Modeling, identification and control 1, no. 3 (1980): pp. 135-163 and Jon 
Holvik, "Basics of dynamic positioning" in Dynamic positioning conference 
(Houston: 1998). 
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Figure 14) Schematic cybernetics: The DP filter structure231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The point in distinguishing between these various expressions of movement 
was a quest for an optimal regulatory strategy. It is futile to fight wave-
induced movements (they are too strong and nevertheless cancel each other 
                                                     
231 Balchen et al., "A dynamic positioning system based on Kalman filtering and 
optimal control", p. 142. The conceptual drawing to the right was made by Balchen 
for a 1956 paper – I have modified a reprint in Stig Kvaal, Drømmen om det 
moderne norge : Automasjon som visjon og virkelighet i etterkrigstiden, Sts-rapport 
; 13 (Trondheim: Universitetet i Trondheim Senter for teknologi og samfunn, 1992). 
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out). Rather, a DP system should identify the underlying pattern of drift. The 
systems provided by Honeywell, ASI Electronics and others in the 1960s 
and 1970s used a wave filter that removed high frequency movements (rapid 
oscillations) for the same reason a Dolby filter removes noise. Balchen’s 
solution was more elegant. The DP software played around with three 
opinions about how far the vessel had truly surged: the estimate provided by 
the surge model, the measurement provided by navigation equipment, and 
the prediction of the Kalman filter that took both of the above into account 
along with previous best estimates. The estimate of the model (the one built 
for forward coupling) revealed the slow forces. Turning the thrusters against 
the estimate provided the smoothest and most economic way to stay in 
position. The chart below compares these three “opinions”. Whichever way, 
the vessel moved from being roughly six metres ahead at 0 seconds to being 
roughly 12 metres ahead at 120 seconds. As shown by the predicted and the 
measured position, the vessel oscillated back and forth throughout the 
journey – probably because of waves: the ship moved two steps forward, one 
step back, etc. 232 The estimate (the straightest of the lines) indicates the 
strength and direction of slow forces such as wind and stream.  
 
Figure 15) Straight behaviour: DP filter outputs233 
 
                                                     
232 Balchen et al., "A dynamic positioning system based on Kalman filtering and 
optimal control".  
233 Ibid. 
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From the point of view of a cybernetics expert, dynamic positioning was a 
textbook case – a matter of applying science to provide an optimal solution 
to a problem. Alas, reality conspired against science. 
 
4.2 Dynamic positioning in reality 
On 17 May 1977, the Albatross prototype was in place. Bjørn Barth 
Jacobsen, head of the product group, sent flowers to his team. Having 
worked continuously for 36 hours, people collapsed believing the worst part 
of the job was done. 234 Alas, there was “uncertainty and unreliability in 
every link” and little time for rest.235  The errors that kept appearing were not 
theoretical, but very real.  
 
Despite an elegant high-level software design, many issues surfaced when 
science met reality. To make the code work onboard vessels, the young 
engineers had to make a number of modifications. In the process, they 
dumped most - some think all - attempts to maintain an optimal regulatory 
strategy and simplified the software lest none but scientists would be able to 
maintain the code. The people at Kongsberg who implemented the high-level 
code from Trondheim abandoned dynamic Kalman filtering, that is the 
ability to recognize improving or deteriorating performance of an instrument 
and weight the information accordingly. Such tuning was too demanding for 
KV’s proprietary KS 500 computer. KV also had to compromise on the 
ability of Albatross to manoeuvre smoothly. Although the system in 
principle identified the optimal counterforce vector, the calculations 
involved were too complex for practical purposes. Thus, both in the ability 
to identify the correct position and in the ability to manoeuvre the vessel 
back to the desired position, Albatross ended up with solutions whose 
performance hardly differed dramatically from the tried and tested approach 
of Honeywell.236 
 
Another set of concerns originated with hardware. Once, using DP in the 
dead calm waters of Horten harbour, the Eagle suddenly speeded ahead on 
full throttle. Eldar Mathiesen, a young engineer in charge, set up a tracking 
routine and identified the unlikely problem. As planned, the Albatross 
software zeroed out any historic data after three hours without detectable 
wind. However, the KS 500’s micro program (its computer-specific hard-
coded software) mistook the instruction – a bug in the micro program 
                                                     
234 Interview with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004, with Corneliussen, 19 October 2004. 
235 Interview with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004. 
236 Interview with Skoland, 4 January 2006, with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004. 
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confused plus and minus and uploaded the largest number its cache could 
hold. Albatross consequently believed it had encountered a wind of 
unfathomable proportions, and roused all thrusters against the imaginary 
tornado. Such mistakes showed how computers designed for presumably 
demanding military applications sometimes failed in other settings; they had 
proved themselves in guiding specific tasks of shorter duration like the 
aiming of a gun or the guiding of a machine tool, but not for continuous 
operations.237 
 
The weakest link in the new system was arguably the hydro-acoustic 
position reference system (HPR system) that Albatross sourced from Simrad. 
The system worked by emitting a sound wave in the direction of a 
transponder on the seabed. Having detected the signal, the transponder 
emitted an artificial echo; the direction of this signal, and the lapse from 
query to response, revealed the vessel’s position relative to the transponder. 
Depending on the ability to measure angles accurately, one or more 
transponders were required to establish an exact position. Simrad was in the 
process of developing a system that worked with one receiver and one 
transponder,238 which improved ease of use at the expense of accuracy.239 In 
1977, Albatross relied on Simrad’s HPR prototype – it was as unreliable as 
the DP. On one occasion when the Eagle was involved in sandbagging a 
pipeline from Ekofisk, the vessel repeatedly drifted off position. After 48 
hours of emergency repair work, the team discovered the novel HPR would 
occasionally misread the input because some sound waves had multiple 
interpretations.240  
 
                                                     
237 Interview with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004. 
238 For an in-depth account of the development, see Knut Sogner, God på bunnen: 
Simrad - virksomhet 1947-1997 (Oslo: Novus, 1997), pp. 107-109. 
239 R. Bond, "Dynamic positioning control systems and operational experience" 
(paper presented at Conference on Ship Dynamic Positioning & Mooring Systems 
Electrical Aspects, Thursday, 22 February 1979, London, 22 February 1979) p. 55. 
240 Interview with Corneliussen, 19 October 2004. 
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Figure 16) Artificial echo: Hydro-acoustic position reference system 
  
 
Albatross’s various problems were not confined to the first prototype. Every 
one of the early deliveries experienced problems. The Capalonga project 
(1976-77) ran into problems because the vessel had insufficient engine 
power to withstand rough weather, regardless of its redundant DP system. 
Albatross could hardly be blamed for this mishap. In 1977-78, Albatross 
installed dynamic positioning on three dredging barges, and this time the 
Kongsberg people were responsible for underestimating the power 
requirements. The Seaway Sandpiper assignment (1977-78) was deeply 
frustrating as well, allegedly because a subsystem from Norcontrol 
malfunctioned.241 A final and particularly damaging incident occurred with 
the Seaway Swan. On 27 September 1978, the Swan was in position some 15 
metres from a platform in the UK sector – both anchors, dynamic positioning 
and a tugboat worked in concert to keep the Swan in safe distance from the 
platform. Shortly after midnight, the Swan began turning. A lookout became 
aware of the danger, switched to manual control, managed to move the rig 
away, but too late to prevent a derrick on board the Swan from hitting a 
platform rail. None blamed the DP system, but none could acquit it either. 
Most likely, the error was human, for example an inadvertent manoeuvre by 
the tugboat. Such errors were hard to pinpoint because operators resisted 
                                                     
241 Interview with Skoland, 24 January 2006. 
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“Judas systems”, tracking software similar to an airplane’s flight recorder.242 
Maybe Albatross would have survived a few more hiccups, but the bugs that 
did occur were sufficiently serious as to have killed the project. Stolt-Nielsen 
was neither happy nor content. On one occasion the project looked 
particularly flawed, Mathiesen had the discomforting experience of being the 
subject of Jacob Stolt-Nielsen’s abuse at Fornebu. On another occasion, he 
was picked up by helicopter on 45 minutes notice because the DP did not 
work and the Eagle lost USD 25,000 a day.243  
 
Was Albatross more reliable or more accurate than Honeywell’s solution? 
Opinions differ somewhat as to functional superiority. Sælid clearly believes 
the Norwegian solution was the better one. Mathiesen believes the first 
application was no improvement on Honeywell’s solution. Maybe both in a 
sense were right. The code Sælid wrote was superior to Honeywell’s; the 
code Mathiesen ended up implementing was not such a big improvement.244  
 
4.3 Jacobsen’s escape from the weapons factory 
In 1975-76, Honeywell supplied four out of five dynamic positioning 
systems with Thomson a distant second picking up mostly French military 
orders. A few years later, the picture had changed. In 1981, there were 80 
operational DP systems globally, half of them supplied by Albatross. 245 
Interestingly, Albatross gained market leadership between 1976 and 1979 
during a period when the product was hardly reliable. So how did Albatross 
relegate Honeywell to a marginal position? Any full explanation would need 
to consider the peculiar culture that evolved at Albatross. 
 
To understand what Albatross became, it is useful to look at the parent from 
which it departed. Probably, every attempt to capture the attitudes that 
governed KV in the 1970s would produce a different answer. Emphasis is a 
matter of perspective. The outline in this section is obviously no exception, 
                                                     
242 On the Capalonga: interview with Corneliussen, 19 October 2004. On the barges: 
interview with Skoland, 4 January 2006. On the Swan: KV-Cor 239, Henriksen, 
memo to Aasland, 9 October 1978. 
243 Interview with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004 
244 Interview with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004, with Sælid, 12 October 2004. 
245 "The Kongsberg group: Experts on dynamic positioning", Scandinavian oil-gas 
magazine, 1981, pp. 70-71. 
99 
 
but it is uncontroversial to claim that much lot rested with the influence of 
Bjarne Hurlen and the legacy of KV as an army workshop.246 
 
By most accounts, Kongsberg was a run-down workshop by the end of the 
Second World War. The factory lacked a proper sales office; its task was 
limited to the proper processing of incoming orders from the army and 
various companies using KV as a contract manufacturer. There was no 
proper finance function. Until 1948, KV had simply been an entity on the 
defence budget and the transformation into a separate legal entity was less 
than abrupt. Funds tended to arrive once a year; following the passing of a 
defence budget, the company purchased inputs and refined them until the 
funds were depleted. Each budget year composed a business cycle.247 KV 
looked increasingly outdated, uncompetitive and not very businesslike. 248 
This was the factory that Hurlen set out to manage. 
 
Like Hauge, Hurlen had a formidable presence – the term patriarchal 
springs to mind. He upheld hierarchy and rank with earthly symbols such as 
a corporate mansion and two chauffeured limousines. He was caring and 
affectionate – not one to trade his loyalties – but expected subordination and 
demanded results with unquestionable authority and a matching temper. He 
was capable of “stamping results out of the ground”.249 He had unleashed 
these qualities on the rather moribund weapons factory from the mid-1950s. 
Within a decade he had installed a sense of direction in KV. With military 
training and precedence from the American armaments industry, it may 
come as no surprise that Hurlen embraced Taylorism. During his first years 
at the helm, with tremendous energy, he unleashed scientific management on 
the organization and was able to achieve much simply by introducing new 
machinery and copying techniques and practices from more advanced 
engineering industries. Hurlen studied in detail the time-motion analysis that 
                                                     
246 During two dozen interviews with former employees during the autumn of 2004, 
I asked open-ended questions about sentiments at KV and about the role of Hurlen. 
The following paragraphs rely extensively on this material – a collective 
recollection, although individuals are credited with supplying particular details. 
247 Interview with Næsset, 11 October 2004. 
248 For the most depressing assessment I have seen of any business, cf. Yulke 
Company’s review of the “defeatist” attitude, “substandard” quality and “laughable” 
sales and marketing at KV, cf. Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, Korrespondanse, C1 
Direktørkorrespondanse, Rekke III, 111, I.G. Yulke Company, rapport 1 - 16, 1954 - 
1955, Progress Orientation Report No. 1, Meeting held October 30, 1954.  
249 Interview with John Evensen, 23 June 2004.  
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Volvo applied, and strived to copy these at the factory.250 In the late 1950s, 
he travelled extensively in the United States, visited large defence 
contractors and wrote admiringly of their efficiency in execution. 251  If 
modernization was Hurlen’s end, scientific management was his means. 
 
Despite Hurlen’s best efforts, however, KV never became a customer-centric 
company. Some observers, like Jens Glad Balchen, linked the lack of 
commercial instincts with a continued entanglement with the armed 
forces. 252  Defence procurements mauled the work ethics of KV proper. 
Norwegian military customers usually had no option but to place orders at 
KV and the standard contracts specified cost-plus payment. KV covered its 
costs and a profit specified as a percentage of the costs. Consequently, a 
drawn-out and costly project was more profitable than a speedy delivery on 
budget. It could almost be assumed that the work would be expensive and 
late and none would assume responsibility. The attitude was particularly 
damaging for Albatross and other business lines that faced competitive 
markets. Sverre Corneliussen, the principal hardware engineer at Albatross, 
would occasionally claim this or the other part was needed for personal 
reasons – even a hobby – in order to speed up the delivery and avoid the 
Defence Division’s unspoken policy of not being stressed by a customer. 
Skoland caused friction by placing metalwork orders with a small 
mechanical engineering company rather than risking the usual KV delays 
that so alienated customers.253 Such incidents caused strains. 
 
Bjarne Hurlen had begun his term at a company that lagged behind the 
leading engineering companies of the world, but retired from a proud and 
immensely capable company. His most impressive performance, however, 
belonged to the 1950s and 1960s when the young Hurlen had been an agent 
of change. He “aged early”, an old acquaintance observed,254 and the older 
Hurlen was hard pushed to dismantle some less productive practices at KV. 
His engineering conglomerate was not economically prudent and rather 
bureaucratic. Meanwhile, despite Hurlen’s best efforts, his company failed to 
develop a customer-centric and entrepreneurial approach. This was the 
setting when KV set out to manufacture dynamic positioning. 
                                                     
250 Interview with Tveit, 26 October 2004, with Næsset, 11 October 2004.  
251 KV-operations, box 7, memo, Hurlen to board of directors, 10 June 1958. 
252 Interview with Balchen, 15 September 2004. 
253 Disagreement on the taut wire is evident e.g. in KV-Cor box 239, minutes from 
the heads of divisions meeting 2/80 with reference to development work initiated 30 
November 1978. KV Cor 142, 24 Juni 1980, AD til Maritim div og Olje Div. 
254 Interview with Tveit, 26 October 2004. 
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* * * 
 
In understanding how a distinct Albatross culture could emerge in opposition 
to the dominant sentiments at KV, we should consider the role of Bjørn 
Barth Jacobsen. He was educated at NTH where he met Qvenild who agreed 
to become his mentor and invited him to join the KV planning department in 
1970. At the time, there was simply no spare housing in Kongsberg and 
Jacobsen rather spent a few years working for Shell out of den Haag and 
Singapore. In 1973, he returned to Norway. Due to his oil experience, he had 
any number of job options, but eventually opted for Kongsberg. KV 
appeared a lot less structured than e.g. Kværner, but Kongsberg sported 
cheap housing and Jacobsen moved his family from the 11th floor of an Oslo 
complex to a detached house not far from the factory.255 Upon starting in 
May 1974, he was the only KV employee with any experience from the oil 
industry. 
 
No slave to public convention, Jacobsen was an asset and a liability. In 1973, 
before moving to Kongsberg, he had worked as chief engineer in Sønnico, 
an electrical engineering company, where he clashed with the hierarchy and 
moved on. 256  At Kongsberg, he became product manager of supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) and argued its case so insistently that 
Statoil’s head of procurement, Hans M. Daastøl, called Qvenild and asked 
for Jacobsen’s removal. 257  Jacobsen then worked on establishing an 
engineering business. He acquired a run-down factory in Lier, refurbished 
the place, and made Kongsberg Engineering look respectable despite 
employing only four people. However, when the business started to grow as 
part of Norwegian Petroleum Consultants, Bjørn Husemoen was appointed 
managing director, rather than Jacobsen. 
 
Three times passed over, three times bereft of the opportunity to head a 
business, Jacobsen was in line for promotion. Qvenild asked him to look 
after dynamic positioning. Plans were already in place. The head of 
development (Berdal) and the head of the oil division (Qvenild) intended to 
see through but one project: first develop it for 18-24 months, then market it, 
sell it, and aim for profits by 1980.258 Prior to delivery, the product group 
                                                     
255 Interview with Jacobsen, 9 September 2004. 
256 Jacobsen, e-mail to the author, 18 April 2005. 
257 On the Scada development, cf. Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg, chapter 11. On 
the conflict with Statoil: interview with Jacobsen, 9 September 2004. 
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was not supposed to do much in terms of sales and marketing. Although the 
niche was interesting, it had no strategic importance and Jacobsen felt deep 
down he was destined for something better. Nevertheless, deprived of a 
major business line, he set out determined to turn his project into something 
big.259 
 
Jacobsen had the ability to think in sufficiently radical terms and insisted KV 
should achieve world dominance in dynamic positioning. He detested the 
idea of “another hobby workshop” and insisted his product area had to 
deliver three or four systems a year immediately in order to conquer the 
market and avoid becoming a “subsistence business” of the kind he thought 
multiplied at KV.260 The real risk was letting Honeywell get entrenched or, 
worse, allowing Norcontrol a foothold. We enjoy a “tailwind” he explained – 
it would be “wrong not to exploit” the market.261Jacobsen, the son of a small 
businessman, was annoyed by any reluctance to pursue earnings. He was 
insistent Albatross should make money and help customers make money. 262 
The young and inexperienced people on his team found the thought of being 
up against a Goliath “very exciting” and they set out to dethrone Honeywell, 
irrespective of the fact that KV’s solution hardly worked.263  
 
Almost immediately upon assuming responsibility for the dynamic 
positioning project, Jacobsen began his sales efforts. He went to see Odd 
Berg, a shipping company in Tromsø that planned to equip a vessel capable 
of diving support, subsea completion and surveillance of pipe-laying 
operations. For such tasks, the Arctic Seal needed dynamic positioning and - 
because several ships would arrive for the 1978 season - Odd Berg needed 
dynamic positioning by the summer of 1977. Jacobsen offered to submit a 
tender. “Short deadlines”, he wrote to his superiors, were “positive 
incentives”. His superiors turned him down, however, because one failure 
could be more easily overlooked than two failures and because the research 
department would be hard pressed to reallocate people.264  
 
                                                     
259 Interviews with Jacobsen, 9 September 2004 and 31 March 2005. 
260 KV-Cor 239, Jacobsen, letter to Odd Bergh (Klingenberg), 16 January 1976.  
261 KV-Cor 239, Jacobsen, memorandum to Qvenild, 18 January 1976. 
262 Interview with Jacobsen, 29 November 2005. 
263 Interview with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004. 
264 KV-Cor 239, Qvenild, memorandum to Aasland, 16 January 1976. 
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Undeterred, Jacobsen just kept trying to grow his business, routinely 
encountering scorn.265 The first time the public saw Albatross was during the 
1976 Offshore Technology Conference in Houston. Jacobsen had a local 
carpenter manufacture a plywood box. With the proper coating, it could 
resemble something digital. He put a Simrad sonar screen in front and an 
ordinary light bulb in the back.266  
 
Jacobsen had a knack of extremes, and rarely mastered modesty. Raising the 
subject of Jacobsen among those who knew him at Albatross three decades 
ago unfailingly provokes smiles, sometimes even embarrassed smiles, and 
stories. He could be all things, a devil and a sympathetic man. For him, there 
was good and bad, right and wrong, hot and cold. When he clashed with 
people, he did so irredeemably. He heaped scorn on the people he did not get 
along with, and fell out of favour with many people.267 An alumnus of Shell, 
with some 200,000 employees, he failed to be humble when faced with a few 
thousand people in Kongsberg without industry experience. An Albatross 
legend says he smashed a window to get the attention of Qvenild who was 
passing outside (this was not true, though he did jump through a first floor 
window to continue a discussion with assistant managing director Odd 
Løkholm). 268 None doubted, however, that Jacobsen would have been 
capable of smashing a window. He was ignorant of conventions and his 
energies were hard to control. 
 
Jacobsen received any number of rebuffs. When, nevertheless, he was 
allowed to continue, or felt able to ignore the advice he was offered, it was 
because Albatross made money. Sometime during late 1976, the former 
caution was put aside. Because the Seaway Swan had been delayed and been 
supplemented by an order for the Eagle, Albatross nevertheless had to work 
on two prototypes in parallel. Then, in November 1976, Jacobsen secured a 
DP order for the Capalonga, an old tanker that Shell planned to convert into 
a support vessel. Jacobsen’s superiors would have preferred to reject the 
                                                     
265 Evident e.g. in KV-Cor 239, Hurlen, memorandum to Qvenild, 13 February 
1976. Hurlen complained about repeated unprofessional behaviour; Jacobsen had 
printed KV advertisements featuring the Seaway Swan without the consent of the 
angry owner, Jacob Stolt-Nielsen. 
266 Interview with Jacobsen, 29 November 2005. 
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employees during the autumn of 2004. 
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order, but needed the money, and Shell asked for both a redundant DP 
system (double everything) and six KG2 gas turbines. The project would net 
NOK 10 million and Shell offered to provide working capital.269 KV at the 
time struggled to make a profit; the civilian product lines lost money on a 
large scale. Consultants were at the gate telling management what to do and 
contributing to a siege mentality. In this setting, KV management had a hard 
time insisting that Albatross should play by the rules. Had KV been a 
commercially viable, decently run factory, the autonomy and business 
practices of Albatross would never have been tolerated.270 
 
One reason why Jacobsen’s energies proved productive was the qualities of 
his head of development, Skoland.  He proved eminently capable of bridging 
the gap between the conservative and thorough KV culture and the 
“craziness” associated with Jacobsen. In understanding why they managed to 
get along so fabulously, it is probably helpful to leave the purely rational. 
Skoland liked and respected Jacobsen, even trusted him to do right, and 
Jacobsen loved him in return. He thought Thor could do no wrong and 
accepted his guidance and judgement – he behaved. Jacobsen could be his 
own worst enemy, prone to excesses. An extrovert, and a bit of a clown, he 
nevertheless remains very aware of his weaknesses, almost shameful, and 
became eager to confess. A child lost in the cradle in 1971, he interpreted as 
divine punishment, and almost lost ground, only to find salvation in Christ. 
Later in life, when repentance hit upon him, Thor Skoland was there to 
receive his confession and offer spiritual guidance.271 Since they were both 
religious in the evangelical way, there was euphoria to what they did: both 
attacked problems with belief and dedication. Their modus operandi 
differed, however: whereas Jacobsen hacked through the jungle, Skoland 
paved the road beneath and “carried the burden”. The pair influenced the 
wider Albatross culture, which came to resemble the attitude of born-again 
Christians.272 
 
                                                     
269 Conversation with Jacobsen, 1 December 2005. Mr. Jacobsen interpreted the 
generosity as a form of showing off. 
270 This opinion was held by many contemporaries. Torfinn Kildal quoted an STK 
manager saying such a venture would have been impossible at STK (a Norwegian 
subsidiary of Alcatel), interview with Kildal, 29 October 2004. 
271 On the basics of their relationship, both Skoland and Jacobsen are in agreement, 
cf. interview with Skoland, 4 January 2006, with Jacobsen, 31 March 2005 and 9 
September 2004.  
272 Interview with Skoland, 4 January 2006, with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004, and 
with Jacobsen on various occasions. 
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Towards the end of 1977, Skoland took his small team away from the 
Defence Division and united with Jacobsen and his assistant, Nils Willy 
Gulhaugen. On the floor of the huge KV turbine factory, they settled on 
some 200-300 square metres. They laughed and worked. Sometimes, 
someone would run out to buy a bottle of red wine and celebrate inside the 
parameter surrounded by decent and serious Kongsberg employees 
sputtering turbine parts. The KV employees began to notice this circus, and 
the Albatross began telling stories about their distinctness. Thus was born a 
meta-culture of sorts, quite distinct from anything else in the weapons 
factory. Jacobsen spoke of a “gypsy” culture: merry, unrestrained, 
globetrotting. People were told to bring their passport to work every day.273 
At times, Albatross people became excessively self-conscious and self-
righteous to the point they would tear apart company policies and contradict 
the Defence Division on purpose. Albatross probably had an urge to rebel, 
but rebelling against the defence division resulted in spectacular work ethics 
and a high degree of responsiveness to customers. 
 
The work spirit at Albatross was exceptional. Mathiesen recalls a Saturday 
evening when his close associate, Olav Ropstad, and wife had come to the 
Mathiesens for dinner. During dinner, the two DP engineers talked business 
and technology relentlessly, and by 10 at night became so captivated by 
work they left for the factory a few kilometres away leaving behind two 
bored wives. 274 The same obsessive energy that ruined Mrs. Mathiesen’s 
dinner could not but impress the early Albatross customers. The team 
showed extreme flexibility in correcting errors and managed to stay on 
course. They became fabulous ambassadors for the company. This was 
probably what made Stolt-Nielsen not only refrain from throwing KV out as 
his DP system continued to malfunction, but also keep buying Albatross 
products. Albatross’s customer-centric approach and nimble-footed culture 
was the most important explanation as to why the company came to 
dominate the dynamic positioning market towards the closing years of the 
1970s, rather than its technical excellence. Around 1980, however, Albatross 
also gained a technological lead – albeit not for the reasons that Balchen had 
proposed. 
 
                                                     
273 Interview with Skoland, 4 January 2006, with Jacobsen, 31 March 2005 and 9 
September 2004, with Sælid, 12 October 2004 and with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
RA-Arntzen-Oil, quarterly board report, 17 November 1977. 
274 Interview with Mathiesen, 13 October 2004, with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
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4.4 World leader in dynamic positioning 
Every DP system installed during 1980 was made by Albatross. 275  The 
Kongsberg supplier was responsive and customer-centric, and its product 
was probably superior. This technological advantage rested with an 
unintentional twist in Balchen’s invention. Whereas Professor Balchen had 
planned for a smoother regulatory strategy, he ended up devising an 
approach that was somewhat better capable of handling mishaps and 
unreliability. 
 
As for reliability and accuracy, the main concern around 1980 was faulty 
inputs from position reference systems. Precise navigation involved 
measuring the distance to some nearby beacon at a fixed, known location. 
Alas, radio beacons on the seabed would not work because electromagnetic 
energy fails to propagate through water. However, what radio waves can 
accomplish above the surface, sound can accomplish subsea, and most DP 
systems relied on acoustic position reference systems. These emitted sound 
waves and measured the time elapsed before receiving a response from one 
or more underwater transponders. The approach resembled sonar 
technology, the core business of Honeywell Marine System in Seattle. 276 
Honeywell developed a hydro-acoustic position reference system for use 
mainly with deep-water drilling and eventually provided dynamic 
positioning as an add-on.277  
 
Judging from the reference book published by Honeywell in 1978, the 
company’s leading expert believed acoustic reference systems would 
continue to be the mainstay of dynamic positioning and admitted only to the 
desirability of some fine-tuning.278 In reality, the approach was inherently 
unreliable. A shoal of fish might cross between ship and transponder, 
bubbles from a propeller might pass underneath, or salinity and temperature 
might change in ways that hampered sound waves.  In the late 1970s, 
Albatross experienced some sort of disturbance half the time: sometimes the 
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276 Interview with Skoland, 4 January 2006. 
277 KV-Cor 238, Albatross [internal] board papers on marketing strategy, 23 
September 1983. 
278 Morgan, Dynamic positioning of offshore vessels, chapter 10. 
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signal shifted and reappeared from a new and unexplainable angle, 
sometimes the signal would disappear for minutes.279  
 
Albatross gained from its willingness to incorporate numerous position 
reference techniques apart from hydro-acoustics. While working on the 
Seaway Swan in 1978, for example, the team just could not get a proper 
reference from Simrad’s new acoustic position reference system and 
scrambled to have a local workshop build a taut-wire system on 
specification. A taut-wire system relies on the inclination of a line lowered 
onto the seabed by a heavy weight; the angle of the line reveals how the 
vessel has moved since the taut wire was unlashed. It was clumsy and space 
consuming, and not without faults, but provided a desperately needed a 
correction to the acoustics. 280 In other deliveries, Albatross came to rely 
heavily on the Artemis microwave-based reference system.281 The system 
worked by measuring the angle and the distance between a receiver and a 
microwave beacon in the vicinity, typically on a production platform. Of the 
57 deliveries that Albatross supplied between 1977 and 1983, 45 employed 
HPR, 43 employed taut wire and 30 employed Artemis. About a dozen used 
inputs from radio navigation systems while half a dozen attempted satellite 
navigation. 282  A few systems employed TV-tracking, radar or other 
experimental approaches. The variety of techniques involved shows 
Albatross had distanced itself from any given supplier or a specific position 
reference system.283 
 
Most DP suppliers used multiple position reference systems even in the 
1960s, but Albatross was unique in its early ability to combine inputs from 
various systems into a useful equation. The competitors let the operator 
determine which system to be trusted. When the most reliable inputs failed, 
the next in line came on stream according to a queuing procedure. Such DP 
systems took into account only the best available position reference system 
and discarded the remainder. Albatross pioneered a pooling procedure where 
                                                     
279 Nils A. Jenssen and Eldar Mathisen, "Når naturkreftene trekker i andre retninger: 
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every available measurement contributed data to a pool from which a “best 
estimate” of position was determined. Kalman filtering was an advanced 
approach to gain a best estimate, and the early incorporation of Kalman 
filtering meant Albatross could draw on all available position reference 
systems.284 
 
Furthermore, Albatross’s core regulatory strategy was better suited for the 
identification of failing position reference systems and handling signal 
failures. We recall how the new systems included a software model of the 
ship and its surroundings to perform forward coupling.285 This strategy had 
been included on the insistence of Professor Balchen to smoothen the 
manoeuvring of automatically positioned vessels: the model predicted where 
the vessel was heading in order to counteract drift pre-emptively. A 
mathematical model trying to guess where the ship was heading had an 
inherent ability to recognize faulty navigation inputs - at least to the extent 
they violate the constraints of the physical world. With starboard wind and 
no tide, for example, a sudden shift to the right would be unlikely. Besides, 
the mathematical model contributed an emergency strategy. In the unlikely 
situation all reference systems would fail, the mathematical model would 
continue to provide an idea of where the ship was heading based on the 
strength and direction of the wind and historical data about the stream. Such 
usage of the model was not what Balchen had foreseen. He wanted to 
include a model in order to smoothen the manoeuvring, but ended up 
inventing a guard against faulty data from the peculiar behaviour of sound in 
water.286  
 
Albatross’s approach proved superior in incorporating inputs from various 
position reference systems of dubious accuracy. With only one measurement 
system running and stable noise, i.e. without unpleasant surprises, 
Honeywell’s solution was just as accurate and stable as the one provided by 
Albatross. 287 Put differently, if a reliable and accurate navigation system 
such as the global positioning system (GPS) had been operational in the 
1970s, Honeywell would have had a better chance of withstanding the 
onslaught. Conversely, if position reference systems had not been so 
unreliable, Albatross would have had a harder time establishing itself in 
competitive markets. This is not to downplay the importance of good 
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customer relations. By late 1983, Albatross management believed 
Honeywell and General Electric Corporation Ltd. had regained a 
technological equilibrium with Albatross.288 The business skills of Albatross, 
however, were harder to match, and Albatross retained a very high market 
share. 
 
Success came, not only from building sophisticated systems, but also from 
making sophisticated systems simple. Honeywell designed DP systems for 
semi-submersibles and large drillships, floating factories in effect, where a 
dedicated operator could work in a control room set-aside for station 
keeping. In these surroundings, it mattered less if ASK was bulky and the 
user interface non-intuitive. When the drilling market collapsed and 
petroleum support vessels began applying dynamic positioning, the 
operating environment gave a higher premium for compact and nimble 
solutions. Simrad and KV knew how to design a user interface for sea 
captains. Drawing on Simrad’s experience in visualizing sonar signals, the 
Albatross screen used simple graphics to show coordinates and drift. The 
interface was partly derived from KV’s MSI 70U submarine fire-control 
system and the control panel was intuitive: one button, one function. The 
solution could hardly be simple enough; an Albatross employee on a vessel 
recalled how he once saw a control panel littered with reminder stickers with 
helpful advice such as “call to check the engine is running before pushing 
this button”.289 
Figure 17) DP for dummies: the Albatross control panel 
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4.5 A company culture reinforced by customers 
At Albatross, each consecutive success made the team more self-assured. 
The self-image, immodest in the first place, improved even further as sales 
orders piled up. The quite substantial orders that Albatross secured 
reinforced the team and deepened the division between Albatross and the 
rest of the company and Jacobsen gained the standing and money to run a 
freewheeling organization. While Albatross impressed its customers, the 
inexperienced engineers learned a lot from the shipping industry.  
 
Once Albatross became a trusted supplier, customers began involving the 
dynamic positioning group in early stages of planning and the shipping 
community provided Albatross with feedback on existing products and 
inputs for new applications. The customers’ awareness of North Sea 
challenges helped Albatross expand its product portfolio and stretch the 
notion of how a DP system could be useful.  
 
Some market feedback helped to improve the dynamic positioning product, 
for example improving the tactics for getting back to where one wanted to 
be. Thrusters allocation strategy is the industry term for that operation. 
Initially, Albatross attempted to aim straight back to the target position. 
Once on a bridge, Terje Løkling of Albatross realized sea captains, who 
perform such manoeuvres regularly, do it differently. In a counter-intuitive 
manner, the captain set out in the wrong direction and gradually 
straightening up the curve in a ?-shaped manoeuvre much like a truck driver 
backing a semi-trailer. A little zigzagging turned out to be a simpler and 
more robust strategy than hitting and maintaining a perfectly straight line.290 
 
Other user inputs resulted in entirely new products. In 1977, Stolt-Nielsen 
Seaways involved Albatross in a bid to cover Statoil’s pipeline between the 
Ekofisk field and Emden in Germany. The exposed pipeline crossed Danish 
waters and Danish authorities objected to the environmental hazard and 
threatened to close it down. Because a shutdown would strangle gas 
production at Ekofisk, burying or covering the pipeline became a critical 
issue and Statoil asked construction companies to help solve the problem. 
Stolt-Nielsen Seaways proposed to dump sandbags on top of the pipeline and 
challenged Albatross to design an accurate autopilot capable of guiding the 
Seaway Sandpiper along the course of the pipeline. The best available 
autopilots had error margins of 10 or 100 metres; a dynamically positioned 
vessel might deviate no more than one metre from the track. Such accuracy 
would allow a barge to dump stones or sandbags on top of a subsea pipeline 
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with little mass wasted on the surrounding seabed. Part of the solution 
involved designing a dedicated tracking device to supplement the position 
reference systems: a carriage on the seabed followed the pipeline like a blind 
person’s white stick.291 With the assistance of Albatross, Stolt-Nielsen won 
the tender. 
 
Having switched from maintaining a position to following a course, new 
applications followed. Albatross built an application for surveillance ships 
that allowed a vessel to escort a remotely operated underwater vehicle 
equipped with a transponder. Without such software, the surveillance ships 
had to redeploy frequently when their ROVs did exploratory tasks such as 
pipeline inspection.292 
 
A major new product line from Albatross assisted shuttle tankers. In 1979, 
Ugland Management, a shipping company, brought KV to a meeting with 
Arve Johnsen at Statoil.293 Ugland owned a fleet of shuttle tankers carrying 
oil from fields with no pipeline. During such operations, a tanker would pick 
up a hose and a hawser (mooring line) and attach itself to a torrent where the 
huge ship would stay connected for between 24 and 36 hours. In order to 
avoid unnecessary strain on the hawser, the tanker manoeuvred back and 
force in phase with the oscillating torrent to reduce the strains that caused 
frequent and expensive hawser refitting and occasional delays. Keeping the 
hawser reasonably slack was difficult, but difficult in a predictable way. Like 
a pendulum, the oscillation of the torrent would have a degree of regularity. 
Using forward coupling, Albatross designed a guidance system that 
employed computers, measurement systems and propellers to speed or 
reverse the tanker and maintain a desirable distance to the torrent. 294 KV 
supplied the first offshore landing application to the Anders Wilhelmsen 
shipping company in 1981. It performed the job much more accurately than 
any captain had ever done in part because of a horizontal taut wire and the 
Artemis system that measured the distance between tanker and the torrent.295 
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Unlike regular dynamic positioning, the shuttle tanker application did not do 
away with mooring hawsers (the shuttle tankers had insufficient engine 
power to maintain position with engines only), but rather supplemented the 
operation of a moored vessel. 
 
Figure 18) Typical offshore loading connection296   
 
 
Albatross also managed to apply the principles of dynamic positioning for 
drilling rigs. In 1983, the company introduced dynamic mooring - systems 
that combined mooring and dynamic positioning. This technology addressed 
usages where mooring was the norm, but where operations could be 
somewhat improved using dynamic positioning techniques. Despite 
numerous anchors, drilling rigs would experience drift due to wind and tide 
and risk losing risers or a gangway across to the living quarter (floatel). 
Using winches, the vessel would strive to maintain its position,297 bit when 
the weather was rough, drilling operations would come to a halt and the 
drilling company would lose money. Position mooring reduced the time a rig 
spent idle and let rigs operate in otherwise forbidding waters. The system 
surveyed the mooring lines continuously, detected possible dangers and 
warned the crew when to quit operations or call for tugboat assistance. With 
this greater ability to detect and respond to dangers, the operator could hope 
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to get away with less engine power and fewer mooring lines. Furthermore, 
the operator could use Albatross PosMoor systems to automatically tighten 
and relax the mooring lines, manoeuvre more smoothly, and reduce fuel 
consumption and strain. Besides, if for some reason an anchor line would 
nevertheless break, the PosMoor system would act like a DP system, 
immediately employing the thrusters to prevent or limit the damage of 
drift.298  
 
The examples above show the beneficial effect of being close to dynamic 
customers and gaining insight into their technological challenges. In 
addition, Albatross attempted to replicate some successful business practices 
from their shipping customers.  
 
In no small part, Bendigtsen continued to act as a link between Albatross and 
the shipping industry. Upon leaving Stolt-Nielsen in 1976, he set up a 
trading company, acted as general agent, and secured several contracts. More 
importantly, he helped explain the shipping business to Albatross and 
transfer a customer-centric approach.299 He insisted Albatross should always 
keep the customer’s perspective in mind. Bendigtsen and Jacobsen knew that 
sales depended on more than technical merits. One story has Jacobsen insist 
the DP system should have brass buttons at an estimated extra cost of NOK 
50,000, a request denied by more earthbound colleagues. Another story 
related to a Dutch sales agent who suggested a “show pin-up” function for 
bored crews on three dynamically positioned dredging barges intended for 
harbour work in Dubai. 300 Possibly, some of the attempts to please were 
misguided, but they were evidence of an omnipresent customer-centric 
culture where travelling technicians on board a customer’s ship would flatter 
the captain shamelessly and seriously consider his preference for brass 
buttons. It also reflected customers who readily bought into novel 
technology. 
To some extent, employees at Albatross developed commercial instincts, but 
the business unit also attracted commercially minded people. There was 
Bjørn Trosthoel, son of a businessman who bought surplus flowers in Oslo 
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on Saturday and supplied undertakers in Vestfold for the Sunday funerals. 
Like his colleagues at Albatross, he maximized revenues in a way unheard of 
at Kongsberg and maybe not in shipping either. 301  Taut-wire position 
reference systems required a line, some instrument to measure the inclination 
of the line, and a heavy weight to anchor the line. The weight was nothing 
but a piece of scrap metal painted white for esthetical reasons; it cost NOK 
2000 to manufacture, but Albatross charged NOK 50,000. There are 
abundant stories of various sales tricks, the outcome of a friendly 
competition to sell the most.302 
 
 A final quality of the Albatross culture was the sweeping responsibilities 
granted to the employees. Both Bendigtsen and Jacobsen appreciated this 
value. Bendigtsen marvelled at the trust Jacob Stolt-Nielsen had granted him 
in running Stolt-Nilelsen Seaways, and he firmly believed empowerment 
inspired people to achieve. Jacobsen was a fan of Douglas McGregor - a 
management theorist who emphasised management based on trust and 
motivation.303 He divided management philosophies into Theory X (people 
need control) and Theory Y (people are capable of self-management). 304 
McGregor’s work was descriptive, not a prescription to let go of control, but 
his work made managers and scholars aware of the forcefulness of soft 
management techniques – in this respect he was instrumental in a general 
shift away from hierarchies and command towards something much less 
rigid.  
 
At Albatross, business success fed and underpinned the peculiar culture and 
work ethics that served the company well – it was probably irrelevant or 
misleading to talk of business practices and culture as separate issues. The 
Albatross culture transcended business success and, indeed, part of the 
Albatross culture was to pursue business success. Gradually, these 
sentiments became engraved on the business. 
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4.6 Theory Albatross: institutionalising company culture 
If initially the company culture at Albatross rested with individuals, the 
culture gradually became part of a practice. Culture building was part of a 
conscious process to make the company capable of rapid growth and less 
dependent on individuals. 
 
One night in 1979, Jacobsen felt awkward. His wife had virtually collapsed 
when their fourth child arrived; he had been bypassed as head of division 
when KV included Albatross in a new Maritime Division, and he was lonely 
drinking beer and watching television at a hotel in Calgary, Canada. Then 
Jim Bakker, the televangelist, appeared on screen. “You!” the reverend 
preached, “… who sit alone in the night with a beer watching television…” 
He spoke of empty lives, prayer and salvation – and hit the Albatross 
manager’s nerve. Jacobsen decided to quit. He mailed the Reverend Bakker 
a hundred-dollar check and visited the ministry upon leaving Albatross. 
Years later, when Bakker resigned, Jacobsen failed to join in the popular 
scorn and ridicule. Apparently, the reverend was guilty of sexual 
improprieties with a secretary, fraud involving a Christian theme park, and 
the bad judgement of installing air conditioning in a dog’s house at his 
parishioners’ expense.305 What Jacobsen nevertheless appreciated was a the 
preaching of a raw belief that bordered on irrationality, but inspired 
ambition, energy and optimism much like Jacobsen himself had done.306  
 
The natural heir to Jacobsen was his close associate, Thor Skoland. In the 
summer of 1980, however, KV placed Skoland in charge of Norcontrol AS, 
a troubled ship automation company KV had acquired back in 1978. The job 
of managing Albatross passed on to Nils Willy Gulhaugen. He was probably 
the first ever general manager at KV who was neither an officer nor an 
engineer, but a salesman at heart. Before joining the Oil Division in 1975, he 
studied applied economics at Bedriftsøkonomisk Institutt, Norway, and 
gained an MBA from the University of Wisconsin.307 He went on to head 
Albatross’s marketing effort from 1978. He was inspirational, but something 
                                                     
305 Interview with Jacobsen, 5 March 2005; for details on the Bakker scandal, there 
are Internet sources galore, see e.g. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Bakker#Scandals. 
306 On the establishment of the division, KV-Cor 142, Qvenild to board of directors, 
proposal for 2 May meeting, 27 April 1979. 
307 Interview with Gulhaugen, Kildal and Løkling, 29 October 2004. 
Bedriftsøkonomisk Institutt is nowadays referred to as BI Norwegian School of 
Management. 
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of a thinker, and relied on his Financial Manager Torfinn Kildal for 
execution and spelling out details.  
 
By the time Jacobsen left, most resented his faults and his guerrilla tactics. 
The business had matured somewhat by 1980 and a certain order was 
required, a degree of seriousness, but not a return to Kongsberg normality. 
The fact Jacobsen could leave of his own choosing despite any number of 
serious clashes with superiors was evidence of what he had helped to 
achieve. The counterculture at Albatross had been very productive and the 
Albatross management realized they should retain energy, simplicity, speed 
and creativity while making a growing number of people work in concert. 
The task was branded Theory Albatross.  
 
Theory Albatross was not without precedent. For centuries, certain 
organizations had prided themselves on a strong esprit de corps, the Catholic 
Church or the Prussian army for example. What went on at Albatross was 
similar in effect but quite opposite in approach – excessive discipline was 
not part of the package. In contemporary academic journals, there were a 
few attempts to link company culture with management and strategy.308 In 
1982, a couple of McKinsey consultants published In search of excellence, a 
bestseller that touched on the subject. 309  People everywhere seemed 
increasingly aware of the fact some organizations were held in low esteem 
and their timid employees behaved accordingly. Leif Juster, a contemporary 
Norwegian comedian, made people laugh simply by bending his neck in 
apparent shame and confessing to work for the national telecom monopoly. 
Conversely, commentators pointed to morale when explaining the persistent 
good performance of German football teams in the 1970s. The culture 
builders at Kongsberg were aware of all these contemporary developments, 
but most of all they knew well what not to do; for this they looked to the 
weapons factory next door. 
 
Theory Albatross was imposed upon new Albatross employees in a 
conscious and comprehensive effort. Knowing what attitudes to encourage, 
Gulhaugen and Kildal began a process of cultivation. They manifested the 
message in well-prepared documents and stressed repeatedly the wide 
                                                     
308 Mats Alvesson and Per Olof Berg, "Why is organizational culture so popular?" in 
Corporate culture and organizational symbolism: An overview, De gruyter studies 
in organization, 34 (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1992), XII, p. 258. 
309 One contemporary bestseller that touched the subject was Tom Peters and Robert 
H. Waterman, In search of excellence: Lessons from America's best-run companies 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1982). 
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responsibilities that rested on each individual; people were “brainwashed” 
into being individuals with a common goal and they “were very happy about 
it”. 310  They used propaganda, compensation, organization, motivation, 
management and whatever means at their disposal to underpin behaviour. A 
present-day reader examining their catchy materials might mistakenly 
dismiss them as the output of some human relations consultancy or a 
marketing campaign. Not so: the effort was heartfelt.  
Figure 19) Wild ducks in formation: excerpts from Albatross internal 
communication, ca. 1983311 
 
In the early 1980s, the company called staff meetings, shared information, 
celebrated achievements loudly, and allowed customers to take part in the 
fun. There were budget kick-offs and customer seminars with wining and 
dining - the techniques may be obvious and widespread today, but at the 
time these were innovative practices at least in Norway, not to mention in 
Kongsberg where fraternizing with customers was considered slightly 
strange. Company slogans urged employees to “live for, together with and 
by” their customers. Gulhaugen told his people they should always be 
available at the request of customers, assist in ways that created 
                                                     
310 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
311 Jenssen’s private papers; the illustrations are reproduced from an undated booklet 
“Teori Albatross” handed to each employee in 1982-1983; similar materials were in 
circulation earlier, too.  The above left drawing invokes a management metaphor (I 
want my people to be like wild, wild ducks, but even wild ducks fly in formation) 
that probably originated with Thomas J. Watson, President of IBM from the 1920s 
to the 1950s.  
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interdependence and display empathy. 312  “We help people improve their 
position” became the slogan, not ‘we build the best technology in the world’. 
Management was very explicit customers had priority ahead of routines and 
rules. The best people went to see the customers and then immediately 
turned around to do the patching.313  
  
Figure 20) The double meaning of positioning 
 
 
Customers at home and abroad tended to like the style. The company built 
such strong relations with Russian drillship operators that Soviet authorities 
kept open a border crossing at Kirkenes for Albatross service people; 
Norwegian diplomats and executives visiting the Kola peninsula had to 
make a 2500-kilometre detour by way of Moscow.314 
 
Theory Albatross served to make the product group an attractive employer. 
In a virtuous cycle merry, entrepreneurial people attracted more merry and 
entrepreneurial people. The number of employees would typically increase 
by a third each year and the new hires quickly assumed operational duties, 
not least because of Theory Albatross and other attempts to set expectations 
                                                     
312 Citation translated from KV-ex 9, Albatross market philosophy, 29 September 
1983. 
313 Interview with Gulhaugen, Kildal and Løkling, 29 October 2004, confirmed by 
interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
314 KV-ex10, Gulhaugen to Rolfsen on the marketing of products in Eastern Europe, 
8 January 1985. 
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right. Among those who joined Albatross in 1982 were the two scientists that 
wrote the high level Albatross code back in 1975-76: Jenssen and Sælid. 
 
* * * 
 
Albatross was a pioneer of sorts in spelling out the importance of human 
relations. The term had not entered the Norwegian language and Gulhaugen 
referred to the effort as “personalomsorgen” (the staff caring). Upon learning 
her husband would not make it home on a Friday evening because of work, a 
wife might receive an apologetic gift of flowers. These were small signs of 
compassion, neither strange nor outlandish, but none had ever done such 
things at Kongsberg previously and the effect was profound. Gulhaugen had 
uncovered the beauty of motivation: “I felt like putting money into a 
machine and immediately receiving double the amount,” he would recall. In 
1985, Albatross established a corporate kindergarten – not the first such 
endeavour, they were pioneered at hospitals - but quite early for an almost 
all-male engineering community and definitely the first kindergarten at 
corporate Kongsberg.315 
 
There was a gulf between the manifestations at Albatross and the staid ways 
of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. Gulhaugen recalled being rebuked by a KV 
trade union official for celebrating people with five years of employment; 
one should wait 25 years and then receive the ritual gold watch, the official 
argued. Sometimes, when people from Albatross and KV sat down with 
every intention to cooperate, they still failed to communicate; the fact their 
team was so closely knit tended to alienate outsiders. 316 Such clashes of 
mentalities bothered the Albatross management who tried to come clean of 
their anarchist past and earn themselves a proper company.317 
 
4.7 DP class certificates and their effect on innovation 
Technologies that might improve health and safety received more emphasis 
following accidents and mishaps in the 1970s, most evidently the blowout at 
                                                     
315 Interview with Gulhaugen, Kildal and Løkling, 29 October 2004 
316 On the coherence of the Albatross team, cf. KV-Cor 238, Thorbjørn Gjelstad on 
miscommunication between Albatross and KV management, Albatross [internal] 
board minutes, 22 December 1983. 
317 On the concern of KV’s management, cf. KV-Cor 238, “Albatross – Quo vadis”, 
assistant managing director Rolf E. Rolfsen to Albatross management, 9 February 
1984; on the attempts in Albatross to behave properly, cf. interview with Gulhaugen, 
29 October 2004. 
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Ekofisk Bravo in 1977. While a fountain of oil and gas emerged from Bravo, 
the Seaway Falcon used dynamic positioning from Honeywell to remain in 
place and robotic, heave-compensated, water cannons from KV to bombard 
the platform and prevented fire.318 The incident provided a sales argument 
for anyone with a technology capable of improving offshore safety, but also 
an increased interest in health and safety standards. In this climate, DNV 
authored standards for dynamically positioned vessels. The first ship to sport 
a DP class certificate from Veritas was the Tender Comet, a diving support 
ship with dynamic positioning from Honeywell that entered operations in 
1979.319  
 
As with classification standards in general, DP classification reflected the 
foremost concern at the time of its creation. In the late 1970s, computers 
were likely to crash and computer redundancy correspondingly important. 
The table (below) outlines the concept of the class regime as conceived in 
the 1970s - and as remains today. Class 1 signified a working solution that 
had no redundancy. Class 2 signified a redundant system. Redundancy in 
this respect implied not only extra computers and position reference systems, 
but an approach to detect which of the installed systems was malfunctioning. 
This required computers capable of checking each other’s configuration. 
Frequently, a Class 2 system employed three computers: the first online to 
run operations, the second off-line as a backup, and the third to continually 
monitoring the online computer and check for malfunction. The most robust 
approach, however, was for three operational computers to perform exactly 
the same job. This allowed a voting logic: if two out of three systems agreed 
on the position, chances were the third was erroneous.320  
 
The main effect of the classification regime was to simplify the process of 
acquiring technology and lower the cost of a transaction. Ordering a 
dynamically positioned vessel became less difficult when oil companies 
could rely on the classification societies to specify what they needed and 
ensure that the delivery was according to specifications. The shipping 
companies de facto outsourced the task of specifying requirements and 
assuring the quality of the suppliers.  
 
                                                     
318 On the growing importance of safety issues, cf. Ryggvik, Gullvåg, and Smith-
Solbakken, Blod, svette og olje. On the marketing impact of the Bravo incident, 
interview with Bendigtsen, 21 November 2005. 
319 Kongsberg Maritime, "Interview: Holger Røgeberg", The full picture 2004. DNV 
got extensive assistance from Albatross in outlining its DP standard. 
320 Bray, Dynamic positioning. 
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Figure 21) Touch of class: main properties of the DP classification regime321 
Class Requirements Typical 
application322 
Hardware 
implications 
Class 1 No redundancy, 
meaning loss of position 
may occur in the event 
of a single fault. 
For operations where 
loss of position would 
not endanger human 
lives, cause significant 
damage or pollution. 
One computer will 
suffice. 
Class 2 Operations can continue 
despite any single fault 
in any active system 
component (generators, 
thrusters, switchboards, 
valves.)  
Used during 
operations where loss 
of position could 
cause personnel 
injury, pollution or 
damage. 
Requires two 
independent computer 
systems, independent 
reference systems, etc. 
Class 3 Operations can continue 
despite the failure of a 
static component 
(cables, pipes, manual 
valves etc.) This means 
the system had to 
withstand flood or fire 
in any compartment.  
Used during 
operations where loss 
of position could 
cause fatal accidents, 
severe pollution or 
damage with major 
economic 
consequences 
Requires at least two 
independent computer 
systems and a backup 
system located in a 
separate compartment. 
 
 
Secondly, the classification regime made customers aware of a gold standard 
in dynamic positioning and in effect marketed expensive systems with 
                                                     
321 Composed using information from David Bray, Dynamic positioning, Oilfield 
seamanship, vol. 9 (Ledbury: Oilfield Publications Limited, 1998) and Wikipedia’s 
entity on dynamic positioning, cf. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_positioning. 
322 Only on the Norwegian Shelf were there legal requirements for what class to be 
applied in what circumstances; this column refers these demands as summarized in 
Maritime, "Interview: Holger Røgeberg". 
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multiple computers. By 1997, a triplex computer console could run for 192 
years on average without a fault. 323  Ten years later, the chances of a 
computer failure have diminished to the point where they are miniscule 
compared to the risk of an engine failure or human failure – nevertheless, the 
classification societies impose stricter provisions on computers than on such 
items as fuses or diesel engines – or indeed training.324 
 
In Norway, the classification regime offered the Maritime Directorate a tool 
to make dynamic positioning mandatory and expand the market. In Figure 
21), the second column recapitulates the criteria for applying a particular 
class of dynamic positioning. In other oil provinces, dynamic positioning 
may not be mandatory, but the guidance of the classification societies may 
nevertheless act as a semi-official regulation. Shipping companies and oil 
companies tended to heed the recommendations of classification societies, if 
for no other reason than to escape blame if something did go wrong. 
 
A final effect of the classification regime was less benign: Albatross lost a 
source of inputs. When oil companies began asking for vessels by reference 
to a class certificate, customers and suppliers no longer had to search for the 
ideal solutions, but relied on the classification societies to specify what 
technology was right. Because the shipping companies could rely on semi-
officially sanctioned presuppositions as to what they needed, it became more 
difficult for Albatross and other technology providers to suggest alternations 
and tailor solutions to specific challenges.325 The practice of issuing DP class 
certificates absolved suppliers and customers from the time-consuming, but 
highly creative, process of mapping requirements and specifying solutions. 
Such interaction had helped Kongsberg Albatross develop its solution, and 
the lack of such interaction did nothing to advance product development. 
This lack of inputs was one of several conditions that help explain why the 
basic principles of a DP system settled on a specific design and remained 
stable. The illustration below (excerpts from product brochures dated 1985 
and 1998) is circumstantial evidence of this. On a conceptual level, little 
distinguished one from the other. It was a rare feat for a high-tech company 
to retain the basics of its product brochure over the course of 13 years (or 
indeed 22 years). 
 
                                                     
323 Howard Shatto, "Reliability and risk analysis" (paper at Dynamic Positioning 
Conference, Houston, 1997), p. 26. 
324 Maritime, "Interview: Holger Røgeberg". 
325 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
123 
 
Figure 22) Splitting image: Product brochures of Kongsberg Albatross (1985) 
and Kongsberg Simrad (1998) 
 
The main conserving effect of the classification regime was to ensure 
dynamic positioning remained a stand-alone product, not to be swallowed up 
e.g. by advanced autopilots or general vessel automation. Dynamic 
positioning remains as a stand-alone solution in part because it is unfeasible 
to triple every piece of electronics on board a vessel. However, such 
protection from competition also served as a barrier to the further 
development of the technology: because classification societies tightly 
prescribed the requirements of a DP system, it became somewhat awkward 
to integrate new functionality. Albatross, thus, was entrenched in a double 
sense: its market position was hard to assail, but the bulwark prevented an 
advance into new areas of application. 
 
4.8 Conclusions 
Initially, nothing much distinguished the people that worked with marine 
systems from the people at Albatross. In both lines of business, KV put trust 
in young engineers who responded by putting down an extraordinary effort. 
The young Albatross engineers who left their wives behind at a dinner party 
one Saturday night in the late 1970s had a parallel in Ole Magnus Smeby, 
the famously hard-working head of the subsea group.326 In 2004, this author 
had great difficulty finding a time to interview the then 74-year old subsea 
engineer because he travelled extensively doing what he had been done for 
                                                     
326 For extensive anecdotal evidence of Smeby’s work ethics, cf. Daling et al., 
Offshore Kongsberg.  
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31 years: subsea engineering out of Kongsberg. In each group, people will 
work at night, if need be, with a firm conviction one must always deliver.  
 
There were dedicated people everywhere, but Albatross matched dedication 
with business sentiments. The mentalities at work reflected the outlook of 
some key people who began celebrating their successes and insisting they 
were special. There was Bjørn Barth Jacobsen, who installed in people the 
attitude required to succeed without a superior and patentable product. There 
was Thor Skoland, who made sure things did not get out of hand. Besides, 
there was a handful of people whose departure would have delayed and set 
back Albatross, but possibly not to an extent where the project would have 
been irredeemably derailed. The resulting business culture was very 
productive.  
 
What people achieve depend not only on their abilities, but also on the age in 
which they live and their environment - Albatross faced market conditions 
that boosted the achievements of hard work. In the second half of the 1970s 
and early 1980s, the dynamism of the shipping industry reinforced an 
entrepreneurial culture in the Albatross product group and shaped a business 
that differed sharply from KV. Their customers were innovative and 
businesslike, provided ideas and rewarded effort; the young engineers 
worked with customers that allowed and appreciated extensive initiative. Put 
differently, the shipping industry reinforced the culture that originated at 
Albatross.  
 
Emerging technologies frequently display diversity before a dominant design 
eventually emerges, typically due to trials, failures, habits and economics of 
scale.327 In the case of dynamic positioning, classification societies acted as 
agents for standardization. Det Norske Veritas wrote the first 
recommendation, and in the process helped cement dynamic positioning as a 
stand-alone product subject to certain standards. This advantage came at a 
cost. Where Albatross had previously shaped the choice of its customers 
through discussions and negotiations, classification societies increasingly 
shaped procurement decisions; to a certain degree, they bypassed or abridged 
the productive dialogue between Albatross and its customers. Secondary 
uses of DP technology, however, continued to emerge as Albatross got in 
touch with customers that hoped to apply the basic approach of dynamic 
positioning to a new setting – navigating a narrow course, for example, or 
reducing the strain on hawsers while loading crude onto a tanker. 
                                                     
327 Although not the starting point for studies of dominant designs, the logic is 
described with superior overview in Nelson, "The co-evolution of technology, 
industrial structure, and supporting institutions".  
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A class certificate was a means to lower transaction costs – a way of 
simplifying the order process. In this respect, the classification societies 
underpinned the division of labour between the users and manufacturers of 
marine electronics and strengthened an established pattern. In next chapter, I 
return to transaction costs and changing procurement practises in the 
offshore oil industry, where the division of labour was less elaborate.  
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5 Changing industry architecture, 1979-1985 
Around 1980, the subsea group lacked the kind of strategic overview that 
Albatross enjoyed. Unlike shipping suppliers, those who supplied 
equipment to the Norwegian oil industry relied on extensive guidance from 
their customers, who in effect made every important decision on what 
technology to employ in order to solve a particular problem. In the early 
1980s, this picture began to change and the subsea group acquired tasks that 
previously belonged exclusively in the realm of oil companies. 
 
In the late 1970s, the subsea group struggled to get across to an industry that 
preferred to make design decisions in-house and stuck with established 
procedures. Eventually, KV managed to secure an assignment by exploiting 
the concessions regime. Oil companies received concessions free of charge, 
not through auctions, in return for paying taxes, sourcing equipment from 
Norwegian suppliers and granting favours to Norwegian industry and 
research institutions. KV got a well-paid apprenticeship with Elf at North 
East Frigg. In return for this and other favours, Elf secured a concession to 
exploit the block where Snorre was found. A similar arrangement secured 
KV an advanced research assignment with Shell – which in return received 
concessions on the block where Troll was found.  
 
In the mid-1980s, the picture changed somewhat. The subsea group gained 
something to sell: not primarily the equipment Hurlen had set out to 
fabricate, but the systems expertise, services and know-how that made 
Kongsberg Offshore a valuable player in its own right, and less dependent on 
political favours. 
 
Apart from the slow accumulation of skills and experience, what particularly 
helped Kongsberg Offshore improve was a change in procurement practices 
on the Norwegian shelf. The early 1980s witnessed the introduction of 
Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) contracts that shifted 
responsibilities onto suppliers. Elsewhere, oil companies employed large in-
house engineering departments with firm opinions on how things should be 
done, or they employed advisory engineers that spelt out in detail how things 
should be done. The Norwegian oil companies lacked large in-house 
engineering departments, and the national engineering champion that Statoil 
hoped to nurture, NPC, had begun to disintegrate. Rather, they absolved 
themselves of detailed engineering and began purchasing equipment based 
on comparably simple specifications and functional descriptions of the end 
result. It was for the main contractor to build the equipment, buy it, invent it, 
or solve the task in whichever way they saw fit. The role and stature of 
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suppliers grew in response to this shift in procurement practices – the 
industry architecture changed. The subsea group increasingly influenced the 
choice of its customers and allowed the concerns of customers to influence 
designs. 
 
5.1 Lobbying for a role alongside oil companies 
Around 1980, oil companies rather than engineering companies possessed 
the most useful experience in devising subsea solutions. KV’s first proper 
subsea assignments arrived courtesy of oil companies that needed to please 
the authorities with which KV enjoyed close relations. 
  
Like shipping companies, oil companies rarely manufactured tools, but 
preferred to acquire technology from suppliers. Unlike shipping customers, 
however, oil companies tended to specify what solution to apply in order to 
solve a particular problem and sometimes designed equipment in quite 
minute detail. Besides, oil companies frequently took upon themselves to 
integrate equipment into working technological systems. In short, oil 
companies continued to possess key technology. 
 
Apart from oil companies, only their advisory engineers retained an 
overview. The advisors were large consulting companies, such as Brown & 
Root, which sketched every aspect of a platform. In the 1970s, oil companies 
everywhere bought their services. When developing an offshore field, oil 
companies or their engineering management contractor (e.g. Norwegian 
Petroleum Consultants) selected components or sub-systems from various 
manufacturers.328 All planning, projecting and engineering was done before 
selecting suppliers, of whom little was expected except the proper execution 
according to drawings – whether they worked or not. This procedure limited 
the suppliers’ responsibility and their capacity to innovate – and their room 
for making errors. Statoil adopted the same procedure, the issuing of 
fabrication contracts.  
 
In the field of deepwater technology, the division of labour that marked the 
1970s allowed suppliers of technology rather less room than was the case in 
the 1960s. In part, the suppliers were themselves to blame Lockheed and 
other aerospace companies had developed equipment that was too 
sophisticated. “Blowout preventers and Christmas trees became towering 
monuments of steel with a towering price-tag to match”, one industry 
                                                     
328 Smeby’s private papers, Dixon Associates, “Subsea oil well completion and 
production systems: a current evaluation”, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. 
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observer remarked. 329  Put simply, the aerospace companies disappointed 
their customers with unreliable products and high prices. Most aerospace 
companies then disappeared from the market and oil companies took charge 
of technology development; costs levelled off, and a new realism arrived in 
the industry. By 1980, specialist suppliers continued to play a significant 
role, but they rarely attempted independent technology development and 
mostly took their cue from oil companies. KV and Cameron played to this 
script.  
 
Because oil companies retained control of their technological systems, they 
could accommodate special concerns – and they could be called upon to 
accommodate special concerns. In the highly political nature of the oil 
economy, KV could leverage its excellent connections to gain subsea 
assignments. 
 
Since 1965, the Norwegian authorities had granted licenses to explore and 
develop oil fields on the Norwegian Shelf. Concessions were nominally free, 
but the receiver accepted a set of terms collectively known as Technology 
Agreements, i.e. various commitments to develop Norwegian industry. 
Initially, the receiver of a concession was expected only to support 
Norwegian oil-related industry, but when the fourth round of concessions 
was announced in April 1978, the scope broadened. The Norwegian 
authorities placed emphasis on the oil companies’ wider cooperation with 
Norwegian industry.330 KV managed to turn the procedure into a tool for the 
company’s subsea strategy. 
 
Technology development received more attention in the late 1970s. The 
costs of building the Statfjord platforms were much higher than expected, 
particularly Statfjord A. Conceived as an up-scaled version of Mobil’s Beryl 
platform, it ended up costing three times as much.331 Inflation and capacity 
problems in the supplier industry explained part of the cost overrun. In 
addition, a substantial extra charge occurred from hasty and inadequate 
initial planning fully equipped, the platform would have been too heavy for a 
tow and certain modules had to be retrofitted in the field causing delays and 
substantial extra costs. The operator, Mobil, had been constrained in its 
choice of suppliers and consultants and substantial costs went into 
                                                     
329 Booth, "North Sea: Testbed for advanced subsea production". 
330 Jostein Dahl Karlsen, "Forhandling og tilpasning under usikkerhet: En studie av 
industrisamarbeidsordningen 1978-1986", (Diploma, BI Norwegian School of 
Management, 1988), pp. 15 and 27. 
331 Cf. footnote 175. 
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transferring competencies to Statoil and Norwegian suppliers.332 The Moe 
Commission, which investigated the cost overruns, did not comment on the 
technological style that Statoil and Mobil had chosen, but people in the 
industry began questioning the economic viability of the huge platforms. 
“Have the giant concrete production platforms outplayed their role?” ran one 
introduction in Scandinavian Oil and Gas Magazine. The article referred to 
the progress of Shell Petroleum in finding new and cost-efficient approaches 
to extract oil from great depths including the Spar platforms that resembled 
giant buoys. 333 In the mid-1970s, establishing a production capacity capable 
of one barrel per day cost less than GBP 100 in the Saudi desert, about 400 
offshore Nigeria and 900 in the Gulf of Mexico. 334  Statfjord A, by 
comparison, required GBP 2000 in investments for each barrel of 
capacity. 335  Hence, the cost overruns served to raise the interest in 
alternatives to the Norwegian Style gravity platform.  
 
The fourth round of concessions followed in the aftermath of a failed gambit 
aimed at trading oil concessions for industrial prowess. During 1978, Hauge 
had negotiated a deal granting a Swedish automotive company, Volvo, 
substantial ownership on the Norwegian shelf in return for offering 40 per 
cent of the company’s stock to Norwegians. The negotiations touched upon 
how to apply Volvo’s broad industrial expertise to subsea developments. 
When Swedish shareholders rejected the gambit in January 1979, Statoil 
became generally more interested in the supplier industry and generally 
more receptive to KV’s concerns about subsea systems.336 
 
Hurlen was deft at exploiting opportunities offered by the technology 
agreements. When the government linked the concession regime with 
industrial policy, Hurlen shared his thoughts with the Ministry of oil and 
                                                     
332 Johannes Moe et al., "Rapport fra styringsgruppen oppnevnt ved kongelig 
resolusjon av 16. Mars 1979", Kostnadsanalysen norsk kontinentalsokkel, Volume 2, 
(Oslo: Ministry of oil and energy, 1980). 
333 "Shell raises the veil: How to produce petroleum from great water depths", 
Scandinavian oil-gas magazine, 1978, 43 ff. On the SPAR design, cf. Figure 41) on 
p. 149. 
334 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby, “A Norwegian activity on subsea completion / 
deep water production systems”, 11 November 1975. 
335 Cf. footnote 175. 
336 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild, memo from 14 December meeting with Statoil, 19 
December 1979: “Vi har jo bl.a. tidligere diskutert samarbeid på 
undervannssystemsiden med Volvo. Dette var i Volvo-avtalens heteste dager – og 
når Volvo ikke fikk konsesjon, døde diskusjonen bort.” 
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energy on how the authorities could assist KV. Primarily, KV wanted first-
hand experience with a comparably simple subsea development. Secondly, a 
research assignment on advanced components: risers for greater depths, 
manifolds, valves, process equipment, control systems or maintenance 
techniques.337 Hurlen identified Shell as a leading company in the field.338 In 
the autumn of 1978, as if to strengthen KV’s hand, the ministry asked oil 
companies what concrete plans they had to cooperate with Norwegian 
industry and research institutes on “deep-water technology”.339 
 
The ministry’s letter established a separate category of favours that 
Norwegian authorities expected from the oil companies, tilbudsavtalene 
(hereinafter referred to as “arranged proposals”). The arranged proposals 
invited oil companies to do specific work with a specific partner; the 
remaining technology agreements placed general obligations on the oil 
companies, namely a commitment to do as much research and development 
as possible in Norway and no less than 50 per cent of the research and 
development related to the block on offer.340  
 
In the autumn of 1978, KV made 14 oil companies aware of the match 
between what KV needed and what the ministry asked them to contribute.341 
Elf was of particular interest. The company had done pioneer work on 
subsea development in Grondin outside West Africa. In the second round of 
concessions, Elf got hold of the blocks that contained huge amounts of gas: 
Heimdal (1972), Frigg (1971), and several minor adjacent gas reservoirs, 
East Frigg (1973), Lille Frigg (1975) and North East Frigg (1974). The 
                                                     
337 KV-Cor 242, Qvenild to Ministry of industry (Hernes), 4 January 1979. 
338 KV-Cor 248, Hurlen to Ministry of oil and energy (Tamburstuen) with copy to 
Statoil and Shell, 3 July 1978. 
339 The communication between the Ministry of oil and energy and the oil 
companies is cited in KV-Cor 242, Qvenild to Herns (industridept), 4 January 1979. 
The government’s policy was later stated in a White Paper, St.meld nr. 63 (1978-
79). 
340 The various arrangements are recapitulated in Karlsen, "Forhandling og 
tilpasning under usikkerhet: En studie av industrisamarbeidsordningen 1978-1986", 
and Heidi Wiig and Svein Olav Nås, "Teknologiavtalene som insentiv i norsk 
forskningspolitikk", Notat / NTNF programmet Fremtidsrettet teknologipolitikk ; 
14/92, (Oslo: Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige forskningsråd, 1992). 
341 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report dated 26 October 1978; KV-Cor 242, Qvenild to 
Ministry of industry (Hernes), 4 January 1979. 
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adjacent fields were suitable for subsea satellite developments.342 Elf had an 
office in Oslo to deal with government relations, in effect seeking out what 
would be a good political move. In 1979, someone hinted it might be a good 
move if the French government made SNECMA, a French jet engine 
manufacturer, cooperate with KV and straighten out a certain problem with 
25 per cent spare capacity at Kongsberg. 343  In the modus operandi of 
gentlemen, Elf was advised to look into KV’s subsea interests. Headquarters 
in Paris then issued instructions to Elf Norway, which made a deal with 
KV.344 Qvenild, who spoke fluent French and had a degree from INSEAD, 
was a valuable facilitator. 
 
In early 1979, Elf offered KV a subsea assignment at North East Frigg, a 
pocket of gas 17 kilometres from the Frigg complex. Next, the two parties 
formalized this into an arranged proposal (tilbudsavtale). Elf sent a letter to 
the ministry offering to share its knowledge with KV and other Norwegian 
partners. KV countered with a letter stating the company wanted to become a 
subsea expert, but had no useful experience. The lack of competencies 
became a sales argument for hiring KV. Elf was to assist KV in the 
implementation and grant KV freedom to resell the intellectual property that 
originated from the cooperation.345 The purpose of the letter exchange was to 
establish a set of conditions, not legally binding in the strictest sense, but that 
hardly mattered: the government not only acted as arbitrator, but also 
occasionally granted concessions free of charge in a rich oil province. The 
prospect of future grants obviously inclined Elf to withhold any second 
thought about KV’s ability as a main contractor or any misgivings about 
letting KV exploit its intellectual property. 
 
Elf was a valuable partner, but Shell had an even more extensive and 
valuable subsea experience. In the autumn of 1978, KV discussed how Shell 
                                                     
342 Historien til elf petroleum norge 1965 - 2001 (Total E&P Norge, [cited April 
2007]); available from 
http://www.total.no/no/About+TOTAL+NORGE/History/Elf/index.aspx. 
343 The deal is referred in KV-Cor 248, Qvenild, letter to Ministry of oil and energy 
(Himle), 4 May 1982. 
344 Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
345 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild, telex to Hauge with Elf’s draft of letter to the Ministry of 
oil and energy, 7 February 1979. The vetted letter was sent from Elf to the Ministry, 
cf. KV-Cor 248, Elf Aquitaine Norway (Isoard) to KV, copy of letter to Ministry of 
oil and energy, 14 February 1979. KV approved, cf. KV-Cor 242, Qvenild to 
Ministry of oil and energy (Wattne) with copies to Elf, Statoil and the Ministry of 
industry, 14 February 1979. 
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could specify and finance a subsea project for KV to deliver. KV wanted 
proprietary rights to any technology developed during the project 346  and 
involved Statoil in the negotiations to add gravitas - but also complications. 
Shell was concerned about giving Statoil, a competitor, access to 
technology.347 Nevertheless, KV managed to forge an agreement with Shell, 
although an agreement more vague than the one with Elf and one that 
primarily offered KV a role in assessing components in future research and 
development projects.348  
 
Having secured deals with Elf and Shell, KV enlisted Statoil to ensure these 
two companies received a pay-off in the fourth round of concessions. In 
March 1979, Statoil co-authored a letter to the Ministry of oil and energy to 
confirm that both Statoil and KV needed the kind of experience offered by 
Elf and Shell.349 When concessions were offered in April 1979, most blocks 
went to Norwegian companies: Hydro, Saga and Statoil. Only two 
multinationals had reasons to be satisfied: Elf and Shell. The French got 
parts of the block where Oseberg was found; Shell got a large share of the 
block where Troll, at that time the world’s largest offshore gas reservoir, was 
found.350 If the industrial ambitions of KV played any part in the awards, 
being friends with KV provided spectacular payback. 
 
5.2 KV as a subsea apprentice 
Having received the hoped-for concessions in 1979, Elf duly employed KV 
and Cameron in the development of a subsea solution for North East Frigg. 
Cameron was to supply parts, and KV was to become the main contractor. 
This division of labour was the result of a drawn-out dispute. 
 
Both Cameron and Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk sported a manufacturing bias. 
Their business was product ownership, product fabrication and product 
sales. When Cameron and KV began to collaborate on subsea technology in 
the mid-1970s, the shared emphasis on products and manufacturing 
                                                     
346 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report, 26 October 1978. 
347 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild to Hurlen and Aasland, memo from meeting with Shell, 16 
October 1978. 
348 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board reports dated 13 August 1979 and 6 November 1979. 
349 Drafts of letters from the Ministry to Elf and Shell were initially written at 
Kongsberg, cf. KV-Cor 248, KV (Qvenild) and Statoil (Ager-Hanssen) to Ministry 
of oil and energy (Wattne), 2 March 1979. 
350 For a brief overview, cf. Nerheim, Det norske oje-eventyret ([cited).  
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hampered their cooperation. Specifying a meaningful division of labour 
between the two was difficult since both wanted ownership and 
manufacturing assignments. KV hoped to manufacture advanced BOP stacks 
on behalf of Cameron, but following the rig bust in 1975, the market for 
blowout preventers and offshore drilling equipment diminished to the point 
where Cameron Iron Works could meet demand with existing capacity. This 
suited Cameron, which preferred in-house manufacturing. 351  KV, 
furthermore, hoped to develop new products in partnership with Cameron, 
but Cameron was anxious to protect its core competencies from a partner 
that hoped one day to manufacture proprietary oil tools in a factory at 
Kongsberg or by the sea.352 
 
Denied its familiar role as a manufacturer by a protectionist partner, KV 
negotiated a different role, that of a “contractor in Norwegian waters and for 
systems sold to Norwegian clients” [my emphasis]. The role KV secured for 
itself involved tasks that Cameron either did not want or considered to be 
within the realms of oil companies: “system layout, design of special parts to 
integrate standard Cameron components, design components and subsystems 
where Cameron has no presence, design electronic equipment, 
instrumentation and control system packaging” and to “assemble and test the 
systems”.353 KV got the presumably less important task of making the nuts 
and bolts that surrounded Cameron’s equipment. This included system 
integration, a task that, at the time, rested with oil companies and sometimes 
with their main contractors – no loss for Cameron. Cameron was confident 
that its command of the valve tree was what mattered. Cameron abandoned 
its control system business in 1978 despite having bought a supplier a few 
years earlier. The company believed it earned less from the sale of systems 
than from the sale of individual components and focused narrowly on 
Christmas trees and certain other parts. Besides, Cameron Iron Works had 
few competitive advantages in control systems.354  
                                                     
351 Husemoen’s private papers, Leif Husemoen, memorandum on the history of 
Kongsberg Offshore Systems, 22 September 1998. Smeby’s private papers, Smeby 
to Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: activity status and future prospects”, 29 
June 1981. 
352 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: 
activity status and future prospects, 29 June 1981. 
353 KV-Cor 243, memorandum of understanding between KV and Cameron Iron 
Works regarding engineering, marketing & production cooperation on subsea 
completion and control systems, 26 March 1976. 
354 KV-Cor 248, Smeby, agenda for meeting with Cameron dated 2 November 1977 
and memorandum on meeting with Cameron about control systems dated 9 January 
1978. 
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At North-East Frigg, KV became the official “main contractor”. Actual 
management and experience, however, resided with Elf’s engineers who had 
built subsea systems at Grondin off Gabon in West Africa, and with 
Cameron, which had supplied valve trees for numerous developments 
including the one at Grondin. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the “main 
contractor” handled straightforward tasks such as designing a template (the 
steel structure to encompass the system) and refining the hydraulics on the 
experimental electro-hydraulic (multiplex) control systems that Elf bought 
from Matra. 355  Cameron agreed to perform the assembly and testing in 
Norway, which offered KV some useful experience, but Cameron’s quality 
demands strained the economics of the assignment. 356  Developing North 
East Frigg cost NOK 1.9 billion, of which KV supplied services worth five 
per cent, and most of this small share (70 per cent) originated from the 
reselling of Cameron equipment.357 No task rested solely on KV. 
 
Figure 23) Big hat – no cattle: KV’s assignments on North East Frigg358 
Task Supplier 
Main contractor for subsea station KV (with guidance from Elf and 
assistance from Comex and Cameron) 
Valve tree Cameron 
Templates KV/Comex 
Control system Cameron 
Installation Comex / Stolt-Nielsen 
Articulated tower Kværner and French partner 
Experimental electro hydraulic control KV and Matra 
Wellheads and maintenance KV and ACB 
Installation Herema 
                                                     
355 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board reports dated 8 May 1980 and 7 May 1981. 
356 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board reports dated 8 May 1980 and 30 October 1980. 
357 The costs of North East Frigg appear in the annual report of the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, cf. St.mld. 8, 1984-85. KV’s turnover from the project are 
stated in various communications, using various figures within the same general 
ballpark (NOK 100-110 million in 1986 denomination), cf. KV-Cor 244, Kongsberg 
Offshore Systems information memorandum, 14 January 1986; RA-Arntzen-Oil, 
board reports dated 6 November 1979 and 8 May 1980. 
358 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild, letter to Statoil (Johnsen et. al.) in preparation of 18 
January meeting, 15 January 1980. 
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The pretence to leadership backfired on KV when Elf disapproved of the 
quality of the valve trees and demanded a replacement. Cameron pointed to 
KV. As main contractor, KV was responsible, but hardly in a position to 
foresee or counteract the problem. People at Kongsberg suspected 
Cameron’s new production facility in Leeds was not up to the task and that 
their partner neglected the project to demonstrate KV’s lack of 
competence.359 The incident strained KV’s relationship with Cameron and 
revealed a standing conflict. Cameron valued KV’s connections, not its 
technological prowess, and kept pushing its Norwegian partner to focus on 
sales and lobbying. 360  KV, on the other hand, found its partner 
complacent.361 The more KV strived to master technology, the more difficult 
its relationship with Cameron became.  
 
* * * 
 
North East Frigg was but the first of a string of subsea related assignments 
that Kongsberg Offshore (the subsea group) secured during the early 1980s. 
The team began to assemble useful knowledge, but assignment generally 
originated from a political intervention, for example through provisions in 
the technology agreements that required foreign oil companies to spend 
money on Norwegian research and development. Between 1980 and 1985, 
the subsea group secured assignments worth NOK 387 million (see list 
below) – far more than the company could have hoped for in a competitive 
market. Each of these assignments brought not only revenues but also 
technology transfer. 362  KV probably received half of all funds spent on 
subsea research in Norway including what oil companies did in-house before 
1985 and maybe 90 per cent of what was spent actually building solutions.363 
                                                     
359 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report, 20 October 1981. 
360 Various incidents are referred e.g. in Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg, or KV-
Cor 248, Smeby, minutes from 5 May meeting with Cameron in Houston, 20 June 
1977. 
361 KV-Cor 245, Smeby, memo from meeting with Norsk Hydro (Tuxen), 17 March 
1976. 
362 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report, 8 May 1980. The list does not include paid studies 
such as those commissioned by Deminex and Statoil, only projects that involved a 
technology transfer from the party that commissioned the project to KV. 
363 There are no official accounts on total research in this niche, but some numbers 
figure in Tore Andvig, "Undervannskonstruksjoner" (paper presented at NTNF-
seminar: Norsk oljeforskning - 80 årenes petroleumsindustri: Oljeforskningen og 
næringslivets plass i fremtidig petroleumsvirksomhet, NTH, Trondheim, 11-12 June 
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However, the various subsea assignments that KV secured in the early 
1980s were not so much proof the company possessed valuable 
competencies, but rather an important step in building such competencies. 
 
Figure 24) Learning experiences, 1980-1986364 
Year Project Sponsor Value 
mNOK 
1980-83 North East Frigg Elf 110 
1982-86 Acoustic subsea control system  AGIP & Shell 45 
1982-84 Connector test and design Shell 10 
1983-85 Cold tapping for repair of 
pipelines  
Total 30 
1983-85 Skuld system Elf 80 
1980-83 Riser program Shell 4 
1984 Leek monitoring Shell 20 
1982 Troll technology studies Shell 25 
1984 Dimos manifold for 600 metres 
depth 
Shell 40 
1985-86 Tie-in, etc. Total / Statoil 15 
1985 Downhole BOP Statoil / 
Smedvig 
6 
1984-85 Offshore loading system Statoil / Mobil 2 
 TOTAL  387 
 
5.3 EPC contracts and their effect on innovation 
At North East Frigg, Kongsberg Offshore secured a somewhat hollow role as 
“main contractor”. In practice, the important decisions rested with Elf. Like 
in previous decades, no oil company seriously considered purchasing a total 
subsea system from one supplier . 365 A set of developments in the early 
                                                                                                                            
1985), p. 51 ff. For turnover from the various research assignments KV received, cf. 
Figure 24) on p. 88. 
364 KV-Cor 244, KV to Aker, background for company presentation, 5 March 1986. 
365 Dixon Associates, ”Subsea oil well completion and production systems: a current 
evaluation”, Houston, Texas, 31 August 1973. 
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1980s turned this situation around and gave substance to KV’s superfluous 
role as main contractor. The main contractor worked to fulfil Engineering 
Procurement Construction (EPC) contracts. 
 
The use of EPC contracts for offshore deliveries was a novelty that was 
pioneered on the Norwegian shelf. When such procedures gained ground in 
the 1980s, they served to shift more responsibility from oil companies onto 
the supplier industry. Because EPC contracts usually would cover a rather 
complex product, a system or a module, the supplier industry shifted focus 
from being suppliers of parts to becoming providers of solutions. We will 
argue that greater discretion helped foster innovation. Furthermore, by 
simplifying the process of ordering subsea systems and lowering the cost of 
doing transactions, EPC contracts strengthened the role of independent 
suppliers in relation to the integrated oil companies. 
 
The established procedure for ordering offshore equipment was expensive. 
In Norway, the combination of bureaucratic central engineering, the use of 
huge gravity platforms and the involvement of a protected, local supplier 
industry became a recipe for cost overruns. Statfjord A was always 
something of a special case, but the cost overruns continued on the almost 
identical Statfjord B; despite their close resemblance, NPC and Brown & 
Root spent 400-500 man-years on detailed specification.366 Frequently, the 
planners had to adjust drawings to fit the competencies of individual 
suppliers. The oil companies added yet more costs by establishing shadow 
organisations to monitor the engineering and manufacturing firms they had 
hired. Some areas of work and responsibility tended to overlap and to secure 
cooperation and guard against litigation, the bureaucracy sprawled further 
still.367 In the process, the shortage of skilled engineers worsened and wages 
skyrocketed.  
 
In establishing NPC back in 1975, Statoil and KV had consciously 
circumscribed the role of Aker and Kværner in specifying designs, but 
neither Statoil nor KV had any interest in suffocating creativity. The issue 
was contentious because the fabrication contracts tended to specify in 
excessive detail what the suppliers should provide. 368  Big Norwegian 
                                                     
366 KV-Cor 245, Qvenild to Hurlen and Aasland, minutes from meeting with Statoil 
(Ager-Hansen), 23 June 1977. 
367 Engeland, "Ingeniørfabrikk på norsk", p. 138 with reference to interview with 
Olav Lappegaard, 3 June 1998. 
368 Cf. p. 28. KV-Cor 245, Qvenild to Hurlen and Aasland, minutes from meeting 
with Statoil (Ager-Hansen), 23 June 1977. 
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engineering companies, particularly Aker and Kværner, argued that such 
procurement procedures locked the industry out of the creative phase of 
offshore projects and constrained their opportunity to develop capabilities.369 
In their capacity as ship builders, large construction companies such as Aker 
and Kværner were used to taking on rather extensive responsibility in the 
delivery of ships including the integration of equipment and a considerable 
amount of the engineering. Shipping companies provided mainly functional 
requirements, and the yards themselves had a certain freedom to solve tasks. 
 
Meanwhile, on the Murchison field that bordered both Norwegian and 
British territory, Conoco delivered an integrated production platform without 
cost overruns. In part, Conoco simplified the job by placing fewer orders 
with larger suppliers. The platform that came into production in 1980 
employed only 14 modules compared with the 37 modules that spawned the 
extensive deck of Statfjord B. Conoco, furthermore, handled most of the 
conceptual design in-house and allowed the supplier industry itself to design 
more solutions. This approach halved the resources spent on third-party 
engineering compared with the approach used e.g. on Statfjord B.370  
 
The success of such less intrusive planning, along with dissatisfaction 
amongst the biggest suppliers and a lack of skilled Norwegian engineers, 
made Statoil reconsider the use of engineering management contractors. 
From 1981, the company hired project service contractors (PCS) for less 
extensive support tasks in the same fashion Conoco had done on Murchison. 
The practice of employing a large firm of technical consultants to plan and 
execute field developments withered. In Norway, the attraction of large 
independent engineering firms diminished further because Aker and 
Kværner withdrew from NPC in 1982. NPC had few engineers among its 
staff, but drew on the employees and resources of its participating 
companies.371  
 
Unlike its international competitors, Statoil lacked sufficient in-house 
capabilities to replace third-party engineers. Statoil had refrained from 
building a large engineering department in-house, and preferred to rely on 
Norwegian Petroleum Consultants in which KV and companies associated 
with Hurlen played a major part. Bereft of a strong partner capable of 
running huge centralized development projects, Statoil opted for a new 
                                                     
369 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", p. 133, drawing on an interview with Tore 
Bergersen, 19 September 1997. 
370 Engeland, "Ingeniørfabrikk på norsk".  
371 Ibid., p. 39. 
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procedure: Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) contracts. Rather 
than assuming responsibilities themselves, oil companies operating in 
Norway adopted the approach of shipping / shipbuilding. When issuing EPC 
contracts, oil companies provided the supplier (the main contractor) with 
functional requirements and conceptual sketches, while the suppliers took 
upon themselves to plan the work, acquire supplies and assemble the 
equipment. After the bureaucratic excess of Statfjord, it became more 
common to place EPC contracts with Norwegian yard, not for complete 
platforms, but for straightforward modules such as living quarters, buoys for 
loading and various steel structures – these were tasks where the yards 
routinely took on full responsibility when building ships. 372  In effect, a 
considerable planning procedure was shifted from the oil company to the 
supplier company. 
 
At the time the old approach to fabrication contracts began to unravel, Statoil 
was planning its first assignment as field development operator. The field in 
question, Gullfaks, would host three giant Condeeps just like Statfjord, only 
this time Statoil would add some subsea satellites to drain distant parts of the 
reservoir. Although the subsea wells would be well within the reach of 
divers, KV suggested a diverless system to gain useful knowledge for future 
assignments. Due to excellent relations and appeals to Statoil’s need for a 
future subsea supplier, KV got the assignment. 373  A breakthrough with 
significance beyond the technological arena, Statoil used the EPC procedure 
to procure the subsea system. This was the first time ever an oil company 
bought a subsea package consisting of engineering, procurement and 
construction. The contract offered only a brief summary of what Statoil 
wanted, and it was for KV to plan the details.374 Statoil hired more suppliers 
to perform adjacent tasks such as testing, installation and the delivery of 
umbilicals (a hose for the supply of hydraulic power, chemicals and 
particularly electric signals subsea). 
 
Although KV was in charge for the Gullfaks delivery, the task of building 
and assembling the system went to various subcontractors. Cameron 
supplied wellheads and valve trees and Ferranti supplied the control system. 
Ideally, the main contractor (KV) was to use a proprietary control system 
                                                     
372 SINTEF and Asbjørn Habberstad A/S, "Norsk offshoreindustris 
konkurranseevne", (Trondhjem: SINTEF, 1985). 
373 KV-Cor 243, Qvenild to Statoil (Johnsen et. al.), memo in preparation of 18 
January meeting, 15 January 1980; KV-Cor 243, Qvenild, memo in preparation for 
Statoil meeting, 6 June 1983; Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
374 Interview with Smeby, 20 September 2004. 
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since guidance was integral to the system, but Statoil preferred a tried and 
tested solution and bought a system from Ferranti before KV got its EPC 
contract. In the aftermath, Statoil arranged for the contract to be transferred 
to a new company, Kongsberg Subsea Controls A/S, in which KV owned 51 
per cent and Ferranti 49 per cent of the stocks.375 Regardless of who supplied 
any subsystem in question, the Oil Division now had undisputed overall 
responsibility.376 
 
Figure 25) Now you fix! Contract strategies at North East Frigg (1980) and 
Gullfaks A (1984)377 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At a fixed price of NOK 270 millions, the Gullfaks contract was probably 
lucrative, but it involved risks and responsibilities. Previously, KV’s Oil 
Division mostly got reimbursements for whatever work was done or package 
contracts where each supplier delivered a part and the oil company assumed 
the risk for every interface.378 KV had usually been able to shift whatever 
costs occurred onto the customer. In a publication written for the 25th 
anniversary of the Oil Division, one of the pioneers recalled with joy how 
the team “got to romp around without a thought for money”. KV was paid by 
the hour and earned money regardless of any technical problems that might 
arise. The EPC contract, however, forced KV to take responsibility for every 
                                                     
375 KV-Cor 242 includes much material on the subject, e.g. KV board paper, 20 
March 1985. 
376 KV-Cor 243, Weibye to Qvenild, 15 December 1982.  
377 Steenstrup’s private papers, Carl J. Steenstrup, "The changing philosophy of 
contracting: An international perspective" in Contract Risk Management for 
Upstream Oil & Gas (Calgary: FMC Energy Systems, 2004). 
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incorrectly bent hydraulic pipe and each incorrect fit. Since there was 
nobody to shield the contractor from mistakes, the impact of trial and error 
was strongly felt and lessons readily drawn. A number of engineers recalled 
the terrific experience of being relied upon to punch above one’s weight. 379  
 
For the supplier industry, the practice of handling EPC contracts spurred 
innovations. Previously, when oil companies handled technology 
development through centralized planning, just a few people from their 
central staff attained a full overview: according to one Statoil manager, it 
“was an industry where nobody had a very large - a general overview - and 
there was nobody that was responsible for the totality”.380 The practice of 
handing out EPC contracts changed the picture by assigning responsibility 
for the totality onto a specialist supplier. This supplier, in turn, lavished 
attention on weak links and critical issues – the reverse salients that held 
back the advance of subsea petroleum production. Previously, when the 
industry relied on fabrication contracts, suppliers focused on delivering 
flawless components – ever better valve trees or pipes. It appeared some of 
the greatest shortcomings rested not with given components, but rather in the 
area of system integration: ways of assembling, fitting and refitting the 
system. KV, for example, placed much emphasis on tie-in systems to 
connect equipment under water. The subsea systems at Gullfaks required 
novel ways to fit equipment to avoid the use of divers.  
Figure 26) Diverless tie-in381 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
379 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
380 Quoted from Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", based on interview with Jostein 
Ravndal (Statoil), 15 October 1997. 
381 A freehand drawing by Halvorsen, interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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Apart from technical expertise, Kongsberg Offshore learned how to 
collaborate closely with customers. Some 20 Statoil people came to 
Kongsberg to follow the Gullfaks project.382 Because Statoil had refrained 
from specifying every detail, the people involved had to sort out ambiguous 
details and did so with a degree of flexibility that surprised the non-
Norwegians involved. 383  In the course of the project, the Oil Division 
improved its project management skills and pioneered internal control and 
computer-assisted project management with the assistance of Statoil.384 
 
Furthermore, the practice of handling EPC contracts had strategic 
implications – it realigned the industry architecture. Forward-looking 
people at the oil division, Jørgen Haslestad among others, eyed an 
opportunity to gain the upper hand, not only through the control of 
products and product rights, but by assuming responsibility for the 
performance of the complete system. They managed to do so partly 
because of a lack of response on behalf of the industry leader, Cameron 
Iron Works. In Cameron’s perception (and mostly in the opinion of 
Norwegian engineers too), he who controlled the valve tree controlled the 
subsea development. The Americans thought it odd to order a whole 
system and assign responsibility for the delivery through an EPC contract. 
The practice did not fit the philosophy of the Texans; they failed to 
understand the logic – possibly, they did not want to understand the logic, 
as it relegated the status of the product experts and elevated the status of a 
new kind of supplier that acted as a go-between for the oil companies.385 
 
In isolation, the EPC contracts paved the way for a little less hierarchy and a 
bit more decentralized decision-making in the Norwegian offshore industry. 
It strengthened the role of a supplier industry separate from the oil 
companies and created a new sort of company: a main contractor capable of 
influencing designs and sourcing supplies.  
 
5.4 Regulation conserving the industry architecture 
In isolation, the EPC procedure allowed supplier companies an increased 
role in relation to oil companies. There were other issues, however, that 
                                                     
382 Arne Eide, "Kv senter for undervannsteknologi?", Drammens Tidende Buskeruds 
Blad, 1985. 
383 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
384 Interview with Smeby, 20 September 2004. 
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worked to constrain the role of suppliers in relation to oil companies. The 
legal framework on the Norwegian shelf worked to preserve a dominant role 
for integrated oil companies, and reduce the scope of tasks that suppliers 
could handle. Due to regulation, oil companies working in the North Sea had 
to handle more tasks internally, and rely less on suppliers, than oil 
companies in the Gulf of Mexico. The first attempts to introduce floating 
production facilities demonstrated the conserving effects of regulation. 
 
Companies that sought to provide production equipment and services faced a 
set of difficulties. An interesting example related to floating production 
facilities. While Condeeps continued to dominate the Norwegian shelf, 
floating production systems began to appear in other oil provinces. British 
Petroleum introduced floating production on the Buchan field in 1981 and 
began work on an experimental single well oil production system (SWOP) 
that received a lot of attention in the mid 1980s. A SWOP was a tanker, 250 
metres long, equipped to extract and process oil from a single well before 
heading towards a terminal to unload the crude.386 
 
In Norway, alternative ways of extracting oil met with resistance. In the mid-
1980s, Hydro began questioning the widespread use of Condeeps. The 
company was operator on the Silver Block (Oseberg) in which Statoil owned 
a majority stake. Statoil pushed for a field development similar to Statfjord 
whereas Hydro wanted to combine an integrated platform with a separate 
production platform made of steel. Hydro’s approach was somewhat more 
complex and possibly more expensive, but offered a number of advantages. 
Most importantly, when employing a steel platform, a rig could drill and 
complete the wells in advance allowing Hydro to retrofit the platform on top 
of a completed well and cut time-to production. Furthermore, the steel 
production platform could offload the concrete platform and possibly 
increase its ability to process oil and gas from satellite developments. 
Statoil’s traditional field developments did not allow early production from 
pre-drilled wells and imposed space constraints that made the platforms ill 
fitted for additional tasks. Statfjord, for example, lacked room for engines 
and pumps to support a pipeline and had no spare capacity to process oil 
from subsea satellites. In 1984, the Ministry of energy sided with Hydro and 
Statoil had to give in.387 
 
                                                     
386 Inge Lorange, "Ny vending i offshoreindustrien", Norges Handels og 
Sjøfartstidende 1984, 11. On the attempt to supply dynamic positioning to this 
vessel, cf. p. 136. 
387 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", pp. 118ff. 
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In cooperation with a shipping company, Hydro pioneered the use of floating 
production. The ship Petrojarl was conceived in 1983 by Nordenfjeldske 
Dampskibsselskap, a shipping company. They intended to build, own and 
operate the production ship through a subsidiary (Golar-Nor Offshore) and 
rent the vessel to Hydro for use at Oseberg. The Petrojarl would secure early 
production – it was capable of producing, storing and offloading oil until 
fixed platforms were in place. Unlike every prior development project on the 
Norwegian shelf, Hydro hoped to outsource oil production to a third party. 
This challenged a modus operandi in which integrated oil companies tightly 
controlled the core tasks involved in oil production.  
From the conception of the Petrojarl initiative in 1983, the Norwegian 
regulatory framework frustrated the parties involved. Unlike a ship - where a 
class certificate could be granted irrespective of who designed, built, owned 
and operated the vessel – the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate refused to 
deal with anybody except the operator that was to hire the production ship. 
The directorates insisted the end-user (Hydro) should handle quality 
assurance, decide on design options and know the rationale behind minute 
technical designs. When approached by Golar-Nor, the directorate declined 
to comment on the design of the Petrojarl or comment on the requirements it 
would have to meet. Golan-Nor had to communicate through Hydro, which 
was forced to guarantee the viability of a technology designed, owned and 
operated by a third party.388 The legal framework recognized only the role of 
the operators and assumed the oil companies themselves designed and 
operated every piece of equipment. In effect, the law protected the vertical 
integration of oil companies. 
 
The inflexibility of Norwegian petroleum law was not only a way of writing 
the status quo into the legal code, but also a conscious choice. The 
directorate believed subcontracting could hamper security; the security 
assurance programme they foresaw presumed a hierarchal organization as 
employed by large, integrated oil companies. Helge Ryggvik, who has 
written extensively on the issue, has shown how labour unions influenced 
the health and environmental policies and insisted on extensive, non-
transferable responsibilities for the operator. The unions, obviously, 
recognized the operators could afford paying higher wages and grant more 
favourable working conditions than independent suppliers could. 389  The 
resulting legal code hampered the evolution of specialized suppliers.  
 
                                                     
388 Ibid. 
389 Helge Ryggvik, "Norsk oljevirksomhet mellom det nasjonale og det 
internasjonale", (Dr. philol, University of Oslo, 2000). 
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The Petrojarl experience, or rather the frustrations Hydro went through 
when attempting early production, was evidence of the inflexible industry 
architecture offshore. Furthermore, Petrojarl exemplified the potential of 
new technology. The ship began producing oil in 1985 with 93 per cent 
regularity. 390  Low oil prices in 1985 and 1986 probably strained the 
economics of the operation, but the ship moved on. As of 2008, Petrojarl I 
had been through several refittings and served on seven oil fields in the 
North Sea. In the early years, the ship mostly did trial production, but in later 
years it drained marginal fields.391 
 
5.5 Reliability as a reverse salient 
In the early 1980s, most technology development related to subsea systems 
took part within oil companies. KV was invited to take part in a number of 
such studies (cf. Figure 24). A particular concern of these projects was the 
reliability and maintenance of systems in increasingly deep waters.   
 
Around 1980, there was a conservative revision in relation to subsea 
systems. Several field developments abandoned advanced and experimental 
techniques and installed basic systems. The conservative reversion in the 
second half of the 1970s was evident in technological choices. North East 
Frigg was a case in point. Contemporary Norwegian magazines celebrated 
the North East Frigg development as innovative – but that was an 
exaggeration. 392 Elf wanted its installation to be foolproof, not innovative, 
and opted for low-tech solutions. The aerospace industry had favoured 
advanced electro-hydraulic control systems; they were large, cumbersome 
and rumoured to be unreliable because a minor breach in the insulation 
would short-circuit the electronics. Reflecting the sombre mood, Elf relied 
on direct hydraulic control at North East Frigg. This approach implied some 
problems; hydraulic pressure travels at a much slower speed than electric 
signals – too slow to allow remote control directly from Frigg 17 kilometres 
                                                     
390 Kaare M. Gisvold, "Pts petrojarl i: Eiernes erfaringer" in Feltutbygging på 
kontinentalsokkelen: Hvordan møte nye oljepriser? (Golsfjellet: Norske 
Sivilingeniørers Forening, 1987). 
391 A-tekst (a newspaper database) contains 149 articles on the ship refering to 
service on Oseberg (N) Fulmar (UK), Balder (N), Troll (N), Angus (UK), Hudson 
(UK), Foinaven-Blendhim (UK) and Glitne (N). 
392 Stein Bekkevold, "Innovatory subsea technology makes ne frigg economic", 
Teknisk Ukeblad, 19 August 1982. 
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away. 393 To circumvent this problem, Elf relied on a radio link between 
Frigg and a steel tower erected above the subsea installations. The tower 
contained a control system and a hydraulic pump that regulated the 
pressure in 22 hydraulic hoses stretching from the tower down to valves on 
the Christmas trees below. 394  The sixth well was equipped with an 
experimental multiplex system; this well required only one hydraulic hose 
and one electric cable.395  
 
Figure 27) Foolproof: North East Frigg field layout396 
 
 
                                                     
393 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to Oil Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: 
activity status and future prospects”, 29 June 1981. 
394 Tore Andvig, "Undervanns produksjon- og kontrollutsyr kritisk", Teknisk 
Ukeblad, 1984, pp. 26-28 
395 "Subsea technology into the realistic years: The contemporary era of subsea 
production". 
396 Drawing slightly modified from St.mld. 8, 1984-85, 1983 Annual report of the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, p. 54. 
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Although tried and tested solutions offered a solution, large international oil 
companies continued to invest in deepwater technology. Some of the 
development that took place on the Norwegian shelf added little to what had 
been attempted elsewhere, 397  but technology agreements required 
investments in research and development and tax deductions would offset 
much of the costs. 
 
KV was involved in every major subsea trial on the Norwegian shelf. Ahead 
of the fifth round of concessions (1980), Elf offered to involve KV in a 
research programme. 398 When the formalities were in place, Elf’s deputy 
project manager, Carl Johan Steenstrup, went to Karmøy in 1981 and 
enlisted KV to help assemble a test system devised at the company’s 
research department in Pau, France. None of the parties involved had much 
experience, but Elf brought some people with subsea practice from West 
Africa: like the proverbial “one-eyed leading the blind”, they guided a few 
people from Statoil, Hydro, Sintef and KV.399 KV’s people handled supplies 
(metalwork, food, hot water, etc.) and did most of the testing on the 
experimental system. The project was named Skuld, a female being from 
Norse mythology whose name translates into “future” but also 
“necessity”.400  
 
Skuld demonstrated a new approach to the maintenance challenge: 
modularity. Elf’s people clustered the least reliable components (control 
system and wing valves) in a central module. During replacement or repair, 
the operator could de-couple this module, like a cork drawn from a bottle, 
and haul it to the surface. Other modules such as the lower parts of the valve 
                                                     
397 The considerable investments Shell made in subsea developments on the 
Norwegian shelf in the early 1980s did not imply any major technological leaps 
compared e.g. to what Shell was doing on the British Shelf. Around 1980, Shell 
spent considerable sums on a sophisticated, experimental Underwater Manifold 
Centre for the British Cormorant platform whose features included a track-bound 
robot for maintenance and repair. "Subsea Technology," Noroil, June 1983, pp. 27-
36; M.M. Brady and D. Henery, "Subsea production systems and the umc 
experience", Journal of Petroleum Technology, 35, no. 8 (1980), pp. 1231-1238; 
Booth, "North sea: Testbed for advanced subsea production". 
398 "Skuld kan revolusjonere norsk offshore-fremtid", Offshore i Vest, 1984, p. 12; 
Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
399 For quote and background, interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004.  
400 "Skuld kan revolusjonere norsk offshore-fremtid", Interview with Steenstrup, 14 
October 2004. Skuld was a norne, one of the female beings who sat by Ygdrasil, the 
tree at the centre of the cosmos, and governed fate. 
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tree could not be removed without killing the well, but these parts were less 
exposed to wear and tear.401 While working on Skuld, KV gained important 
pockets of knowledge. The modular architecture of the system placed extra 
demands on jumpers (cables, pipes) and connectors (the locks that seal pipes 
and cables to secure the flow of oil, hydraulic fluids, chemicals and electric 
signals between components). Insulating the parts that carried electric 
current tended to be the hardest part in making decent connectors, and the 
Kongsberg people gained first-hand experience in the difficulties of keeping 
water out of electrical systems, e.g. how pressurized water and salt reacted 
with residual materials forming ionic pathways that failed to insulate.402 The 
assignment produced some tangible results; where American firms made 
functional connectors that worked, KV analysed why they worked and drew 
up guidelines for the design of connectors that became an industry 
standard. 403 Due to this experience, KV secured a research contract with 
Shell in 1982. This was possibly the first contract that arrived without some 
application of political connections. Shell, of course, was committed to 
carrying out as much R&D as possible in Norway, but the company was not 
committed to placing this order at Kongsberg.  
 
Many of the activities that oil companies undertook in Norway in the early 
1980s centred on Troll. Shell discovered this huge gas field in 1979. Block 
31/2 and adjacent blocks contained a reservoir large enough to provide all of 
Europe (including Russia) with gas from 2003 to 2007 and all of Europe 
with oil for three months.404 At 340 metres of water, the reservoir was much 
less accessible than e.g. Statfjord and gravity platforms for such depths 
would be very expensive. Subsea systems were an economic alternative, but 
divers would struggle to work at such depths. Humans in protective suits 
could not easily operate below 300 metres. Besides, the profession was 
dangerous. In November 1983, five divers died while working on the 
                                                     
401 "Subsea technology into the realistic years: The contemporary era of subsea 
production"; Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. On modular designs, cf. 
Tore Halvorsen, "Havbunnsinstallasjoner" in Flytende produksjonssystemer for olje 
og gass (Gol: Norske Sivilingeniøreres Forening, 1986). 
402 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
403 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
404 On Troll’s resource base, cf. Troll (Norsk Teknisk Museum, 2005 [cited April 
2007]); available from http://www.histos.no/oljemuseet/vis.php?kat=1&id=44. 
These are contrasted with information on natural gas consumption, cf. Natural gas 
consumption (BP, [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9010960&contentId=70215
80. 
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subsea systems at North East Frigg. In the early 1980s, the impetus of 
the technology development that took place was on reliability, 
maintenance and techniques that would work without divers. 
 
Maintenance was a particular reverse salient. Although subsea systems 
as such would work, oil companies worried about the challenge 
involved in handling wear, tear and mishaps. Such challenges 
intensified in line with the depth of the systems. For example, the 
common way of shipping equipment down to a subsea system involved 
guidelines serving as funiculars between a maintenance vessel and specific 
posts on the subsea template. At close to 500 metres, however, installation 
vessels could no longer hold a wire taut and oil companies could no longer 
rely on guidelines for maintenance and repair. Rather, Shell looked into the 
use of remotely operated underwater vehicles in combination with 
cranes.405 A crane lowered the equipment onto the seabed where a ROV 
could make the fit.406 
 
Divers and ROVs mimicked the procedures used to maintain a dry tree. 
Alas, this approach had drawbacks. The remotely operated vehicles were 
not entirely trustworthy and required costly templates large enough for a 
ROV to penetrate. 407  An alternative technique involved wirelines for 
remedial action. In essence, a maintenance rig would first attach a heavy 
riser (a hose) to the well and then ship equipment down to the well with 
wires, not ROVs. Although the subsea gondola could carry tools for logging, 
gauging, plugging, re-perforation and other downhole operations, wireline 
operations were not ideal. The well had to be shut down with heavy mud 
before the intervention and maintenance rigs were expensive. The costs 
triggered a search for alternative methods of maintaining subsea wells. 
 
Oil companies such as Shell had been experimenting with through-flowline 
(TFL) maintenance techniques. In the same fashion that antiquated pipe 
systems delivered internal mail in large office buildings, TFL techniques 
worked by pumping a piston-actuated tool from a production platform (not a 
maintenance rig) down the tube where oil and gas usually flowed.408 After 
the tool had performed this or the other operation, the pump was reversed 
                                                     
405 "One step further for Shell's Dimos project", North Sea Observer, 22 April 1985, 
pp. 10ff. 
406 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
407 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
408 Booth, "North Sea: Testbed for advanced subsea production", on the evolution of 
competing maintenance techniques. 
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and the tool returned. Although suited only for half the workover operations 
(e.g. paraffin scraping), TFL was faster and cheaper than wireline techniques 
because there was no need to mobilize a maintenance rig. 409  Alas, TFL 
techniques added to the complexity of the wells and restricted the 
dimensions of the tubing.  
 
Manifolding was another promising technique around 1980. Manifolding 
techniques evolved during the 1980s. A manifold pooled the output from 
several wells into a single riser; without a manifold, each well would require 
a separate flowline to the location where processing took place. When the 
output from several wells mixed, variations in pressure had to be cancelled 
out, lest the output from one well would force its way down another. Hence, 
a manifold needed choke valves to align the pressure and a control system to 
tune the valves. These controls might require manifolds of their own. 
Electro-hydraulic control systems used hydraulic manifolds to distribute 
power from one hydraulic pipe to the various valves on a subsea system. 
Additional manifolds could handle injection fluids such as corrosion 
inhibitors (anti-rust), scale inhibitors (anti-infarct) and hydrate inhibitor 
(anti-freeze). Manifolding was a key to reduce the number of hoses, lines 
and pipes that passed through the riser onto the surface; on DIMOS 
(diverless, installable and maintainable oil production system) manifolding 
cut the number of communication lines from 56 to 10.410  
 
5.6 Project Thor – striving for a larger portfolio 
Although KV gained a lot from being the main contractor, and from 
participating in various paid research efforts, the company had not forsaken 
its ambitions regarding product ownership.  
 
Almost from the very onset, in the 1970s, KV had considered ways of 
gaining a proprietary product range, but the factory lacked resources and 
capabilities. An independent analysis carried out in 1983 credited KV with 
“a reasonably good subsea systems knowledge”, but “a virtual absence” of 
knowledge on how to design the core components in the system.411 The in-
house product range was small. By 1986, an informal quantification 
                                                     
409 O.J.S. Ribeiro, L.A.G. Costra, and Petrobras, "Deepwater subsea completions: 
State of the art and future trends" (paper presented at Offshore Technology 
Conference, Houston, 3-6 May 1993), p. 335ff. 
410 Ibid. 
411 KV-Cor 248, H.O. Mohr & associates, “Assessment: Kongsberg as an 
Independent Subsea Production Equipment Supplier”, January 1983. 
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indicated KV could supply one fifth of the hardware in a system, compared 
with 90 per cent for Cameron and Vetco and 70 per cent for McEvoy.412 The 
Oil Division was rather more knowledgeable about the bits and pieces that 
combined production equipment into multiwell systems, e.g. templates, 
production risers, manifolds and control systems. In addition, KV sported 
knowledge about tie-in technology and diverless designs: advanced areas 
that many Houston-based companies failed to master or considered 
irrelevant because systems delivery was not in fashion in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Judging from its products portfolio, KV was better placed to 
supplement a valve tree manufacturer than to become one:413 hence the quest 
to buy a valve-tree supplier. The codename for this effort was Project 
Thor. 414 The candidates for takeover were all American: Vetco Gray and 
Cameron were market leaders; National and Reagan (Hughes Offshore) had 
smaller market shares, but advanced technology; and McEvoy and FMC 
were “sporadic performers” having been in and out of the market.415  
 
 
                                                     
412 KV-Cor 244, Qvenild, presentation, 14 January 1986. 
413 KV-Cor 248, Assessment: Kongsberg as an Independent Subsea Production 
Equipment Supplier, H.O. Mohr & associates, January 1983. On the arguments 
against proprietary product development, cf. Smeby’s private papers, Smeby to Oil 
Division, “KV’s oil tool equipment: activity status and future prospects”, 29 June 
1981. 
414 Not the first communication, but elaborate on the motives: KV-Cor 244, proposal 
to KV board to create Kongsberg Subsea Systems AS (KSS), 17 April 1986 
(withdrawn due to Elkem’s rejection). 
415 KV-Cor 248, Assessment: Kongsberg as an Independent Subsea Production 
Equipment Supplier, H.O. Mohr & associates, January 1983. 
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Figure 28) Dark matter: core system and adjacent manifold 
 
In early 1986, KV had reasons to believe both Vetco and McEvoy were for 
sale.416 KV and Mosvold, a holding company that controlled diverse offshore 
and shipping interests including Farsund-gruppen, agreed in principle to 
combine forces and buy one of the American companies. KV would turn its 
Oil Division into a limited liability company and sell 50 per cent of the 
shares to Mosvold for NOK 225 million.417 The new company would align 
itself with Hughes Offshore and combine resources to buy the market leader, 
                                                     
416 KV-Cor 244, board proposal, 14 January 1986; KV-Cor 244, minutes of meeting 
with Smith International (owners of McEvoy), 3 January 1986. 
417 KV-Cor 244, proposal to the KV board, 27 February 1986 suggesting KV 32%, 
Mosvold through its Gambit subsidiary 32%, Norcem 32%, employees ca 5%. 
154 
 
Vetco Gray (with a book value of NOK 2.5 billion).418 KV and Mosvold 
worked to enlist another Norwegian company in order for the Norwegians to 
control 55 per cent of the shares in the proposed giant. They negotiated in 
parallel with Aker and Elkem. Since Aker might deny KV a lead role in the 
new venture, KV preferred working with Elkem.419 In April 1986 the board 
of Elkem rejected the deal, possibly in preparation for a forthcoming 
attempted to acquire Kværner,420 and the deal unravelled. By that time, KV 
itself was unravelling too. That is the subject of chapter 6. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
Where this chapter started out, Albatross was about to become a world 
leader in dynamic positioning. We traced the success to a consumer-centric 
approach to business, but also to a somewhat unforeseen effect of its model-
based software: Albatross was somewhat better then the competition in 
handling fundamentally unreliable position reference systems.  
 
Kongsberg Offshore was improving too. Due to the beneficiary effects of the 
technology agreements, the subsea group gained a number of assignments 
and improved its understanding. Because volumes were uneven, and because 
Cameron protected its technology, KV assumed a somewhat superfluous and 
symbolic role as main contractor. Bereft of a proper manufacturing 
assignment, the subsea group stretched the traditional responsibilities of 
suppliers and aspired to tasks that traditionally belonged to the oil 
companies. Such experience as an overseer and integrator of equipment 
proved to be of strategic importance when oil companies began asking their 
suppliers to arrange almost every aspect of a subsea completion. 
 
A couple of changes in the way shipping companies and oil companies 
procured technology proved to have profound effects on suppliers of 
deepwater technology. EPC contracts and class certificates simplified the 
process and cut the costs involved in ordering technology from independent 
suppliers. The supplier industry gained accordingly, but there were 
differences as well as similarities in the changes that took place. With regard 
                                                     
418 KV-Cor 244, Morgan Stanley Project Thor LBO, Morgan Stanley, Project Thor 
LBO: Heads of Agreement, undated. The book value is calculated using an 
exchange rate of 7.4 (USD/NOK) as suggested by the National Bureau of Statistics, 
Historisk statistikk. 
419 KV-Cor 244, board proposal, 14 January 1986. 
420 Kjell Aaserud, ”Mikal H. Grønner synger ut: Har ikke tillit til Elkem”, 
Aftenposten, 17 November 1986.  
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to dynamic positioning, classification societies took some of the 
responsibility from buyers and suppliers. With regard to EPC contracts, 
suppliers assumed some of the responsibility of the oil industry. The latter 
approach spurred innovation and creativity. 
 
Albatross had always gained from being close to its customers, learning 
from their concerns and taking full responsibility for eventual solutions. In 
the early 1980s, the subsea group gained a similar opportunity with the 
introduction of EPC contracts. Kongsberg Offshore changed from an 
(passive) executioner of fabrication orders to a contractor in charge of 
integrating the products of various sub-suppliers. The contractors gained a 
corresponding freedom to innovate, and the oversight required to handle 
reverse salients. The innovations that did occur centred, not so much on the 
individual components of subsea systems, but on better ways of making the 
components work together in a proper system. The most crucial search was 
not for a more reliable valve tree, but for ways to install and service that 
valve tree.  
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6 Creative destruction, 1984-1987 
In the mid-1980s, the rules of the offshore game shifted in ways that 
favoured capitalism and competition. The change was much amplified at 
Kongsberg, where shifts in the Norwegian political economy, a collapse in 
the price of crude, and rapidly escalating losses at Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk 
caused turmoil in the deepwater business. 
 
Despite Hurlen’s energetic efforts to build an excellent manufacturer, KV 
struggled to make a profit. The defence business carried little risk and some 
of the oil-related business thrived, but once successful product lines faced 
problems when exposed to competition. The difficulties became all the more 
critical due to KV’s response. Management rarely chose withdrawal, but 
rather redoubled research and development to reclaim ground. Like a speed 
skater about to fall, the company threw its weight around to regain balance; 
the eventual fall was somewhat delayed but uncontrolled and very painful.  
 
For a while, KV’s offshore-related businesses did well enough to postpone 
the factory’s eventual collapse. Decent returns at Geco and Albatross, and 
growth in the area of subsea systems, offered KV an opportunity to float 
these businesses or offset their increased book value against losses 
elsewhere. Then, in 1985 and 1986, an outpouring of cheap Saudi oil 
depressed the price of crude and rapidly destroyed the economics of 
exploring deposits outside easily accessible reservoirs in the Middle East. 
Investors lost appetite for oil-related stocks and doused KV’s hope of raising 
funds. Furthermore, falling oil prices and diminishing public revenues 
reduced the government’s appetite for funding. In 1987, KV succumbed 
under a mountain of debt. Its various divisions and business units were sold 
off, including Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore Systems (KOS), the 
incorporated subsea group. 
 
Although KV failed to change with sufficiently speed, a transformation had 
begun well before 1987 and continued well beyond 1987. Much inspiration 
stemmed from a wide international change in sentiments that favoured de-
merging conglomerates. Albatross was arch-typical of this new philosophy. 
Despite not being a legal entity (not being incorporated), Albatross managed 
to secure considerable freedom of operations. In 1980, the business unit 
moved from KV’s premises in a fenced factory down to an abandoned ski 
factory by the river Lågen. From this location, the team continued with little 
interference and little assistance from KV. The remaining parts of KV 
moved broadly in the same direction, and by the time the arms factory ran 
out of funds in 1986-87, management had gone some way towards splitting 
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the conglomerate into self-contained businesses capable of navigating their 
environment. 
 
6.1 Institutional change 
All around Kongsberg, the landscape was shifting in a neo-liberal direction. 
In Norway, Liberal politicians made gains in the polls by denouncing 
collectivism and demanding better service from the government. In 1981, a 
conservative election victory made KV’s relations with the Ministry of 
industry less predictable. The new government discontinued the practice of 
awarding concessions to foreign oil companies based on their contributions 
to the well-being of individual companies (tilbudsavtalene). KV had been the 
prime recipient of favours in return for concessions. 421  Statoil became a 
slightly more normal company, less intent on forging a relationship with KV. 
Other oil companies, most notably Hydro, were able to ignore Statoil’s field 
development strategies and supplier policies. In a new and more competitive 
business environment, Kongsberg Offshore initially lost ground. 
 
In the early 1980s, the ties between KV and Statoil were very strong. In 
meetings, the two state-owned companies exchanged notes on the division of 
labour on the Norwegian shelf – what areas KV should dominate and where 
to allow supplements. 422  KV relied on Statoil and on Johnsen, Statoil’s 
managing director, to convey an “industrial understanding” to his 
subordinates. Because Statoil acted “sensibly” and refrained from 
competitive tenders, KV enjoyed a strong growth in turnover from the North 
Sea.423 
 
Something had begun to change, however, and by the mid-1980s, KV could 
no longer sideline its competitors at will. The shift was particularly strong 
compared with practices in 1973-1976, when Statoil’s favouritism was 
unabashed and complaints from competitors had little impact on the national 
                                                     
421 Before being discontinued, five arranged proposals were signed, for a total of 
NOK 270 million, mostly related to French subsea technology. Wiig and Nås, 
"Teknologiavtalene som insentiv i norsk forskningspolitikk". 
422 KV-Cor 248, Qvenild to Statoil (Johnsen et. al.), memo in preparation of 18 
January meeting, 15 January 1980. 
423 KV-Cor 243, letter, Qvenild to Statoil (Johnsen), 22 April 1983. The number 
roughly corresponds with the calculations of this author. Roughly half of this 
turnover originated with gas turbines. 
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oil company.424 Around 1976, the special partnerships that KV and Statoil 
had formed began to change. Most visibly, the two state-owned companies 
stopped building businesses together. Possibly, KV had more businesses 
running than the company could handle, but the shift also coincided with 
Jens Chr. Hauge’s retirement as Statoil chairman – his successor Finn Lied, 
although no adversary of KV, valued meritocracy and disapproved of 
favouritism.425  
 
The conservative election victory in 1981 undermined Statoil’s position 
somewhat. The new government disliked the business practice of Statoil and 
its dominant position; Statoil’s cash flow in relation to the Norwegian 
economy defied comparison with any company in any democratic country.426 
Although Statoil mostly managed to retain its privileges, the new 
government succeeded in handing the semi-private Hydro enough 
concessions to create a rival of sorts. 427 Hydro had been working on the 
Norwegian shelf since 1965. 
 
The KV management was particularly concerned when the government 
withdrew a proposal to make Statoil the operator on the eastern part of Troll 
– ostensibly to make room for Hydro. The size of the reservoir and the water 
depth (below 300 metres) indicated there would be many opportunities for 
subsea developments. Block 31/2, the western part where Shell was the 
operator, contained about a quarter of the gas reservoir and might on its own 
make room for 80 subsea units worth 1.6 billion – an assignment large 
                                                     
424 On the general perception that KV was a favourite of Statoil’s, cf. Nerheim, En 
gassnasjon blir til, p. 96. On Statoil’s attitude, cf. KV-Cor 245, Qvenild, minutes 
from 5 December meeting with AS Raufoss ammunisjonsfabrikker and Statoil, 10 
December 1974: “I forbindelse med STATOIL’s påvirkning av utenlandske 
oljeselskaper med sikte på kjøp av KV-utstyr var det noen selskaper som hadde 
klaget til Industridepartementet. For STATOIL vil ikke disse klagene ha noen 
praktiske konsekvenser.” 
425 On Hauge acting as an advocate for his favoured causes, see for example the 
Norwegian Petroleum Consultants incident on p. 29. On the attitude of Lied, cf. 
Interview with Lied and Knut Sogner, 6 December 2005. As director of the defence 
research establishment, Lied seemed equally supportive of private and government 
defence contractors, cf. Njølstad and Wicken, Kunnskap som våpen.  
426 With at least 50 per cent ownership in any substantial field, Statoil looked set to 
control a cash flow equalling maybe ten per cent of GDP and 25 per cent of all 
investments in Norway, cf. Figure 4) on page 21. On the sentiments of some 
conservative politicians, cf. Osmundsen, Gjøkungen: Skal statoil styre norge?  
427 On the offshore activities of Hydro, cf. Lie, Oljerikdommer og internasjonal 
ekspansjon: Hydro 1977-2005.  
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enough to justify the development of proprietary valve trees (almost) from 
scratch.428  
 
KV worried that Hydro’s ownership structure would discourage the 
company from taking the “interests of the nation” into account. 429  The 
“interests of the nation” translated into avoiding competition. KV thought 
Hydro more likely than Statoil to buy subsea services from others. 430 In 
communication with Statoil, KV argued there was no need for alternatives 
since KV had been looking into the subsea field since 1973.431 When Statoil 
in 1982 considered giving some research and study assignments to Seanor, a 
start-up with defectors from Kongsberg, the head of KV’s subsea business 
branded Statoil as irresponsible – a “serious” company such as Statoil should 
know better than encourage “fragmentation” of the field.432 Qvenild argued a 
single supplier should be allowed to dominate its niche to avoid 
“unnecessary competition” and duplication of competencies and resources - 
since the task of developing Troll was so formidable, and the domestic 
resources so meagre, the nation could not afford competition. The subsea 
niche should belong to KV, Qvenild argued.433 
 
Whatever the policies of Statoil, Hydro had no intention of making 
Kongsberg Offshore its sole supplier of subsea technology. When Hydro 
decided to use subsea satellites on the southern part of its Oseberg reservoir, 
the company invited several Norwegian companies to compete for an EPC 
contract: KV, Kværner and Frank Mohn. At the time, the people at 
Kongsberg felt confident in their abilities and believed they could “maintain 
                                                     
428 KV-Cor 243, Weibye to Qvenild, input to a briefing for Statoil, 12 November 
1982; KV-Cor 248, memo in preparation of meeting on 18 January, Qvenild to 
Statoil (Johnsen et. al.), 15 January 1980; KV-Cor 243, Troll memorandum, Qvenild 
to Statoil (Johnsen), 17 November 1982. 
429 KV-Cor 243, Qvenild to Statoil (Johnsen), Troll memorandum, 17 November 
1982. RA-Arntzen-Oil, department of public companies in the Ministry of industry, 
minutes from meeting with Qvenild, 11February 1983: “Qvenild mente at Hydro 
med sin eierstruktur ikke ville kunne ta nasjonale hensyn på samme måte.” 
430 KV-Cor 243, Qvenild to Statoil (Johnsen), Troll memorandum, 17 November 
1982. 
431 KV-Cor 243, Weibye to Qvenild, Troll memo, 12 November 1982. 
432 KV-Cor 243, Weibye to Qvenild, 15 December 1982. 
433 KV-Cor 243, Qvenild to Statoil (Johnsen), Troll memorandum, 17 November 
1982. 
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a lead”. 434  Although Kongsberg Offshore had more experience, having 
secured every major subsea contract on offer on the Norwegian shelf, Hydro 
nevertheless chose Frank Mohn - a Bergen-based engineering company 
whose main product was hydraulic pumps. Frank Mohn had no prior 
experience with subsea production systems, but offered to do the job for 
some NOK 50 million less than KV. Apart from the price, Hydro credited 
Frank Mohn’s ability to work with suppliers. Thorleif Enger, Hydro’s 
project manager, was aware of the extent to which his Norwegian suppliers 
had to draw on American expertise, 435 and Frank Mohn enjoyed a close 
rapport with McEvoy - in some contrast to Kværner, which struggled to get 
along with Vetco Gray436 and in stark contrast to KV, which was about to 
fall out with Cameron. For the Oil Division, losing a single contract to Frank 
Mohn in December 1985 was no crisis. Bidding was expensive, Husemoen 
admitted, but the company was busy completing orders for Gullfaks – and 
there were other contracts approaching.  
 
It appeared Kongsberg Offshore was in for more losses. In the winter of 
1985/1986, Elf Aquitaine decided to refit parts of the control system on 
North East Frigg and develop a small gas reservoir (East Frigg) using 
diverless technology along the lines of the Skuld project.437 The French oil 
company bought valve trees (NOK 60 million) and assembly (22 million) 
from Vetco AS and a manifold centre (NOK 20 million) from Kværner 
Rosenborg. Meanwhile, Liaaen Helitron and ACB, a French company, got 
the order to redesign the leaky electro-hydraulics on North East Frigg.438 KV 
claimed Elf sidestepped an agreement offering KV exclusive use of Skuld 
technology in Norway and asked the Norwegian government to annul the 
contract. 439  Either because of this pressure, or because KV had done 
innovative work in related fields, Elf hired KV to develop a clamp connector 
                                                     
434 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report on first six months, 1984; Smeby’s private papers, 
“Presentation to Cameron management”, 14 September 1985. 
435 Morten Wang, ”Undervannsoppdrag på Oseberg: Gjennombrudd for Frank 
Mohn”, Aftenposten, 12 December 1985. 
436 Smeby’s private papers, “Presentation to Cameron management”, 14 September 
1985. 
437 KV-Cor 243, Qvenild, letter to Elf Aquitaine Norge (Godec), 22 November 1985.  
438 ”Elf-oppdrag til Rosenberg”, NTB, 27 August 1986. 
439 KV-Cor 244, Qvenild, letter to Ministry of oil and energy (Himle), 9 January 
1986. Although the Norwegian government was not part of the agreement, it had 
been signed in the presence of Minister Kåre Kristiansen, not least in order to 
bestow goodwill on Elf with the granting of later concessions in mind. 
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that helped Elf fit flowlines without using divers. Albeit KV did secure some 
work for Elf, Kongsberg Offshore had lost much of its ability to gain 
assignments irrespective of competing offers. 
 
6.2 Attempts to become more nimble 
The institutional shift that occurred in the 1980s affected KV’s ability to 
secure orders in the offshore market, but also the company’s choices of how 
to organize its operations. 
 
The conservative government began to alter the composition of KV’s board. 
Johan H. Andresen, a conservative-leaning businessman, joined the board in 
1982. In 1983, the government refrained from reappointing Hauge, and in 
late 1985, Andresen replaced Hurlen as chairman. More importantly, a new 
set of sentiments took hold. In the 1980s, investors increasingly held 
conglomerates to account for their profitability and – if failing to show any – 
expected an explanation as to how their component pieces contributed to the 
creation of value. Such ideas were particular to the late 1970s and early 
1980s, but also evident in the drawn-out shift away from hierarchal 
organization with emphasis on scale and centralized oversight towards self-
contained business units with goals and strategies in their own right.440  
 
Hurlen’s approach to management had been somewhat inconsistent. On one 
hand, he expected and encouraged people to take responsibility and display 
initiative; he rather enjoyed being around entrepreneurial people with 
optimism and ambition. On the other hand, he rarely relinquished the 
ultimate say and his tolerance of deviation may have been diminishing. In 
the early 1960s, he relaxed the hierarchies at the arms factory and introduced 
project management: a manager would bargain for resources from KV’s 
functional departments (sales, electronics, welding, etc.) and use these 
resources for a project, typically product development. In the 1970s, Hurlen 
pursued a one-firm policy. At the board’s urging, he established a divisional 
structure in 1973, but whereas divisions in other large companies employed 
the resources necessary to engage in independent pursuits on par with a 
limited liability company, Hurlen’s divisions relied heavily on support from 
the Defence Division and central staff. Tasks such as purchasing and 
recruitment remained centralized and the divisions would typically employ 
but one or two people with a business or economics background.441 Besides, 
                                                     
440 The single most influential advocate, and chronicler, of the change was probably 
Peter Drucker, whose main concepts are referred to in footnote 4. 
441 Eli Hoan, "Personalfunksjonen i a/s kongsberg våpenfabrikk", (Course paper 
[seminaroppgave], Norges Handelshøyskole, 1977). 
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Hurlen “liked the old style”; he and Hauge collaborated with project 
managers as they saw fit regardless of who headed the various divisions.442 
The naming and organization of divisions and departments continued to 
resemble an army bureaucracy where people and functions were assigned 
fixed tasks and corresponding letters and numbers: F4 was a research and 
development team at the defence division; O6 was the Oil Division’s vessel 
automation group, also known as Albatross. The business units at Kongsberg 
remained within an unquestionable chain of command. Upon retiring in 
1975, he moved upstairs and stayed on as working chairman for another ten 
years. The new managing director, Jacob Aasland, never gained any useful 
room for manoeuvre. 443 Rolf Qvenild, who became managing director in 
early 1979, was rather relaxed about letting subordinates actually run 
businesses – particularly businesses like Albatross that generated substantial 
revenues.444   
 
Although privatizing KV was never on the agenda, the issue loomed. A 
conservative ideologue, Jan P. Syse, had helped coin the term 
selveierdemokrati, which is the notion that proprietary (private) ownership 
has civilizing, empowering and industrious effects. As minister of industry 
from 1983, he acted at KV’s general meeting of shareholders. KV’s 
management preferred the perceived stability of public ownership and feared 
any new petition for equity capital might have triggered a partial 
privatisation of the weapons factory. Qvenild ducked the issue by inviting 
investors to finance non-core activities. In 1982, KV incorporated its map 
drawing business and set up Sysscan AS in cooperation with Messerschmitt-
Bölkow-Blohm, a German maker of drawing tools and other advanced 
machinery. Sysscan was listed on Oslo Stock Exchange and did well for a 
while. The approach was a de-facto reversal of Hurlen’s policies. Whenever 
Hurlen had acquired a new business line, the business became a part of the 
sprawling portfolio of the arms factory. None of KV’s businesses worked as 
limited liability companies except Geco/Statex and the old guard refrained 
from cooperative ventures they could not ultimately control. 
 
                                                     
442 On Hurlen’s reluctance to delegate authority, see e.g. the recapitulation of the 
disagreement in Berdal’s private papers, Qvenild’s speech at the dinner in the 
honour of Bjarne Hurlen, Kongsberg, 29 September 1994; the same subject in KV-
Cor, box 44, Binder Dijker Otte & Co, Memorandum from executive seminar 30 
June – 1 July 1983, 16 August 1983. 
443 Interview with Næsset, 10 October 2004. 
444 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004, and conversation with Gulhaugen, 
Kildal and Løkling, 29 October 2004. 
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Some of KV’s peers went further in disintegrating composite businesses and 
establishing focused businesses. Simrad, for example, implemented the new 
thinking in full. Around 1980, the company failed to compete in the market 
for echo sounders and sonar, mature products sold mainly to the fishing 
industry. One part of the company thrived, however: the business line that 
provided hydro-acoustics technology for the offshore industry, most 
importantly as a supplier of position reference systems to Albatross dynamic 
positioning.445 Offshore revenues could not offset the collapse in traditional 
markets, but Simrad’s chief financial officer, Harald Ellefsen, floated Simrad 
Subsea and turned to the stock exchange for funds.446 Investors believed in 
the company and funded it generously through several emissions. The high 
capitalization then enabled Simrad Subsea to acquire its sibling, Simrad 
Marine, the company that made sonar and echo sounders.447  
 
In Horten, KV attempted something similar with Norcontrol, a supplier of 
ship-automation that KV had acquired in 1977. The traditional product line - 
monitoring machine rooms and supplying remote propulsion control – 
suffered in the aftermath of the 1975 shipping crisis and the continuous shift 
of shipbuilding from Europe to Japan and Korea in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. KV decided to split the business in four: a company to focus on 
shared manufacturing; another to handle the ship automation (Norcontrol 
Automation AS); a third to supply systems for collision control, e.g. in 
harbours (Norcontrol Surveillance AS), and a fourth to train harbour 
controllers and platform operators in the same fashion a flight simulator 
trained pilots (Norcontrol Simulations AS). Initially, KV did not attempt to 
float any of these businesses. 
 
KV drew much comfort from a success in seismic surveying. This business 
originated with Statex, the company that KV and Statoil founded in the early 
1970s. Initially, Statex lost money. Statoil’s participation was politically 
                                                     
445 Knut Sogner’s private papers, Simrad accounting department, historical figures, 
1996 (undated). 
446 Albatross had accounted for more than two-thirds of Simrad’s offshore sales in 
the late 1970s declining to about fifty per cent in 1981-1982 and one third in 1985. 
These figures are arrived at by comparing information from the following: 
KMaritim, binder on historical documents, reference list, 1981 (undated); CA-KM-
Simrad, Simrad Subsea board minutes, 21 December 1981; KV-ex 12, Thoen, 
memorandum to Fjell, 22 January 1985, and; Knut Sogner’s private papers, Simrad 
accounting department, historical figures, 1996 (undated). Ahead of the public 
offering, Albatross was invited to buy shares in Simrad Subsea, but KV declined.  
447 For a comprehensive account of Simrad during these years, see Sogner, God på 
bunnen.  
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touchy, sparked disagreement on the board, 448  and made competing oil 
companies reluctant to do business. In 1976, Statoil sold its shares to KV.449 
Although Statoil remained a customer, the oil company paid less generously 
for its services, and Statex’s losses increased. In 1977, Statex merged with 
Geophysical Company of Norway A/S (GECO). 450  GECO did well and 
became one of the world’s three largest seismic service providers by 1979 
with 80 per cent of its sales originating abroad.451 During 1982 and 1983, 
KV sold some shares in GECO and netted NOK 134.2 million while the 
value of KV’s remaining 27 per cent share grew to several hundred million. 
Appreciation of these shares and other oil-related assets helped KV balance 
its books and contributed to a feeling that escape from KV was profitable for 
all parties involved.452  
 
With regard to offshore oil, Qvenild began to withdraw from businesses that 
failed to meet expectations. The CCB workshop outside Bergen, the one KV 
had seized from Kone OY to perform maintenance work on Statfjord, lost 
money throughout the 1970s. Waiting for Statfjord to come on stream, KV 
had to focus on the maintenance of drilling rigs. Business was slow, or 
rather uneven, since drilling ceased during the rough winter season – a fact 
that kept surprising KV, at least to the extent the company was unable to 
budget for an annual, seasonal downturn.453 KV returned the property to the 
Costal Center Base in 1981. Another Kongsberg operation at the CCB, the 
Terotech/Teronor gas turbine workshop, struggled against hard and dirty 
                                                     
448 For a subjective but informed assessment, see Osmundsen, Gjøkungen: Skal 
statoil styre norge? The two dissenters, Vidkunn Hveding and Per Hanssen, were 
removed in a reshuffle when Hauge retired as chairman in 1975. 
449 RA-Arntzen-Oil, Board reports 9 September 1975, November 1976, and 1 March 
1977. The nominal price of the shares was NOK 1.1 million. 
450 Andersen and Collett, Anchor and balance: Det norske veritas 1864-1989. When 
Veritas and KV agreed to merge their seismic surveying companies, KV had to 
contribute NOK 4 million to maintain a 50 per cent stake. 
451 RA-Arntzen-Oil, Board report dated 6 November 1979, and attachment to letter 
from KV to Ministry of industry, 23 February 1979. The merger agreement was 
signed on 25 March 1977. 
452 KV-Cor 239, Qvenild, confidential memo to Jan Sollid, Lasse Hansen, et. al., 
spring 1983 (undated).  
453 RA-Arntzen-Oil, Board reports 20 June 1974, 10 October 1974, 9 September 
1975, 26 April 1976, 25 August 1977, 2 May 1979 and 6 November 1979. 
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competition. 454 In the late 1970s, KV and Kværner merged their turbine 
maintenance activities, but continued to compete for sales. This tug “tug-of-
war” split across on to the maintenance business.455 The issue was resolved 
only in 1985 when KV sold out to Kværner. 456 KV also withdrew from 
advisory engineering. In the 1970s, Kongsberg Engineering suffered 
substantial losses on most work, but its 10 per cent stake in Norwegian 
Petroleum Consultants provided well-paid assignments. KV struggled to 
recruit a sufficient number of qualified engineers and few Kongsberg 
employees wanted to work out of Drammen or Asker where Kongsberg 
Engineering set up shop. An effort to merge Kongsberg Engineering with 
IKO Software Service A/S in Oslo, a financially troubled provider of 
engineering planning software, was not entirely successful.457 In 1984, KV 
sold 49 per cent of the shares in Kongsberg Engineering to McDermott for 
NOK 15 million.458 Following these retreats, KV’s offshore interests centred 
on Albatross dynamic positioning and subsea systems.  
 
6.3 Independence for Albatross 
Albatross was the one business unit that best exemplified the new sentiments 
in organizing businesses. The dynamic positioning business also exemplified 
the difficulties involved in allowing parts of a conglomerate to pursue 
independent goals. 
 
Albatross’s transformation into a limited liability company was gradual. In 
1983, Qvenild agreed to establish an Albatross board that played much the 
same role as the board of a limited liability company - although the 
independent director, Thorbjørn Gjelstad, made little difference while KV’s 
top management formed the rest of the board. 459 Then, in January 1984, 
                                                     
454 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board report, 8 May 1980; Husemoen’s private papers, Leif 
Husemoen, memorandum on the history of Kongsberg Offshore Systems, 22 
September 1998.  
455 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
456 KV-ex 9, memo from Fjell (CFO) to Qvenild on the sales process, 28 October 
1985. 
457 RA-Arntzen-Oil, Board reports dated 12 February 1974, 1 November 1974, 3 
May 1975, 21 August 1978 and 2 May 1979. 
458 RA-Arntzen-Oil, board reports dated 6 November 1979, 12 March 1980, 8 May 
1980, and board proposal dated, 7 May 1984. 
459 KV-Cor 238, Albatross [internal] board minutes, 22 December 1983; KV-Cor 
238, Qvenild to Gulhaugen, 5 October 1984.  
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Albatross switched status from product group to division. Qvenild might 
well have incorporated the dynamic positioning business, if not for its 
generous remuneration policy that caused envy. 460  Management was 
particularly conscious about rewards. Productivity and commitment, they 
argued, required compensation in excess of what salaried workers received 
elsewhere. Without extraordinary pay, the group’s “ability to develop and 
maintain motivation and … take on additional burdens” would suffer. 461 
Many earned considerable sums: a service engineer at the time could earn 
NOK 600 000. Developers earned twice the wages at SINTEF.462 Things like 
this made people feel special. As a limited liability company, existing tariff 
agreements would not apply to Albatross, and the equality-conscious trade 
unions at KV were likely to object. Gradually, however, the division gained 
more freedoms such as the final say in hiring and firing and permission to 
grant sales bonuses for deals made abroad.463  
 
Having gained additional freedoms, the Albatross management responded by 
passing authority on to middle managers and employees. In effect, the 
company adopted management by objectives.464 The company’s mission was 
broken down into specific goals for the various departments handling tasks 
such as training, quality assurance and service. 465  To encourage those 
technologically disposed to engage with customers and salespeople, there 
was no dedicated research or development function;466 only in the summer of 
1985, when rapid growth threatened to absorb all resources, did Albatross 
establish a dedicated development team headed by Terje Løkling and a 
                                                     
460 KV-Cor 238, “Albatross – Quo vadis”, assistant managing director Rolf E. 
Rolfsen to Albatross management, 9 February 1984. 
461 KV-Cor 238, Albatross [internal] board papers on “Personalomsorgen”, not dated 
but probably from late 1983, translation by the author. 
462 On its attractiveness as an employer, cf. Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004 
and with Jenssen, 14 October 2004; 
463 On the increased freedoms, cf. KV-Cor 238, Albatross [internal] board minutes, 
16 May 1984; on deliberations about not to incorporate Albatross, cf. KV-Cor 238, 
Albatross [internal] board minutes, 23 March 1984. 
464 A term popularized by Peter Drucker his 1954 book The Practice of 
Management, cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Management_by_objectives. 
465 KV-ex 9, Albatross market philosophy, 29 September 1983. 
466 Conservation with Gulhaugen, Kildal and Løkling, 29 October 2004, confirmed 
by interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
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budget equalling about 10 per cent of turnover.467 Regardless of department, 
Albatross insisted on setting goals, offering coaching on how to reach these 
goals and granting compensation in line with achievements. 468  
 
When the conglomerate split into independent business units, KV lost some 
of its ability to run consorted joint development efforts. Some worried the 
disintegration would destroy synergies – others saw an opportunity to escape 
from dysfunctional binds. A particularly heated conflict related to Albatross 
and computer development. 
 
When KV went into dynamic positioning in 1974-1975, its KS 500 
computers were state of the art and quite suitable for automation. Most 
commercially available mini-computers could not solve exponentials (Xn) 
fast enough for automation purposes, but KS 500 solved the task using a 
dedicated chip in the same fashion a game console would employ a 
dedicated graphics card. Such floating-point calculation in hardware 
improved the speed of specific operations, albeit at the cost of added 
complexity. 469 
 
By the early 1980s, single-chip architecture made rapid gains. Every 18 
months or so - as prescribed by Moore’s Law – chips manufacturers doubled 
the number of circuits on a given silicon surface. The cramming allowed 
more memory, cut the distance a signal needed to travel, and increased 
processor speed. A single central processing unit (CPU) could handle signal 
processing, memory access and most other tasks by subdividing jobs into a 
mind-boggling number of operations performed in rapid succession. 470 
Powerful CPUs allowed a simple architecture as exemplified by the success 
of affordable personal computers (PCs) powered by Intel x86 chips. By 
1982, such inexpensive and powerful off-the-shelf computers could be 
employed for dynamic positioning, but Albatross was stuck paying high 
prices for dysfunctional KV computers. The KS 500’s huge frame looked 
deceptively robust: the hardware inside was running on the edge of capacity 
                                                     
467 KV-Cor 238, Albatross board minutes, 27 June 1985; KV-Cor 238, Albatross 
board minutes, 17 October 1985. 
468 On the ability to integrate successfully, cf. KV-Cor 238, Albatross [internal] 
board minutes, 29 September 1983. 
469 Interview with Corneliussen, 19 October 2004. 
470 Ph.D. student Gard Paulsen of the BI Norwegian School of Management, 
Department of innovation and economic organization, has been helpful in pointing 
out the changing concepts of computer chip development in the 1970s. 
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and frequently backfired. KV intended to develop a new generation of 
computers and insisted Albatross should wait for this future platform.  
 
People at Albatross doubted KV could develop a useful replacement on time, 
but distrusted most commercially available alternatives. PCs were designed 
for non-critical applications with some tolerance of system crashes. Norsk 
Data supplied reliable computers, but ran on an outdated operating system.471 
To resolve the dilemma, Albatross ignored specific instructions and built a 
computer from components. A team led by Vidar Solli used Intel 186 chips 
for the CPU but settled for a more straightforward and reliable architecture 
than contemporary PCs. Every component fitted onto a single motherboard, 
hence the name Single Board Computer (SBC) 1000. 472  After strong 
exchanges of opinion, KV resigned itself to the fait accompli.473 By the time 
single board computers had replaced KV computers on every DP system, in 
1986-1987, KV’s computer business had imploded. To my best knowledge, 
the KS 900, which replaced the KS 500, found no application except as a 
control system on board a few Norwegian submarines.474 It is hard to see 
how Albatross could have survived in a competitive market if Kongsberg 
computers were at its core. 
 
Effective from 1 January 1985, Albatross became a limited liability 
company, Kongsberg Albatross AS, albeit with KV as sole shareholder. 
Potential investors seemed to favour employee shareholding 475  and, by 
threatening to quit collectively, the employees secured a right to buy five per 
cent of the shares ahead of a foreseen public offering (listing).476 Albatross 
                                                     
471 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004. 
472 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004 and with Corneliussen, 19 October 2004. 
473 KV-Cor 238, Albatross [internal] board minutes, 29 September 1983. 
474 On the increasing cost of quality assurance, cf. interview with Mathiesen, 13 
October 2004. On the 1980 decision to replace Norwegian made chips with 
Motorola merchandise in the MKIII Penguin air to sea missile, see Erlandsen, 
Flygende pingviner: Historien om sjømålsraketten penguin, pp. 253-254. 
475 KV-ex10, memo from CFO Olav Fjell to Managing Director Qvenild, 28 October 
1985. In 1985, the employers’ union generally recommended employee co-
ownership, cf. Aftenposten Morgen, “N.A.F. har vurdert medeierskap: Aksjer i egen 
bedrift styrker tilhørigheten”, 25 April 1985. Several companies that did well on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange had offered shares to their employees, including Norsk Data, 
Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrikk and Simrad Subsea. 
476 KV-Cor 238, Qvenild to Gulhaugen, 5 October 1984; conversation with 
Gulhaugen, Kildal and Løkling, 29 October 2004. Løkling on one occasion led a 
team of technicians to the KV managing director with an ultimatum. 
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offered shares to everyone in an egalitarian approach.477 In addition, senior 
management had the option of buying additional shares at NOK 267 per 
share. The latter number valued Albatross at NOK 120 million, a rather 
small discount on the predicted trading price, but bullish employees bought 
95 per cent of the shares on offer.478  
 
The business grew rapidly – cf. table below – and Albatross was profitable. 
Its margins remained close to 10 per cent, way above other business lines at 
KV, but not impressive for a company with an 80 per cent market share 
selling mission-critical applications in an industry awash with money. 
Albatross claimed to be running at or above capacity, putting priority on 
timely delivery rather than costs and investing in the training of new 
people,479 but we may suspect the albatrosses were disinclined to pour profit 
down the drain at the arms factory. KV meanwhile lacked the instruments 
and routines, but also the authority, to demand higher dividends. 
 
                                                     
477 The approach used by Albatross was egalitarian in relation to the practice of large 
American companies, but not much different from contemporary practice in Silicon 
Valley. At least since 1997, most big American firms granted options almost 
exclusively to senior executives, but the high tech industry differed with some 80 
per cent of share options granted to employees below the top five executives, cf. The 
Economist, “Who wants to be a billionaire?”, 6 May 1999, citing Pearl Meyer and 
Partners, a compensation consultancy.  
478 On the share programme, cf. KV-Cor 238, Qvenild to Albatross, 27 November 
1985. In 1983, the few Norwegian companies that offered employee co-ownership 
were valued at 4 billion; the employees had paid 45 million for stocks worth 137 
million (that is 67% rebate on shares worth 3.4 per cent of the total), cf. Aftenposten 
Morgen, “Aksjer med stor rabatt”, 25 February 1984. In comparision, the proportion 
of shares promised as options in the United States reached an all time high of 15.7 
per cent in 2002, about twice the share held in 1989, cf. The Economist, “Fat cats 
feeding”, 9 October 2003. 
479 On the capacity problems, cf. KV-Cor 238, Albatross board minutes, 17 October 
1985; on the market share, cf. KV-Cor 239, deliberations about the 1985 Albatross 
annual report, 13 February 1986. 
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Figure 29) Albatross take off: orders, turnover, employees and profit, 1979-85480 
 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Orders (mNOK)    62 60 105 155 176 196 242 
Turnover (mNOK) 20 35 51 74 86 141 169 162 233 
Operating profit   2.8 6.2 9.4 11.4 14 10.3 23 
Number of employees   50 61 74 135 146 152 166 
Margin (per cent)   5.5 8.4 10.9 8.1 8.3 6.4 9.9 
 
On 22 November 1985, exactly ten years after the signing of the Seaway 
Swan contract, there was a terrific party. Albatross chartered a train and 
brought every employee from Kongsberg to an Oslo hotel where some 200 
people watched a cabaret written specifically for the occasion and dined on 
plates engraved to commemorate the occasion. Qvenild read an excerpt from 
Kahlil Gibran’s The Prophet about childhood and adulthood, or rather about 
the pleasures of breaking free and the response of a wise parent. 481  He 
praised Theory Albatross unreservedly for its customer focus and recognition 
of employees and shared the honour of success generously with Nils Willy 
Gulhaugen, Jacob Stolt-Nielsen and Bjørn Barth Jacobsen (there was no 
mention of Professor Balchen).482 As a grand finale, Qvenild announced the 
board had agreed to float Albatross. The night was dizzy with success. 
 
6.4 The unravelling 
Regardless of the odd success, KV’s financial position deteriorated 
throughout 1985. The group was heavily indebted, and annual interest 
payments ran at NOK 120 million. 483 Only defence contracts provided a 
steady profit – and the steady appreciation of various oil-related assets. KV 
hoped the restructuring and sale of these assets could provide a lifeline. 
When the oil price fell in 1985, the company succumbed. Albatross and 
                                                     
480 The table is assembled from various soruces. Turnover in 1977, interview with 
Jacobsen, 9 September 2004; turnover 1978, RA-Arntnzen-Oil, board report, 15 
March 1979; accounts 1979, cf. KV-Cor 238, KV board papers, 12 September 1984; 
accounts 1980-85, cf. KV-ex 12, Albatross board minutes, 22 January 1987. All 
figures are in nominal NOK millions except, of course, the employee count. 
481 KV-Cor 238, 10 year anniversary, 22 November 1985. 
482 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004; with Jacobsen, 29 November 2005. 
483 KV annual reports, 1983-1986. 
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Kongsberg Offshore were sold, albeit at a fraction of the price that KV had 
hoped for. 
 
Figure 30) Oiloholic: relative performance of the Oslo Stock Exchange484 
 
Since the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, oil prices had remained high, 
underpinned by Saudi Arabian policy. The kingdom acted as a swing 
producer, cutting production in periods of low demand and, in effect, 
guaranteeing a high and stable oil price. The effect of this approach was a 
tumbling Saudi market share as other OPEC members produced beyond their 
quotas and high-cost producers in the North Sea and elsewhere brought oil to 
market. In August 1985, the Saudis tired of restraint and gradually increased 
the Kingdom’s output from two million barrels per day to five million 
barrels. They accepted whatever price the spot market offered and the price 
of crude plummeted below USD 10 per barrel by mid-1986.485 In response to 
the changed market conditions, the Oslo Stock Exchange fell markedly, and 
the book value of KV’s various oil-related assets collapsed. 
                                                     
484 Hogne I. Tyssøy and Holbergfondene, "'buy' eller 'bye, bye' oslo børs?" (paper 
presented at Oslo Børs Investorseminar, Bergen, 1 June 2005). The dark line shows 
how the main stock index on the Oslo Stock Exchange behaved in relation to an 
index composed of various global stock exchanges; a value of 110 on the left hand 
scale indicates that the Oslo Stock exchange is outperforming the global capital 
markets by ten per cent. Evidently, the relative performance correlates with the price 
of crude (grey line, right-hand scale) – since 1983, the Oslo Stock Exchange has 
performed comparably well in periods of expensive oil and less well in periods of 
cheap oil. 
485 James L. Williams, Oil price history and analysis (WTRG economics, 2006 
[cited April 2007]); available from http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm. 
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In the autumn of 1986, KV could no longer pay its creditors; losses were 
mounting and the company’s assets were worth less than its liabilities. On 21 
November, the Ministry of industry appointed a new board chaired by Karl 
Glad. Parliament then extended an emergency credit line. In January 1987, 
the board decided to spin off everything but the defence business and hired 
Tor Espedal as temporary managing director.486 The new team pushed for a 
clear break with the past, established each business unit as a limited liability 
company roughly in line with the previously established divisions, and sold 
everything but the defence business to investors.487  
 
* * * 
 
Albatross was the one business at Kongsberg most directly hit by collapsing 
oil prices. Everywhere, oil companies cut back on exploration and required 
fewer services from the various vessels providing diving support, anchor 
handling, underwater engineering and other offshore activities. Low demand 
resulted in low day rates and, eventually, an almost complete halt in new 
orders new of petroleum support vessels (see figure below). Equipping such 
newly built vessels was the mainstay of Albatross dynamic positioning, and 
now that mainstay vanished. 
 
A few more problems originated with the fragile state of KV’s finances. All 
profits were returned to KV in the shape of dividends; financially, the 
dynamic positioning company started each year from zero and a single bad 
year would be sufficient to break the company. Although the core business 
of selling dynamic positioning broke even, KV had loaded Albatross with 20 
million in interest-carrying debts and a portfolio of questionable assets from 
its struggling foray into marine electronics.488 These assets included some 
shares in Bird and all shares in Norcontrol Automation – sold in 1986 at for 
NOK 22 million less than their book value.489 After this, the share capital of 
Albatross was probably gone. 
                                                     
486 KV-utvalget and Arntzen, "Nou 1989:2". 
487 John Eriksen, "Næringsøkonomiske virkninger av nedleggelse av store bedrifter", 
ECON-rapport, 35, (Oslo: ECON Senter for økonomisk analyse, 1993). 
488 KV-Cor 238, Albatross board minutes, 27 June 1985. 
489 KV-Cor 238, Albatross board minutes, 27 June 1985; KV-Cor 238, papers for the 
29 March 1985 board meeting; KV-Cor 238, Albatross AS 1986 annual report. 
Albatross lost 5.14 million on Bird and 17 million related to Norcontrol Automation. 
The non-performing Bird shares were the payment from the sale of Robertson Radio 
Elektro in Egersund to Bird. Robertson was a manufacturer of ship radios that later 
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Figure 31) Bubble: Annual building of petroleum support vessels, 1960-2000490 
 
 
By early 1987, when KV was in effect bankrupt, the board hired a corporate 
finance house, Samuel Montagu, to assist in the speedy sale of Albatross.491 
The Norwegian financial markets were in disarray and the likely buyers of 
Albatross were industrial companies that knew the market. A Swedish 
provider of maritime electronics (Concilium), a British electronics and 
defence contractor (Ferranti), and an Italian manufacturer of automation 
gear (Carlo Gavazzi) took an interest. Honeywell looked at the opportunity, 
but withdraw upon learning the employees threatened to leave.492 
                                                                                                                            
shifted to radio navigation equipment and various other electronic equipment for 
ships. 
490 Reconstructed based on Bob Beagle, The gulf offshore market: A broker's view 
(Marcone International, 2001 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.marcon.com/marcon2c.cfm?SectionListsID=86&PageID=262. The 
original data source seems to be Clarkson Research Studies, “The Offshore Service 
Vessel Register – 2001”, London 2001. 
491 KV-ex 10, Samuel Montagu AS, letter to Kåre Thoen, 5 December 1986. 
492 For an overview of potential bidders (long list), cf. KV-ex 10, Samuel Montague 
Co Ltd, letter to Samuel Montague AS, (not dated); specifically on Honeywell, cf. 
175 
 
A management buy-out was an option at the time. Gulhaugen, Løkling, 
Kildal and the head of sales, Svein Thorsen, made an attempt. They 
discussed a deal with Kreditkassen, a bank, but could not agree on the terms 
of a loan. At the time, there were few Norwegian institutions willing and 
able to see through a management buy-out. The available money pursued 
companies with a positive cash flow and foreseeable risk. Few investors did 
venture financing, the kind of deal where investors needed to prepare well in 
order to assess a high risk – possibly losing on the great majority of deals 
while earning handsomely on a few. Some nevertheless managed to pull 
through such deals. The managers and employees of KV’s automotive 
division did raise sufficient funds to buy their place of work. Unlike the 
Albatross case, the automotive business was untouched by falling oil prices. 
Unlike the Albatross case, the deal involved risk sharing among a broad 
range of employees, and; unlike the Albatross case, the automotive people 
had the courage to mortgage their homes fully. Failing a leveraged buy-out, 
Albatross management preferred acquisition by Simrad Subsea. 493  Some 
were left with the feeling that management preferred being bought by 
Simrad than a broad alliance of employees.494 
 
In March 1987, Samuel Montagu invited interested parties to submit offers 
for KV’s shares in Kongsberg Albatross AS. Some of the bidders were 
mainly interested in Albatross’s controlling stake in Norcontrol Simulation 
AS and KV decided to sell each business separately. In the end, only Simrad 
bid for Kongsberg Albatross and acquired all KV’s assets and liabilities 
related to dynamic positioning for NOK 20 million.495 Did Albatross come 
cheap? Simrad claimed to take on debts worth 10 million more than 
Albatross’s assets. In addition, Simrad had to spend NOK 9.4 million 
acquiring shares from employees. 496  This meant Simrad put NOK 39.4 
                                                                                                                            
KV-ex 11, Honeywell AS (Birkeland) to KV (Fjell og Arentz-Hansen), 3 April 
1987. 
493 Gulhaugen recalls how acting managing director, Tor Espedal, in a hurry to 
liquidate KV’s various holdings, encouraged Albatross’s search for a new owner, cf. 
interview with Gulhaugen, 29 October 2004. 
494 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004. 
495 For Simrad’s revised offer, cf. KV-ex 11, Fax from Simrad (Hansen) to KV 
(Fjell), 21 April 1987 – the Simrad board, cf. CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad Subsea board 
minutes, 30 April 1987; the transaction is recapitulated in KV-ex 11, KV board 
minutes, 5 May 1987. 
496 The financial logic, including an assessment of the employees’ claim, cf. KV-ex 
11, Samuel Montagu AS (Carpenter), letter to KV (Fjell), 27 April 1987. On the 
conditions governing employee shareholding, cf. KV-Cor 238, Managing Director 
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million at risk when buying Albatross. Not much in the light of recent 
earnings, but more than anyone else would stomach. 
 
Figure 32) Albatross crashing: valuations 1984-1987, nominal NOK millions497 
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* * * 
 
As with Albatross, KV attempted to sell the subsea business; as with 
Albatross, the eventual sale in 1987 raised but a fifth of the sums foreseen a 
year earlier. Effective from October 1986, the arms factory incorporated the 
                                                                                                                            
Qvenild, memorandum, 10 December 1985. Although the employees owned only 
five per cent of the shares, they received almost a third of the compensation for the 
sale. Their holding was subject to a guarantee. Back in 1985, KV had agreed to buy 
untradable Albatross shares at NOK 267 by the end of 1987 – a guarantee against 
any retreat from the plans to float Albatross. The deal implicitly valued Albatross at 
NOK 120 million. The employees, furthermore, demanded a part of the proceeds 
from the sale of Norcontrol Simulation. They eventually got 326 per share – 
probably as a gesture of goodwill from Simrad. Simrad paid for the shares with 1.7 
million in cash and Simrad shares worth NOK 7.7 million. 
497 Trend line based on valuations in the following documents: KV-Cor 238, “Issue 
no. 6: Establishing Albatross as an incorporated company”, excerpts from KV board 
protocol, 12 September 1984; KV-ex10, CFO (Fjell), memo to Qvenild, 28 October 
1985; KV-Cor 238, Albatross board papers, 21 November 1985; KV-Cor 239, board 
minutes of 22 May and 3 July 1986; KV-ex 11, Samuel Montagu AS (Carpenter), 
letter to KV (Fjell), 27 April 1987. 
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Oil Division and formed Kongsberg Offshore Systems AS (KOS).498 This 
unit employed 45 people working on surveillance systems (SCADA), 135 
people working on subsea systems, 35 advisory engineers based in London, 
and a 51 per cent share in Kongsberg Subsea Controls A/S, where 15 people 
made subsea control systems based on Ferranti’s technology. KOS was 
thinly capitalized.499 Several suitors showed an interest, including Ferranti, 
shipping magnate Terje Mikalsen, Norwegian Contractors and Elektrisk 
Bureau. In the end, Siemens AG, a German conglomerate, bought the subsea 
supplier.500  
 
Kongsberg had appeared on the Siemens horizon even before KOS was 
officially for sale. Siemens owned a diverse range of businesses including 
Kraftwerkunion, whose 15,000 employees built power plants. By the mid-
1980s, opposition to nuclear power had grown and the company looked for 
new applications of its automation expertise. Siemens identified subsea 
engineering as a promising area. The basics of a deal were agreed in March 
1987 and finalized in June. Siemens agreed to pay NOK 53 million on 
certain conditions, but ended up paying 47.7 million when it turned out their 
acquisition was in worse shape than initially stated.501  
 
* * * 
 
In the spring of 1987, the majority of the board members hoped to refinance 
KV while Glad and another director favoured bankruptcy. The Ministry of 
industry eventually settled for a compromise of sorts: compulsory 
composition. KV discontinued the payment of outstanding (old) debt and 
requested court-administered negotiations with its creditors. In March 1988, 
the debt commission (gjeldsnemd) recommended a solution: small creditors 
got payment in full, the rest in relation to the size of their verified claims. A 
large majority of the creditors voted in favour of the arrangement, because 
the government had offered to put another NOK 300 million on the table. 
When books were finally closed, the government had lost about NOK 1.15 
billion in equity and outstanding loans - financial institutions and suppliers 
lost another billion.502  
                                                     
498 KV-Cor 244, KV board papers dated 27 February 1986, 23 April 1986, 21 
August 1986, and 3 October 1986. 
499 KV-Cor 244, KV board minutes, 14 October 1986. 
500 Correspondence related to the sale is stored in KV-ex 10. 
501 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg; KV-utvalget and Arntzen, "Nou 1989:2". 
502 KV-utvalget and Arntzen, "Nou 1989:2". Accumulated nominal figures. 
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6.5 Explaining downfall and recovery 
The harsh criticism that followed KV’s collapse fed on an air of ineptitude. 
Although years of strained financial results preceded the crisis, management 
seemed caught by surprise.503 Equally stunning was the rapid recovery of the 
Kongsberg industry in the years that followed. In each of the dozen 
companies that picked up pieces of KV, results began to improve. In the first 
decade after the compulsory composition, the Kongsberg family earned 
enough to handle an imaginary debt the size of KV’s total losses (see figure 
below). 
 
The figure indicates that KV might have been able to continue as a going 
concern, if someone had been willing to provide financing. That is 
misleading. The bleeding stopped because the companies that replaced the 
arms factory discontinued its mission-driven technology development, its 
less than vigorous cost focus and reinforced customer orientation.  
 
Figure 33) Phoenix just off the ground: accumulated profit and loss in NOK 
millions (1998) in the Kongsberg family, 1968-2004504 
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503 The department of industry established an independent committee to establish 
how the money was lost and who bore the responsibility. The official government 
inquiry into the affair is published: Ibid.  
504 The figure contains numerous assumptions. For details, turn to Appendix 11.2 on 
page 301 
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KV’s success in the first post-war decades, when KV employed few 
engineers and sported little experience, had been reminiscent of what is 
frequently seen on a macro level: a lagging party rapidly catching up by 
copying the technologies of the more advanced companies and countries. 
Another particular advantage of KV was soft financing to invest in property, 
plants, equipment and research, but also working capital to finance 
operations. Most financing was public or guaranteed by the state: the armed 
forces, for example, paid in advance; the government provided some extra 
share capital, and government connections meant KV had easy access to 
loans. 505 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, interest rates were locked by 
political decree below the rate of inflation and the burden of KV’s loans 
depreciated over time.506 Furthermore, the armed forces entered into cost-
plus contracts whose concept of a cost allowed KV to write off investments 
in general manufacturing capacity. 
 
Hurlen, furthermore, pursued a slightly nonchalant attitude to financing. 
Like a general or a philosopher, he would not accept that an important 
project could be held back from lack of money, but forged ahead with a 
certain ignorance as to how money would eventually emerge. 507  Hurlen 
frequently analyzed industry in terms of power relations: success flowed to 
the ones that exercised power and influence. Costs and profits counted less. 
Irresponsible as the sentiments may sound, they were mostly right with 
regard to the core businesses that KV pursued: defence, oil and public 
procurement. In the political economy of the 1960s and 1970s, success in 
these areas relied a lot on connections (cf. chapter 5.1). 
 
The engine of diffusion slowed in the 1970s and 1980s. Norwegian wages 
rose, there was less room for catching up and fewer easy victories. With 
rising cost levels and new competitors emerging, borrowed technology could 
                                                     
505 From 1970 to 1986, the balance sheet of KV expanded by NOK 3.9 billion – to 
which retained profits contributed NOK 150 million, increased equity contributed 
537 million, and debts to customers and lenders contributed the rest. Particularly in 
the aftermath of the crisis, numerous lenders claimed they had been enticed by an 
implicit guarantee the company was government-backed. The government white 
paper that looked into the crisis concluded the issue was highly blurred, cf. KV-
utvalget and Arntzen, "Nou 1989:2".  
506 On the policy of offering low interests, cf. Øyvind Eitrheim and Jan Tore 
Klovland, Historical monetary statistics for Norway 1819-2003, Norges banks 
skriftserie; no 35 (Oslo: Norges bank, 2004) – figure 14 on page 21shows the 
interest rate on bonds was negative from about 1965 to the early 1980s. 
507 Interview with Næsset, 10 October 2004. The eventual fate of KV is additional 
evidence. 
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not sustain a low-productivity manufacturing operation at Kongsberg. Each 
consecutive development effort was considerably more expensive than the 
previous round. While development costs escalated, market conditions in 
general were difficult in the late 1970s. The global economy grew less 
rapidly than in previous decades and although counter-cyclical spending in 
anticipation of oil revenues cushioned the home market, the cost level 
spiralled and threatened export industries.  
 
Gradually a pattern emerged. On its own or through connections at the 
defence research establishment, KV would identify a promising new 
technology and develop a product. This product would enjoy modest success 
at first, almost recouping the initial investment, upon which KV would raise 
the stakes and develop a next-generation product. Although KV hired ever 
more graduate engineers and no doubt gained in capability, the second-
generation products were generally less successful than their predecessors 
were. This second attempt would face unexpected cost hikes, technological 
problems and stiffening competition … whereupon KV would redouble its 
efforts and make a third-generation product. These third-generation failures 
undid KV in the 1980s.  
 
Figure 34) Twice bitten, never shy: KV’s declining success on competitive 
markets508 
 
 
* * * 
 
In explaining why KV failed to act on its failures, it is useful to consider a 
set of mechanisms that cause its escalation of commitment, i.e. the economic, 
                                                     
508 Useful information is assembled in KV-utvalget and Arntzen, "Nou 1989:2". 
Product line 1960s 1970s 1980s
Accumulated loss by  
1987 (NOK 1998) 
KG2 KG5 KG 3
Small loss Very big losses Very unprofitable 1.1 billion 
F-16 PW 4000
Profitable Very unprofitable 2.4 billion 
SM3 SM4 KS 500-900
Few stand- 
alone sales Losses
Very unprofitable, 
abandoned Not available 
Essi CNC 2000 CNC 3000
Profitable Lossmaking Abandoned, lossmaking 1.1 billion 
Gas turbines 
Turbofan parts
Robotics (numerical 
control) 
Computers 
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psychological, sociological and structural mechanism that caused decision-
makers to redouble their commitment to projects gone wrong.509 
 
KV’s gas turbines provided an instructive case of escalating commitment. In 
the 1960s, KV had developed a radial gas turbine - the first such undertaking 
in-house, neither on license nor on blueprint from the defence research 
establishment. The first generation KG 2 was reliable, easy, robust and 
adjustable to various types of fuel; it became a moderate success and gained 
30 per cent of the market for small turbines in the early 1970s.510 Alas, it was 
rather inefficient - just 17 per cent of the inherent energy in its fuel 
transferred into useful power and the 1973 price hike on fuel made KG 2 
unsuited as a source of permanent power. 
 
Having come close to full-scale success, the decision to develop a new gas 
turbine did not seem controversial. KV aimed to supply offshore oil 
platforms with gas turbines – a market that demanded larger and more 
efficient turbines. Despite long and costly development efforts, the new 
turbine (KG 5) failed to impress customers. At the time of its launch in 1979, 
the offshore market had settled on aircraft-derived turbines that were lighter 
and burned fuel at a higher temperature – their efficacy and efficiency was 
superior to conventional gas turbines.  
 
When KV again faced a choice between discontinuing the turbine business 
and escalating its commitment, the decision had grown increasingly painful. 
A large internal constituency had based their careers on gas turbine 
development. KV’s board of directors remarked on the difficulties of 
agreeing “to terminate” the turbine business and ensuring “that the gas 
turbine competency in Norway would not be lost”.511 They felt that the very 
thought of withdrawal felt like an “amputation”.512 The board went along 
                                                     
509 Barry M. Staw and Jerry Ross, "Behavior in escalation situations: Antecedents, 
prototypes, and solutions", Research in Organizational Behavior, 9 (1987), pp. 39-
78. 
510 KV-utvalget and Arntzen, "Nou 1989:2". 
511 KV board meeting on 13 August 1979, referred to in Ibid., p. 111: “Det ville 
være vanskelig å resignere med å avslutte gassturbinvirksomheten ved KV med 
KG2 og KG5. […] Styret ville til neste gang be om å få seg forelagt en plan for en 
ny familie av turbiner basert på anvendelse av ny teknologi og nye materialer. Med 
full satsing på fornyelse burde også volumet kunne økes. Det ville imidlertid neppe 
være mulig for KV alene å bære frem slike nyutviklinger. Det måtte sies å være en 
nasjonal interesse å hindre at gassturbinkompetansen i Norge gikk tapt.”  
512 From the deliberations of the board on 15 December 1981; the minutes are cited 
in Ibid., p. 115. 
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with the head of the gas turbine division who proposed a new concept called 
KG3: a small, light gas turbine burning fuel at a high temperature with 
correspondingly high fuel efficiency. Drawing on political connections, KV 
got a public institution, Industrifondet (“the Fund”) to help finance the 
project.  KV lacked the capacity to finance and market such a turbine, and 
acknowledged the need to enlist an industrial partner. In order not to lose 
time, the board agreed to begin development without a partner. The only 
forthcoming partners were Tenneco and Phillips Petroleum Company, two 
oil companies under obligation to spend money on research in Norway. This 
support was insufficient to see the project through, but out of reluctance to 
see investments done in vain, KV and the Fund decided to continue without 
an industrial partner.513  
 
The enlisting of external partners created structural ties that made KV’s 
commitment to gas turbines ever deeper. In February 1979, with several 
product lines running into trouble, KV supplied the Ministry of Industry with 
a detailed recovery plan. The plan required additional equity, and KV got an 
additional NOK 200 million by resolution of parliament. No more then six 
months later, management realized they could not deliver according to the 
plan; KV risked making the ministry look stupid – or worse, dishonest - in 
front of parliament. The company responded with heavy investments in the 
development of data systems, gas turbines and jet engines. For a vivid 
parallel, imagine the psychology of a gambler who, having borrowed 
excessively from the mafia, found his luck running out, scrambled together 
his available resources and upped the bets to regain lost investments. 
Although the gas turbine project fell behind schedule, turning back became 
more painful with each passing month. 
  
A similar escalation of commitment unfolded in the jet engine division. In 
the mid-1970s, when the Norwegian air force was about to acquire F-16 
fighter-bombers, KV secured a re-purchase agreement: the American 
manufacturer of the airplanes was obliged to source turbo fans from 
Kongsberg. The contract was lucrative, but volumes were lower than 
expected. As with gas turbines, KV was loath to quit a business that (almost) 
had achieved a decent success. As with gas turbines, KV secured certain 
benefits from foreign oil interests that improved the economics of the 
business somewhat.514 As with gas turbines, KV hesitantly attempted a state-
                                                     
513 Ibid.  
514 In 1979 Elf received gained concessions in the North Sea in return for, among 
other favours, a deal where Société Nationale d’Etude et de Construction de Moteurs 
d’Aviation (SNECMA), an air engine factory owned by the French government, 
bought manufacturing services from KV, cf. KV-Cor 248, Qvenild, letter to 
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of-the-art development project and bought into Pratt & Whitney’s effort to 
develop a new civilian jet engine. As with gas turbines, KV failed to meet 
expectations. As with gas turbines, the cost of withdrawal eventually grew so 
high that retreat was no longer an option (the contractual arrangements 
specified huge liabilities if the parts failed to arrive on time or failed to meet 
quality standards). KV could not afford either to continue or to withdraw. 
 
Somewhat simplified, the projects that escalated out of control were initiated 
for financial reasons, but continued in no small part for reasons of 
psychology. Eventually, the projects gained momentum and binding, enlisted 
structural support, and became ever harder to close. In the final stages, 
financial arguments again surfaced to keep the projects running: writing off 
the sunk costs threatened to break the company. Accepting failure and 
expensing the costs in the early 1980s would have drained the share capital 
of KV and threatened bankruptcy or the involvement of private shareholders. 
Only failure and restructuring helped terminate KV’s commitment.  
 
The successor companies lacked KV’s commitment. Some of KV’s 
unprofitable business lines closed, including several businesses involved in 
computing and robotics. Elsewhere, the companies shred costs. Norsk 
Forsvarsteknologi AS (NFT), a state-owned company established to run 
KV’s defence business, hired a managing director, Jan T. Jørgensen, who set 
out to handle Kongsberg’s cost problem with a certain brutality. He was 
unsentimental about workers, heeded the recommendations of his economic 
advisors, and cut capacity whenever old product lines lost markets.515 The 
abrupt turnaround after 1987 was in no small part attributed to a change in 
mentalities. Such a profound awakening is hard to measure objectively, but 
certainly influenced business practices. It was not a matter of transforming 
the average employee, engineer or manager into profit-maximizing 
entrepreneurs, but new owners and managers met less resistance in their 
efforts to streamline and commercialise the businesses.516  
 
* * * 
                                                                                                                            
Ministry of oil and energy (Himle), 4 May 1982; RA-Arntzen-Oil, ”En orientering 
om aksjoner og planer for 1983”, November 1982. 
515 Interview with Solberg, 27 March 2003; with Korssjøen, 27 March 2003.  
516 Interview with Solberg, 27 March 2003. The same sentiments from a 
contemporary source, cf. Managing Director Espedal in Laagendalsposten, 12 
March 1987: ”Vi er ingen vernet bedrift. KV er en kommersiell virksomhet, der det 
er resultatene som teller. Vi skal ta hånd om det positive fra fortiden – ellers får vi 
legge den bak oss. Denne holdningen må ned til hver eneste ansatt.”  
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Those businesses that were profitable to begin with faced same demands for 
prudence. Albatross was a case in point. In the early 1980s, when the 
company basked in money and success, the Albatrosses had developed a 
towering self-esteem and a touch of arrogance e.g. in relation to competition. 
Occasionally, when discussing Honeywell, someone would fake the 
recollection of a distant memory and remark: “Oh, the thermostat people” 
(Honeywell Corporation manufactured ventilation systems, and the 
Honeywell logo was displayed on the air-conditioning control panel in the 
Albatross meeting room). The culture “went cowboy” according to then 
employee representative Steinar Sælid. The Albatrosses certainly used some 
of their freedom to develop previously unheard-of spending habits, for 
example hiring planes to bring customers in for events.517 Such habits, too, 
disappeared in the wake of the crisis. 
 
KV’s approach to financing is evident in the graph below. A financially 
minded reader will notice a consistent discrepancy between budgets, plans 
and actual results. Actual results always failed to match budgets and prior 
plans, a condition known as “KV sickness”.518 Middle managers thought the 
budgets surreal; they were encouraged and leaned upon to set high targets, 
but were rarely sanctioned for their failure to deliver. Secondly, we suspect 
top management held accounting in some disdain: nine years in a row, KV’s 
profit and loss statement returned an almost exact zero. Partly, KV aimed to 
spend as much as it earned; partly, the company valued such items as unsold 
goods retrospectively to avoid losses. In addition, the company wrote off its 
investments at historic prices irrespective of the costs of actually replacing 
worn-out plants and equipment. 519 In short, the graphs reveal a company in 
which economics was not allowed to overshadow such considerations as 
engineering excellence or strategic initiatives to modernize the country. 
 
                                                     
517 The arrogance has been commented upon by several sources apart from Sælid, cf. 
interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004, and conversation with Gulhaugen, Kildal 
and Løkling, 29 October 2004. 
518 KV-utvalget and Arntzen, "Nou 1989:2". 
519 Bernt-Ivar Amundsen and Morten Bjerke, "Prisnivåjusteringer, a/s kongsberg 
våpenfabrikk", (Seminaroppgave, Norges Handelshøyskole, 1976). 
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Figure 35) Cooked books: budgets, profits and losses at KV, 1970-1986 (nominal 
NOK millions) 
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
Actual Budget Plan previous year
-338,9
 
Simply by installing greater discipline, the new owners and managers that 
took charge of KV’s various successor companies managed to improve their 
businesses. There was an intangible effect of the 1987 crisis: after 1987, a 
business mentality cautioned the predominant engineering mentality. Most 
would admit the weapons factory had been no model of efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the crowned capital “K” that formed KV’s logo had been a 
symbol of something fundamentally sound and solid. The collapse of the 
weapons factory was a tremendous blow. After 1987, Norsk 
Forsvarsteknologi AS preferred not to refer to “Kongsberg” in its name. 
People at Kongsberg, furthermore, suffered through 50 stories on Norway’s 
sole national TV-news show in the course of one year – each incident a 
reminder of the fiasco and a demeaning experience. 520  Making matters 
worse, the US Senate threatened to block all import of KV equipment 
because the company had supplied numerical control systems to Soviet naval 
yards that employed the technology in the making of very silent submarine 
propellers. 521  In the aftermath of 1987, people at Kongsberg steeled 
themselves “swearing never again to be the laughing stock of national 
                                                     
520 Interview with Korssjøen, 27 March 2003. 
521 Wicken, "Stille propell i storpolitisk storm: KV/Toshiba-saken og dens 
bakgrunn".  
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television news”. 522  Almost immediately, the new sentiments made an 
impact on in company accounts. The business lines at Kongsberg stopped 
bleeding cash.  
 
The KV crisis of 1987 was a period of uncertainty and discomfort for most 
employees and managers at Kongsberg. The collapse of the company was an 
apocalyptic event, a shock sufficiently strong to reshape mentalities. The 
wide-ranging recovery following 1987 was in no small part made possible 
because people accepted the need for change. In this, the crisis of 1987 
became an opportunity. New owners and managers, from within or without 
Kongsberg, were able to reconfigure the businesses they had acquired. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
Some of the conditions for the rapid growth of KV in the years from 1950 to 
1980 were not worth having in the end. They included lax corporate 
governance, soft financing, captive customers, political privileges, the 
pursuit of engineering excellence irrespective of demand, and a lack of 
competition. Prompted by low oil prices after 1986, cost consciousness had 
taken hold in the industry and the oil industrial complex behaved slightly 
more as a regular industry in a market economy. Statoil ceased treating 
Kongsberg Offshore as a sibling and regarded the company simply as a 
favoured supplier.  
 
The companies that adjusted to new and less hospitable settings became 
stronger than the company that succumbed in 1987. In no small part, the 
crisis and the recovery were connected. Some of the changes that eventually 
served to create successful industries were well underway before the 
disintegration of KV. By 1987, KV had come a long way towards 
establishing separate profit units and abandoning the monolithic practice of 
the 1970s. The change was too slow to avoid a meltdown and the company 
hesitated to discontinue once-successful product lines. 
 
The environment that faced Kongsberg Offshore and Albatross was 
simultaneously hostile and promising. Lower oil prices paved the way for 
new technology, but KOS lost its favoured status with the oil companies and 
struggled to reposition itself. Despite its former dominance, or possibly 
because of this dominance, new competitors emerged to challenge the 
company’s previous near-monopoly of subsea assignments off the 
Norwegian coast. Albatross, meanwhile, suffered from an almost complete 
halt in the market for new offshore support vessels.  
 
                                                     
522 Interview with Korssjøen, 27 March 2003. 
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7 Inventing simplicity, 1986-1991 
Difficult years from 1986 onwards honed business skills at Kongsberg. An 
absence of work and the emergence of strong competitors sharpened minds 
and made engineers more focused on markets and customers. In these years, 
both Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore refocused on making the lives of 
their customers simpler. Unrelated at first sight, the innovations covered in 
this chapter addressed a roughly similar demand: the need to handle 
complexity.  
 
The low oil prices that helped undo KV also helped refocus the Norwegian 
oil industry. In Norway, the introduction of new technologies needed 
political backing – or, more precisely, non-interference. Following 1986, the 
will to impose a certain style of field development took a hit with the oil 
price collapse. Alternative development styles were allowed to challenge 
gravity platforms. This offered much more room for deepwater technology. 
In that respect, the mid-1980s were a turning point for the two businesses we 
have been tracing. The offshore industry became much more receptive to the 
nimble and cost-efficient ways of developing oil fields. This fundamental 
shift favoured the Kongsberg-based supplier industry. 
 
Although the market moved in ways that favoured Albatross and Kongsberg 
Offshore, recovery was slow. For a number of years, the sale of DP systems 
remained well below its mid-1980s peak. The oil price collapse in 1986 had 
in effect pricked a bubble in rigs and offshore supply vessels, and the market 
did not recover in line with the price of oil. Kongsberg Offshore, having won 
every contract up to 1984, missed the major opportunities that arose in the 
late 1980s. To make matters worse, the company lost its main supplier 
(Cameron). Only through product innovations did Albatross and Kongsberg 
Offshore reposition their business. 
 
If last chapter was mainly about disintegration, reintegration was a more 
fitting label for the period that followed. System sales forced an integration 
of technologies and at times an integration of companies. Albatross profited 
somewhat from the extended marine electronics competencies of its owner, 
Simrad, but also from the parent’s service network and organizational skills. 
In this setting, the exceptionality that had served Albatross well in the 
previous decade was less of an asset. For suppliers of subsea systems, a 
complementary product range was increasingly of essence. Kongsberg 
Offshore found a partner in Food Machine and Chemical Corporation 
(FMC), which supplied Christmas trees and other equipment that matched 
the control systems made at Kongsberg. 
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A second response to complexity was standardization. Albatross had 
streamlined its product offering almost from the very beginning: the 
company offered a set of defined Albatross dynamic positioning products 
such as the ADP 501 (non-redundant) ADP 503 (triple redundant) and 
strived to limit variance.523 Oil companies, by contrast, tended to introduce 
some novelty in every subsea field development. Around 1990, Kongsberg 
Offshore initiated an effort to standardize wellhead technology. The 
company postulated there would be considerable economies of scale if they 
could allow standardization. By locking on to a limited product range, 
Kongsberg Offshore delivered cost savings that served to make subsea 
systems a more compelling option. 
 
7.1 Cost consciousness and competition in the oil industry 
The low oil prices of the late 1980s challenged every company involved in 
offshore oil. In Norway, the development of fields continued much as 
before, but low prices somewhat undermined the economics of large, gravity 
platforms. The relative decline of Statoil and the rise of competing centres of 
expertise helped introduce competition on the Norwegian Shelf. Statoil, too, 
changed. It came to behave more like an ordinary, profit-seeking company, 
aiming to cut the cost of developing and running offshore fields – not as a 
regulatory tool to secure maximum Norwegian content. Kongsberg Offshore 
suffered, but the transformation eventually helped advance the kind of cost-
efficient development styles that the company offered. 
 
Oil companies became more cost-focused and self-critical, and in Norway, 
the public joined in an outcry against large expenditures.524 Arve Johnsen 
had to leave Statoil in 1988 following huge overruns at Mongstad where 
Statoil botched the rebuilding of a petroleum refinery. Offshore, the cost of 
developing fields seemed palatable in the light of eventual earnings, but cost 
overruns in the downstream industries were transparent. Mongstad looked 
set to lose money on a scale that captured the public mind. Apart from home-
grown anger with spendthrift development projects, a global prudence also 
made inroads. Johnsen’s predecessor developed close ties with British 
Petroleum. The British shelf matured earlier (cf. the cream curve on 
                                                     
523 The naming philosophy was inspired by a Peugeot car series – Jacobsen, the 
Albatross manager during 1976-80, loved his car. 
524 For an elaborate argument reflecting the public outcry, cf. Sissel Myklebust and 
Espen Søbye, "Overinvestering og statlig styring i oljevirksomheten", Nytt Norsk 
Tidsskrift 1988, pp. 25-40. 
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page 218) and operators on the British shelf turned to cost cutting and 
outsourcing early. Statoil took notice.525 
 
Everywhere, companies became more concerned about investing in offshore 
oil. Albatross was hard hit. Some two-thirds of its market disappeared when 
shipping companies stopped ordering new petroleum support vessels.526 In 
1988, Albatross lost a few million; in 1989, Albatross earned a few million. 
As the price of dynamic positioning fell and reliability improved, dynamic 
positioning found applications on naval vessels, icebreakers and other 
specialist vessels unrelated to the oil business. In the 1990s, such diverse 
customers accounted for 20-30 per cent of Albatross’s deliveries (cf. figure 
below). When telecom companies rushed to put down overseas 
telecommunications cables around 1990, Albatross secured contracts to 
equip a number of cable-laying vessels with dynamic positioning that in 
effect worked like a very precise autopilot.  
 
                                                     
525  On the British inspiration, cf. Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", p. 156, with 
reference to a speech by Harald Nordvik: ”Norsk Petroleumsvirksomhet - 
Internasjonale utfordringer og muligheter” (Norwegian Petroleum Activities - 
International Challenges and Opportunities), Den Polytekniske Forening, Oslo, 20 
March 1990. 
526 CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad AS board minutes, 24 August 1987. 
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Figure 36) Not just oil: Albatross deliveries by vessel type, 1979-1994527 
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Throughout the downturn, Kongsberg’s market share in up-market dynamic 
positioning remained high, possibly reaching 90 per cent of the market,528 
and Albatross continued to earn money on support, training and after 
sales. 529  In the late 1980s, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) 
underpinned the certification arrangement by issuing prescriptive regulations 
in the 1980s that linked DP classes with specific operations and 
circumstances.530 If, for example, a failure to maintain position threatened 
human life, serious environmental damage or large economic consequences, 
the vessel conducting that operation needed a class 3 certificate (fully 
redundant DP system). Outside Norway, oil companies were not legally 
obliged to apply specific DP equipment for specific tasks, but tended to heed 
the advice of classification societies nevertheless. Originally intended as 
guidelines assisting investors and insurers in the assessment of risk, the class 
system grew into an institution that governments could rely on when 
                                                     
527 The figure is calculated using various sources, most importantly reference lists 
published in 1981 and 2001 from KMedu. The lists correspond with the company’s 
ad-hoc sales database, which is somewhat more difficult to draw on for grouping 
sales according to vessel type. 
528 Laagendalsposten, 19 February 1987. 
529 KV-ex 12, Albatross board minutes, 22 January 1987. 
530 Bray, Dynamic positioning.  
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specifying environmental standards or health and safety regulations. Such 
arrangements created a demand for dynamic positioning, but compared to 
previous years, business was down. 
 
* * * 
 
For Kongsberg Offshore, the cost focus was rather advantageous. It 
eventually shifted focus from huge gravity platforms into deepwater 
technology. Up until 1986, the oil industry in Norway thought large-scale 
subsea developments were feasible only where the waters were deep and 
rough or the geology was difficult. Subsea systems addressed their physical 
constraints – not the economic constraints of the industry - and oil 
companies channelled their research money into diverless systems for 
extreme conditions.531 The subsea developments that de-facto took place on 
the Norwegian shelf prior to 1986, however, were satellite developments for 
economic reasons. Gradually, the economic advantages of subsea field 
developments became their most attractive feature and the mainstay of new 
field development styles. This shift began in the late 1980s, when low oil 
prices provided a push away from gravity platforms. The will to protect 
existing practices irrespective of cost was diminishing. The oil industry’s 
share of Norway’s gross national product declined from almost 20 per cent 
in 1985 to 10 percent in 1988. In 1986, the state coffers received no oil 
money at all and exploration activities came close to halt because the costs 
involved in building Condeeps destroyed the economics of every project 
except for such giants as Troll. 532  Despite heavy lobbying, successive 
governments intervened less and allowed new development styles to take 
hold although the shift away from Condeeps exposed the supplier industry to 
international competition. 
 
Particularly on marginal fields, low prices triggered a new development 
style. Tommeliten was a case in point. At the time of its discovery, in the 
mid-1970s, KV had proposed a field development based on subsea 
technology, but Statoil continued to search for ways of developing the field 
in an economic way using manned platforms. After the fall in oil prices, 
however, Phillips Petroleum proposed to develop the field with subsea 
installations only. “Paradoxically enough, we may conclude that it was the 
fall of the oil price in 1986 that led to the building of Tommeliten,“ writes 
                                                     
531 For a typical and contemporary recollection of the arguments in favour of subsea 
systems in the early 1980s, cf. Pedersen et al., "Introduction to subsea production 
systems".  
532 Cf. the figure on p. 38.  
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Engen. Only when oil prices had fallen to a point where the old style of 
developing fields was obviously unprofitable, was it “legitimate” in the 
Statoil organization to consider subsea field development. 533  In October 
1986, when Statoil asked various suppliers to submit bids for subsea 
systems, KV’s financial health was fast deteriorating. That was probably 
why Statoil bypassed Kongsberg Offshore and ordered equipment from 
Aker-Hughes A/S.534 
 
Another opportunity emerged in the summer of 1987, when Kongsberg 
Offshore had gained the financial backing of Siemens. At the time, Hydro 
arranged a tender for Troll Oseberg Gas Injection (TOGI), a plan to extract 
Troll gas from subsea wells, ship it across to Oseberg in a pipeline, inject the 
gas to increase reservoir pressure at Oseberg and hence extract more oil. 
With backing from the Ministry of energy, Hydro overturned the opposition 
of Statoil and Shell, which thought the concept too adventurous, and went 
ahead with a tender for subsea equipment. 535  Kongsberg Offshore’s 
relationship with Cameron disintegrated in preparation for the bid. The 
Kongsberg engineers shifted track and offered a subsea system based on 
valve trees and other critical components from WKM and Dril-Quip. The 
change arguably introduced uncertainty and Hydro awarded the contract to 
Kværner, which was now cooperating with Cameron. 536 In August 1987, 
Kongsberg Offshore was about to run out of work. The company had lost a 
string of bids in a row. During the next few years, Siemens injected about 
100 million (2008) to keep its acquisition afloat.537 
 
Kongsberg Offshore’s losses were the gains of other engineering companies. 
In the course of two years, Hydro awarded contracts to several Norwegian 
engineering companies worth NOK 740 million and offered each an 
opportunity to invest and expand. During Kongsberg Offshore’s difficult 
years, a host of competitors gained footholds including Aker, Kværner and 
                                                     
533 Wallace, Duberg, and Kirkley, "Dynamics of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf 
of Mexico: 1980-2000: Final report".  
534 ”Rimeligere utbygging av Tommeliten?”, NTB, 4 February 1986; ”Trolig 4.8 
milliarders utbygging på Tommeliten”, NTB, 10 March 1986; ”Tommeliten-
kontrakt til nytt Stord-firma”, NTB, 27 September 1986.  
535 Lie, Oljerikdommer og internasjonal ekspansjon: Hydro 1977-2005  
536 ”250 millioners kontrakt til Kværner”, NTB, 3 August 1987. 
537 A rough estimate of accumulated losses in the late 1980s as they appear in annual 
reports and Eriksen, "Næringsøkonomiske virkninger av nedleggelse av store 
bedrifter", See also appendix 11.6. 
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Elektrisk Bureau. Most established themselves supplying Hydro. In effect, 
Hydro’s effort to produce oil at Oseberg created a new industry.  
 
Like Statoil on Gullfaks, Hydro adopted the EPC contract strategy and asked 
suppliers to take full responsibility. This created a market for subsea 
deliveries where KOS had previously enjoyed a near monopoly. By the late 
1980s, four players were able to take on subsea system assignments (EPC 
contracts) on the Norwegian shelf. None actually manufactured pressure-
containing equipment in Norway, but sourced such equipment from 
companies based in Houston. All companies focused on control systems and 
systems engineering.  
 
Kværner was the single company best placed to compete against Kongsberg 
Offshore. The company had acquired a well of general engineering 
experience and had taken part in various paid subsea studies that arrived 
through the technology agreements. In the second half of the 1980s, Kværner 
Subsea outgrew Kongsberg Offshore in terms of revenue. Kværner built 
subsea systems for East Frigg, Tommeliten, TOGI and Snorre. From 1987 to 
1991, Kværner worked in cooperation with Cameron.538 
 
Around 1990, Elektrisk Bureau (EB) emerged as a leading supplier. EB 
looked into the subsea field on several occasions during the late 1980s and 
considered buying Kongsberg Offshore Systems A/S in 1986.539 The next 
year, Asea Brown Boweri (ABB) bought a controlling stake in EB and then 
(1989) in Skeie Gruppen, whose portfolio included the Seanor subsidiary 
that offered subsea engineering.540 In 1992, having bought out all minority 
owners in its Norwegian operations, ABB assigned overall responsibility for 
offshore activities to ABB Norway and put the former EB office at 
Billingstad in charge of the large offshore engineering business of Vetco 
Gray, which ABB acquired in 1991 through the purchase of Combustion 
Engineering. Vetco Gray was a global market leader in valve trees and other 
subsea technology.541 ABB gained a strong position on the Norwegian shelf, 
most notably through a NOK 400 million contract (1992) to supply subsea 
systems for oil extraction at Troll and subsequent assignments for Saga on 
Tordis and Vigids. 
                                                     
538 On Snorre, cf. ”Kværner får ny Snorre-kontrakt”, Dagens Næringsliv, 11 March 
1989; on TOGI, cf. Martin Brakas, "Kværner har fått viktige undervannskontrakter", 
Offshore Norge 1987, p. 9. 
539 ”Elektrisk Bureau blant interesserte KV-kjøpere”, NTB, 12 March 1987. 
540 Sverre A. Christensen, "EBs historie [forthcoming]" (2009). 
541 Ibid.  
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Aker had been looking into subsea engineering since the 1970s, but 
succeeded only in the 1990s.542 Around 1990, Aker Subsea employed some 
40 people who distributed third-party control systems. In 1991, Aker Subsea 
acquired the control system business of Hughes Aircraft, allied itself with 
National Oilwell (valve trees) and GEC Avionics (control system specialist) 
and invested in facilities to mach Kværner and Kongsberg Offshore.543 In 
1992, following the acquisition of Norwegian Petroleum Consultants, Aker 
had a quite broad subsea portfolio. That year, the company secured a subsea 
systems delivery contract at Lille-Frigg.544 By then, four companies based in 
Norway were capable of supplying turnkey subsea systems. 
 
Apart from the large engineering companies, specialist suppliers emerged to 
do work on subsea systems. One of the most significant was Frank Mohn 
(Framo) in Bergen. The company was renowned for ship pumps (80 per cent 
market share in 1988) and did innovative work on multi-phase pumping (the 
pumping of more or less untreated well-stream).545 Other companies came up 
with complimentary products to support subsea developments. Simrad, for 
example, used its acoustics knowledge to develop systems capable of 
detecting gas leaks or the presence of sand in gas pipelines.546 Moreover, 
various shipping companies came up with specialized offshore supply 
vessels capable of installing, servicing and maintaining the various pieces of 
equipment on the seabed. Many of these vessels employed dynamic 
positioning equipment from Albatross. 
 
In the short run, Kongsberg Offshore obviously had a lot to lose, and little to 
gain, from competition. In the end, however, the plethora of subsea providers 
                                                     
542 In the 1970s, Aker looked at solutions to complement its competencies in floating 
installations and cooperated with industry specialists such as FMC, Vickers 
Offshore Development and ASEA, cf. Smeby’s private papers, Smeby, “A 
Norwegian activity on subsea completion / deep water production systems”, 11 
November 1975; KV-Cor 248, Smeby, minutes from meeting with Cameron Iron 
Works, 9 January 1978. 
543 S.N. Asgaut, ”Aker Subsea bygger ny undervannsbase”, Dagens Næringsliv, 2 
August 1991.  
544 Torgeir Anda and Kjell Østerbø, ”Strømlinjet Aker vetner på oppgangen”, 
Dagens Næringsliv, 21 January 1992. 
545 ”Ny teknikk gir mer olje”, Dagens Næringsliv, 18 May 1988; Morten Woldsdal, 
”Landplattform for fremtiden”, Aftenposten, 9 March 1987; ”Teknologisk nyvinning 
med store vyer”, NTB, 23 March 1988; ”Ny teknikk gir mer olje”, Dagens 
Næringsliv, 18 May 1988. On multi-phase pumping, cf. p. 277. 
546 Tron Bø, ”Milepæl for norsk undervannsteknologi”, Aftenposten, 13 July 1989. 
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had a beneficial effect. Because oil companies on the Norwegian shelf could 
draw on various providers, they felt assured there would be a competitive 
market for subsea tenders. This made subsea developments a more attractive 
option. In this sense, the competitiveness of the industry contributed to an 
eventual shift in field development styles. 
 
7.2 Pulling an act together 
Both Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore suffered in the late 1980s - 
Albatross from a disappearing market, Kongsberg Offshore from a string of 
losses. Both needed time and the support of their respective new owners to 
realign. 
 
Prior to 1986, Albatross had thrived without extensive checks on spending; 
there were few incentives “to return money rather than have fun” according 
to one long-timer. 547  The profligacy worried Simrad’s board and its 
managing director, Kåre Hansen. His instructions were to “closely follow” 
developments at Kongsberg. 548  Simrad was a financially conservative 
company with stringent control. A favourite of the stock exchange, Simrad 
knew how to communicate goals and fulfil promises. Hansen transferred 
these qualities to Albatross.549 
  
Albatross encountered a company that was quite tolerant of diversity. Being 
less certain their company was exceptional, people at Simrad were better 
able to appreciate, incorporate and accommodate others. The renamed 
Simrad Albatross AS retained a distinct identity, a separate location and a 
clear-cut product line. Nevertheless, relations between Simrad and Albatross 
produced a clash of cultures. From Albatross’s point of view, the Simrad 
people were conservative and controlling, somewhat resembling people at 
KV. There was “something of a clash” before things levelled.550 In part, the 
conflict centred on Hansen. His business talent was undisputed, but he was a 
domineering manager, something of a loner and not a good listener. As with 
other technicians turned managers he tended to involve himself in minute 
                                                     
547 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
548 CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad AS board minutes dated 24 August 1987 and 23 August 
1990. 
549 Interview with Kildal, 29 October 2004. 
550 Conversation with Kildal, Gulhaugen and Løkling, 29 October 2004. 
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details, annoying the engineers in charge who in turn responded with a 
variety of obstructive techniques.551  
 
Simrad hoped to forge a new identity on top of the specific Albatross 
culture, as evident in successive re-brandings.552 In 1989, the Albatross name 
disappeared from subsidiaries abroad. The most controversial move was 
replacing a logo, substituting the Albatross bird with the Simrad wave. Like 
losing the standard in battle, the change was an emotional and psychological 
blow. The dynamic positioning people lost some of their identity and 
nothing came along to replace it. When the business was rebranded 
Kongsberg Simrad AS, employees stubbornly continued to speak of 
Albatross.553 
 
One of those who lost heart was Gulhaugen. A few years prior, a slightly 
populist business magazine, Kapital, had pronounced him a genius. He had 
become a sought-after and engaging conference speaker on the subject of 
success and motivation. When the downturn stuck, he had to initiate a cost-
savings initiative named Target ´90 to save NOK 20 million554 and insist on 
selling products in stock at the expense of distant opportunities. As a 
response, many employees accused him of insufficient knowledge in matters 
technological and plotted to get rid of him. While most of the management 
team was abroad, employee representatives launched a “technicians’ 
mutiny”. The incident wore heavily on Gulhaugen. He switched some 
attention from daily operations and took interest in aloof public relations or 
mundane work.555 In December 1987 he formally transferred to Simrad’s 
corporate headquarters - in effect he stepped onto the sidelines. Torfinn 
Kildal, who had been handling finance and economics at Albatross since 
1979, became managing director.556 
 
On Kildal’s watch, there was another defection - this time it affected the 
sales department. Sales had been the subject of special scrutiny during the 
                                                     
551 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. On Hansen’s business talents and some 
of his conflicts, cf. Sogner, God på bunnen, pp. 160 ff. 
552 Cf, Appendix 11.1.  
553 Interview with Helle, 14 April 2005. 
554 Jahnsen’s private papers, Albatross company communications, Target ’90, 
number 2, 1987. 
555 Interview with Sælid, 14 October 2004; conversation with Kildal, Gulhaugen and 
Løkling, 29 October 2004. 
556 Conversation with Kildal, Gulhaugen and Løkling, 29 October 2004. 
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cost-cutting effort. Arguably, Albatross could do with a degree of prudence 
and the salespeople were more flamboyant and high-flying than the average 
albatross, sometimes in a fashion bordering on the irregular. Rather than 
cutting back, key people in the sales department wanted to pursue an 
expansionist strategy, establish a trade company independent of Simrad and 
sell dynamic positioning alongside third-party products. When denied this 
opportunity, three key people left: Sven Thorsen, Vidar Djønne and Ingvald 
Løvdal.557 They founded a company, Alba International, and moved on to 
buy Valmet’s Norwegian subsidiary in 1997. Four years later, Thorsen 
became the biggest earner in Norway when CAE (Canada) acquired their 
business.558 
 
Although Albatross at times had a troubled relationship with Simrad, the 
connection carried advantages. Albatross gained some work from Simrad’s 
NOK 381 million (1990) contract to equip nine Norwegian catamarans for 
the handling of mines. While Simrad and Thompson provided detection 
sonar, mine avoidance sonar and operation planning software, Albatross 
provided a system that kept the catamarans at a safe working distance from 
the explosives.559 
 
Simrad possessed the bureaucracy and the systematic approach needed to 
run a large, diversified, international company. This approach sometimes 
clashed with established practices at Albatross, but gradually, the Simrad 
approach prevailed. The 1991 annual report contained a passage about “little 
rivalry” within the group – an indirect acknowledgement there had been 
controversies. It probably helped Kildal himself who went on to manage 
Simrad’s affairs. He doubled as head of group finances before he stepped in 
to replace Hansen when the latter took time off to establish Simrad in the 
Pacific Rim in 1989-1990.560 Terje Løkling, the head of technology, became 
managing director of Simrad Albatross AS. Like several others, he held a 
diploma in cybernetics from Trondheim. At Albatross, his first job was as a 
                                                     
557 Conversation with Kildal, Gulhaugen and Løkling, 29 October 2004. Specifically 
on the spending habits, cf. interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004. 
558 “Vanlig å havne på ligningstoppen”, Dagens Næringsliv, 17 December 2002.  
559 On the technology, cf. Sogner’s private papers, Simrad Newsletter, issue 1, 1992. 
On the thinking at Albatross about naval deliveries, cf KV-Cor 239, board minutes, 
3 July 1986 and 23 October 1986; KV-ex 12, Albatross board minutes, 22 January 
1987. On the value of mine hunting contract, cf. CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad AS board 
minutes, 26 February 1990. 
560 Sogner, God på bunnen; CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad AS board minutes dated 20 
December 1988 and 6 April 1989. 
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problem solver in the operations department. He had a view for the totality, 
rarely placed himself in the limelight, but strived to “make other people 
good”.561  
 
Albatross remained the most permissive business unit at Kongsberg,562 but 
some dynamism was gone. When the energy of 1975-85 receded, some 
found an outlet for talents outside Albatross. There was Vidar Solli, who 
took Albatross onto a new hardware platform based on Intel processors; he 
established his own company in 1985, devised a tactical trainer for the navy 
and earned serious money.563 There was Ragnvald Otterlei, who established 
MikroMar and took his unmanned surveillance craft to Discovery Channel 
and Newsweek, if not to economic fortune. There was Jon Hognestad, who 
established a company that bundled magazines for delivery 
(Bladsentralen). 564  As a contrast, this author has come across very few 
successful ventures set up by employees from KV’s defence division, air 
engine division or automotive division. In general, Kongsberg conformed to 
a predominant collectivist strain, and a social stigma attached to self-made 
men, something that is claimed to be a distinguishing feature of Norwegian 
one-company towns.565 
 
* * * 
 
While Simrad struggled to incorporate Albatross in its overall business, 
Siemens ran Kongsberg offshore at arms length. Tore Andvig stayed on as 
managing director supplemented by a German chief financial officer who 
imposed financial controls. The head of Siemens Norway became chairman 
of Kongsberg Offshore a.s. and Siemens placed several of its high-ranking 
technology experts as directors.566  
 
Siemens withdrew KOS from some lines of business. Kongsberg Offshore 
possessed some control system technology (SCADA and Octopus) for use on 
production platforms. Siemens had more advanced products in its portfolio 
                                                     
561 Interview with Sælid, 22 May 2006. 
562 Interview with Kildal, 4 January 2006. 
563 KV-Cor 239, Albatross board minutes, 13 February 1986. 
564 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004. 
565 On the social stigma attached to entrepreneurship, cf. Buvikutvalget, NOU 
1983:10 – a governmental inquiry. 
566 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg; interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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and ditched this product line.567 Kongsberg Offshore also offered a subsea 
control system through its 51 per cent share in Kongsberg Subsea 
Controls AS (KSC). This company relied on technology from Ferranti, 
which owned the remaining 49 per cent. 568  Alas, Ferranti was one of 
Siemens’s fiercest competitors. Having bought Kongsberg Offshore 
Systems, Siemens discontinued the cooperation and sold its shares to 
Ferranti in 1987.569 Following this move, Kongsberg Offshore had few 
proprietary products. Its role as a main contractor was based on offerings 
made by Siemens and Cameron. 
 
Shortly after Siemens assumed control, however, the uneasy relationship 
between Cameron and Kongsberg Offshore collapsed. On the surface, the 
dispute was about technology: KV had thought the connectors provided by 
Cameron were lacking in capability and began designing proprietary 
equipment despite its obligation to stick to Cameron equipment. Cameron 
discovered this and demanded all product rights stay with Cameron; in the 
aftermath of the subsequent quarrel, the cooperation was discontinued in 
1987.570 At the heart of the dispute were different perceptions as to what a 
main contractor, the party handling an EPC contract, should do: Cameron 
considered the main contractor a glorified procurement company sourcing 
technology from established oil tool manufacturers; the Kongsberg people 
foresaw a larger role for the main contractor.  
 
In the short term, the break with Cameron added to Kongsberg Offshore’s 
difficulties. Turnover collapsed in 1987-1988 and some employees had to 
leave. Siemens responded calmly and sent senior people to Kongsberg to 
signal commitment and avoid a brain drain. They granted the company 
another five years to prove its worth, but pushed hard to get action plans 
                                                     
567 Siemens had contributed considerably to the supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system that Mobil/Statoil bought in 1975. In the early 
1980s, when KV had gained some experience, the arms factory petitioned Statoil 
for a development contract, ditched Siemens, and developed the Octopus control 
system for Gullfaks Ibid. See also KV-Cor 243, Qvenild, memo in preparation for 
Statoil meeting, 6 June 1983. 
568 ”Britisk på Kongsberg”, Aftenposten, 5 August 1987. 
569 Ferranti trimmed its Norwegian workforce, failed to secure more contracts, 
and closed the business down in 1989. Kjetil Wiedswang, ”Ferranti-fall”, Dagens 
Næringsliv, 4 October 1989. 
570 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg: interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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and milestones. In the fall of 1987, Tore Andvig withdrew as managing 
director and made room for Henrik Reimers.571  
 
As part of the recovery plan, Siemens agreed to reposition Kongsberg 
Offshore in control systems. The people who knew topside control 
systems went to work on fiscal metering systems – the kind of technology 
used to measure output for tax and revenue-sharing purposes. In 
November 1987, Siemens decided to fund the development of a control 
system to replace Ferranti’s technology. The initiative came from 
Kongsberg Offshore, but agreeing came naturally to Siemens. Having 
supplied control systems to nuclear reactors, the German conglomerate was 
familiar with the challenges and rewards involved in developing technology 
for unfriendly environments. 572  Indeed, control systems were one of the 
components that served most to limit the range and usefulness of subsea 
systems. Systems based on electronics or electronics in combination with 
hydraulics (multiplex systems) were liable to short circuit and control 
systems in general were less reliable than the valve trees and manifolds 
they guided. 573  Because of the difficulties involved in employing 
electricity below the surface, many oil companies relied on direct 
hydraulic control of each subsea valve using long hydraulic pipes from the 
surface down to each valve.  
 
Siemens and Kongsberg Offshore intended to address the problem by way 
of modularity – building a control system that could be decoupled from 
the subsea system. In case of failure, the well would shut down, and a 
regular offshore support vessel could replace the system and haul the faulty 
one to the surface for repair. Kongsberg Offshore argued that each 
intervention would cost 2 million less then replacing a competing system.574 
Siemens also provided knowledge in the field of inductive couplers (the 
concept of joining two halves of a transformer – like a plug in a socket – 
to create a single transformer through which signals and power may 
travel).575 
 
                                                     
571 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
572 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
573 Andvig, "Undervannskonstruksjoner".  
574 Sigurd Moe, "Utvidet bruk av rov ved undervannsproduksjon", Norsk olje & gass 
informasjon 1990, pp. 12-13. 
575 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg. 
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Enlisting early customers and gaining field experience was a critical step in 
launching new offshore technology. Kongsberg Offshore went out of its way 
to convince Saga about the reliability of their system and its applicability for 
the subsea wells that Saga wanted to add to its Snorre platform. The 
Kongsberg engineers built a prototype for the all-important industry fair in 
Stavanger, complete with hydraulic power, control system and valves. Saga 
agreed to buy in December 1988.576 Kongsberg Offshore offered the system 
at a fair price, which counted, and the effort they put into the sale was 
probably convincing. On top of this Saga admitted a concern for its supplier 
base: somebody had to nurture a domestic supplier of control systems.577 
Buying a novel product was risky. Indeed the new couplers failed the 
acceptance test and Kongsberg Offshore had to develop a temporary 
solution. Only in September 1993 was a permanent control system in place 
on Snorre, easily retrofitted by a ROV.578 
 
From a strategic point of view, subsea control systems were an excellent 
point of departure. The control system relates to most components in a 
subsea system; whoever mastered the control system mastered systems 
building and systems assembly. Hence, although no other parts were 
manufactured at Kongsberg, the company nevertheless mastered the 
assembly of turnkey systems for subsea oil production. 
 
In order to supply subsea systems, Kongsberg Offshore needed to partner 
with a supplier of valve trees and other critical components. It fell upon 
Reimers and the head of the subsea department, Jørgen O. Haslestad, to 
secure a useful product range. In March 1988, Kongsberg Offshore signed 
a memorandum of understanding with FMC. 579  This conglomerate 
originated as a California-based manufacturer of machinery for the food 
industry (Food Machinery Corp.), and added military equipment during 
WWII. After the war, the company bought some chemical companies and 
rebranded itself as Food Machine and Chemical Corporation. In the 1950s, 
FMC continued to expand in various businesses and bought Oil Center 
                                                     
576 Ø. Finstad, “Julegaver fra Oljeindustrien”, Dagens Næringsliv, 19 December 
1988. 
577 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg; interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
578 CA-FMC-board, Kongsberg Offshore 1993 Annual Report. 
579 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg. The cooperation deal covered marketing, 
sales, fabrication, development installation and service of subsea equipment. 
202 
 
Tool Co. in Houston, Texas.580 This Houston unit made valve trees and 
wellhead equipment.  
 
By 1990, both Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore had settled. The head of 
the subsea department, Haslested, succeeded the man from Siemens as 
managing director.581 Kongsberg Offshore and FMC entered into a proper 
agreement on system deliveries.582 The company had repositioned itself and 
regained capabilities. Albatross, meanwhile, had weathered the difficult 
years in the late 1980s through cost cuts, non-oil customers for its dynamic 
positioning technology, and the handling of more subsystems onboard 
offshore vessels. That is the subject of the section below.  
 
7.3 AIM – Albatross’s control system for vessels 
A system is an integrated whole – change one component and the change 
will affect the remains of the system. With regard to large, complex systems, 
there are many opportunities to identify sub-systems. For example, we may 
divide a dynamic positioning system into various navigation systems, a 
system that attempts to identify the exact position, a thrusters control system, 
etc. In case of a dually redundant DP system, one computer may act as a 
control system to monitor the performance of two DP systems working 
independently. 
 
In a wider setting, the DP system itself was but one sub-system in the 
complexity that made up a vessel. Albatross’s customers increasingly 
worried how dynamic positioning would fit with numerous other sub-
systems employed on board their vessels. They demanded integrated 
solutions that addressed the working of a ship as a whole, not just a specific 
task like navigation or maintaining position in specific circumstances. 
Integrated control systems served to address the task of guiding and 
coordinating the performance of multiple sub-systems. They were essential 
parts of system integration. 
 
The demand for system integration was long coming. In 1963, when an 
optimistic engineer produced the freehand drawing (below) of a happy 
                                                     
580 For a short history of FMC, cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FMC_Corp. Note, 
FMC Kongsberg Subsea is a fully owned subsidiary of FMC Technologies, a 
company that was demerged in 2000 and no longer has any formal links to FMC 
Corp. 
581 ”Ny sjef for Kongsberg Offshore”, Aftenposten, 27 December 1989.  
582 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg. 
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captain and his computer, there were a number of opportunities for ship 
automation. 583  By the 1970s, several companies had entered the market 
including Norcontrol in Horten, a provider of machine room automation, 
collision warning and other naval systems. By the mid-1980s, a ship with 
nothing to do but propel itself had a lot of room for automation and 
specialized ships even more so. As the number of systems onboard 
multiplied, these customers increasingly wanted integrated solutions. Yards 
could not easily handle advanced electronics, and there was an opportunity 
for electronics suppliers to provide interfaces and come up with integrated 
solutions. This triggered a long-term trend towards fewer suppliers that took 
upon themselves to integrate their systems and provide guidance and 
automation.584  
 
Figure 37) Octopus: Ship automation as perceived in 1963 
 
                                                     
583 Signy Overbye, "Fra forskning til industri: Utviklingen av 
skipsautomatiseringsbedriften norcontrol", (Masters thesis [hovedoppgave], 
Universitetet i Oslo, 1989), pp. 66-69. The freehand drawing of the happy captain 
(cf. Octopus: Ship automation as perceived in 1963) also appeared in this thesis, a 
reproduction of a drawing by Leif Sølsnes from a technical report published by 
Institutt for Reguleringsteknikk, NTH, 1963. 
584 KV-ex 9, memo, Gulhaugen to Maritime Division, 17 March 1983. 
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In the mid-1980s, Albatross faced competitors capable of handling a much 
broader range of tasks on board a ship than could a company limited to 
dynamic positioning. A particularly alarming incident occurred in 1985, 
when British Petroleum asked for tenders to equip its Single Well Oil 
Production System, a conceptual vessel that combined the qualities of a 
production ship and a shuttle tanker. Albatross had excellent relations with 
BP, but lost out to General Electric Company (GEC) as the latter offered not 
only dynamic positioning, but also gas turbines, diesel engines, generators, 
switchboards and power distribution.585 Besides, GEC had a large service 
network in Britain. 
 
Alas, Albatross’s software platform was less than ideally suited for general 
automation. Designed to handle a mission-critical task, Albatross employed 
a single-purpose console that committed one button to every function – not a 
viable strategy for general automation. Kalman filtering was a successful 
approach when handling erroneous information, but overshot the 
requirements when handling mundane tasks or reliable inputs. The dynamic 
positioning system was ill suited as the basis for a general-purpose control 
system. 
 
Realizing its limitations, Albatross invested in a new product, Albatross 
Integrated Multifunction System (AIM). Like dynamic positioning, AIM 
originated with cybernetics experts at Trondheim where Sælid and Tor 
Onshus began looking into generic control systems in the late 1970s using 
public funding. In 1982, Sælid tired of bureaucracy, called friends at 
Kongsberg, got a position at Albatross and brought his project with him.586 
Managing Director Gulhaugen was supportive, but urged the developers to 
avoid the fate of Norcontrol, which was “paradoxically experiencing a 
crisis”, and urged them to take “markets [not technology] as our point of 
departure”. 587  Albatross could not spare people, but Sælid hired four 
SINTEF people to write the code. When the concept grew into a product, the 
development effort shifted to Kongsberg.  
 
In part, AIM was inspired by the shortcomings of existing solutions. Around 
1980, companies such as Valmet, Foxboro and Honeywell provided general-
purpose automation that lacked in user-friendliness. To change a work 
process, e.g. if the customer added a valve to a boiler, a programmer had to 
                                                     
585 KV-ex 10, Buchanan, memo to Albatross management, 24 September 1985. 
586 Interview with Sælid, 22 May 2006. 
587 KV-ex 9, memo, Gulhaugen to Maritime Division, copy KV management, 17 
March 1983. 
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rewrite the software and adjust every equation in which the boiler played a 
part including report formats.588 Sælid thought object-oriented programming 
would improve this cumbersome procedure and introduced software objects 
representing physical components in a system. In software, a new valve (or 
rather the object that represented the valve) carried information about its 
maximum throughput, its ability to block a flow and - most importantly - 
about its very existence. In the virtual machine, each part made itself known 
to the control system – if a valve was present, it would appear on screen, in 
reports, etc. If the user changed his work process and removed the valve, 
AIM would reconfigure itself and show workflows and outputs 
unconstrained by the valve. AIM, furthermore, allowed users to build 
complex objects from simple objects and store these in a library for repeated 
use. A mundane parallel would be a carpenter who previously used nails, 
boards, metal, bricks and sheets of glass to assemble a house could now 
utilize pre-fabricated doors, windows and numerous other modules. AIM 
embodied a similar simplification when configuring the control system.589 
 
* * * 
 
A second strength of AIM was its support for distributed computing. 
Previously, central mainframes were at the heart of most attempts at 
automation – cf. the happy captain and his central computer in the drawing 
on page 203. In the mid-20th century, computers were expensive and it 
seemed sensible to install a small number of mainframes capable of diverse 
tasks. (The popular imagination of a robot, a general-purpose mechanical 
man with robotic hands capable of different tasks, has a similar origin.590) 
When the cost of computing fell, the appeal of mainframes diminished and 
distributed computing ascended. Distributed computing meant chips 
embedded in various machines and systems. One particular beauty of this 
concept was modularity, i.e. the ability to replace one sub-system and leave 
the remaining electronics in place. AIM could run on top of such various 
sub-systems, coordinate the data traffic between them and provide a single 
user interface to ease the process of automating and monitoring the various 
systems.591 
 
                                                     
588 Interview with Sælid, 22 May 2006. 
589 Interview with Sælid, 22 May 2006. Sælid’s private papers contain ample 
product information on AIM. 
590 “The gentle rise of the machines”, Economist, 11 March 2004. 
591 Interview with Sælid, 22 May 2006; KV-ex 9, Gulhaugen, letter to Hurlen and 
Qvenild, 23 October 1984. 
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The Albatross Single Board Computer (cf. page 169) worked well with AIM 
because the computer employed an innovative networking standard. In the 
early 1980s, it was common to link each peripheral to a computer through a 
dedicated hardwire (again, cf. the happy captain on page 203). Fitting a DP 
system onto a vessel required kilometres of wiring. To simplify the process, 
the SBC’s creators decided to trust the Ethernet protocol, possibly the first 
application of Ethernet for industrial purposes. Ethernet technology allowed 
numerous position reference systems to communicate with the computer 
through a single shared cable  (the notion of ether is a parallel to wireless 
radio amateurs who communicated on a shared frequency). In 1982, when 
Albatross began looking into Ethernet technology, it was widely assumed 
such non-deterministic communication was unsuited for industrial 
applications because heavy signal traffic could cause undue delays. 
Albatross calculated, however, the likelihood a signal jam would fail to 
resolve within the required timeframe was less then the chances of being hit 
by lightening.592 Developments in the subsequent years proved the company 
right. The standard was open and assumed data might come from all sorts of 
different media. Furthermore, rather than relying on a central unit to control 
the way data was routed, the Ethernet protocol shunted the heavy-duty work 
of plucking data out of the ether to PCs and other end-devices and has thus 
evolved in tandem with improvements in computing power. Since about 
1990, Ethernet technology has enjoyed a total hegemony obliterating 
competition such as IBM’s proprietary network solutions.593  
 
Figure 38) Ethernet configuration 
 
                                                     
592 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004. 
593 On the impact, cf. “The big three-O”, Economist, 22 May 2003; on technology, 
cf. www.wikipedia.org on “ethernet”. 
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AIM could handle most work processes,594 but Albatross did not attempt to 
sell AIM through licensed dealers. Rather, the sales network of Simrad 
Albatross focused on offshore applications, mainly in connection with 
customers who considered buying dynamic positioning. In this market, 
Albatross secured some very significant contracts just as the market tipped 
into recession. From 1986 to 1990, Albatross installed AIM and dynamic 
positioning on a huge crane vessel owned by Microperi. Albatross integrated 
dynamic positioning with ballast control – ballast pumps and propellers had 
to work in concert during heavy lifting. A second and larger order arrived in 
December 1986 while the oil price remained depressed; Albatross supplied 
dynamic positioning, ballast control and power control for Scarebo 5, the 
world’s largest drilling rig at the time. Because thrusters used half of the 
power, Scarebo wanted to integrate dynamic positioning and power 
management: it was wasteful to run the engine at full throttle when the 
thrusters were idle - and it was dangerous to save on energy consumption 
when the vessel was in danger of drift.  
 
Albatross relied on dynamic positioning as a door-opener when selling AIM. 
Having secured a DP delivery, Albatross was sometimes able to add more 
automation for use on board various special-task vessels in bundles with 
dynamic positioning. AIM had been designed with the needs of oil 
companies in mind, but no oil company ordered AIM for their platform 
operations. Indeed, selling untested control systems for the offshore oil 
industry was a difficult and time-consuming task.  
 
Although the oil companies were missing from the list of customers, 
Albatross enjoyed considerable success with advanced petroleum support 
vessels. The value of the Microperi contract (NOK 30 million) and the 
Scarebo contract (NOK 50 million) equalled some 19 per cent of Albatross’s 
turnover in 1987, 1988 and 1989 and provided important references and 
employment during the downturn. 595  In due time, process automation 
                                                     
594 Norsk Leca bought the first system in 1986 to automate a factory that made large 
bricks (building materials) out of porous clay spheres, cf. CA-KM-hist, 
Laagendalsposten, 19 February 1987. Later sales involved Norwegian processing 
and manufacturing businesses, including Hafslund Nycomed (pharmaceuticals), 
Kronos Titan (melting), a water purification plant and three wood processing plants. 
The sales are listed in CA-KM-sup, historical file, Kongsberg Simrad reference list, 
December 2001. Some details also occur in Sogner’s private papers, Simrad’s 
annual reports 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1992. 
595 On the logic of integration, cf. interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. On the 
Mikroperi contract, CA-KM-hist, Micorperi file. On the Saipem contract, cf. KV-ex 
12, Albatross board minutes, 22 January 1987. On the Scarebo contract, cf. CA-CA-
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became the more important product to emerge from Albatross, and dynamic 
positioning the less important.  
 
7.4 Standardization in the subsea industry 
By the mid-1980s, following 25 years of subsea development, there had been 
but a few attempts to standardize production systems.596 Around 1990, when 
Kongsberg Offshore reclaimed its position as a leading supplier, its success 
depended in no small part on a successful standardization drive. 
 
In the late 1980s, the Brazilians were at the front end of a drive to 
implement standards.597 Petrobras operated some 200 subsea wells linked 
to 10 floaters and 14 fixed platforms. This complex used a variety of tools, 
risers, wellheads, Christmas trees, etc. Perplexed by the expanding 
diversity, Petrobras strived to be coherent when ordering equipment and 
introduced some standards to specify requirements for such features as 
what forces the equipment should be able to withstand, what shape and 
dimensions to use in interfaces, and how to set up contract terms, 
documentation and testing requirements. 598 The Brazilian effort stopped 
short of comprehensive standardization, however, and Petrobras continued 
to order a variety of tailor-made equipment.599  
 
In most cases, each new sale involved a system with a number of new 
components specific to the demands of the customer. The suppliers answered 
a request without much reference to what other customers ordered or what 
the oil company in question had ordered previously. 600  To people like 
Haslestad at Kongsberg Offshore, it seemed ”every oil company engineer 
connected with subsea systems desires a particular touch on a building block 
                                                                                                                            
KM-info, Laagendalsposten, 28 March 1990. For additional information on 
turnover, cf. Figure 52) on page 270. 
596 Jon Harald Kilde, "Undervannssystemer: Anvendelse og kostnadsutvikling", 
Ingeniørnytt 1986, pp. 5-7. 
597 Ribeiro, Paulo, and Neto, "Campos basin subsea equipment: Evolution and next 
steps".  
598 C.A.S. Paulo, C.C. Moreira, and Petrobras, "Programme for standardization of 
subsea equipment" (paper presented at Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 
3-6 May 1993). 
599 Ribeiro, Costra, and Petrobras, "Deepwater subsea completions: State of the art 
and future trends".  
600 Halvorsen, "Havbunnsinstallasjoner".  
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in his project”.601 Since 1986, Haslestad and Tore Halvorsen repeatedly used 
articles and speeches to propagate standardization.602 Haslestad questioned 
the rationale for each customer to employ three or four different approaches 
to a basic operation, e.g. mixing vertical tie-ins and horizontal tie-ins. Sooner 
or later, the industry had to apply the logic of manufacturing industries and 
stop considering each assignment as a development project.  
 
The most obvious advantage of standardization was cost savings. Variety 
carried a cost in the shape of development costs and, more importantly, the 
heavy costs of testing new equipment before delivery. Furthermore, 
standardization was likely to improve quality because the supplier industry 
could accumulate more experience with any given component. Conversely, 
changing but a few items deprived the industry of an opportunity to build a 
record of accomplishment and a portfolio of "field proven" equipment.603 
 
In the spring of 1990, Kongsberg Offshore encountered an opportunity for 
standardization. Shell was building a simplified Condeep for the Draugen 
field with six dry trees and nine subsea wells 250 – 280 metres below the 
surface. The subsea wells would drain distant parts of the reservoir and inject 
gas and water to maintain reservoir pressure. 604 Meanwhile, on Statfjord, 
Statoil decided to add 18 subsea wells clustered on six templates. This 
development was an afterthought: Statoil knew from early on there were 
pockets of oil north and east of the main reservoir, but it took some twenty 
years before the opportunities were acted upon, partly because subsea 
developments were not in fashion and partly because the processing capacity 
of Statfjord was all tied up between 1986 and 1991. The head of subsea 
technology, Tore Halvorsen, reckoned Kongsberg Offshore could win both 
Draugen and Statfjord by standardizing the offering. The requests from 
Shell and Statfjord differed, but Kongsberg Offshore decided to deviate 
somewhat from the tender invitations. The company lobbied Statoil and 
Shell independently to make the oil companies consider bids that were 
                                                     
601 Jørgen Haslestad, "Kostnadseffektive teknologiske byggeklosser: Subsea 
løsninger" in Kostnadseffektive utbyggingsløsninger under nye rammebetingelser 
(Grand Hotel, Oslo: Norwegian Petroleum Society, 1986). The full quotation runs: 
"Til nå i subseasammenheng, har det sett ut som om hver ingeniør som er i befatning 
med subsea innenfor hvert oljeslskap vil ønske å se sin spesielle vri på en 
undervannsbyggekloss bygget inn i sitt prosjekt." 
602 Halvorsen, "Havbunnsinstallasjoner".  
603 Haslestad, "Kostnadseffektive teknologiske byggeklosser: Subsea løsninger".  
604 Draugen (Norsk Teknisk Museum, 2005 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.histos.no/oljemuseet/vis.php?kat=1&id=53. 
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slightly outside the specifications. Kongsberg Offshore then submitted 
bids to Statoil and Shell that reused much equipment and offered the two 
companies a very affordable price.605 At NOK 480 million (1991), the price 
for the Draugen delivery was substantial – but the closest competitor asked 
for 300 million (1991) more.606 The difference was such Shell would not 
immediately accept the offer, but summoned KOS to “sift through every 
detail of the tender” and make sure there were no misconceptions. After 
two days of secretive meetings, Shell was convinced and offered KOS the 
contract.607 Statoil followed in April 1991, and offered Kongsberg Offshore 
the Statfjord contract worth NOK 1.4 billion.608  
 
Such was the cost savings involved in standardization that Kongsberg 
Offshore continued to pick up orders. In August 1991, the Condeep 
foundation destined for Sleipner East collapsed while being tested at 
Gandsfjorden. Statoil rushed to build a new foundation, but the company 
risked breaking its obligation to deliver a certain volume of gas by October 
1993. Although Kongsberg Offshore was running at capacity, the company 
accepted an order for two extra well templates for Sleipner and Loke. These 
early production systems enabled Statoil to deliver gas on time.609  In 1992, 
Kongsberg Offshore added Conoco to its list of subsea customers. Conoco 
was in charge of developing the Heidrun field. Conoco planned a tension-leg 
platform that would drain the reservoir. While the TLP used dry wells only, 
Conoco wanted to add six subsea wells to inject water and increase the 
output. 610  The oil company asked Kongsberg Offshore to supply the 
equipment - without bothering to use a tender.611  At NOK 400 million the 
price was hard to match, particularly because Statoil (which would receive 
the operatorship from Conoco once the field was developed) could reuse tie-
in and maintenance equipment from the Statfjord satellites.612 
                                                     
605 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
606 Tor Husby, "Kongsberg offshore til aberdeen", Offshore & energi, 1991, p. 34. 
607 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
608 ”Milliard-kontrakt til Kongsberg Offshore A / S”, Dagens Næringsliv, 25 April 
1991; N. Asgaut, ”Stor Heidrun-kontrakt til Kongsberg-selskap”, Dagens 
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Kongsberg. 
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611 CA-FMC-board, 1992 annual report. 
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* * * 
 
Putting together the Draugen tender was an all-encompassing effort. When 
deliveries began, the company was short of engineers and had to rely 
extensively on overtime particularly when the Statfjord project began in the 
summer of 1991. This resource shortage triggered a certain in-house 
standardization effort. Kongsberg Offshore introduced new project 
management routines with more responsibilities delegated to self-contained 
teams in charge of systems and sub-systems. Eventually, project 
management became a competitive advantage for Kongsberg Offshore. 613 
The standardizing effort allowed Kongsberg Offshore to design items once 
and stick to that design. Besides, the similarities of the projects allowed 
considerable knowledge transfer in less tangible areas: there were fewer 
unexpected expenditures due to suppliers misreading contracts, less hassle in 
handling sub-suppliers and fewer mistakes during engineering and 
manufacturing.614 The orders arrived in a convenient sequence that allowed 
experiences from one to be applied in the next. The figure below illustrates 
some of the cost savings. On Draugen, for example, only 25 per cent of the 
contract value related to components that had been qualified in previous field 
developments, 75 per cent required development and numerous engineering 
hours of research and development. Subsequent projects reused more 
components and successively cut back on the time spent doing research and 
development. The benefits of standardization also showed in delivery times 
for important components. Getting a Christmas tree ready for Draugen took 
16 months, on Heidrun only 10 months. 
 
Figure 39) Relay race: time and labour savings from reusing components615 
Field (operator) Reuse* R&D**
Q3 90 Q1 91 Q3 91 Q1 92 Q3 92 Q1 93 Q3 93 Q1 94 Q3 94
Draugen (Shell) 25 % 8 %
Statfjord (Statoil) 65 % 6 %
Heidrun (Conoco) 95 % 1 %
*) Value of already qualified equipment in % of total value
**) The labour costs involved in engineering (development) as % of total contract value
Timeframe for assigment
 
                                                     
613 Interview with Smeby, 20 September 2004. 
614 Tore Halvorsen and Louis Araujo, "Standardization of subsea production 
systems: Practical experience from draguen, statfjord satellite, and heidrun projects" 
(paper presented at Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, 3-6 May 
1993), pp. 347 ff. 
615 Ibid. 
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The standardization effort that occurred at Kongsberg in the early 1990s was 
far from comprehensive and the deliveries far from uniform. The projects 
spanned a five-slot template for water injection, a four-slot template for 
production and water injection, single satellites, etc. The single most difficult 
and fundamental issue was agreeing on a single Christmas tree; variances in 
the tree design would spill across to intervention systems, valve 
arrangements, production bore, workover operation, etc. Hence, the use of a 
standard Christmas tree was a precondition for extensive standardization in 
other parts of the subsea system. In the end, Kongsberg Offshore managed to 
coerce its customers into using fundamentally equal valve trees for water 
injection and petroleum production. 616  Most standardization occurred in 
subcomponents while the main components retained a degree of variety. For 
example, each delivery sported a different workover and completion system, 
but each system used many standardized subcomponents. The engineering of 
these various nuts and bolts was time-consuming and the cost savings on the 
subcomponent level were correspondingly large (the appendix on page 314 
contains an overview of where KOS succeeded in its standardizing effort and 
what remained). 
 
Although Kongsberg Offshore secured the contracts, little actual 
manufacturing took place at Kongsberg. More than half the contract value 
was spent procuring products from subcontractors of templates, umbilicals – 
and obviously Christmas trees. 617  Draugen was the first project where 
Kongsberg Offshore could draw on its cooperation with FMC initiated back 
in 1988.618 This project also involved subsea pumps from Framo – allegedly 
the world’s first commercial, as opposed to experimental, application of 
multi-phase pumping to shift untreated oil, gas and water back to the 
processing plant at Draugen.619 
 
Standardization came at a cost. In return for a low price, customers 
sacrificed the freedom to design systems according to specifications. Some, 
like Saga, declined to purchase a standardized subsea solution for its Tordis 
                                                     
616 Ibid. 
617 ”Milliard-kontrakt til Kongsberg Offshore A / S”, Dagens Næringsliv, 25 April 
1991; N. Asgaut, ”Stor Heidrun-kontrakt til Kongsberg-selskap”, Dagens 
Næringsliv Morgen,  2 June 1992. 
618 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
619 Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
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field although Kongsberg Offshore offered the job at NOK 400 million 
(1991) less than the competition.620  
 
The initial standardization gains were won sub-component by sub-
component and not the result of any grand new design. The ability to use 
fundamentally the same Christmas tree for several projects laid the 
foundation for standardizing adjacent equipment and the procedures used to 
install and maintain the systems. The sum of these small standardization 
efforts was huge efficiency gains. To the extent this was innovation, the 
major change took place in the realm of business practices not engineering. 
Only in the years to come did Kongsberg Offshore turn out technological 
innovations to exploit the opportunities that arrived when oil companies had 
accepted the logic of standardization.  
 
7.5 Conclusions  
At any time during the approximately 30 years covered by this thesis, it 
would be truthful to remark that “technology was becoming more complex”. 
The truism triggered a reaction – an antithesis of sorts – and technology 
became more standardized and easier to mix. Albatross and Kongsberg 
Offshore contributed to the standardization and developed technology that 
helped customers cope with the complexity that remained.  
 
Both Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore worked on control systems. Except 
for the need to insulate everything and make the system work under water, 
Kongsberg Offshore relied on established electronics. Albatross, meanwhile, 
combined a set of state-of-the-art techniques to develop a control system: 
Ethernet, distributed computing and object-oriented software solutions. 
Each, however, aimed to solve pressing tasks for their respective customers 
and simplify the operation of mission-critical equipment.  
 
Developing a new control system could be less difficult than selling a new 
control system. In the late 1980s, Albatross struggled to gain access for its 
control system on board oil platforms. Kongsberg Offshore put down a 
focused sales effort, and managed to secure contracts with Saga for a new 
and untested system. Such customers were invaluable for new entrants. 
 
Directly, or by stealth, the mid-1980s were a period of settlement when the 
ways of doing business turned into established patterns. The EPC approach, 
                                                     
620 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", with reference to interview with Tore Halvorsen 
(Kongsberg Offshore) on 23 October 1997. 
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which this thesis suggests was instrumental in fostering innovations in the 
subsea supplier industry, became ingrained in the late 1980s. Hydro asked 
for EPC deliveries when the company placed orders for subsea systems with 
Kongsberg Offshore’s various competitors: Elektro Union (ABB, Vetco), 
Kværner, Aker and Frank Mohn. Losing contracts and facing increased 
competition obviously hurt KOS in the short run, but the long-term effect 
was to create a handful of able competitors each capable of handling systems 
deliveries, which in turn made the oil companies more willing to delegate 
responsibility to suppliers. Besides, the rivalry fostered innovation and 
created a competitive subsea environment on the Norwegian shelf. 
 
Apart from control systems, Kongsberg Offshore succeeded in its effort to 
sell standardized and less costly subsea systems. The company led a drive to 
standardize subsea equipment that, in the course of a few years, made subsea 
systems much cheaper, faster to deploy, and more reliable. Through a 
fortunate staggering of projects from 1990 to 1992, Kongsberg Offshore was 
able to carry the experience of one project along to the next. At Draugen, 
Kongsberg Offshore offered to build a subsea system for 300 million less 
than the closest competition; although not commercially sound, the pricing 
became the opening move in a standardization and cost-cutting drive that 
moved Kongsberg Offshore and its technology partner FMC into the top 
league in Norway.  
 
By leading this drive towards cost-efficient systems, Kongsberg Offshore 
and Albatross contributed to a shift of development styles. During the years 
of low oil prices (1986-1990), the Norwegian Style of field development 
based on huge concrete platforms lost ground. Building such giants was 
prohibitively expensive, particularly since most new discoveries were 
smaller than the giant discoveries of the 1970s and early 1980s. Oil 
companies everywhere looked for less expensive ways of extracting oil. In 
place of concrete gravity platforms, a nimbler technology began to appear – 
techniques that relied on electronics and subsea engineering rather than the 
building of islands in concrete capable of hosting conventional oil tools. 
That shift is the subject of next chapter. 
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8 Deepwater technology replaces fixed platforms, 
1991-1996 
In perspective, the early 1990s saw the business practices pioneered by 
shipping companies making full inroads in the world of offshore oil. 
Competitive tenders and turnkey deliveries were already in place. Now, oil 
companies on the Norwegian shelf increasingly considered floating and 
moving production facilities. Ships replaced platforms. Around 1990, both 
the dynamic positioning business and the subsea systems business at 
Kongsberg revived – for reasons partly related. The oil industry had become 
more accommodating to innovative technology. Everywhere, inventions 
made in previous decades were turned into innovations in a struggle to find 
economic ways of extracting oil from beneath the oceans – and the markets 
for Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore expanded in line with the introduction 
of floating production facilities.  
 
Around 1990, Albatross offered integrated process control to the new 
floating platforms that replaced the Condeeps. In expanding from dynamic 
positioning to process control, Albatross also moved from the peripheral, if 
lucrative, petroleum support business into the core of the oil business itself. 
Among oil companies, Albatross found customers willing to pay a premium 
for spotless execution, service and reliability. 
 
Kongsberg Offshore continued to exploit the inherit potential in 
standardization, modularization and miniaturization. The company helped 
develop a hardware platform that offered its customers choice and flexibility 
while retaining the cost and quality advantages of standardized equipment. 
 
8.1 A challenge to the Norwegian Style of development 
A number of industry observers have commented on the lack of 
technological development in offshore oil in the years before to 1986. For 
more than a decade, from around 1974-75 when Statoil established its 
position as a dominant decision-maker and regulator until the oil price 
collapse of 1986, large concrete gravity platforms with a fully integrated 
production facility on top dominated almost every field. Few innovations 
took hold in this period; the technology used in the mid-1980s was but giant 
escalations of early platforms: simple and robust iron works on top of a 
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platform whose legs were stretched to handle great depths. 621  “It is 
surprising,” the head of Kværner Subsea Contracting admitted in a 1986 
interview: “after 20 years of extensive activity offshore, few truly novel 
concepts and solutions have been put to use.” Apart from the use of 
reinforced concrete in large platforms, no new techniques had emerged from 
the oil companies in the North Sea. 
 
The technological stagnation occurred in every offshore oil province. A 
study of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico, commissioned by the 
United States Department of the Interior, remarks on how for “a decade or 
more prior to the mid-1980’s collapse of oil price, cost reduction through the 
application of technology was not a critical industry strategy”.622 The price 
of crude remained high and looked set to rise higher. High prices put a high 
premium on speedy development and a high penalty on the risk that was 
present in technology development. 
 
The Norwegian Style was doubly expensive: the platforms themselves cost 
billions and the policy of sourcing Norwegian added to the costs. In the mid-
1980s, the average Norwegian supplier was considerably more expensive 
than the average foreign supplier was. Interestingly, the gap was larger for 
advanced equipment (21 per cent) than plain steel structures (just five per 
cent).623 Put simply, the Norwegian supplier industry was further behind in 
technology than in labour productivity. In the mid-1980s, Norwegian 
suppliers had a strong position on the protected home market, but achieved 
“remarkably” little in terms of exports. 624  The supplier industries that 
                                                     
621 A slightly revised quote from Offshore i Vest, no. 2, 1984 ("Taper den norske stat 
milliarder på foreldete produksjonsformer?" Offshore i Vest, 1984, p. 15. The 
citation runs: "Dagens plattformer er jo bare en gigantisk videreføring av de tidligste 
oljeplattformer. Man har bare flyttet dem offshore og forlenget beina stadig mer for 
å rekke ned til havbunnen.” 
622 Wallace, Duberg, and Kirkley, "Dynamics of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf 
of Mexico: 1980-2000: Final report".  
623 The price estimates were arrived at by comparing tenders for specific packages – 
ideally identical requests - and (if need be) adjusting for what was included or left 
out of the quotations, SINTEF and A/S, "Norsk offshoreindustris konkurranseevne".  
624 Ibid., In explaining the lack of competitiveness, the report hinted that political 
protection had induced a certain laxness: “Ved for sterk styring av kontraktene til 
norske bedrifter, er det også en fare for at dette kan bli en sovepute for industrien. 
Det kan synes enklere å be om politisk hjelp til å sikre kontrakter, framfor å 
gjennomføre nødvendig omstilling og rasjonalisering med sikte på økt 
konkurranseevne.”  
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emerged on this protected home market had failed to develop technological 
leadership. 
 
Oil companies on the Norwegian shelf seemed particularly relaxed at the 
prospect of high costs. Up until the mid-1980s, costly developments and cost 
overruns had been accepted, partly because the mindset at Statoil and 
elsewhere remained coloured by rich pastures. Some of the wells on 
Statfjord produced 50,000 barrels of oil per day – on par with the best Saudi 
wells and worlds apart from 830,000 American wells that managed less than 
10 barrels per day.625 At times, most profoundly at Statfjord in the 1970s, 
cost overruns had burdened Statoil, but the subsequent oil price hike around 
1980 made costs look irrelevant. The size of the new fields discovered at the 
time contributed to a mentality in which costs seemed slightly irrelevant. 
Troll, Åsgard and Snøhvit, a string of rich gas fields discovered between 
1979 and 1981, made people believe there were vast undiscovered resources 
of oil and gas.626 Up until the early 1980s, the average new discovery was as 
big or bigger than previous discoveries and the creaming curves (such as the 
ones on the figure below) rose steeply. Field developments on the 
Norwegian shelf looked profitable irrespective of development costs. 627 
Things were about to change, however. From 1985 (when Heidrun was 
found) until 1997 (Ormen Lange) the average new find was rather small 
compared to the early years of North Sea exploration. Gradually, the 
government and the oil companies realized the Norwegian shelf had become 
a mature oil province that could ill afford Statfjord-style developments. 
 
                                                     
625 "Taper den norske stat milliarder på foreldete produksjonsformer?".  
626 For a delightful introduction to creaming curves, cf. Paul Thompson, Jargon 
[Blogg] (2007 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://wolf.readinglitho.co.uk/mainpages/jargon.html. - a blog dedicated to proving 
the world is running out of oil. A creaming curve plots the total amount of oil that is 
discovered against the total number of exploratory wells. Because the first wells 
generally aim for the most promising geological structures, they find the “cream of 
the crop” – subsequent discoveries tend to be less prolific. 
627 On the mentality of oil companies, cf. Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", citing e.g. 
Ole Melberg (Smedvig), interview 6 September 1997. 
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Figure 40) Cream of the crop: succession of rich early finds in the North Sea628 
 
 
When oil prices fell after 1985-86, a range of technologies was employed 
worldwide to extract oil in an economic way. From the late 1980s onwards, 
horizontal drilling enabled a single platform to cover a larger area, movable 
offshore installations allowed re-use, gas and water injection increased 
output from fields, subsea satellites made better use of the infrastructure, etc. 
Some of these technologies were novel, e.g. logging-while-drilling tools. 
Mostly, however, the industry responded to falling prices by actually 
applying inventions that had been known for decades. A report on 
technology in the Gulf of Mexico remarked on how in “the early 1980’s, 
much of the technology that would later have major impacts on the 
industry’s costs was in place, but was not making a substantial difference to 
operations.” The report listed seismic imaging with three-dimensional 
capabilities (first tested 1974), horizontal drilling (first used onshore 1953, 
                                                     
628 The figure includes both proven and probable reserves, cf. Johan Nic Vold, 
Norsk petroleumsaktivitet ved et veiskille (Oljeindustriens Landforening, 2003 
[cited November 2005]); available from 
http://www.olf.no/naringspolitikk/konkraft/prosjekt/?15529.pdf. The original source 
appears to be an analysis performed by Wood Mackenzie based on input from 
McKinsey (internal reference number 45537-01-08.03). 
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offshore 1981) and floating platforms (first used in the mid-1970s). Only in 
the second half of the 1980s did oil companies start to employ these 
techniques extensively.629  
 
In Norway, powerful interests helped prolong the use of costly Condeeps. 
The money spent building the giants offered jobs to 30,000 – 40,000 people, 
a constituency anxious to retain the status quo. Bjørn Rasmussen, Hydro’s 
director of oil technology, once likened this yard lobby to Luddites.630 The 
chief advocate of large platforms was Norwegian Contractors, headquartered 
in Stavanger with 4000 employees skilled in the construction of concrete 
foundations, but Statoil belonged to the conservative camp as well. In 1986, 
the company copied the routines and procedures from Gullfaks A onto 
Gullfaks C. When Statoil’s Sleiper platform sank in December 1991, the 
company opted for a new Condeep – a style the company hoped to establish 
as a “technological hegemony”. 631  Besides, the field development 
bureaucracies at Statoil and various foreign oil companies that had set up 
office in Norway had grown accustomed to Condeeps and held little 
experience with alternative field development styles. Out of NOK 130 
billion (1997) spent on developing oil and gas field in Norway between 1986 
and 1993, 80 per cent went to fields that employed integrated Condeep 
platforms including the 472-metre Troll platform. Planned before the 1986 
oil price collapse, it was the largest platform ever built. Nevertheless, 
deepwater technology came to dominate the satellites on the margins of the 
large reservoirs. Here, the developer would usually tie the subsea wells back 
to some existing platform. Up until the 1990s, every subsea installation on 
the Norwegian shelf served as satellites, draining some distant pocket of oil 
and gas and feeding the output onto a fixed platform in the vicinity. 
 
8.2 Floating production and economic field development 
Increasingly, nimble technology made inroads into the larger fields. The 
main attraction, obviously, was the prospect of cost savings.  
                                                     
629 Wallace, Duberg, and Kirkley, "Dynamics of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf 
of Mexico: 1980-2000: Final report".  
630 Alf Ole Ask, “Ingen fremtid for offshoreverft”, Dagens Næringsliv, 4 October 
1999. The interviewee did not use the term “Luddite” but drew a parallel with a 
story of textile workers destroying a Spinning Jenny (allegedly) in 1743, that is, 70 
years before the Luddite movement … and some twenty years before the Spinning 
Jenny was invented. 
631 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", drawing on Odd Mosbergvik (Statoil), interview 
on 3 June 1998. 
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Comparing Brazilian and Norwegian development styles may offer a clue to 
the economics of deepwater technology. Such a comparison is not 
straightforward, but there were remarkable similarities. In the mid-1980s, 
both extracted oil offshore in the same market conditions; both countries 
insisted on a high degree of national content reaching 90 per cent in the 
Brazilian case. The Norwegian fields were larger, much more productive and 
on average in shallower waters. Petrobras, however, had the advantage of 
lower labour costs and apparently the advantage of a cost-efficient 
development style. When using fixed platforms, Petrobras needed an oil 
price (a break-even price) of USD 14 (1985) to turn a profit – roughly in line 
with the USD 16-20 required from fixed platforms in the North Sea. Using 
subsea systems and floating production, Petrobras could turn a profit with 
prices running at USD 8-10 and no more than USD 6-7 at the prolific 
Piuhana field.632  
 
On the Norwegian shelf, floating production first arrived at the main fields in 
the shape of tension-leg platforms (TLPs). Above the surface, a TLP 
resembles a regular platform such as the integrated Condeep designs: a huge 
concrete structure with living quarters, production and processing works. 
These platforms, however, had no gravity foundation, but floated on air-
filled tanks. The topside structure was firmly fixed to the seabed with hollow 
steel tubes (tethers) and not subject to heave. Aker had advocated the 
concept since the mid-1970s. The first TLP was introduced on the British 
shelf in 1984, with no link to Norwegian industry at all.633 Saga Petroleum 
A/S, a privately owned Norwegian company, looked into the concept for use 
on Snorre, a reservoir discovered in 1979 at 300-350 metres of water. The 
company spent almost a decade considering how to develop the field in 
which Hydro and Statoil were in the licensee group. In 1987-1988, Hydro 
advocated a floating installation against fierce opposition from Statoil. Saga 
eventually settled for the mid-way solution, a tension-leg platform. 634  A 
couple of years later, Conoco ordered a TLP for Heidrun. 
 
                                                     
632 Zephyrino Machado, "Utbygging av mindre felt kan gjøres mye rimeligere", 
Offshore-Norge 1985, p. 6. 
633 Smeby’s private papers, Smeby “A Norwegian activity on subsea completion / 
deep water production systems”, 11 November 1975.  
634 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", referring a.o. to interview with Jan Wennesland, 
(Aker Maritime), 14 November 1997. 
221 
 
Figure 41) Basic platform designs for deep waters635 
 Compliant steel 
structures636 
Tension-leg 
platforms 
Spar 
First 
devised 
1960s Conceived in 1970s, 
deployed in 1984 
Mid-late 1980s 
Theoretical 
depth limit 
1 500 feet 4 000 feet637 7 500 feet 
Actual 
(2002) 
1 000 feet 3 000 feet 4 800 feet 
 
 
 
As conceptual halfway points between fixed and floating production 
facilities, TLPs resembled the Spar-type installations developed on the 
                                                     
635 Drawn mainly from Pieter Wybro, "Floating production system: Deepwater 
development options" (paper presented at MTS Field development workshop, 
Houston, September 28-30 2004). The illustrations are adopted from Wallace, 
Duberg, and Kirkley, "Dynamics of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico: 
1980-2000: Final report".  
636 A compliant structure attempted not to withstand the forces of the ocean (as did 
Condeeps) but to ride off the forces. These structures oscillated, albeit not at a 
frequency that threatened to break down the platform. For an introduction, cf. Pratt, 
Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore pioneers.  
637 Wallace, Duberg, and Kirkley, "Dynamics of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf 
of Mexico: 1980-2000: Final report".  
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British shelf and used mainly in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico.638 Both 
techniques did away with the huge foundations required for gravity 
platforms and, when firmly moored, the Spars and TLPs suppressed heave to 
a point where the operator could use dry valve trees on top the platforms. In 
harsh weather, however, the moored platforms would sway.  
 
* * * 
 
The logical succession to Spars and TLPs was truly floating – and moveable 
- production facilities: semi-submersible production rigs and floating 
production, storage and offload (FPSO) ships. Semi-subs had limited storage 
capacity and relied on storage tankers or export pipelines to offload its oil; 
FPSOs resembled tankers with production equipment mounted on the deck 
and storage tanks beneath the deck. Unlike fixed installations, these floaters 
required complementary deepwater technologies; because they were subject 
to heave, they required subsea systems; because they were subject to sway, 
they frequently employed dynamic positioning to supplement their mooring 
lines. In no small part, floating production was limited by the shortcomings 
of complementary deepwater technology. 
 
Moveable production platforms gained ground on the Norwegian shelf in 
line with the growing acceptance of subsea systems. Their introduction in 
the mid-1990s was eased by years of experience with subsea systems and the 
fact these subsea systems worked quite well; the technology started to look 
reliable. Elf’s installations around Frigg initially suffered from some minor 
leakages of methanol and hydraulic fluids and some shortcuts in the electro-
hydraulic control system, but mostly, however, the systems worked well.639 
North East Frigg was completed in late 1983 and began producing six to 
seven million cubic metres of gas per day in 1984. It continued to work 
without major problems until the reservoir ran dry in 1997. The hydraulics 
would occasionally leak, and there were certain problems with flexible 
pipes, but it worked.640 Gullfaks A went on stream on 22 December 1986. 
                                                     
638 On platform developments from the perspectives of suppliers, cf. Pratt, Priest, 
and Castaneda, Offshore pioneers. For a general history of technology offshore, cf. 
Veldman and Lagers, 50 years offshore.  
639 ”Suksess for Elf med Superskuld-test på Andenes”, NTB, 14 August 1987; 
”Produksjonsplattform på havbunnen”, NTB, 6 August 1987; Nina Skram Gil and 
Eyvind Grude, "Driftserfaringer fra nord øst frigg og øst frigg" in 
Undervannsteknologi frem mot år 2000: Hvordan kan 80-årenes erfaringer 
omformes til en ny strategi for teknologivinning og nye metoder for 
prosjektgjennomføring (Stavanger: Norsk Petroleumsforening, 1991). 
640 Ibid. 
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The four subsea wells turned out 50,000 barrels of oil – more if not for 
bottlenecks in the adjacent topside systems. 641 Statoil had calculated the 
subsea systems would work 85 per cent of the time – after one year of 
operations their regularity was close to 100 per cent. The total costs of the 
subsea development ran at NOK 1.5 billion offset against an annual 
increased output worth NOK 2.5 billion regardless of low oil prices in the 
late 1980s.642 
 
By 1990, subsea systems not only seemed reliable, but their introduction 
allowed relatively speedy and inexpensive field development. Both 
Tommeliten and East Frigg had been completed below budget and ahead of 
plan.643 Tommeliten began shipping gas to Ekofisk less than two years after 
the project was initiated, 25 per cent below budget and only half as 
expensive as the calculated cost of a platform-based development. 644 The 
subsea systems that extracted gas from Troll to increase reservoir pressure at 
Oseberg began working eight months ahead of plan and contributed NOK 10 
billion in extra revenues by increasing the output of oil from Oseberg.645 
 
What transformed the perceivably unreliable systems of 1980 into the 
reliable systems of 1990? Ironically, in no small part, the answer was 
“nothing”. Part of the problem had been psychological; people trusted what 
they saw and distrusted systems out of reach. Part of the problem was false 
analogy; practical people of the oil industry knew valve trees above surface 
                                                     
641 Svein-Erik Tosterud, "Havbunnsbrønner gir gullfaks flyvende start", Teknisk 
Ukeblad, 2 April 1987 1987, pp. 12-13. 
642 Svein-Erik Tosterud, "Havbunnsbrønnene på gullfaks tjener penger", Teknisk 
Ukeblad, 28 January 1988, pp. 32-33. 
643 ”Øst-Frigg-utbyggingen redusert med 20 prosent”, NTB, 10 December 1987. 
644 The estimate for a fixed platform development ran at NOK 5.5 billion (1985) not 
including the cost of drilling. The subsea development cost NOK 2.8 billion (1987) 
excluding drilling but including the work spent rebuilding a platform at Ekofisk to 
accommodate the output from Tommeliten, cf. “Ros til Statoil for Tommeliten-
prosjektet”, NTB, 1 December 1988. On the project in general, cf. H. Hatlestad, 
"Feltutbyggingsløsninger: Tommeliten" in Kostnadseffektive utbyggingsløsninger 
under nye rammebetingelser (Grand Hotel, Oslo: Norwegian Petroleum Society, 
1986). 
645 That is 12 million tonnes of oil at 1991 prices; the cost of the project ran at NOK 
3.2 billion (1991) plus another billion to rebuild Oseberg. It was expected that some 
four-fifths of the injected gas would be extracted towards the end of the Oseberg 
project. Claude Roland Olsen, “Mer olje ut av Oseberg”, Dagens Næringsliv, 25 
January 1991. 
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were susceptible to hick-ups, and assumed subsea systems would be even 
less reliable. The reverse was more likely true. Equipment onboard platforms 
tended to fail. Once on the seabed, inaccessible for clumsy roughnecks, the 
same equipment worked better. It seemed that much of the servicing and 
maintenance tended to upset, rather than smooth, the working of valve 
trees.646 Besides, in anticipation of the need for maintenance, the industry 
had added complexity to the subsea systems. TFL techniques (where tools 
circulated through the system in a U-tube) were a case in point; they required 
dual flowlines and dual completion that limited the dimensions of the tubing, 
required more components, more complexity, and less reliability – and some 
extra space on the production platform. 647   Often, the best maintenance 
strategy was building a simple and robust system, and a philosophy of “let it 
be, and intervene only when necessary”. 
 
Some new techniques did take hold and served to make subsea systems more 
reliable. Modular designs that allowed oil companies to remove active 
components for servicing, as pioneered with Skuld in the early 1980s, 
became a permanent feature of subsea systems.648 The industry also placed 
increasing emphasis on redundancy and designs that allowed workarounds – 
ways of keeping a system operational despite a single point failure. Finally, 
the performance of subsea systems improved steadily due to utterly ruthless 
quality control. In sum, a less interventionist maintenance strategy combined 
with steady improvements in design served to allay many concerns about 
subsea systems – and pave the way for more nimble development styles. 
 
* * * 
 
Almost 20 years after the Brazilians employed floating production, and 
almost ten years after Hydro employed a ship for early production, movable 
floaters arrived in earnest on the Norwegian shelf. The figure below shows 
how floating production gained acceptance globally and what technology the 
industry employed – particularly the success of FPSOs and semi-
submersibles. These could move from one field to another and exploit 
marginal fields that ran dry in a few years. In principle, they would work at 
any depth. Offshore Norway, they began to arrive in the mid-1990s on the 
                                                     
646 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
647 Tore Andvig, "Present development and trends for production in the Norwegian 
sector of the North Sea", in Offshore Northern Seas Conference and Exhibition 
(Stavanger: Norsk Petroleumsforening, 1986); Tosterud, "Havbunnsbrønner gir 
gullfaks flyvende start". 
648 Haslestad, "Kostnadseffektive teknologiske byggeklosser: Subsea løsninger".  
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somewhat deeper waters of Norne (380 metres of water depth), Visund (335 
metres), Balder and Åsgard (240-300 metres).649 These fields were located in 
the Norwegian Sea far north of the platforms and pipelines in the North Sea.  
 
Figure 42) Mobility beats stability: floating platforms installed, 1975-2006650 
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The shift to floating production placed a premium on speedy subsea 
completion. In the 1980s, an operator ordering a subsea system for a new 
field on the Norwegian shelf would not be much concerned about delivery 
times: the building of an adjacent platform would require more time than any 
subsea development. Floating production concepts could arrive quickly; the 
oil company would hire a semi-sub from a shipping company or ask a yard 
to convert an existing tanker into an FPSO.651 Hence, the time spent building 
                                                     
649 The annual fact sheet and the various web pages of the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, www.npd.no offers an excellent overview. For some additional insights 
in the Balder development, cf. Balder, north sea northern, norway [Industry portal] 
(SPG Media Limited, [cited April 2007]); available from http://www.offshore-
technology.com/projects/balder/. 
650 The figure is inspired by, and has drawn much data from a graph assembled by 
James R. McCaul, Growing requirement for floating production systems (May 2006) 
(International Maritime Associates, Inc., 2006 [cited January 2008]); available from 
http://www.imastudies.com/id25.htm. 
651 J. Rosnes, H.J. Lindland, and O. Inderberg, "Subsea production systems: Improve 
cost efficiency and further reduce cost per barrel produced" (paper presented at 
Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 5-8 May 1997), pp. 155-163. 
226 
 
and installing a subsea system became all the more critical. Since fast 
development meant fast revenues, and frequently cost savings, the supplier 
industry had every incentive to continue developing modularized, 
standardized subsea systems.  
 
The shift of development styles and the introduction of floating production 
coincided in time with an overall standardization drive on the Norwegian 
shelf – and subsea standardization was in the forefront. The single most 
vivid manifestation of the general effort was the 1993 Norsok programme 
where public authorities, oil companies and suppliers agreed on measures in 
a corporatist manner. Inspired by a preceding programme on the British shelf 
(CRINE), Norsok aimed to cut life-cycle costs and encourage reuse of 
equipment. The outcome of the programme was a series of initiatives to 
standardize technology and improve the collaboration between users and 
producers.652 Possibly the most important impact of the programme was the 
systematic use of EPC contracts, an approach long established when 
ordering subsea systems. Norsok also encouraged cooperation on standards. 
The programme, we may say, sanctioned as best practice what Kongsberg 
Offshore had been doing with Shell, Conoco and Statoil since 1990. 
 
8.3 Norne and the concept of interchangeable modules 
When floating and movable production started to arrive, the market for 
subsea systems looked set to expand. Kongsberg Offshore was well 
positioned to take advantage of the opportunity, but feared competition. To 
improve its chances, the company added an innovative touch that added 
flexibility to Statoil’s ordering procedure.  
 
Statoil’s first FPSO for permanent use was devised for Haltenbanken 
(Norne). Between 1994 and 1997, Statoil equipped a ship that resembled a 
regular tanker with a processing plant on the deck, storage capacity in the 
hull and facilities to offload oil to a tanker on its heck.653 Oil would flow 
from the subsea system through a flexible riser onto a giant cylindrical turret 
in the hull of the production ship.654 After being processed, a pipe carried 
the oil across to another ship for storage and offloading. Another pipe carried 
gas from Norne to the nearby Åsgard field.  
                                                     
652 On the British inspiration of for the standardizing Norsok drive, cf. Ryggvik, 
"Norsk oljevirksomhet mellom det nasjonale og det internasjonale".  
653 Norne (Norsk Teknisk Museum, 2005 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.histos.no/oljemuseet/vis.php?kat=&id=38. 
654 Facts 2007 ([cited), p. 119. 
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For Kongsberg Offshore, the Norne opportunity arrived at a most welcome 
time. By 1994, work on Heidrun would be finished and Kongsberg Offshore 
lacked orders to fill the slack. Oil prices slumped in 1993 following a period 
of high prices in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War. Several field developments 
on the Norwegian shelf were postponed.655  
 
Although Statoil and Kongsberg Offshore had a close rapport, the subsea 
supplier faced stiff competition. Companies like ABB and Kværner had 
proved to be efficient in planning and administration, and the competitors 
quickly learned tricks from one another.656 To gain an edge, Kongsberg 
Offshore offered Statoil a simplified ordering procedure for subsea 
systems – in effect a catalogue of parts and prices.  
 
The innovative act at Norne was to make options in the assembly process 
sufficiently transparent for customers to become involved. The subsea 
engineers decomposed a subsea system into component parts, posted 
clippings of parts on a board, reassembled the pieces in a document, and 
put a price on each part based on recent assignments. Unlike a tender, the 
catalogue involved customer choice. Statoil could choose from a limited 
number of optional parts and add-ons centred on a Christmas tree. The 
approach allowed economies of scale while Statoil retained a feeling the 
system could be tailor-made or at least configured to fit evolving needs. 
Statoil liked the approach and signed a deal with Kongsberg Offshore in 
April 1994. The transparent approach to pricing allowed Statoil to 
circumvent the hassle of a tender and choose a supplier early. 657  Statoil 
ended up buying five templates with 14 Christmas trees from the Norne 
catalogue.658  
 
  
                                                     
655 CA-FMC-board, 1993 annual report. 
656 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
657 Nina Olkvam, ” Norne-oppdrag plassert ”, Dagens Næringsliv, 14 April 1994.  
658 Steenstrup’s private papers, orders overview. 
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Figure 43) Seabed Lego: a decomposed subsea system659 
 
Norne marked the beginning of a new area. Before Norne, Condeeps had 
been the dominant development styles for new fields. The radically lower 
costs of floating production put an efficient stop to Condeeps on the 
Norwegian shelf and indeed everywhere. The figure below shows what 
investments were required to extract oil from gravity platforms and 
floaters. 660  Although floating production saved costs, Statoil initially 
struggled to develop floating concepts on time and budget. Several 
production ships were delayed and there were numerous cost overruns. A 
cost overrun at Åsgard forced Harald Norvik, the managing director of 
Statoil, to resign in 1999. 
 
                                                     
659 Steenstrup’s private papers, Steenstrup, "The changing philosophy of contracting: 
An international perspective".  
660 On the overruns, cf. Knut Kaasen, "Analyse av investeringsutviklingen på 
kontinentalsokkelen", NOU, (1999). 
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Figure 44) Cheap and floating: investment per barrel for fixed and floating 
installations661 
 
 
The cost overruns that did follow rarely related to subsea systems. By 1994, 
Norwegian subsea developments were cheaper than projects elsewhere in 
Europe and the industry was on track to achieve global cost leadership.662 
Tellingly, the cost reduction drive had only just begun. 
8.4 HOST and the second standardization drive, 1995-1998 
At Norne, Kongsberg Offshore offered products from its existing portfolio – 
developed largely by FMC. The new managing director, Tore Halvorsen, 
knew the potential of further standardization and modularization of subsea 
equipment.  
 
In the wake of the low oil prices that that curbed exploration activities in the 
mid-1990s, a new opportunity arrived: the day rates of drilling rigs fell much 
below the rates for heavy cranes and other specialized construction vessels. 
By substituting the former for the latter, oil companies could develop subsea 
fields cheaply. Drilling rigs employed cranes centred on a hole in the middle 
(a moonpool), but a standard moonpool was designed to lower drillbits and 
strings, not large subsea equipment. Halvorsen thought of a subsea template 
with foldable wing elements that would unfold only when the equipment was 
                                                     
661 The figure appears in a government white paper (St.meld 38. 2003-2004) with 
Statoil credited as the original source. 
662 Arnt Even Bøe, ”Oljeselskaper samarbeider: billigst i verden på havbunnen”, 
Stavanger Aftenblad, 15 October 1994.  
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in place on the seabed. A drilling rig might lower such a system through its 
moonpool and save considerable sums. In the mid-1990s, Kongsberg 
Offshore introduced a range of equipment named HOST - acronym for 
“hinge-over subsea template”.  
 
HOST enticed Statoil, partly because the system allowed 40 per cent savings 
on installation cost, but also because Kongsberg Offshore offered to cut the 
hardware cost by a further 25 per cent.663 In July 1994, the oil company 
contributed NOK 40 million to finance half the costs of a three-year 
development programme. Six months later, Mobil signed on as partner. Elf 
and Shell joined in October 1995. In total, Kongsberg Offshore raised 
NOK 110 million from oil companies to develop HOST.664 
 
Part of the project was the design of a single versatile, high-capacity 
Christmas tree, made by FMC. Although the quality and the capabilities of 
the tree were excessive in many circumstances, the approach allowed 
Kongsberg Offshore to cut back on the time spent doing expensive tailoring. 
The engineers thought their standard solution would be applicable for 70-80 
per cent of the future field developments. At the time, HOST was developed, 
Statoil and Kongsberg Offshore still thought there were arguments for two 
different standards: one for marginal fields with a short life where priority 
was on keeping costs and risk down; another standard for prolific reservoirs 
where the emphasis was on high availability and maximal recovery. The 
prolific fields could justify development projects. 665 Over time, however, 
components used for the high-end standard migrated onto marginal fields as 
the cost advantages of standardization and volume manufacturing 
outweighed the cost of such items as higher-grade steel. HOST helped to 
make subsea equipment more affordable. 
 
The most thorough redesign related to templates: the frames that offered 
protection and support for subsea equipment. Before the mid-1990s, each 
subsea project usually involved a purpose-built template. From lack of 
experience and analysis, people preferred to play safe, built structures that 
could withstand any impact and made the templates large enough for divers 
or remotely operated underwater vehicles to inspect and repair the system 
within. Besides, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate insisted subsea 
systems should sport a protective structure capable of withstanding a force of 
                                                     
663 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
664 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
665 Rosnes, Lindland, and Inderberg, "Subsea production systems: Improve cost 
efficiency and further reduce cost per barrel produced".  
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100 tonnes in any direction, equal to the impact of a trawl. 666  The 
requirements made the templates difficult and time-consuming to install, 
inspect, retrieve and maintain. In the 1990s, the arguments for large and 
solid templates seemed outdated. The emphasis had shifted from repair by 
divers and ROVs to modular structures whose individual parts could be 
hauled to the surface for repair or replacement. Besides, the rules that 
specified a subsea system should withstand a trawl were reinterpreted to 
allow structures that would simply deflect a trawl. 667  Doing away with 
excessive protection, the HOST project cut template weight from 600 tonnes 
in the 1980s to less than 100 tonnes. This allowed for a degree of “serial” 
production and cut the time and effort required for installation. The 
company in charge of the completion could ship the template using 
ordinary supply vessels or even an aircraft. 668  Time spent installing a 
compact HOST system was only seven days compared to almost a month for 
conventional subsea completions.669 
 
A second novelty of the HOST template was its increased flexibility. In the 
1980s, Kongsberg Offshore made systems with specially designed 
components to fit the field and the operator’s tastes. Beginning with 
Draugen, Kongsberg Offshore succeeded in standardizing subcomponents - 
the nuts and bolts of the system. As exemplified with the Norne “catalogue”, 
this approach could accommodate a degree of choice by allowing the 
customers to select from among interchangeable components that fitted like 
pieces of Lego. The Host equipment took this principle a step further by 
introducing the Lego principle not only to subcomponents, but also to the 
basic building blocks of a subsea system – the design allowed oil companies 
to play with big Lego pieces to do actual field design. When drilling began at 
a given field, the initial seismic results may have indicated the need for four 
wells. The oil company would then order a template and drill four wells 
through that template; once the template was down, the field layout could 
not be changed. HOST, however, allowed the operator to change plans while 
developing a field. While drilling outside Equatorial Guinea, Mobil made 
extensive use of this feature. Mobil drilled one well and tested the output. 
Based on the test results, they decided where to drill next. The company 
made 90 changes, without delay or additional costs, before the 40 wells were 
                                                     
666 Andvig, "Present development and trends for production in the Norwegian sector 
of the North Sea"; Haslestad, "Kostnadseffektive teknologiske byggeklosser: Subsea 
løsninger".  
667 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
668 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
669 ”Statoil: Kongsberg Offshore vant overlegent på pris”, NTB, 28 August 1995. 
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in place. Some of the wells were on templates, some were separate wells tied 
in to manifolds.670 To achieve this kind of functionality, the component parts 
of the HOST system had to be versatile, e.g. by allowing flowlines to be 
attached from opposing sides. In the years that followed, Kongsberg 
Offshore kept adding orders for its HOST technology, not only from Statoil 
but also from Mobile, Hydro, Agip, Elf and others. 
 
The steady modifications made subsea systems smaller, more standardized 
and modularized, and significantly affected the cost of building such 
systems. The figure below plots the price of subsea systems on the 
Norwegian shelf (inflation adjusted price per completed well not including 
drilling, installation, umbilicals, topside work and flowlines). Several 
objections could be voiced regarding the plotting – appendix 11.10 explains 
how the numbers are arrived at – but although any single observation may 
be inaccurate, the trend itself is not in question: prices were falling and the 
price corridor narrowed - a sign the systems were becoming more 
standardized. In a decade, the hardware costs fell to less than a third of its 
former level. Meanwhile, the variance between expensive high-end systems 
and regular systems almost disappeared. 
 
                                                     
670 C.P. Henderson, "Host to innovations in subsea technology", Scandinavian oil-
gas magazine, 1998, pp. 12-15 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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Figure 45) Down the drain: price of standardized subsea system, 1982-1997671  
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Reduced construction costs were but one of the circumstances that caused a 
fall in prices. Changes on the side of demand were equally important. By the 
mid-1990s, general-purpose subsea systems for moderate waters (e.g. 
HOST) had become reliable and fairly standardized. The standardization 
effort that helped make the subsea systems reliable and less costly to 
manufacture turned the systems into more of a commodity – simpler to order 
and simpler to compare in terms of pricing. Oil companies have been 
looking more to prices and less to technological excellence and other “soft” 
issues when awarding contracts. The ability of to oil companies to compare 
and calculate prices improved, and the prices tumbled albeit from a very 
high level. 
 
8.5 Steady improvements in dynamic positioning 
While subsea systems continued to drop in price and improve in quality, 
something similar occurred with marine electronics as exemplified by 
Albatross. Dynamic positioning improved considerably and improved the 
fortunes of anybody involved in mission-critical operations involving 
floating vessels. 
                                                     
671 For sources and methods, please refer to appendix on page 222: Calculating the 
price of a subsea system. 
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Since the onset in the 1960s, the reliability of dynamic positioning has 
improved continuously. When the world’s first dynamically positioned 
vessel, Eureka, was assembling ocean-floor core samples in 1961, the 
operator experienced 20 per cent downtime (the Eureka would still gather 
several times as many core samples per day as her anchored rivals and from 
much greater depths). Since then, drillship operators have sought to reduce 
downtime. DP drilling vessels introduced dual or triple redundancy in points 
of frequent failure, and by the early 1980s, leading firms showed a consistent 
average of one position failure or disconnect every six months. Due to 
damage and delay, such incidents cost an average USD 1 million (xxx) in 
1983672 and served to keep the industry focused on reliability. In 1990, the 
first attempt to drill from a dynamically positioned vessel in Norwegian 
waters actually ended in a drift-off and the rig lost position outside 
Sognefjorden. 673  A fault in the (non-redundant) power distribution panel 
caused an engine failure, although the Albatross system worked fine in 
isolation. Indeed, computer failures had become a rarity.  
 
From 1987 to 1997, improvements in computing and satellite navigation 
made the DP systems more reliable. To gain a reliable position reference, the 
industry increasingly put its trust in Navstar global positioning system 
(GPS). The navigation system was launched by the US Navy in the 1980s, 
and for a while the armed forces added signal errors. Nevertheless, civilian 
users found ways of improving accuracy. The deviation could be handled by 
differential GPS – a service that measured the distortion and broadcasted a 
correction (any observation in a whole region would be distorted in a similar 
fashion – e.g. 30 metres north of the true position). In the 1990s, American 
authorities abandoned the policy of scrambling and offered civilians access 
to signals with nearly the same accuracy as military users.674 This offered a 
boon for precise offshore navigation.  
 
The figure below plots how prices on dynamic positioning systems have 
tumbled while the reliability of the systems has improved. The common 
measure for reliability is mean time between failures (MTBF) – a statistical 
measure indicating the number of months a vessel can work before a freak 
                                                     
672 Shatto, "Reliability and risk analysis".  
673 Interview with Røkeberg, 9 May 2006; Asgaut Næss ”Boring ved Sognefjorden”, 
Dagens Næringsliv, 22 August 1990; Svein-Erik Tosterud, "Yatzy borer i høy sjø - 
uten oppankring", Teknisk Ukeblad, 22 November 1990, pp. 8-9. 
674 Slightly revised from Wikipedia’s entry on GPS, cf. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gps. 
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incident cause a loss of position. 675  In the course of three decades, the 
systems became 50 times more reliable. If previously, the DP would lose 
position every third month, the typical incidence has reached once every 10 
or 15 years. Meanwhile, the price of a high-end system fell by 90 per cent 
(down to one tenth) in real, inflation-adjusted, terms. 
 
Figure 46) Cheaper and more cheerful DP: falling prices and improved 
performance, 1977-2006676 
At first sight, the link between prices and quality seemed counter-intuitive – 
one would expect high quality to mirror high prices. However, the basic 
technological advances in computing and navigation that made dynamic 
positioning more reliable also simplified the process of making a DP system, 
                                                     
675 Shatto, "Reliability and risk analysis".  
676 Historic data on MTBF are drawn from Ibid. On the reliability of dynamic 
positioning in 2004, cf. Dp trends and traits (2004 [cited April 2007]); available 
from http://www.kingdomdrilling.co.uk/drillops/equipment/DWDP01.pdf. The 
pricing data are calculated top-down by dividing tunover (cf. figure page 270) by the 
number of sales (cf. figure page 192). Prior to this calculation, I have subtracted 
revenues from aftersales (rising from nothing to roughly one third of turnover) – 
actual numbers where these are known and assumptions where they are not. The 
prices arrived at through this calculation correspond closely with the estimations of 
various people offered in interviews with the author and with those references that 
are found in the historical project archive of Kongsberg Maritime(CA-KM-hist). 
236 
 
lowered the barriers of entry for new suppliers and put pressure on prices. 
Since a marginal rise in the number of competitors pushed the prices down, 
while a marginal rise in the number of customers affected the price less, 
potential new entrants put a lid on prices. 
 
At the high end of the market, the competitive pressure was less pronounced. 
The tearing of a riser during drilling caused downtime, possible rig damage, 
and a remote possibility of losing control of a well. In 1997, the average 
mishap would set the operator back about NOK 15 million.677 Customers 
facing such risks were reluctant to compromise on quality. 
  
At the low end of the DP market, an increasing number of companies began 
offering joystick systems (easy thrusters control) linked to autopilots. With 
little redundancy and heavy reliance on GPS, such systems were much easier 
to design and build than fully redundant systems. Robertson Radio Elektro 
(RRE) in Egersund, Norway, competed in the low end of the DP market 
from 1986 onwards.678 Simrad bought RRE in 1994, but after a few years of 
internal strife, the stripped-down DP version was withdrawn from the market 
in order not to cannibalise the high-end products. Rather than giving in, the 
main proponent of the mini-systems, Jan Arild Mikalsen, left Egersund for 
Louisiana and set up a competing company, Marine Technologies LLC, 
sponsored by Edison Chouest Offshore.679 This business has sold a number 
of systems to workboats on the Mississippi. Meanwhile, thruster 
manufacturers such as Brunvoll and Rolls-Royce Marine PLC (formerly 
Ulstein) added DP capabilities to the operating system that modern ship 
engines use to guide propulsion.680 
 
Interestingly, the margins enjoyed by Albatross have not suffered much in 
three decades despite of falling prices. A major innovative effort of 
                                                     
677 Shatto, "Reliability and risk analysis". The calculation uses an exchange rate of 
7.3 – cf. Statistisk Årbok 1997, Norwegian Bureau of Statistics. 
678 KV acquired RRE in the mid-1970s, but sold the business to Bird in 1984. From 
1986, the Bird group offered simple and less expensive positioning products, 
somewhat in competition with Albatross, cf. KV-ex10, memorandum on strategic 
issues and action points, early 1986. 
679 Some brief information can be found on the Marine Technologies home page 
http://www.marine-technologies.com/contact.htm, but I rely mainly on Helle, 
interview with Helle, 14 April 2005. Jan Mikalsen, Marine technologies news 
[Newsletter vol. 13] (Edison Chouest Offshore, 2004 [cited May 2007]); available 
from http://www.chouest.com/Newsletters/Vol_13.pdf. 
680 Interview with Helle, 14 April 2005. 
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Albatross has been to identify sufficient savings to offset falling prices. After 
the crisis of 1986, some gains occurred simply from scaling back on 
discretionary spending and from the introduction of financial discipline. 
Albatross, furthermore, made large gains by sourcing technology. The 
company saved considerable sums by replacing the KS 500 computers,681 
partly because computers based on off-the-shelf chips were cheaper, but also 
because new hardware required less maintenance. Since then, the price of 
computer components and position reference systems has kept falling.  
 
Another category of savings originated with internal efficiency. For each 
additional installation, and each problem solved, the team gained in 
experience. Albatross assessed new jobs more exactly and completed these 
tasks faster, with less hassle and fewer cost overruns. Routines, too, played a 
part. By consciously designing the procedure for a customer acceptance test 
– the final check of the DP systems to assure every process and subsystem 
was functioning smoothly – Albatross cut back on the number of man-hours 
involved. In 1989, testing a complex, triply redundant system at a yard might 
require 300-400 hours of testing. By consciously focusing on getting things 
right the first time and assigning responsibility for the correction of faults in 
subsystems to the relevant supplier, the time spent testing came down to 30-
40 hours in a few years.682 From about 1986, Albatross invested in software 
to configure the systems. We recall how Albatross relied on Balchen’s 
approach, which required a mathematical model of the ship to predict how 
the ship would respond to e.g. one knot of stream from a certain angle. A 
model designed in advance cut back on the need for extensive and expensive 
work on board the vessel.683 In the course of more than a decade, Albatross 
refined software tools that helped configure the DP system prior to 
delivery.684 
 
The strongest pressure on prices affected the less advanced DP systems sold 
to customers with some tolerance of fault. Today (2008) a talented 
programmer can probably assemble a working DP solution with tolerable 
performance from off-the shelf equipment, particularly a GPS and a personal 
computer. 685  By the late 1990s a simple system consisting of a single 
                                                     
681 Cf. KV-Cor 238, Albatross board minutes, 17 October 1985. 
682 CA-KM-sup, newsletter, Tross’ern September 1992. 
683 KV-Cor 238, Albatross board minutes dated 27 June 1985 and 17 October 1985; 
interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004. On the model-based approach to dynamic 
positioning, cf. page 88. 
684 Interview with Helle, 14 April 2005. 
685 Interview with Sælid, 12 October 2004, and with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
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computer getting data from a single GPS receiver could be designed and 
implemented with comparably few resources and nevertheless provide 
accuracy and reliability in excess of anything in 1985. Such “small” systems 
have been able to gain markets, albeit not in the high end of the market 
where the classification regime required strict standards of redundancy.686 
Redundant systems are hard to program. Class 2 and class 3 certificates 
called for mutually independent position reference systems capable of 
validating or replacing inputs from navigation satellites. These might, on 
very rare occasions, malfunction in ways that were hard to detect. An even 
harsher requirement in the classification regime is the demand for Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis, i.e. the identification of what maximum 
environmental forces (wind, stream) a vessel could handle before a worst-
case failure turned disastrous.687 In effect, a system capable of doing this 
would have to adapt the approach of Albatross and build a computer model 
of the vessel in question. 
 
Apart from any increase in demand that occurred as a result of improved 
quality, Albatross also faced less hostile market conditions in the early 
1990s. The oil price recovered sufficiently for oil companies to take a fresh 
look at exploration. The price of used jack-ups and semi-submersibles 
doubled or even tripled from a low around 1989-1990. Exploration was the 
bellwether of recovery and Simrad Albatross got numerous orders for 
upgrading and replacing old equipment.  
 
While Albatross continued to deliver dynamic positioning to petroleum 
support vessels, a new market emerged on the processing platforms – 
increasingly oil production took place on floating structures with qualities 
and challenges that resembled those that faced a ship.   
 
8.6 Albatross into the oil industry’s core 
The investments that went into oil infrastructure dwarfed the cost of building 
offshore support vessels. The introduction of nimble production technology 
provided numerous opportunities and turned Albatross Integrated 
Multifunction System (AIM) into the most important product in the 
Albatross portfolio. 
 
                                                     
686 On redundancy, cf. page 119. 
687 Interview with Røkeberg, 9 May 2006. A worst-case failure would typically 
involve the failure of an engine. 
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Introducing a new system to the oil industry was a tedious task. In principle, 
there was no lack of tasks for AIM. The system could monitor and improve a 
range of functions including heat, water and ventilation, ballast, processing 
of oil and gas, power generation, pumps and drilling equipment along with 
various systems designed to detect leakage, tension and fire.688 However, 
contracts were hard to get by without prior experience in offshore process 
automation. 689  All the more important when Statoil awarded Simrad 
Albatross a NOK 30 million contract to install AIM 1000 on the three 
platforms at Statfjord in December 1989.690 Statoil cited reliability as the 
most importantly consideration guiding its choice. 691  Albatross may well 
have been competent, but the breakthrough assignment on Statfjord 
depended in no small part on strategic considerations as Statoil sought to 
decrease its dependence on systems from Siemens. Whatever the leitmotif, 
Albatross proved perfectly capable. In just 15 days during 1991, the 
albatrosses tied together 60 single board computers monitoring 3300 signals 
on a hot platform – that is a platform in full operation. Albatross Managing 
Director Løkling relished the experience and foresaw more jobs with 
offshore process control.692 
 
The Statfjord platforms were massive Condeep constructions – a huge 
complex on an immovable foundation. The main competitive advantage 
of Albatross related to the new generations of platforms that were 
floating. In such environments, Albatross found more applications of its 
know-how. In 1991, Albatross received an important contract supplying 
Snorre – Saga’s tension leg platform – with ballast control. The ballast and 
bilge control system (BBCS) guided the process of installing the floating 
platform. During installation, BBCS controlled the filling of ballast tanks. 
This lowered the platform down to a position where hull and deck could be 
hooked onto the tethers. The system then emptied the tanks and allowed 
Snorre to hover. After the regular equipment was in place, BBCS pumped 
ballast around to stabilize the platform. While the platform began operations, 
                                                     
688 Sogner’s private papers, Simrad Newsletter, December 1993. 
689 KV-Cor 239, summary of strategy gathering, 27 January 1986; KV-Cor 238, 
Albatross board minutes, 2 September 1985. 
690 The installation replaced the platforms’ SCADA (supervision, control and data 
acquisition) system, cf. page 51. 
691 Sogner’s private papers, Simrad Newsletter, July 1990. 
692 CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad AS board minutes, 25 June 1991. 
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its software helped monitor the placement of tethers and collected data on 
tether stretch and tension in response to the environment.693 
 
The less the operator relied on permanent structures, the more opportunities 
for dynamic positioning and complex process control. At Heidrun outside 
Trøndelag, Conoco decided to build a TLP. The field was beyond the reach 
of existing pipelines, and relied on tankers to ship the output. The operator 
decided to do without storage facilities and rely on just-in-time shipping with 
purpose-built tankers. These would pull an underwater buoy onto the hull 
and load crude almost regardless of the weather.694 Between 1991 and 1993, 
Simrad Albatross secured a number of process control contracts for platform, 
subsea wells and tankers bound for Heidrun. The main process control 
contract was worth NOK 80 million - equipping two of the three tankers 
with dynamic positioning, power management, ballast management, alarms 
etc. earned Albatross another 34 million.695 
 
Figure 47) Shift from DP to integrated deliveries, revenues 1987-2004 
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693 Sogner’s private papers, Simrad Newsletter, September 1991. 
694 To assess the field development, or indeed the development of any major field on 
the Norwegian shelf, cf. Heidrun (Norsk Teknisk Museum, 2005 [cited April 2007]); 
available from http://www.histos.no/oljemuseet/vis.php?kat=1&id=22. 
695 ”80 millioners kontrakt til Simrad”, Dagens Næringsliv, 2 December 1991; 
”Simrad kontrakt på 34 mill.”, Aftenposten, 24 February 1993. 
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Even larger opportunities arrived when the oil industry moved from gravity 
platforms and TLPs onto production ships and semi-submersibles. Such 
movable installations offered more opportunities and larger orders than 
anything related to fixed platforms. At Norne, Albatross supplied 
instrumentation, process control and safety systems for the production ship. 
At Åsgard, Albatross supplied a complete integrated automation system: 
position mooring equipment to keep the vessels in place, control systems for 
the equipment that processed oil and gas, training simulators, monitoring and 
metering equipment. 696  At NOK 110 million (Norne) and 100 million 
(Åsgard), these contracts were of a larger magnitude than anything Albatross 
had received previously. 697  The oil companies preferred to buy one 
integrated control system to keep the number of engineering hours down, 
simplify testing and save on maintenance. 698  The winner took all – and 
sometimes the winner was Albatross. The 1995 annual report claimed a 30 
per cent market share for automation offshore. Outside Norway, however, 
Albatross rarely got such contracts except as an add-on to its thriving DP 
business. 
 
For Albatross, the Norne and Åsgard contracts were harbingers of a closer 
relationship between customer and supplier. In the maritime shipping 
markets, suppliers and customers might enjoy cordial relations, but their 
relationship was contractual and carried few obligations except for delivery 
and payment. The constellations put together to perform offshore field 
development in the North Sea during the 1990s were different. The oil 
companies worked closely with their suppliers; deliveries could not always 
be specified in great detail ahead of the contract, and to keep up speed the oil 
company sat down with its suppliers to assist in making decisions on the run, 
cut development time and develop standards for wider use.699 Statoil would 
grant block contracts and secure its partners a steadier flow of contracts in 
return for favourable terms of business. There was less need for the 
                                                     
696 Sogner’s private papers, Simrad Inside, issue 2, 1995; KMedu, Kongsberg 
Simrad: Offshore and ocean survey products, product brochure, 1998. 
697 “Milliardoppdrag for to Statoil-felt”, Dagens Næringsliv, 9 January 1996; 
”Norne-kontrakt til Simrad”, Aftenposten, 10 June 1995. The technological and 
particularly the organizational outlay of Åsgard is the subject of a recent PhD thesis, 
cf. Beate Karlsen, Organisatoriske valg etablering og utvikling av nye 
arbeidsformer offshore, Doktoravhandlinger forsvart ved det 
samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, universitetet i oslo nr. 67 ([Oslo]: Senter for 
teknologi, innovasjon og kultur, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet Unipub, 2007). 
698 Sogner’s private papers, Simrad Inside, issue 2, 1995. 
699 Sogner’s private papers, Simrad Inside, issue 2, 1995. 
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commercialism that had served Albatross well in previous decades. One sign 
of the times, possibly, came in 1993 when Løkling tired of management and 
left the position to Steinar Gregersen, who became Albatross’s next 
managing director. 
 
When Albatross succeeded in supplying integrated control systems to 
various floating production systems in the North Sea, its business began to 
resemble that of Kongsberg Offshore. After some twenty years of distinct 
business with distinct customers, the two converged towards the same kind 
of capitalism. Whether selling a subsea system for the seabed at Åsgard, or 
an integrated process control system for the various production ships 
anchored above that subsea system, the same rules applied.  
 
8.7 Corporate winds of change 
Both Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore changed owners and managing 
directors in the mid-1990s. Neither sale had anything to do with the other, 
nor with deepwater technology.  
 
For a while, Siemens had considered closer coordination between its general 
offshore automation business, e.g. its SCADA-type systems, and Kongsberg 
Offshore. When Siemens realized there would be few synergies in 
integrating the two, the company considered buying the petroleum-related 
business of FMC and establishing a global market leader in subsea 
systems. The Americans rejected the offer in the summer of 1992,700 and 
Siemens eventually decided to put Kongsberg Offshore KOS up for sale. 
Apart from FMC and ABB, the most eager suitors were Kværner and 
Aker. The employees at Kongsberg were particularly concerned about the 
Norwegian suitors, who were likely to incorporate Kongsberg Offshore in 
their overall organization. In the contest that followed, FMC offered the 
highest price - NOK 455 million. Siemens, having paid 47.7 million in 1987 
and infused maybe 100 million during the next few years, received a decent 
return on its investment while FMC bought a company with considerable 
reserves. 701  On 30 June 1993 all assets and obligations in Kongsberg 
                                                     
700 The acquisition is treated extensively in Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg, albeit 
with slightly diverging information. Peter Kinnear of FMC is quoted saying an offer 
was made; Tore Andvig (KOS) is quoted saying he recommended a deal, but 
Siemens thought the cost and management resources required were forbidding. 
701 Ibid. ; Sogner, God på bunnen. 
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Offshore was transferred to FMC Norway A/S. The single most important 
consideration for FMC was market access.702  
 
In Norway, the sale caused political concern. The acquisition coincided with 
the sale of iconic chocolate manufacturer Freia Marabou to Kraft Foods 
(Phillip Morris Corp.) and a heightened public awareness of foreign 
ownership. When FMC was about to acquire Kongsberg Offshore, the 
employee representatives insisted FMC honoured a set of concessions 
similar to those that Siemens had accepted in 1987. 703  In a subsequent 
arrangement, the Americans promised intellectual property would stay with 
Kongsberg Offshore and that FMC would allow Kongsberg Offshore an 
international role. Furthermore, FMC promised to grant Kongsberg Offshore 
operational freedom. Despite its 100 per cent ownership, FMC placed only 
one of its directors on the board and left the initiative with independent 
directors and employee representatives. 704 
 
The transaction set in motion a few profound changes. Haslestad decided to 
pursue a career at Siemens. FMC was disappointed, but allowed the board to 
pursue its business independently and to hire a Kongsberg insider, Tore 
Halvorsen, as managing director. Halvorsen had been with the business since 
1980 and became managing director in July 1994.705 Although FMC did 
have an in-house metering business already, the company decided to make 
Kongsberg a “global centre of excellence” for gas metering. A year later, 
however, FMC bought into Smith Meter Inc and the importance of metering 
at Kongsberg somewhat diminished. Mostly, however, the sale implied 
business as usual. 
 
* * * 
 
While the sale of Kongsberg Offshore was “friendly” in the language of 
corporate finance, Albatross succumbed to a hostile takeover when 
Kongsberg Gruppen bought Simrad. The conditions that allowed such a 
takeover were long coming. 
 
In the early 1990s, Hansen enjoyed absolute control at Simrad. He hoped to 
acquire Norcontrol and Bird Technology and thus unite most of the 
                                                     
702 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
703 Interview with Fjelldal, 29 October 2004. 
704 Inteview with Christiansen, 19 February 2007; with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
705 Interview with Christiansen, 19 February 2007; with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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Norwegian marine electronics industry. Hansen’s ambitions required 
financial backing, but his fierce independence upset investors. He rejected 
offers from Thomson for closer ties and hoped to offer Statoil a controlling 
stake as a shield against “foreign ownership”. When Statoil preferred to stay 
aloof of its suppliers, Hansen turned to Kværner, a company that shared his 
thoughts on restructuring the electronics industry. 706  With this backing, 
Simrad acquired Osprey, a British supplier of naval sonar, and Hydro Vision 
International Inc, a producer of underwater cameras. When the owners of 
Bird Technology decided to liquidate the company in 1993, Simrad got hold 
of Bentech Subsea AS (experimental parametric sonar) and Robertson AS 
(autopilots and various navigation solutions). In February 1994, Simrad 
acquired the Danish Shipmate Group whose retail network addressed yachts 
and fishing vessels.707 For a while, Simrad looked set to dominate marine 
electronics. 
 
From then on, a number of issues conspired to frustrate Hansen’s ambitions. 
Most importantly, Norsk Forsvarsteknologi (NFT) – the restructured remains 
of KV’s Defence Division, also took an interest in marine electronics. The 
trauma of 1987 had made NFT’s board and management reluctant to rely on 
government funding and correspondingly eager to secure stock market 
funding, but the stock exchange was unlikely to stomach a pure defence 
company. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and defence spending 
looked set to fall, NFT decided to diversify. Marine electronics was a 
familiar field, and in 1992, NFT bought Norcontrol.708 From then on, both 
NFT and Simrad aimed to expand in marine electronics. 
 
Secondly, Simrad started to perform below expectations. Although Albatross 
and the rest of Simrad’s offshore business continued to return a handsome 
return, margins were lower than in previous years. The company misjudged 
a mine-hunting project, booked large profits in 1990 and 1991, but reported 
losses in subsequent years making the project only marginally profitable. 
                                                     
706 Sogner, God på bunnen pp. 205 ff. Simrad’s ambition with regard to the maritime 
electronics industry was stated in CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad AS board minutes, 14 
April 1992.  
707 Sogner’s private papers, Simrad annual reports 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. 
Shipmate cost NOK 16.3 million plus debts running at 36.2 million; a 44 per cent 
stake in Bird (1992) cost 61 million. 
708 On the thinking of Kongsberg Gruppen, cf. interview with Jørgensen, 21 
September 2004; with Solberg, 27 March 2003. For details on the initial public 
offering, cf. Sogner’s private papers, Norsk Forsvarsteknologi AS, annual report 
1993. 
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Osprey was losing money outright.709 As if to prove a common argument 
against conglomerates, profits fell in line with the number of acquisitions, 
from 12 per cent in 1987-1991 to 10 per cent in 1992-1993, and down to less 
than 6 per cent in 1994-1996. When Simrad performed below expectations, 
shareholders no longer put up with the independent ways of Hansen. 
Deprived of influence, many wanted to leave. 
 
Figure 48) The Simrad group, EBITA as a percentage of turnover, 1983-1996710 
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While Simrad’s valuation diminished, NFT gained better access to funds. In 
December 1993, NFT went public - 49 per cent of the shares were sold to 
private shareholders while the government retained 51 per cent. 711  The 
business was renamed Kongsberg Gruppen – and aimed to expand its 
civilian product line. In the spring of 1996, Simrad became vulnerable. 
Kværner sold its ten per cent holding to help finance its forthcoming 
acquisition of Trafalgar House, and Simrad lacked the support of dedicated 
                                                     
709 On the difficulties with Osprey and the naval project, cf. Sogner, God på bunnen.  
710 Sogner’s private papers, figures prepared by the accounting department of 
Simrad AS, undated. 
711 On the thinking of Kongsberg Gruppen, cf. interview with Jørgensen, 21 
September 2004; with Solberg, 27 March 2003. For details on the initial public 
offering, cf. Sogner’s private papers, Norsk Forsvarsteknologi AS, annual report 
1993. 
246 
 
owners. 712 On 11 April 1996, Kongsberg Gruppen offered to buy Simrad 
shares at a 44 per cent premium on the average 1996 stock price, and 
shareholders representing a majority agreed within a matter of hours. Hansen 
faced a fait accompli and left the company a few weeks later.713 Another 
early casualty was Gregersen, who failed to get along with the new 
management and left after a clash with the head of Kongsberg Maritime, the 
marine electronics division of Kongsberg Gruppen.714 Gregersen, who ran 
Kongsberg Simrad from 1993 to 1996, watched margins strictly and was 
reluctant to take on new people. When he left for Kongsberg Offshore, 
following conflicts with the new owners, Hans Christian Helle became head 
of Vessel Systems (DP and automation) and Steinar Aabelvik head of the 
Albatross (DP) unit.715 Overall, the business continued much as before. 
 
8.8 Conclusions 
The early chapters of this thesis frequently returned to the considerable 
differences between the world of shipping, where Albatross resided, and the 
realms of Statoil, where Kongsberg Offshore found work. In the period 
covered by this chapter, these worlds became blurred. When Albatross 
succeeded in supplying integrated control systems to various floating 
production systems in the North Sea, its business began to resemble that of 
Kongsberg Offshore. After some twenty years of distinct business with 
distinct customers, the two converged towards the same kind of capitalism. 
Whether selling a subsea system for the seabed at Åsgard, or an integrated 
process control system for the various production ships anchored above that 
subsea system, the same rules applied.  
 
What mattered was the fact that the institutional setting on the Norwegian 
shelf had become a lot more dynamic. The early sections of this and the 
previous chapter provided many examples of how oil companies and public 
authorities became more receptive to costs and earnings. The most evident 
change occurred as floating production systems replaced Condeeps despite 
                                                     
712 Tradewinds, 8 March 1996. 
713 On the disappointment of shareholders, cf. interview with Jørgensen, 21 
September 2004, and the account in Sogner, God på bunnen. On the bid and its 
reception by the Simrad board, cf. CA-KM-Simrad, Simrad AS board minutes, 26 
April. 
714 Before subsequent restructuring, Kongsberg Maritime was a holding company 
that comprised Kongsberg Simrad AS (i.e. Albatross), Kongsberg Norcontrol AS, 
Kongsberg Norcontrol Simulation AS and Simrad AS. 
715 Interview with Helle, 14 April 2005. 
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the strong constituencies that fought to preserve this costly way of 
developing offshore fields. 
 
A new style of field development provided a set of opportunities for the 
deepwater companies that worked out of Kongsberg. National and global 
competition, however, disciplined these suppliers and forced a remarkable 
drive towards lower costs, both in relation to dynamic positioning and 
subsea systems. If anything, the competitive pressures increased. 
 
In this setting, the suppliers managed to innovate repeatedly. Both 
companies introduced new products (the HOST product range and various 
integrated control systems for use onboard floating platforms). Both 
companies also led a remarkable drive towards cost-efficient deliveries. 
Whereas Kongsberg Offshore cut prices as part of a conscious effort to gain 
a market, price cutting at Albatross was part of a never-ending struggle to 
keep competition at bay. Computing and navigation technology matured to 
the extent that any electronics company with some resources could develop a 
basic DP system – and the product became subject to strong price pressures. 
In a setting where quality and functionality improved, the overall costs of 
dynamic positioning and subsea systems fell by roughly 50 per cent from 
1991 to 1997. The deepwater industry showed every sign of vitality. 
 
In explaining this dynamism, a number of issues played a part. Some credit 
goes to culture, experience, improved economies of scale and pure talent. 
Another explanation should recall the fact that suppliers on the Norwegian 
shelf were granted considerable freedom and trust. The practice of awarding 
EPC contracts was a key success criterion in the drive to standardize subsea 
equipment and devise control systems for floating production platforms; they 
offered the suppliers the necessary authority to make design choices. In 
some contrast to the established procedure in most oil provinces, companies 
that issued tenders on the Norwegian shelf refrained from excessive 
specification before choosing a main contractor. The oil companies expected 
these suppliers to carry extensive risks and responsibilities and to make 
decisions that oil companies had traditionally reserved for themselves. The 
more discretion left to suppliers, the more functional requirements and the 
fewer specific requirements, the larger the room for innovation and 
standardization. Since critical knowledge rested with the supplier industry, 
not with a single oil company, the benefits of standardization and 
technological improvements travelled faster and spread wider. Petrobras’s 
effort at standardization, for example, had fewer immediate gains for the 
offshore industry in general.Beginning in the late 1990s, Norwegian 
deepwater suppliers with this independent streak found promising 
opportunities abroad. 
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9 Profiting from geology and globalization, 1997-
2007 
In the final decade covered by this thesis, both Albatross and Kongsberg 
Offshore experienced success. Largely, the strong performance occurred 
when business practices pioneered on the Norwegian shelf travelled abroad. 
 
Initially, global oil companies elsewhere continued to procure Christmas 
trees as one package, templates as another, control systems as a third 
package, tie-in services as a fourth, and so on. As late as the mid-1990s, the 
EPC approach was fairly unique to the Norwegian continental shelf where 
oil companies (like shipping companies) trusted their suppliers with 
extensive responsibilities for turnkey deliveries. From the mid-1990s 
onwards, such practices spread rapidly to other oil provinces. EPC contracts 
simplified the business of oil companies and lowered their transaction 
costs. In the 1990s, offshore oil companies increasingly explored setting 
up business in new oil provinces without an established supplier 
industry and with weak institutions – they faced higher risks and 
embraced the opportunity of offloading technological risk on to 
suppliers capable of taking on every responsibility through EPC 
contracts. Early exposure to systems delivery provided the Norwegian 
supplier industry with valuable experience and a beachhead for export sales 
when the practice took off globally in the 1990s.716 
 
Like EPC contracts for offshore installations, class certificates served to 
simplify the process of procuring dynamic positioning. As with EPC 
contracts, the practice originated with the Norwegian shelf. As with EPC 
contracts, the practice travelled abroad.   
 
If contracting strategies such as the use of class certificates and turnkey 
contracts have shaped the deepwater industry, how may changes in the 
institutional framework affect the future? That issue is somewhat 
beyond the topic covered in this thesis, but is fascinating nonetheless. 
The concluding sections of this chapter deal with recent trends that are 
yet to have a profound effect on the industry. 
 
Apart from those advantages that were unique to Norwegian companies, 
the decade that began in 1997 was favourable for any competent 
provider of deepwater technology. The global oil industry addressed 
                                                     
716 Cf. interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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increasingly inaccessible oil fields and provided numerous opportunities 
for companies that offered nimble solutions for smaller fields, far away 
in deep waters. 
 
9.1 How demanding procurement practices helped Norwegian suppliers 
expand abroad 
The companies we have followed succeeded in part because they knew the 
challenges of oil production in deep waters and managed to innovate. A 
visible contributor to success, furthermore, was the ability of these 
companies to expand abroad. Their way of doing business travelled easily to 
meet the demanding conditions faced by the offshore industry in new oil 
provinces. 
 
In the oil industry, globalization showed in development styles. If previously 
there was local technology (e.g. Condeeps in Norway, semi-submersibles in 
Brazil and Spars in the Gulf of Mexico), recent development projects relied 
on a global technology base where one global supplier industry served a 
global market in which prices converged. Host countries continued to 
demand local content, but rarely prevented global suppliers from playing a 
major role. 
 
Albatross had served a global shipping industry almost from the moment its 
business was established. The company had a worldwide presence quite 
early. Up until the 1990s, however, the most promising markets resided in 
the North Sea. In the mid-1980s, two-thirds of Albatross’s sales originated 
with North Sea operations.717 Hardly any petroleum support vessels in the 
Gulf of Mexico used dynamic positioning in the 1970s and Albatross spent 
barely a tenth of its marketing budget on the American market in 1985.718 
Although the United States remained a technological base for North Sea oil, 
the US oil industry in general appeared technologically conservative and 
cost conscious.719 Most export sales went to Singapore, Japan and Korea, 
whose shipbuilding industries came to dominate the global market.720  
 
                                                     
717 KV-Cor 238, Albatross [internal] board papers on marketing strategy, 23 
September 1983. 
718 KV-ex 10, marketing budget, 4 February 1986. 
719 On the conservative inclination of the US offshore oil industry, cf. KV-Cor 238, 
marketing strategy, 23 September 1983. 
720 KV-Cor 238, Albatross board minutes, 2 September 1985. 
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Albatross’s export orders grew in line with the introduction of new 
procurement practices. The shift was most evident in the Gulf of Mexico 
where Albatross received a wave of orders in the mid- and late 1990s 
reaching 30 per cent of total orders for dynamic positioning.721 In recent 
years, some two-thirds of Kongsberg Offshore’s offshore-related orders 
classify as export.722 Oil activity in deeper waters played a part, but also a 
global adoption of class certificates for dynamic positioning. First introduced 
in the late 1970s (cf. chapter 4.7), the practice of placing orders by reference 
to a class regime became entrenched for North Sea operations in the 1980s. 
From Norway, the use of class certificates spread abroad. Lloyds Register 
began issuing class regulations that roughly matched those of DNV,723 but 
until the 1990s, the reliance on classification societies to specify how crucial 
electronic equipment should work remained a North Sea phenomenon. In 
June 1994, however, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
advised its members to adopt a classification regime for dynamic 
positioning. 724  American regulators and the US oil industry heeded this 
advice and guidelines from this United Nations body helped speed the 
adoption of dynamic positioning in the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
Regardless of public guidelines, global oil companies have in effect 
harmonised standards somewhat independently of the classification 
societies. The oil industry preferred uniform standards everywhere to 
simplify ordering – such concerns tended to favour a convergence towards 
the highest requirements. Owners of petroleum support vessels, furthermore, 
would normally hedge their bets and build vessels capable of competing for 
the widest possible range of assignments; an American shipping company 
might invest in advanced dynamic positioning, not because its present 
customers demanded such systems, but because its future customers might 
appear in the North Sea sometime in the future. 725 Increasingly, shipping 
                                                     
721 Paul Erik Hattestad, "Kongsberg simrad as: Valg av inngangsstrategi i mexico 
gulfen med tanke på produktet dynamisk posisjonering", (Diplomoppgave, Norges 
Handelshøyskole, 1998). 
722 Cf. Inge K. Hansen et al., "Internasjonalisering", KonKraft rapport no. 4, 
(KonKraft, 2008). Recent figures no longer track separate product lines such as 
dynamic positioning and integrated control systems – a twist that reflects the 
integrated nature of many deliveries. 
723 Maritime, "Interview: Holger røgeberg". 
724 IMO’s ”Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems” are available 
online at http://www.imo.org/. Their wording resembles the DNV requirements, cf. 
Bray, Dynamic positioning, p. 207. 
725 Interview with Røkeberg, 9 May 2006. 
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companies around the globe ordered dynamic positioning in order to be 
eligible for the occasional North Sea order.  
 
* * * 
 
At Kongsberg Offshore, export orders picked up even more rapidly than at 
Albatross, and from a much lower base. Prior to 1995, Kongsberg Offshore 
had no export orders of any importance. Although the Norwegian shelf 
remains an important market, the strongest growth is elsewhere. In 2005, 
some two-thirds of FMC Kongsberg Subsea’s sales were exports.726 Again, 
the spread of familiar procurement practices greatly assisted the export drive. 
 
The growing internationalization of Norwegian oil companies since 1997 
provided only limited assistance to the Norwegian supplier industry. 
Although both Statoil and Hydro invested heavily abroad, deepwater was not 
their prime focus727 - only after year 2000 did Statoil and Hydro buy into 
deepwater fields in the Gulf of Mexico. Rather, foreign companies with 
experience on the Norwegian shelf invited Kongsberg Offshore to expand 
deliveries to new oil provinces, most evidently to fields in the sea west of 
Africa and to Asia. 
 
The extent of the export sales surprised FMC. The Houston-based company 
had bought Kongsberg Offshore primarily to gain access to the Norwegian 
shelf,728 and offered Kongsberg Offshore responsibilities for “total subsea 
systems” as part of an effort to build goodwill. 729 Total subsea systems 
meant the practice of EPC contracts. Such contracts had taken hold on the 
Norwegian shelf whereas oil companies on the British shelf and in the Gulf 
of Mexico mostly ordered products and took upon themselves to handle 
interfaces.  
 
In the second half of the 1990s, when subsea developments became 
increasingly common, oil companies everywhere found EPC rewarding and 
easy to administer. The practice of awarding total contracts spread and 
within the FMC family, Kongsberg Offshore handled many of the 
                                                     
726 The percentage of sales abroad varies from year to year. Some figures are cited in 
Hans Ohrstrand, “’Juletrær’ hyllevare i oljen”, Adressaeavisen, 6 December 2005 
and Hansen et al., "Internasjonalisering", p. 48. 
727 Acha and Finch, "Paths to deepwater in the international petroleum industry".  
728 Interview with Fjelldal, 29 October 2004. 
729 CA-FMC-board, Kongsberg Offshore 1993 annual report. 
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deliveries.730 FMC relied on Kongsberg Offshore whenever a customer in the 
Eastern hemisphere wanted total systems. FMC’s then vice president, Peter 
Kinnear, credited the Kongsberg business with having “helped us to see 
the big picture in subsea systems, with the emphasis on systems. FMC has 
traditionally been a product-oriented company. Now we have learned the 
architecture of building systems.”731  
 
The approach of multinational oil companies outside Africa was a case in 
point. No major equipment manufacturer could claim West Africa as a 
home market. In the late 1990s, FMC Kongsberg Subsea gained orders 
from Elf for the huge Girassol field off Angola, 732  and from British 
Petroleum on Block 18 outside Angola. BP had a long-standing relationship 
with Cameron and usually bought subsea equipment from Cameron. Off 
Angola, however, where building anything was difficult, BP chose to offload 
the risk through EPC contracts. By 2004, Kongsberg Offshore had secured 
subsea orders for 100 wells and a turnover of more than NOK 5 billion 
related to West African fields.733  
 
Kongsberg Offshore had experience with EPC contracts, but also a company 
culture that helped the execution of such contracts. Kongsberg Offshore 
sported an engineer culture, not unlike KV in its heydays. Mostly everyone 
at Kongsberg Offshore was trained an as engineer except for the people at 
the finance department. Popular talk centres around technical challenges: the 
pleasures of finding a way to withstand hydrogen embitterment of metal at 
1500 metres, the excitement of being a thought-leader on the physics of 
couplings, etc. 734  Such people got along fabulously with their clients’ 
engineers and formed teams that sorted out whatever issues would occur in 
EPC contracts and alliances. This congenial, problem-solving, technical 
attitude was conciliatory by nature; this author is not aware of any lawsuit 
filed by customers during the 30 years covered in this study. Other 
companies may have been better at extracting concessions from their 
customers.  
 
                                                     
730 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
731 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg, citing interview with Peter Kinnear (FMC). 
732 Dag Tinholt, ”Storkontrakt til Kongsberg”, Dagens Næringsliv, 10 July 1998. 
733 Asgaut Næss, “Subsea i 100 utenfor Angola”, Dagens Næringsliv, 27 August 
2004.  
734 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg, citing interview with Jan Thoresen. 
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FMC Kongsberg Subsea was probably a permissive company. That diverges 
from the popular impression of competitive global businesses and Anglo-
American capitalism. Kongsberg Offshore had become a wholly owned 
subsidiary of FMC Technologies.735 Like most listed American companies, 
FMC Technologies ran a tight ship. Subsidiaries were subject to strict 
reporting and control; SAP software suits kept track of all activities. Each 
quarter FMC Technologies reported its earnings to the stock market and 
quarterly earnings carry weight. The company insisted on a decent return on 
capital, not only in the long run, but also in the short run and in every 
product and project.  
 
How come quarterly capitalism co-existed with cosiness at Kongsberg 
Offshore? One line of thought points to the legal restraints that FMC 
Technologies have to abide by in Norway. When FMC bought Kongsberg 
Offshore, the company promised its acquisition a degree of independence: 
access to international markets, ownership of intellectual property, etc. 
The board of directors, furthermore, has a majority of Norwegian directors 
whose mandate by law is to look after the subsidiary – not the American 
stock market.736 More likely, the continued independence of Kongsberg 
Offshore and tolerance of its ways had something to do with the 
company’s stellar performance. Why would Houston change a subsidiary 
that consistently outperformed the competition and other energy-related 
businesses of FMC? Rather, the Norwegian operations were allowed to 
influence the global operation. In 2001, FMC split into two companies: 
oil and engineering (FMC Technologies) and chemicals (FMC). At the 
time, FMC Technologies considered a listing at Oslo Stock Exchange 
alongside the New York Stock Exchange.737 Due to the sharp growth in 
subsea systems, offshore became ever more important for FMC 
Technologies. In February 2007, Peter Kinnear, the Vice President who 
oversaw the Kongsberg Operation, became CEO and Tore Halvorsen 
assumed overall responsibility for all subsea activities in FMC 
Technologies. 
 
                                                     
735 FMC demerged its engineering business in April 2000, set up FMC Technologies 
as a separate listed stock company and sold off the shares, cf. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FMC_Technologies. The subsequent annual reports 
offer more details, cf. Annual reports (FMC Technologies, [cited May 2007]); 
available from http://ir.fmctechnologies.com/annuals.cfm. 
736 Interview with Fjelldal, 29 October 2004. 
737 Thor Chr. Jenssen, ”FMC vurderer Oslo Børs”, Dagens Næringsliv, 9 November 
2001. 
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The spread of EPC contracts for subsea systems was a boon for Kværner 
and ABB Norway as well.738 Each had gained their experience with EPC 
contracts on the Norwegian continental shelf. Each then went on to tell 
clients around the world about the advantage of buying systems. Besides, the 
oil industry saw three companies willing to bid for EPC contracts, which 
meant there would be sufficient competition among suppliers capable of 
handling systems integration.739 As of 2007, there were five major suppliers 
of subsea systems; three of these have a strong technology base within one 
hour’s drive of Oslo: ABB/Vetco, Kværner Oilfield Products and Kongsberg 
Offshore. All thrived on a worldwide adoption of EPC contracts similar to 
the arrangements that had been pioneered on the Norwegian shelf in the 
1980s. 
 
9.2 On competition 
Tracking every competing company that offers deepwater technology has 
been beyond my scope. Nonetheless, when discussing the success of 
Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore, the competition needs consideration. 
Quite impressive efforts might be a relative failure in the face of advanced 
competitors, and laggards might succeed when facing a worse laggard – or 
no competition at all. 
 
Gaining ground in the late 1990s, FMC (of which Kongsberg Offshore was 
part) established itself as the market leader during the first few years of the 
new millennium. Since 2002-2003, the company’s market share has stayed 
above 40 per cent.740 When FMC emerged as a market leader, some of the 
credit should be assigned to the greater disarray of its competitors. 
 
                                                     
738 Yngve Hellestøl, ”Norsk kamp om milliardkontrakter i Vest-Afrika”, 
Aftenposten, 18 March 2000. 
739 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
740 The figure is reproduced from the limited materials that are available to the 
public on Quest offshore resources ([cited). According to Chrisiansen, FMC 
Technologies’ market share remained in this range during 2004-2006, interview 
with Chrisiansen, 19 February 2007. 
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Figure 49) Global market share for subsea systems, cumulative 2002-2004741 
ABB (Vetco Gray)
13 %
Cameron
27 %
Dril-Quip
5 %
FMC
39 %
Products
16 %
 
Cameron used to be the market leader in subsea technology, but Cameron 
Iron Works Inc. remained focused on products and production. Cameron’s 
business thrived from tight alliances with customers, particularly BP, and the 
sale of products. When oil companies began placing orders for full systems, 
not individual components, Cameron fell behind.742 In 1998/99, the Houston-
based company developed a control system and finally came around to offer 
turnkey systems, but Cameron had lost ground. 
 
Other competitors stumbled, not because of technological choices, but due to 
financial instability that undermined trust. Kværner expanded rapidly in the 
late 1990s. Its business was diverse, more so following the acquisition of a 
troubled British engineering company, Trafalgar House, in 1996. The deal 
caused Kværner serious financial problems in the late 1990s and undermined 
the company’s trustworthiness. Around year 2000, ABB ran into financial 
problems as well: asbestos litigation in the United States almost forced its 
American subsidiary, Combustion Engineering, into receivership. 743  With 
tumbling stock prices, ABB was reluctant to offer guarantees. Private equity 
investors eventually bought the subsea systems business of ABB and the 
supplier business eventually regained business on the Norwegian shelf 
winning contracts to supply Ormen Lange with experimental gas 
compression and power supply technology and Snøhvit with subsea 
                                                     
741 Adapted from Ibid. (cited). The numbers include market share from Q1 2002 
until Q1 2004. 
742 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
743 “Unpleasant stuff”, Economist, 24 October 2002. 
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production systems.744 Kongsberg Offshore by contrast remained a paragon 
of stability throughout the period. 
 
Apart from the four established suppliers, Dril-Quip emerged as a competitor 
during the 1990s. Dril-Quip had a somewhat limited assortment, with no in-
house control system technology. Other companies retreated. Frank Mohn 
stopped offering third party production systems; Aker failed to gain a proper 
foothold in subsea production systems and refocused on Spar technology out 
of Texas. Aker divested this business in year 2000 to help finance its 
acquisition of Kværner.745 
 
Distinguishing the products on offer in recent years (1997-2007) invariably 
runs into difficulties. The product converged rapidly due to the fact 
competitors were able to imitate most improvements; each of the five copied 
and incorporate new developments. There were few patents or patentable 
technologies and in terms of technology, no single company ever got far 
ahead.746 Although Kongsberg Offshore made far wider use of the patent 
institute than other Kongsberg-based industries, 747  oil companies such as 
Hydro and Statoil patented more extensively and mostly publish what they 
choose not to patent – a common strategy to prevent the formation of a 
monopoly in technologies considered key to business.748  
 
* * * 
 
Like subsea systems, dynamic positioning was sold on a competitive market. 
As of 2005, there were three significant players in the high-end of the 
                                                     
744 On the revival of ABB/Vetco, cf. NTB 12 July 2004; Adresseavisen, 13 July 
2006; Steve Sasanow, "Special report: A sub-sea history", Offshore & Energy 2004, 
pp. 46-48. 
745 On the divestiture of Aker’s deepwater technology, cf. Helge Keilen, ”Røkke og 
offshoreteknologi”, Dagens Næringsliv, 1 November 2000. On the origins of Aker 
as a systems provider, cf. p. 196.  
746 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
747 "Ipr database" (The Norwegian Patent Office) accessible at 
https://dbsearch.patentstyret.no/. The author counted 256 patent applications from 
the various Kongsberg industries: Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (prior to 1987) held 31, 
Kongsberg Automotive 36, Kongsberg Offshore [systems] (1986-2000) held 40 and 
FMC Kongsberg Subsea 56. 
748 Mandag Morgen, no. 1, 9 January 2006. The article referred to an international 
comparison made by Zacco Analysis and interviews with Brit Ragnhildstveit 
(Statoil) and Bjarne Skeie (Sinvest).  
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market: Kongsberg Maritime (formerly Albatross), Nautronix of Australia 
(formerly Honeywell) and Alstom of France (formerly General Electric, but 
subject to several changes in name and owners). Albatross remained the 
most successful with possibly 70 per cent of the world market for high-end 
systems – a position the company had been able to defend for 25 years.749  
 
Any lack of competition was not for lack of attempts. Several stranded, not 
only because of technological challenges, but also because upstarts lacked 
sufficient scale to remain. Staying in the high-end of the market required 
investments in continuous R&D. Besides, any provider would have to 
dedicate resources to provide a 24-hour global stand-by service. The supplier 
with the more complete service network got more orders – and could better 
afford a finely masked network. For shipping companies, who rarely knew 
where their support vessels would eventually end up working, access to 
worldwide support was of the essence.750 A potential entrant would also have 
to match the costs of Albatross – not easy since these depend on scale, past 
investments in software libraries and application knowledge: each new job 
improved the ability of engineers to install a system efficiently. ABB entered 
the race in the 1990s, sold but seven systems in a decade, and eventually 
handed its business to Albatross (Kongsberg Maritime). Navicon, another 
upstart, never got off the ground – but served to keep the incumbents alert 
and the market vital. 
 
9.3 Dilemmas related to success 
In the decade from 1997 to 2007, both Albatross and Kongsberg 
Offshore enjoyed international success and profited profoundly. Their 
strengths contributed to a spectacular revival of the engineering industry at 
Kongsberg (of which the turnover figures below are evidence).751 During this 
                                                     
749 The author is not aware of any proper market survey. The information in this 
paragraph is stitched together from the author’s interviews with, among others, 
Sælid, Jenssen, Kildal, Gulhauguen and Røkeberg. 
750 Interview with Helle, 14 April 2005; Hattestad, "Kongsberg simrad as: Valg av 
inngangsstrategi i mexico gulfen med tanke på produktet dynamisk posisjonering".  
751 The chart depicts the combined turnover of a family of companies that either 
originated with Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk or later merged with a company that was 
part of KV, not a specific company nor a specific geographical location. For 
methodological concerns and a list of included businesses, please refer to appendix 
11.2. The approach serves to retain focus on organic growth and eliminate the effect 
of mergers, acquisitions, sales and de-mergers. An even better comparison would 
involve value-added rather than turnover. Some of the growth implied in Figure 50) 
originates with the increased value of inputs as KV and associated businesses 
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period, offshore-related businesses came to dwarf all other industrial 
activities at Kongsberg.  
 
Figure 50) Oil in the machinery: the revenue of KV and associated businesses by 
segment, 1957-2004, in NOK millions (1998) 
 
 
In the decade from 1997 to 2007, both Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore 
faced dilemmas and problems worth having: challenges that originate with 
success. Both companies became very profitable. Were the historic profits 
from dynamic positioning placed in an interest-bearing bank account, the 
balance would have read NOK 2.4 billions by yearend 2004 – enough to 
finance a takeover of almost the entire Norwegian marine electronics 
industry. Using the same approach, the subsea business would have 
generated NOK 1.7 billions in cash by yearend 2004.752  
 
The turnover of Kongsberg Offshore grew fivefold in real terms between 
1996 and 2006 (cf. figure below) and the company struggled to add capacity. 
                                                                                                                            
limited the extent of in-house production and relied increasingly on the packaging of 
components into systems. The effects on profitability is covered in chapter 9.3. 
752 For an introduction to the methodology, cf. appendix 11.2, particularly page 304. 
The figure does not include substantial revenues from Albatross integrated 
multifuncion system (AIM). 
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Stellar growth in turnover did not result in stellar margins; these remained at 
about six per cent and grew mostly in line with turnover.  
 
Figure 51) The surge I: turnover, profit and loss in subsea systems, 1975-2006753 
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The growth pushed Kongsberg Offshore against capacity boundaries. In 
1995, new office quarters were added turning the complex into a maze – 
confusing for visitors, but an improvement on the improvised structures of 
old. An extra floor in the electronics building was completed in 1999 and a 
10,000m2 hall in 1998 for assembly, testing and storage. 754  These and 
other facilities enabled the company to assemble 120 subsea modules per 
year and test each for pressures up to 20,000 psi.755  
 
Workers, however, remained in short supply. During the recent boom, 
hiring and retaining skilled workers became difficult. Kongsberg Offshore 
proved to be an attractive employer and managed to hire, among others, a 
cohort of employees from Albatross with a strong technology focus. In the 
late 1980s, Albatross’s core “system engineering group” consisted of five 
people. As of 2005, only Nils Albert Jenssen remained at Albatross. Another 
                                                     
753 Cf. Appendix 11.6. 
754 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
755 “Dobler kapasiteten”, Teknisk Ukeblad, 30 January 2007. 
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cybernetics expert, Steinar Sælid, founded an engineering consultancy, 
Prediktor AS, and went to work for his start-up in 1995. The remains of the 
systems engineering group eventually ended up working for Kongsberg 
Offshore: Terje Løkling, Steinar Gregersen and Sverre Corneliussen.  
 
New recruits could solve only part of the demand for extra capacity and 
Kongsberg Offshore had to make better use of its existing engineers. Before 
1996, the company ran project groups with employees assigned full time to a 
single project. In 1996, the company reorganized and shaped product groups 
in which engineers worked on several projects simultaneously albeit with a 
more consistent set of tasks. The change improved productivity and reflected 
a long-term trend from few and big projects towards more, but smaller, 
projects.756 
 
When Kongsberg Offshore actually managed to handle a steep rise in 
demand, the reason rested in part with a long established practice of 
outsourced production. Initially, this was less of a strategy and more of an 
accident. Back in the mid-1970s, Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk ventured into 
the offshore market without a defined set of products and with much 
uncertainty about volumes; subsequently, KV refrained from building a 
dedicated oil-tool factory – divisions apart from the oil division were set 
up to do manufacturing – and asked the Oil Division to source parts and 
services from other divisions. The limbo continued into the 1980s because 
Cameron was protective of its intellectual property and resisted KV’s calls 
to establish a Norwegian oil-tools manufacturing operation.757 Ironically, 
the path this business had taken at a time of unpredictable and low 
volumes was equally suited for surging and high volumes. FMC’s 
factories in Scotland provided valves and pressure containing equipment 
(roughly 20 per cent of the value of a typical contract in 1995), while a 
variety of mostly Norwegian subcontractors produced the remaining 
equipment (50 per cent of contract value). Kongsberg Offshore 
manufactured only control systems in-house. The company relied on a 
variety of strategies to source equipment ranging from competitive 
tenders for such items as umbilicals and longer-term alliances for other 
items such as templates.758  
As subsea systems providers began exporting to the world outside Norway, 
they faced demands for local content similar to what the Norwegian 
                                                     
756 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
757 On the origins of outsourced production, cf. page 297. 
758 Asgaut Næss, ”Milliard-jubel på Kongsberg”, Dagens Næringsliv, 29 August 
1995. 
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authorities insisted on in the 1970s and 1980s. Kongsberg Offshore has 
tailored bids to accommodate local industry in Canada, West Africa and 
Australia and learned how to choose the best partner among those present. In 
countries such as Canada, local industry was capable of making parts 
according to drawings. 759  Elsewhere, deliveries needed adjustment to 
accommodate local suppliers. Before Angolan workers applied their torch 
blowers to a template, for example, the equipment had been jigged by FMC 
to improve accuracy and system engineers on site had been equipped with 
tools to improve upon the deliveries.760 Much like foreign oil companies had 
found on the Norwegian shelf around 1980, the locals were necessary to 
secure contracts, but of limited assistance in actually building subsea 
systems. 
 
* * * 
 
Like Kongsberg Offshore, Albatross enjoyed spectacular success from the 
late 1990s onwards. Sales grew and profits shadowed sales. Despite a 
prolonged fall in prices,761 the direct variable unit costs remained at around 
fifty per cent, and gross margins ran between 12 to 17 per cent - somewhat 
higher in peak years such as 1999 and somewhat lower in periods of 
recession (1987-88) or rapid growth (1997-98).  
 
                                                     
759 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
760 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. On the manufacture of manifolds in 
Angola, cf. “Ny storkontrakt til Kongsberg”, Aftenposten, 9 September 2004. 
761 On the price fall, cf. chart on page 240. 
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Figure 52) The surge II: turnover, profit and loss in dynamic positioning, 1977-
2004762 
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Albatross always had ambitious owners and, except for a few turbulent 
years, Albatross always enabled its owners to be ambitious. Revenues from 
Albatross financed a string of acquisitions at Simrad (cf. chapter 8.7) and 
continued to finance a string of acquisitions at Kongsberg Maritime: in 2000, 
Kongsberg Gruppen bought Navia ASA including the Seatex (GPS) and 
Autronica (fire alarms) product lines, then KonMap Maritime Systems AS 
(naval maps) in 2001 and Seaflex (riser technology) in 2002.763 This growth 
by acquisition caused controversy about the sprawling nature of the business. 
 
                                                     
762 For numbers prior to 1987, cf. appendix 11.6. The 1987-2004 figures are stitched 
together from Simrad AS annual reports, Kongsberg Gruppen annual reports, 
Sogner’s private papers and correspondance between the author and Steinar 
Aabelvik, CFO of Kongsberg Maritime CFO, June 2006. For 1996-1998, this author 
has not found a product specific account for dynamic positioning. For these years, 
we assume growth and profitability in line with the offshore buisness of Kongsberg 
Maritime of which Albatross was part. 
763 Kongsberg Gruppen annual reports 1996-2005; Our maritime history (Kongsberg 
Gruppen, [cited May 2007]); available from 
http://www.Kongsberg.com/eng/kog/AboutUs/History/default.asp?page=/ENG/KO
G/About%20us&id=32693. 
264 
 
Like Simrad in the early 1990s, growth driven by acquisition apparently did 
not help margins. The former Norcontrol and the rest of Kongsberg 
Maritime’s Merchant marine segment returned less than four per cent 
margins on sales - Yachting and fishery likewise. After 2002, Kongsberg 
Maritime ceased to report on its most profitable and least profitable segment 
but rather merged the two into an Offshore and marine segment. Possibly 
eying a case for reorganization, Nordic Capital, a Swedish private equity 
group, offered to buy Kongsberg Maritime for NOK 3.3 billion in September 
2004 – half a billion more than the stock market value of Kongsberg 
Gruppen’s combined civilian and military activities. 764 The offer came to 
nothing. The state’s 51 per cent shareholding ruled out any hostile takeover 
and Kongsberg Gruppen’s board rejected a friendly takeover claiming there 
were considerable synergies in the various business lines. However, in a 
move that partly proved the critics right, Kongsberg Gruppen announced the 
sale of its yachting business in September 2005.765  
 
9.4 The quest for oil and its effect on deepwater technology 
In part, the success of the deepwater supplier industry reflected a shift in the 
oil industry onto more extreme conditions. A scarcity of oil in the regions 
most accessible to the oil majors triggered a search for oil in regions with 
very deep waters, very weak infrastructure, smaller deposits of petroleum 
and challenging geological structures. Overall, this shift increased demand 
for deepwater technology and inspired innovations to make the technology 
more applicable. 
 
For a century, oil companies strived to access the oil that lay just out of 
reach. At times the intensity of the search ebbed, while at other times it 
intensified. In the late 1930s, for example, when large quantities of oil 
appeared in the Middle East, the offshore oil industry progressed less 
rapidly. Similarly, a gush of cheap oil in the late 1980s deterred deepwater 
exploration. The long-term trend, however, was for oil companies to explore 
deeper waters, and the trend accelerated in the 1990s. As of year 2002, 
deepwater fields supplied some 3 per cent of the global oil supply – a 
                                                     
764 ”Er klar for høye bølger”, Dagens Næringsliv, 17 September 2004. 
765 On the sale of the yachting business, cf. “Halv milliard for fritidsbåtene”, 
Gjengangeren, 27 September 2005. The deal is also cited in Kongsberg Gruppen’s 
2005 annual report available online at www..com. On the stock market’s skepticism 
regarding the acquisitions and the profitability, cf. Engen, interview with the author 
on 13 September 2004. 
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proportion expected to reach 10 per cent by 2012.766 In politically stable 
regions such as Brazil and the Gulf of Mexico, more than half of all offshore 
crude originated from fields at depths of more than 400 metres.767 This surge 
affected the demand for deepwater technologies. 
 
Progress was evident in numerous ways. Around 1970, in offshore jargon, 
“deep” meant 100 metres of water. A decade later, Norwegian oilmen 
thought “deep” meant waters in which concrete platforms were infeasible, 
i.e. beyond 250-300 metres. After successive reinterpretation, trade 
publications in the new millennium seemed to distinguish between “deep” 
waters of around 1000 metres and “ultra-deep” meaning 2000 metres and 
below.768 As of the year 2005, state-of-the-art production technology was 
deployed down to 2500 metres, and exploratory drilling down to 3000 
metres, close to the limit where outside water pressure could rival pressure in 
the well itself.769  
 
From the mid-1990s, the demand for subsea systems grew exponentially – as 
did the depths in which they were applied. The figure below shows a freak 
correlation between application and the maximum record depth. Between 
1975 and 2000, the accumulated number of installed systems offered a good 
approximation of how deep the oil industry had ventured – and vice versa. 
Hence, by 1980 there were some 180 systems in place capable of 
withstanding 180 metres of water; by 1990 there were about 500 systems 
capable of withstanding 500 metres of water; by year 2000 there were 2000 
systems capable of withstanding 2000 metres of water. 770  Recently, the 
number of systems sold has surged ahead of the depth records. 
 
                                                     
766 Hansen et al., "Internasjonalisering", The report does not define “deepwater”. 
767 Numbers from 2002, cf. "Deepwater Gulf of Mexico 2004: America's expanding 
frontier", ed. U.S. Department of the Interior, OCS Report (Gulf of Mexico OCS 
Region, 2004). On petroleum production outside Brazil, cf. Ribeiro, Costra, and 
Petrobras, "Deepwater subsea completions: State of the art and future trends".  
768 Acha and Finch, "Paths to deepwater in the international petroleum industry".  
769 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. There is no principal reason why oil 
cannot be extracted from such depths, but state-of-the-art (2005) designs are made to 
contain the well pressure, not to protect well and equipment from external pressure 
and problems that may be caused by water penetrating the wellhead. 
770 The figure is assembled from a number of sources of which the two most useful 
have been "Subsea technology", and Quest offshore resources (cited). 
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Figure 53) More common and more capable: accumulated number of subsea 
systems and deepest recorded completion, 1960-2005771 
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In ultra-deep waters, production became more difficult, as did drilling. In 
order to drill where the water depth reached 2000 metres or more, a rig 
would need very long risers, lots of mud, strong winches, forceful mud 
pumps and separation equipment. This added thousands of tonnes to the 
weight.772 Most operational rigs in the mid-1990s could not work beyond 
500 metres, 773  and capable rigs fetched very substantial daily rates. 774 
Demand was particularly high in the Gulf of Mexico, where Shell had 
discovered its Auger field at 900 metres depth offshore Louisiana in 1990-
1991. It contained roughly three times more oil and gas than Statfjord and 
somewhat more than Troll. The find triggered a rush to explore the deep 
                                                     
771 The figure is assembled from a number of sources of which the two most useful 
have been Quest offshore resources (cited) and "Subsea technology".  
772 Mamdou M. Salama, "Some challenges and innovations for deepwater 
developments" (paper presented at Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 5-8 
May 1997). 
773 Ibid. 
774 R.S. Platou Offshore, Offshore rig market status report (www.platou.com, 2005 
[cited 23 February 2007]). 
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waters in the central Gulf of Mexico,775 particularly after 1995 when the U.S. 
authorities suspended royalties on some discoveries.776 Partly as a response 
to this demand, the second-hand value of a modern (third generation) rig 
rose from USD 60 million in the summer of 1995 to USD 150 million in the 
summer of 1998. 777  Dynamic positioning cut back on the time required 
deploying the rig, the costs of the support vessels that handled anchors, the 
weight of the mooring lines, and the drift that would occur regardless of the 
mooring.778 In deep waters, these advantages offset the cost of extra fuel and 
a slightly increased risk of a drift that might disconnect the marine riser. 
Fully 58 per cent of all rigs working on more than 1000 metres of water 
employed dynamic positioning – as opposed to two per cent of the rigs that 
worked on shallower waters. 779 Besides, when an increasing number of 
drilling operations shifted from deep to very deep waters, the various 
petroleum support vessels that accompanied the rigs requested 
advanced DP equipment too. 
 
In various ways, the geological difficulties of oil companies contributed 
to rapid growth at Kongsberg. Gravity platforms and traditional 
approaches to offshore oil were best suited for large finds in shallow 
waters - conditions that were harder to come by with each passing year. 
Deepwater technology was better suited for the large depths that oil 
companies had to address in order to escape political risks in places such 
as Russia, the Middle East and Venezuela. Meanwhile, the remaining fields 
on shallow shelves were smaller than in previous years. Here, too, 
mobile production equipment was better suited than traditional 
platforms because such equipment could move from one emptying field 
to another. Regardless of the nature of the challenge, deep waters or smaller 
reservoirs, the kind of technology provided by Albatross and Kongsberg 
Offshore was increasingly in demand. 
 
                                                     
775 Salama, "Some challenges and innovations for deepwater developments"; Mike 
Forrest, "Wildcat recollections: 'bright' investments paid off", AAPG Explorer, 
August 2000. 
776 Wallace, Duberg, and Kirkley, "Dynamics of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf 
of Mexico: 1980-2000: Final report".  
777 Offshore, Offshore rig market status report ([cited). 
778 Ribeiro, Paulo, and Neto, "Campos basin subsea equipment: Evolution and next 
steps".  
779 Krall, "Keynote speech from Exxonmobil development company".  
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9.5 Reverse salients, continued 
Not to deny the good fortunes of difficult geology, Albatross and 
Kongsberg Offshore contributed to the success by continuously 
improving their offering. The ability to innovate, which this thesis has 
linked to industrial architecture and company cultures, continued to 
yield results in new areas. From the late 1990s onwards, the reliability of 
deepwater technology was increasingly taken for granted. Rather, the 
main concerns of the industry shifted to the practicalities of operating in 
large depths, the struggle to get more output from declining fields and a 
venture into a new area of offshore technology where oil companies 
could do away with platforms altogether and pump the produce directly 
to shore. The deepwater industry at Kongsberg took part in a number of 
initiatives aimed at overcoming depth, distance and dearth – long-time 
reverse salients of offshore oil production. I return to each issue in sequence. 
 
Depth had always been an issue for the offshore oil industry. With regard to 
subsea systems, depth affected their design – not so much the design of the 
system itself, but the various techniques to install and maintain installations 
far below the surface using remotely operated vehicles.780 Depth also tended 
to affect reservoir pressure – the further from the surface, the more weight 
on top of the reservoir. Outside West Africa, where oil resided typically 
1000-1200 metres below the seabed, pressure and temperatures were 
comparably low. In the North Sea, where oil and gas resided 2000-3000 
metres below the seabed, the pressure was higher. Some fields in the Gulf of 
Mexico contained petroleum 6000 metres below the seabed with enormous 
pressures. 781  In 1997, Kongsberg Offshore modified its Host system to 
handle 10,000 pounds per square inch, sufficient for most tasks down to 
water depths of 2500 metres. Around 2005, subsea systems were tested for 
pressures up to 15,000psi, but some known offshore reservoirs had an 
internal pressure of 20,000psi.782  
 
Dynamic positioning also became more demanding at great depths. A 
particular challenge related to navigation: fully redundant DP systems 
could not simply rely on GPS but required alternative position reference 
systems. The second best alternative was hydro-acoustic systems, but 
their accuracy decreased in line with water depth and the systems were slow 
to detect a deviation because sound waves had to travel several kilometres. 
                                                     
780 Rosnes, Lindland, and Inderberg, "Subsea production systems: Improve cost 
efficiency and further reduce cost per barrel produced".  
781 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
782 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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Making such data reliable required advanced software, cybernetics expertise 
and mathematical models. Low-end systems mostly failed the challenge and 
left a profitable market for the most advanced suppliers. 783  Albatross 
(Kongsberg Maritime) profited handsomely from the mid-1990s boom in 
deep water drilling rigs. Between 1995 and 2001, the number of rigs capable 
of working in depths below 1500 metres (5000 feet) increased from 40 to 
120. 784  Albatross controlled most (maybe 80 per cent) of the market. 785 
These rigs bought complex systems that frequently included advanced 
process control, power management, ballast handling, riser management, etc.  
 
* * * 
 
Recently, the most rapid progress seems to be taking place on a second 
frontier - distance. If pipelines could carry the output straight from an 
underwater installation onto shore, the industry could do away with fixed 
and floating topside facilities, save considerable sums and circumvent the 
challenge of harsh climates. The industry pursues two broad approaches to 
ship wellstream: multi-phase pumping and subsea processing. Both 
techniques reduce the backpressure that otherwise lowers ultimate recovery, 
and both techniques can do away with production platforms (fixed or 
floating) altogether. Marketing materials boast that these techniques have 
game changing impact.786 Such techniques have been on the drawing board 
for decades. Their slow emergence is evidence of the conservative attitude of 
oil companies. 
 
Multi-phase transport is an industry term for shipping untreated wellstream. 
Phase in this respect means a substance such as oil, natural gas, water or 
vapour. Multi-phase was commonly shipped across short distances, for 
example ten or 15 kilometres from a satellite well onto a nearby platform. 
Shipping stuff further frequently required a technique to increase pressure 
(pumping). Considerable sums of research money have been channelled into 
multi-phase pumping787 - a task complicated by the unruly nature of oil and 
gas. Petroleum often occurred as a mix of substances with diverse qualities 
                                                     
783 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
784 Offshore, Offshore rig market status report ([cited). 
785 Anders J. Steensen, "I stødig posisjon", Teknisk Ukeblad, 18 February 1999, p. 
38, citing an Albatross market director, Finn Søberg. 
786 FMC Technologies, "New challenges, new solutions for subsea systems" in Oil & 
Gas Journal (Undated, probably 2006). 
787 On Frank Mohn AS, cf. page 195.  
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such as methane (which boils at minus 164°C) and heptadecane (which boils 
at plus 303°C). Gases affect oil in the same unpredictable way as air in a 
water hose; and if the temperature drops, gases turn to liquid and liquids 
sometimes to wax that clog the pipeline.788 Most inconveniently, at about 20 
degrees Celsius, hydrocarbons may act somewhat like water at 0 degrees. 
The supplier industry has come up with various responses ranging from the 
mere adding (and recycling) of antifreeze, insulating and heating subsea 
pipelines, or simply stirring the wellstream to create a mixture that resembles 
“slush”.789 The subsea systems that control these processes require power 
supply and long distance signal transfer – both tasks are challenging 
underneath water. Only recently have such techniques been applied offshore: 
the first multiphase pump for use subsea was installed in 1993. 
 
Keeping in mind the difficulties of multi-phase transport, the benefits of 
subsea processing were obvious. Processing mostly involves the separation 
of phases to simplify the task of pumping the produce onto shore or to some 
faraway production facility.790 The fewer the phases, the easier to ship multi-
phase. Besides, the separation of water and sand from petroleum on the 
seabed reduced backpressure and increased output from a reservoir. 
Processing can be very simple: an early example at Troll C separated (light) 
oil from (heavy) water in a gravity tank. In deep waters, however, such tanks 
would have to withstand high pressure and might not work very well. 791 
Kongsberg Offshore ventured into subsea separation in the late 1990s and 
gained ground in 2003 when FMC Technologies bought CDS 
Engineering.792 The company focused on inline separation: when spinning 
fluids pass through a pipe at high velocity, centrifugal forces push heavy 
components such as oil and sand towards the wall and retain gas and other 
light substances in the centre for capture in an inner pipe.793 In fields that 
                                                     
788 Nils H. Lundberg, "Flere faser - færre plattformer", Norsk Olje Revy 1989, pp. 
16-19. 
789 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
790 Based on New challenges, new solutions for subsea production systems [Product 
brochure] (FMC Technologies [cited May 2007]); available from 
http://www.fmctechnologies.com/Subsea.aspx. 
791 Perry A. Fischer, "Subsea production systems progressing quickly", World Oil 
Magazine, November 2004. 
792 Fmc technologies to provide subsea separation and boosting system for Statoil’s 
Tordis field: 10 November 2005 [Press release] (FMC Technologies, 2005 [cited 
December 2006]); available from www.fmctechnologies.com/tordis. 
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contain pure, dry gas, such as Ormen Lange and Snøhvit, less processing is 
required. 
 
Figure 54) Changed game: Options for the offshore oil industry, 2005 
 
 
A final technological challenge dealt with dearth – how to increase recovery 
from emptying fields. The degree of recovery depended on reservoir 
characteristics, how many wells the operator chose to sink, tactics to 
maintain reservoir pressure e.g. by injecting gas or water, but also techniques 
to fine-tune production and intervene in the well to prevent clogging.  
 
Up until the 1990s, operators intervened reluctantly and infrequently. 
Systems that allowed for easy well intervention were costly and complex. In 
the 1990s, more technologies appeared to help extract more oil from each 
well. One set of improvements centred on control systems, popularly known 
as intelligent subsea control. The concept encompassed close loop control – 
i.e. the fine-tuning of output from multiple wells by monitoring temperature 
and output. Temperature would typically vary between wells; if temperature 
dropped in one well, the system could compensate by increasing output from 
another well and maintain the desired flow (warm oil flows more freely).794 
                                                                                                                            
793 The technique has been installed at Tordis to separate a slurry of water and sand 
from the petroleum. Roald Sirevaag, "Subsea production: Status and challenges" 
(paper presented at International offshore contracting & subsea engineering 
conference, Aberdeen, 29-31 October 1996) Anders J. Steensen, “Tordis – første 
faste undervannseparator”, Teknisk Ukeblad, 26 August 2005. 
794 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
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Other techniques analysed the presence of sand in the wellflow, predict 
erosion and suggested when to service or replace certain parts. A third 
technique automated emergency procedures; rather than alert an operator in 
case of an emergency, a control system could be entrusted to employ 
standard operating procedures in case of such incidents as an abnormal fall 
in pressure. These techniques were sometimes referred to as e-fields, a drive 
to automate and remotely control ever more aspects of petroleum production 
above or below the surface.795 
 
A second drive to increase recovery centred on well intervention. Wells may 
clog just as arteries do, but oil companies could rely on various techniques to 
keep petroleum flowing. Kongsberg Offshore pioneered through tubing 
rotary drilling where a dynamically positioned drilling rig would fit a blow-
out preventer onto a subsea Christmas tree, insert a dill-bit down the tubing 
and perform directional drilling. If performed repeatedly, the well eventually 
resembled a tree trunk with multiple roots to drain petroleum. 796  Statoil 
signed a deal in 2005 to try out the new approach in cooperation with FMC 
Production Services, a subsidiary of FMC Kongsberg Subsea. 797  FMC 
Kongsberg Subsea (Kongsberg Offshore) has also done work on riserless 
light well intervention in cooperation with Statoil and Prosafe. 798  Using 
compact tools and comparably light umbilicals, this technique aimed to cut 
the costs of well intervention. 799 Kongsberg Offshore began applying the 
technique to Statoil’s 245 subsea wells in 2006.800 
                                                     
795 For a principled introduction, cf. interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. For 
specific applications of the e-fields approach, cf. information on the Troll field in 
St.meld 38, 2003-2004 [a government white paper]. On the effect of fine-tuning to 
increase the regularity of prolific fields, cf. Rosnes, Lindland, and Inderberg, 
"Subsea production systems: Improve cost efficiency and further reduce cost per 
barrel produced". On close loop control, cf. Sirevaag, "Subsea production: Status 
and challenges".  
796 Anders J. Steensen, “Får mer ut av undervannsbrønner”, Teknisk Ukeblad, 27 
October 2005. 
797 Statoil signs agreement with FMC Kongsberg Subsea on new technology: 
Kongsberg, 11 March 2005 [Press release] (FMC Technologies, 2005 [cited 
December 2006]); available from www.fmctechnologies.com. 
798 “Kongsberg Subsea bak økt utvinning”, Aftenposten, 12 November 2003. 
799 FMC technologies' product brochure: New challenges, new solutions ([cited). 
800 FMC technologies to provide Statoil with subsea riserless light well intervention 
technology over multi-year period: Houston, 6July 2005 [Press release] (FMC 
Technologies, 2006 [cited December 2006]); available from 
www.fmctechnologies.com. 
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The innovations cited above often involved not the core deepwater 
technologies covered so far in this thesis, but complementary equipment and 
techniques. Such a shift in focus indicated that the most pressing concerns of 
oil companies no longer related to subsea production systems and dynamic 
positioning, but other components in the technological system that 
surrounded offshore oil production. Submersible pumps, for example, found 
more applications related to depth, distance and dearth. In deep waters, they 
could drain heavy oil away from the well, decrease back-pressure, and 
increase the rate over recovery. At Lufeng outside China, Kongsberg 
Offshore employed pumps from Frank Mohn (FRAMO) in Bergen to devise 
a system for Statoil. 801  A host of techniques such as the insulation and 
heating of flowlines, subsea separation and new approaches to drilling 
contributed significantly to the advances of the offshore oil industry in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. This is not to argue the techniques covered in 
this thesis were stagnant.  
 
* * * 
 
Albatross made some significant contributions to dynamic positioning 
towards the end of the 1990s. The company introduced Green DP in 1998-
99. Interestingly, this twist was exactly what had motivated Professor Jens 
Glad Balchen to develop a new dynamic positioning system in the late 
1960s: the promise of smoother manoeuvres.802 Albatross did not initially 
implement optimal dynamic positioning. This shortcoming was not because 
of any lack of theoretical insight, but because of the economic and practical 
limitations placed by computing technology. In the 1970s and 1980s, a 
computer sufficiently powerful to do optimal dynamic positioning would 
have been horrendously expensive compared to mooring.803 In the 1990s, 
however, computers were able to handle the very complex algorithms that 
guide Green DP. The previous DP had turned the thrusters on or off. By 
making predictions further ahead in time, and applying corrective action 
earlier and on less than full throttle, Green DP saved some 20 to 25 per cent 
on fuel costs. Initially sold as an option, it shortly became part of the 
standard DP delivery form Kongsberg.804 Some 25 years was required before 
                                                     
801 Sirevaag, "Subsea production: Status and challenges"; Fraga et al., "Campos 
basin: 25 years of production and its contribution to the oil industry". 
802 Cf. Chapter 4.2, page 91 ff. 
803 Interview with Jenssen, 14 October 2004. 
804 Interview with Helle, 14 April 2005. 
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an optimal regulatory strategy based on Kalman filtering and forward 
coupling was implemented in line with cybernetic theory.  
 
The sections above cover numerous improvements and innovations. Many 
originated in the crossroads between several actors, e.g. Statoil, Kongsberg 
Offshore, CDS engineering of the Netherlands and FMC Technologies of 
Houston, Texas. Apart from such cross-pollination, innovations could draw 
on knowledge gathered in previous decades and new insights provided 
through science and research.805 As in previous decades, however, we should 
not downplay the dynamics of the companies involved: innovative 
developments occurred in no small part because suppliers had the freedom to 
suggest original solutions and engineers in these companies were expected to 
show initiative. Such sentiments contributed to innovation, but also to 
deliveries far beyond the traditional home markets of Albatross and 
Kongsberg Offshore. 
 
9.6  New approaches to contracting 
Throughout this chapter, and frequently throughout the remains of the thesis, 
I have returned to the beneficial effect of innovative procurement practices – 
strategies that allow suppliers responsibilities and leeway in exchange for 
taking risks. The EPC contracts introduced in the 1980s exemplified this 
approach, but contracting strategies were evolving. As subsea technology 
matured and the inherent risks in deploying subsea systems diminished, oil 
companies became less concerned about technical excellence - and the 
procurement procedures changed accordingly. The established practice of 
granting EPC contracts was refined in ways that shifted additional risks onto 
suppliers, e.g. by specifying extensive guarantees.806 The more fundamental 
change involved entirely new procurement formats. 
 
In the 1990s, it became more common to buy hardware and services as a 
single package through life of field contracts. If previously the supplier sold 
a subsea system and a tie-in system to install the equipment (and then be 
placed in store), oil companies increasingly preferred to buy only the 
production system and ask the supplier to handle installation. Tie-in and 
installation became separate industry niches procured as a service. Since the 
mid-1990s, most subsea assignments result in two contracts – one for the 
                                                     
805 Helge Keilen, Åse Pauline Thirud, and Stein Arve Tjelta, Petroleumsforskning 
lønner seg (Trondheim: Offshore Media Group, 2005). 
806 Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
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equipment and one for services. 807  Kongsberg Offshore responded by 
establishing a service business at the Coast Center Base outside Bergen. 
This unit would install subsea systems on behalf of an oil company, and the 
oil company would then verify and survey its operations. In case of a 
malfunction, the supplier would take a module to the surface for repair, 
maintenance or replacement. 808  The procedure served to make suppliers 
more attuned to the operational challenges of oil companies. 
 
The 1990s also saw the emergence of new approaches to the ordering of 
hardware. Framework contracts were a case in point. Like life-of-field 
contracts, they aimed to align the interests of users and producers. A 
framework agreement would last several years. In this period, the customer 
stuck to one supplier and a specified product range in return for guaranteed 
prices and terms of delivery. In 1995, Statoil invited suppliers of subsea 
systems to bid for a framework contract. Statoil indicated the company 
would buy turnkey systems worth NOK 3 billion (80 wells) in a five-year 
period, and asked in effect for a list of prices and conditions.809 Kongsberg 
Offshore secured this contract in competition with Kværner, ABB and 
Cameron. 810  The contract secured Statoil a decent price and Kongsberg 
Offshore economies of scale – the volume ended up at twice what Statoil had 
indicated.811 
 
Framework agreements cut back substantially on the time required to 
develop a field. These agreements derived the operator of the opportunity - 
and saved him the time – of deal-making: the “framework” determined 
options and prices. The operator saved months by skipping the tender 
                                                     
807 Daling et al., Offshore Kongsberg.  
808 Interview with Halvorsen, 4 October 2004. 
809 Sirevaag, "Subsea production: Status and challenges". The procedure somewhat 
resembled the approach that Kongsberg Offshore suggested in relation to Norne, cf. 
chapter 8.3. 
810 Asgaut Næss, ”Milliard-jubel på Kongsberg”, Dagens Næringsliv, 29 August 
1995; ”Statoil: Kongsberg Offshore vant overlegent på pris”, NTB, 28 August 1995. 
811 Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. The framework contract covered 
deliveries for Yme Beta (1996), Lufeng in China (1996), additional Gullfaks 
satellites (1999) and most importantly for Åsgard (1995-97) with 16 templates and 
52 Christmas trees. Embracing three discoveries (one gas reservoir and two 
reservoirs with a combination of oil and gas), Åsgard was large by Norwegian 
standards. Statoil decided to develop the field using a FPSO for oil production and a 
moored, semi-submersible production platform to process gas for shipment. 
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process and the time spent assessing offers and clarifying terms.812 More 
importantly, the supplier could cut delivery times because the framework 
made demand foreseeable and allowed the supplier to keep items with long 
lead times in stock. Template was a case in point. Before the Host 
technology (cf. chapter 8.4) and the framework contracts, Kongsberg 
Offshore might spend four months designing and 12 months 
manufacturing and installing a template. In the late 1990s, Kongsberg 
Offshore would simply supply one from its stock. 813  (Appendix 11.11 
contains a list of framework agreements entered into by Kongsberg Offshore 
between 1995 and 2004). 
 
Oil companies used framework contracts to cut costs and deployment times, 
but these were not the industry’s only concerns. Sometimes a subsea project 
involved great technological uncertainty or the development of new 
technology, i.e. technological risks. Responding to such challenges, oil 
companies sometimes employed alliance strategies. 
 
Kongsberg Offshore gained some experience with innovative new ways of 
offloading risk when working outside the Norwegian shelf. Petro-Canada 
had little offshore experience, and faced a major technical challenge in 
developing a field off Newfoundland where large icebergs threatened 
installations both topside and subsea. In 1995, inspired by a new contracting 
strategy on the British shelf, Petro-Canada invited suppliers to form alliances 
and submit bids for the handling of every aspect related to the field 
development: facilities design, procurement, drilling, construction and 
installing of equipment – everything that had to be in place until the first 
tanker left Terra Nova with a load of oil. Only then would the suppliers get 
their success fee.814 This contracting strategy forced a number of suppliers 
with complementary technology to align their work. Unless one company 
had every skill in-house, the suppliers would have to form alliances and 
work out between themselves how to share risks and rewards. 815  The 
winning team, Grand Banks Alliance, was managed by Brown & Root and 
                                                     
812 Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
813 Sirevaag, "Subsea production: Status and challenges"; Rosnes, Lindland, and 
Inderberg, "Subsea production systems: Improve cost efficiency and further reduce 
cost per barrel produced".  
814 G.V. Lever, B. Dunsmore, and J.R. Kean, "Terra nova development: Challenges 
and lessons learned" in Offshore Technology Conference (Houston: 2001). The 
alliance resembled what BP had pioneered e.g. in the BP ETAP project. 
815 Ibid.  
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included subsea systems from Kongsberg. 816  Brown & Root designed a 
FPSO capable of absorbing the impact of a 100,000-tonne iceberg or 
disconnect at short notice to avoid danger. Coflexip Stena Offshore moved 
290,000 cubic metres to dig glory holes that offered protection for the subsea 
systems, 817 and Kongsberg Offshore supplied subsea systems. The figure 
below indicates the division of labour.  
 
Figure 55) The Terra Nova alliance818 
 
The contract structure of the Grand Banks Alliance (and a few other similar 
alliances of which Kongsberg Offshore was part) made the partners jointly 
liable for the full scope of the work.819 Within certain limits, the alliance 
shared extra cost, shared eventual profits and shared the bonuses that were to 
                                                     
816 Ole Peder Enger and Yngve Andreassen, "Internasjonalisering i offshorebransjen 
og bruk av strategiske allianser: Kongsberg offshore as: Et casestudium", 
(Semesteroppgave, Norges Handelshøyskole, 1998). Interview with Steenstrup, 14 
October 2004. Aker, Maersk, and Flour Daniel headed other teams that bid for this 
assignment. 
817 Lever, Dunsmore, and Kean, "Terra nova development: Challenges and lessons 
learned". 
818 Interview with Steenstrup, 14 October 2004. 
819 Steenstrup, "The changing philosophy of contracting: An international 
perspective".  
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be paid when oil began to flow and when the field reached a certain 
capacity.820 Such terms served to keep all parties aligned and focused on 
objectives and deliverables. The suppliers had to acquire an overview and a 
very wide skill-set – rivalling and possibly surpassing that of a small oil 
company. In addition, deepwater suppliers assumed operational risks and 
sometimes pay in relation to the output of a field. The introduction of such 
collaborating strategies has blurred the boundary between supplier 
industry and upstream oil industry. One may wonder what exactly 
constitutes an oil company and what constitutes a supplier? 
 
9.7 Conclusions: the shape of things to come 
In the field of competitive strategy, if not in business history, it is common 
to reflect on the implications of any finding the author has come across. In 
our case, these reflections are not so much guesswork, as an attempt to link 
the Kongsberg-based supplier industry’s 35 years history with some recent 
developments on the Norwegian shelf. 
 
Assume, as do materialist (and Marxist) historians, that owning the means of 
production really matters. In a world of liquid capital markets and 
outsourced manufacturing, actually owning a tool or a piece of machinery is 
probably less important than owning design, patents and knowledge. These 
immaterial rights increasingly belong to engineering companies rather than 
the large integrated oil companies that have dominated oil and gas 
exploration. 
 
When offshore oil production relied on integrated platforms, the very size of 
these undertakings did not allow a single supplier to gain an overview, but 
rather presumed significant central planning by the oil company or a large 
engineering firm. In the 1970s and 1980s, Statoil further diminished the role 
of individual firms by sharing out the work of building the topside structure 
amongst numerous suppliers while the oil companies and their advisors 
retained responsibility for all interfaces in the complex projects. The 
development style, that is, did little to encourage independent designs from 
innovative suppliers; a reluctance to relinquish control of key technology 
helps explain the drawn-out shift away from Condeeps. 
 
Nowadays, independent suppliers control the technology most suited for 
deep waters, small fields and low oil prices. What oil companies previously 
                                                     
820 Lever, Dunsmore, and Kean, "Terra nova development: Challenges and lessons 
learned"  
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controlled in-house, suppliers such as Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore 
now offer on a market. This has been a precondition for the emergence of 
what the Norwegian trade press has named oljemygger (literally oil 
mosquitoes) - small oil companies that place bets in fields that escape the 
attention of the oil majors. The newcomers have hardly any in-house 
organization and count on outsourcing exploration, development, operations 
and servicing. The crossroads between shipping and oil, mobile oil 
installations, provide a particularly fertile ground for the specialists. The 
floating production company that services one mature field today may move 
on to another when that well is dry. The shuttle tankers that carry the oil to 
market are even more flexible. These companies operate in the crossroads 
between a very dynamic, risk-seeking shipping industry, and a conservative, 
risk-averse oil industry – and the scope they can handle grows in line with 
the increased competencies of the supplier industry. 
 
Where oil companies retain a large role, they may choose to cooperate with 
their suppliers in ways that reshape the current industry architecture. The 
increased involvement of Kongsberg Offshore in services and the emergence 
of field-development alliances are examples. Such approaches may extend to 
life-of-field alliances where suppliers agree to provide, not only equipment, 
but also the services required to make them run throughout the life of a field. 
Going further, oil companies may prefer to lease the production equipment 
from suppliers in the same manner a company may lease a floating 
production, storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel. It is not inconceivable to 
lease subsea equipment in the same manner. 821 Besides, why pay for the 
service at all? A small oil company with a promising field may forge deals 
whereby one or more suppliers may provide equipment free in return for a 
cut in the revenue stream. On the Norwegian shelf, Kværner and Aker 
considered applying for licenses on the Norwegian shelf.822 Aker-Kværner 
was close to forging an alliance with Hydro when the latter preferred 
acquisition by Statoil. Whichever way, the growth of a supplier industry 
capable of handling the core skills of the oil companies permits innovative 
and entrepreneurial ways of exploiting oil offshore. Given a sustained period 
of low oil prices, interesting things will happen. 
 
                                                     
821 Steenstrup, "The changing philosophy of contracting: An international 
perspective". Similar thoughts were expressed by Jon Kløve in Daling et al., 
Offshore Kongsberg. 
822 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities".  
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10 Conclusions: shipshaped progress, 1972-2007 
In the mid-1970s, huge islands of concrete looked set to dominate the 
Norwegian Shelf. As of 2008, this author is not aware of any large gravity 
platform on order. Oil exploitation moved beneath the surface where the 
number of subsea completions grows rapidly supported by dynamically 
positioned vessels.  
 
The path to deepwater oil production opened with a string of radical 
inventions around 1960. Although technology developed constantly in 
subsequent years, the basic principles remained in place. A shipping 
company in the 1990s would relate to similar concerns as the Glomar 
Challenger, which pioneered dynamic positioning in 1960-61; an oil 
company ordering subsea technology today relies on a technology whose 
principles were pioneered in the waters outside California in 1960-61. One 
may even argue the basics have changed little since the early 20th century 
when wildcatters in Louisiana submerged valve trees into the marshes. Like 
most experimental techniques, deepwater technology was first applied where 
nothing else would work – beneath the icy surface of Lake Erie, for example, 
or on drillships above the extreme depths where scientists hoped to penetrate 
the crust of the Earth. Only later did deepwater technology enter the 
mainstream. 
 
Whatever the exact exaltation time, we are left wondering it took so long. 
Why did these techniques take thirty or forty years to reshape the offshore 
oil industry and Norwegian oil? 
 
From the point of view of oil companies, reliability was the main argument 
against deepwater technology. Thus, engineers and developers had to 
provide robust solutions before the oil industry would do away with fixed 
platforms and mooring. Field developers knew the risks involved in untested 
technologies: only when the payback was exceptional would oil companies 
experiment - and the pace of progress lingered until technology eventually 
became sufficiently reliable. This line of thought implies a linear view of 
technological development – i.e. the tendency to place science and R&D at 
the beginning of a causal chain followed by innovation, diffusion and 
eventual productivity growth.823 Put simply, the problem and its eventual 
                                                     
823 Few actually advocate a linear view of technological development – it is a term 
used in the long running effort of historians to reclaim technology and innovations 
for the social sciences rather than placing science and R&D at the beginning of a 
causal chain followed by innovation, diffusion and eventual productivity growth. 
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solution rested with what economists dub the supply side – the providers of 
technology. 
 
This thesis has investigated advances and setbacks on the supply side in 
order to understand how subsea systems and dynamic positioning systems 
advanced. Mapping what went on at Kongsberg, we have chronicled the 
progress in some detail.  We looked at innovative new uses of cybernetics 
and statistics to develop model-based dynamic positioning with powers of 
prediction. We looked at advances in computing that cut costs and improved 
reliability. We followed ever more techniques aiming to simplify repair and 
maintenance of subsea production systems, beginning with diver access and 
atmospheric chambers before moving on to remotely operated vehicles, 
modular designs, wireline techniques, duplication strategies and control 
systems aiming to reduce wear and tear. We saw trial and error, extensive 
labour, and constant improvement through incremental innovations. 
 
There were patterns to the efforts that took place. One observation in this 
thesis, as in a rich body of research on large technological systems, is the 
futility of improving only the advanced hallmark components when the 
nature of a technology is systemic. A brilliant novelty would fail to make 
inroads due to the lack of complementary technologies and the prevalence of 
reverse salients – parts of the technological frontline that failed to move on 
and held back the very field of which it was part. Dynamic positioning could 
only advance as far as contemporary computers and position reference 
systems; subsea systems could not advance beyond the limitations of its 
weakest components, usually repair and maintenance. For most purposes the 
industry needed not only a working wellhead system, but also a floating 
production system, a control system and everything else that had to be in 
place for a technological system to function properly. 
 
In due time, a dominant design became firmly entrenched. Suppliers 
experimented less with various solutions and settled for official or unofficial 
standards. The developments resembled a common pattern in studies of the 
                                                                                                                            
The linear view is often coupled with technological determinism and portrayed as a 
deux ex machina – something important yet unpredictable that appears on the scene 
to be taken into account but not influenced – much as a farmer acknowledges the 
effect of the weather. The argument, often implicit, is that inventions originate from 
genius and is not subject to generalizations – or else we assume the genius applies 
his rationality, listing the various options before selecting, based on reason, the 
solution with best functionality that subsequently succeeds. For an eloquent 
introduction, see Andersen, "Manna fra himmelen: Om teknologihistorie og 
teknologideterministisk historie". 
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history technology: large variety in an early stage, standardization in a later 
stage. Eventually, the product settled on a path, not only because of trial and 
error, but also because users’ habits favour established techniques. 
Regulations and other formal specifications further enforced homogeneity.824 
We may also point to company-internal influences that served to maintain 
standards. In the mid- and late 1980s, Kongsberg Offshore was among the 
most vocal proponents of standardization as a road to affordable and reliable 
field developments. Possibly, the act of perfecting a technology undermined 
the producer’s capacity for radical improvements. For example, the sheer 
volume of dynamic positioning orders forced a certain bureaucracy upon the 
people who deliver; one cannot possibly deliver hundreds of systems the 
way one used to deliver a few. To cut costs and improve efficiency, 
Albatross had to codify procedures and rely less on discretion – a discretion 
that frequently caused cost overruns, but sometimes innovation.  
 
Although technological evolution followed familiar patterns, we should not 
assume inevitability or automation. Social sciences frequently ascribe 
innovation to organizational learning, firm-wide competencies, systems of 
innovation or some other term that credits organizations and networks with 
the qualities of humans. This thesis prefers to give credit to humans. 
Inventions mostly rested with a few who were sufficiently unbound by 
convention and sufficiently informed about business and research. Jens Glad 
Balchen, the entrepreneurial professor who suggested model-based dynamic 
positioning, was a case in point. There was Steinar Sælid, who played a 
prominent role in designing both dynamic positioning and Albatross’s 
integrated control system – and Tore Halvorsen, who habitually launched 
ideas that improved upon existing subsea systems. There was Bjørn Barth 
Jacobsen, who introduced new business practices, and a few individuals who 
turned them into a company culture.  Like a number of case studies on 
innovation, this thesis finds that breakthroughs rested with a few, not with 
teams and organizations.825 
 
Alas, a superior product may count for less than one may think. This thesis 
has stressed the need to look beyond technology and examine attitudes to 
adopting new techniques. For example, the early success of Albatross 
dynamic positioning relied less on a functionally superior technology, but 
                                                     
824 For a review of the life cycle literature, cf. Nelson, "The co-evolution of 
technology, industrial structure, and supporting institutions".  
825 For an illustrative account of individual contributions, cf. the emphasis on the 
impact of Hugo Holtermann in the development of modern contrast media, Sogner, 
"An innovative culture: Nyegaard & co, Norway and the environments of business". 
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mainly on intense footwork that managed to overcome the system’s early 
flaws; only in the medium term did Albatross dynamic positioning become 
accurate, tolerably error-prone and affordable. In explaining eventual 
success, much credit must go to people who bought the systems, suffered 
from the uncertainty and offered feedback. That is the demand side of the 
equation. 
 
10.1  The effect of venturesome consumption 
The advent of new techniques in the North Sea and elsewhere ultimately 
depended on customers. These users affected the Kongsberg suppliers in 
various ways – in some cases contributing actual ideas and designs – and 
most fundamentally, they made innovation possible by paying for the end 
products.  
 
When contrasting oil and shipping in the first few decades covered by this 
thesis, we notice an unequal propensity to adopt new techniques. Oilmen 
everywhere, with a few noteworthy exceptions, tended to shun technological 
risk. That attitude came with the business: price fluctuations and political 
uncertainty caused enough concern without adding unnecessary 
technological risk. Oil companies ran tight ships, strived to impose 
uniformity by way of hierarchy and centralized procurement policies in part 
to avoid experimentation with untested products and suppliers. The 
conservative sentiments in the industry contrasted with the shipping 
paradigm – where customers bought Albatross dynamic positioning before 
the concept remotely resembled a product. Consequently, subsea systems 
took decades to gain a following amongst oil companies based in Norway 
whereas dynamic positioning rapidly caught on among shipping companies 
servicing offshore oil installations (cf. chapter 3).  
 
How can we know whether the differences belong to the realm of culture and 
mentality, not hard technological or economic rationality? How can we 
know whether the differences were unrelated to the maturity of the 
respective deepwater technologies? For one, we note how conservative 
sentiments in the oil paradigm slowed or hindered not only the adoption of 
subsea technology, but also the adoption of innovative techniques in general. 
Industry observers fail to recall a single innovative technology that 
originated with the oil industrial complex between 1973 and 1986.826 Such 
                                                     
826 Rolf Kvamsdal and Terje A. Totland, "Undervannsteknologi: Noe for de få eller 
for de mange?" Jernindustri 1986, pp. 52-56. Kvamsdal (Kværner Subsea 
Contracting A/S) was quoted saying "på tross av den store offshoreaktiviten vi har 
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conservatism in the application of technology was not unique to Norway, but 
the early Norwegian oil industry was possibly less prone to change than 
offshore oil companies in oil provinces in which oil companies had more 
freedom to decide on development styles. When Statoil and public 
authorities insisted on Condeeps, they did so in part because they knew and 
trusted this technology and in part because such platforms provided the most 
work for the influential ship-building industry. This affection for fixed 
platforms at times turned into opposition to subsea systems and floating 
production, what Hydro’s director of oil technology once likened to the 
Luddites.827 By contrast, shipping and drilling companies rapidly improved 
the capacity of their ships and rigs adopting new technologies such as 
dynamic positioning. 
 
Besides, if subsea systems were irredeemably unreliable and the 
conservatism in the oil industry well founded, how is it the less orthodox 
parts of the oil industry applied them successfully? Chapters 3.3 and 8.2 
contrasted developments on the Norwegian Shelf with developments in the 
Campos Basin to show how Petrobras deployed subsea systems and floating 
production. Closer to home, across the border on the British shelf, Hamilton 
Brothers introduced floating production two decades before these systems 
gained acceptance with Statoil. Such experiments, pioneered by industry 
mavericks and entrepreneurs with meagre resources, challenged the notion 
there were no viable alternatives to gravity platforms and no room for subsea 
systems on the Norwegian shelf in the 1970s.  
 
A comparison in time provides a final reason for de-emphasising the idea 
that technologies succeeded based on their own merits or readiness. 
Although the subsea systems improved continuously, the systems that gained 
acceptance around 1990 much resembled the systems that failed to catch on 
in Norway around 1980. What changed was not primarily technology, but 
the propensity to apply the technology. By 1990, oil companies had become 
more tolerant of technological risk and more open to third-party technology 
development – somewhat resembling shipping companies.  
 
When examining the role of customers, we have noticed their importance, 
not only as a source of revenue, but also as a source of sentiments. In part 
because Albatross and Kongsberg Offshore faced different customers, they 
developed distinct cultures. Particularly in chapter 4, I have pointed out how 
                                                                                                                            
hatt i Nordsjøen i de siste 20 år, er det allikevel forbausende hvor få virkelig nye 
konsepter og løsninger som er lansert og tatt i bruk.” 
827 Cf. footnote 630. 
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culture helped coordinate the effort of numerous innovative people at 
Albatross. I have pointed to the various productive outcomes of Theory 
Albatross, how it spurred technology development and drove sales.828  
 
Intriguingly, some of the most noteworthy innovations originated with 
improved business processes rather than technical invention. At Albatross, 
for example, a flat and customer-centric organization aligned customers, 
salespeople, developers and support personnel. This approach to organizing 
helped the company identify numerous applications for its technology such 
as dynamic mooring, applications for offshore loading and pipe-laying. 
Another set of improvements streamlined the delivery process and cut back 
on the time spent configuring and testing systems at the customer’s 
premises. A third set of improvements introduced a trade in tasks that 
replaced proprietary manufacturing with components and services from 
specialized suppliers. Such improved business processes helped Albatross 
maintain its considerable margins on high-end dynamic positioning although 
real prices in 2007 (not to mention nominal prices) were but a fraction of the 
levels in 1977. Meanwhile, the reliability and accuracy of the systems kept 
improving. Kongsberg Offshore’s efforts to standardize deliveries and 
introduce scale economics to subsea systems involved some technical 
refinement, but much of the gains stemmed from improved business 
practices.  
 
10.2  Ingenious when left to one’s own devices 
At times, this thesis reads like an argument why the practices of the shipping 
industry – the shipping paradigm - fostered innovation. From the 1980s 
onwards, innovation in the Norwegian oil industry frequently stemmed from 
the adoption of shipping techniques, shipping attitudes, shipping institutions 
and shipping’s industry architecture. In explaining why, this thesis has 
argued implicitly and explicitly that entrepreneurship met less resistance in 
the shipping paradigm because hierarchies played a less prominent role. 
Relaxing hierarchies played a crucial role in fostering innovation. This 
disintegration occurred within firms in which empowered employees took on 
larger responsibilities and between firms. The ability of people to sort out 
things themselves, rather than conforming to directions from above, helped 
foster innovation, and build a robust supplier industry. 
 
                                                     
828 Not only a personal judgement, but one also shared by others such as Helle and 
Jenssen, interview with Hans Christian Helle, 14 October 2005, and Nils Albert 
Jenssen, 14 April 2005. 
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In a library database or on the web, there is an abundance of articles about 
individual companies inventing and innovating for the offshore oil economy. 
Attempts to generalize what went on frequently take a government agency or 
policy as a vantage point. At times, the role of companies remain in view, as 
is the case with Ole Andreas Engen’s thesis about the Norsok cooperation; 
he readily points out how formal coordination frequently sanctioned 
established industry practices.829 Some attempts to explain innovation as a 
function of wise industrial policies are distorting. A panegyric publication 
sponsored by the Norwegian Research Council, for example, claims the 
technological foundation of the Norwegian subsea companies originated in 
voluntary communal work (“dugnad”) between Norwegian research 
institutes and oil companies. The research efforts initiated around 1980, 
when foreign oil companies committed themselves to do as much research as 
possible in Norway, brought about innovation. Without the “active 
participation of the government and the strong support of the three 
Norwegian oil companies” the subsea companies would “never have had 
today’s strong position in the market” the research council claims.830 In the 
deepwater industry that I have followed, I struggle to identify direct and 
positive effects of publicly guided research and development. People with 
research background helped spot oportunities, but public funding played a 
limited role in further developments. Kongsberg Offshore received 
considerable support in the early 1980s, but did rather worse in subsequent 
years than ABB and Kværner, which received far less in research grants. In 
the 1990s, when subsea industry became a great export success, this 
discipline was not a favoured recipient of research funds.831 Public research 
in general has probably strengthened the supplier industries covered in this 
thesis, but related public policies served to prolong the use of conventional 
techniques and delay the introduction of deepwater technology. Hans 
Mjelva, who has written a solid thesis on large Norwegian yards between 
1960 and 1980, exonerates the policy of offering these yards large subsidies. 
                                                     
829 Engen, "Rhetoric and realities", conclusions, p. 296. 
830 Cf. Keilen, Thirud, and Tjelta, Petroleumsforskning lønner seg. The quotation 
runs: ”Uten myndighetenes aktive medvirkning, og sterk støtte fra de tre norske 
selskapene, ville disse bedriftene aldri hatt dagens sterposisjon i markedet. Det 
samme kan man si om de norske forskningsinstituttene.” 
831 A mapping of the “institutional knowledge base” of Norwegian oil and gas made 
in 1997 tracked how oil companies did research in Norway alongside 26 research 
institutes and 24 university departments. The study grouped the effort into 19 major 
technological fields and 30 main knowledge fields of which “sub-sea production 
catered to the smallest R&D network”. Aslaug Mikkelsen et al., "Country report: 
Upstream oil and gas in Norway", Sectoral Case Studies in Innovation, (NIFU-
STEP: TIP focus group on energy innovation system, 2003). 
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He argues this funding helped prepare the engineering industry for success in 
the 1990s.832 I suggest the reverse is more to the point. 
 
This is my key argument: the cooperative efforts we call innovations usually 
gained in pace when people in authority failed to direct progress – a 
weakening of hierarchies contributed to innovation and entrepreneurship. 
When left to their own devices, salespeople, engineers and suppliers made 
numerous choices large and small that shaped industrious businesses. As the 
presumed safe hands lost control, individuals further down the former line of 
command assumed responsibilities themselves - and the outcome was mostly 
shipshaped. I should hasten to add that the freedoms that people experienced 
when hierarchies disintegrated generally brought no ease. Customers, 
investors and self-imposed pride replaced the discipline of plans, orders and 
authority. Corporate life rather became harder for each lost certainty… but 
arguably more innovative. 
 
On the level of individuals and in matters internal to companies and 
businesses, the disintegration of hierarchies offered individuals opportunity. 
No organization was ever strictly hierarchical; every organization offers 
some leeway to those who actually perform tasks - possibly more than is 
assumed. Although Hurlen employed a chauffeured limousine and insisted 
on a chain of command, the workings of the arms factory obviously 
depended on numerous people making informed decisions. Nevertheless, 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk was not an entrepreneurial sort of place.  Some of 
the of deepwater technology development related to the undoing of the old 
factory and the unleashing of initiative and decision-making among line 
managers and ordinary employees. In the 1970s, for example, Albatross 
succeeded in no small part by loosening hierarchies. Albatross embraced 
empowerment and management by objectives – concepts advocated by 
progressive management thinkers for half a century. At Albatross, the term 
was “Theory Albatross”, an attempt to codify a company culture and a 
mission statement. The culture of Albatross grew in opposition to Honeywell 
                                                     
832 Mjelva, "Tre storverft", pp. 227-230. The argument is restated in the concluding 
remarks: ”Det er tvilsamt om denne avhandlinga vil gjere så mykje til eller frå her, 
men den har i det minste fått fram at veksten fram til oljekrisa hadde viktige 
føresetnader i politiske tiltak som langt på veg oppheva ’marknadens dom’ i ein av 
dei viktigaste vekstindustriane i perioden. Vidare har eg argumentert for at dette kan 
tolkast positivt, ikkje berre fordi det skapte tusenvis av arbeidsplassar, men fordi det 
bygde opp ein industriell kompetanse som var grunnleggjande for det norske 
industrielle oljeeventyret på 1980- og 1990-talet. Det var med andre ord ikkje berre 
fornorskinga av oljepolitikken som gav den ’vellykkede oljeindustri’ som Sejersted 
prisar, men òg det statlege vernet av skipsbyggingsindustrien på 1960-talet.” 
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and KV, took delight from being faster, and developed an attitude that 
allowed and encouraged lowly employees to fix things. The entrepreneurial 
energy was evident, not only in the way people overlooked ridiculous 
difficulties to corner the market for dynamic positioning, but also by the 
dozen employees that went on to set up companies upon leaving Albatross. 
 
On the level of the company or business unit, the prevailing theories of 
management changed in the period covered in this thesis.  There was less 
belief in hierarchal corporations with emphasis on scale, directed from the 
top in an army-like fashion; more belief in self-contained business units with 
goals and strategies in their own right. This change in sentiments arrived in 
earnest at Kongsberg around 1980. The restructured engineering companies 
that replaced KV mostly organized employees and resources around a 
customer segment and a business idea. The effect was to make achievements 
more transparent – e.g. by highlighting what businesses earned money and 
what businesses lost money. One source of improvement involved nothing 
but abandoning less successful operations and avoiding an escalation of 
commitment of the kind that bankrupted KV (cf. chapter 6.5). Rather than 
maintaining an extensive set of operations in-house, companies increasingly 
became involved in a trade of tasks to save costs. Besides, I have referred to 
some episodic evidence of how detachment from manufacturing helped 
sharpen focus on system building. Because Albatross made no position 
reference technology, the company was less inhibited than Honeywell when 
considering clients’ needs. Because Kongsberg Offshore was denied an 
opportunity to actually manufacture a range of subsea components, the 
subsea group focused on being a main contractor (i.e. system integrator). 
Initially seen as a weakness, and a source of frustration, 833  a certain 
detachment from manufacturing served to develop capabilities that in the 
end would provide a higher value added. 
 
Yet more disintegration took part on the level of the industry or market. 
The great unsettling event in Norwegian oil was the prolonged period of low 
prices after 1985. Although investments in Condeeps kept up for some years 
after 1986, something fundamental shifted and the industry began 
considering costs more seriously (cf. chapters 7.1 and 8.1). Geology 
reinforced the new sentiments on the Norwegian shelf. Whereas discoveries 
of large field had been almost habitual until the early 1980s, later finds were 
progressively smaller, further away, in deeper waters, and more difficult to 
                                                     
833 The frustration was evident e.g. in KV-Cor, box 242, Qvenild to Hurlen, 
memorandum, 9 October 1975, or in Jørgen Haslestad’s recollection that KV’s 
various departments had the same tendency to fight as daughter companies 
elsewhere, cf. "Et naturstridig offshoremiljø", Offshore & Energi, 1991, p. 30. 
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develop. By the 1990s, cost-efficient deepwater technology looked a lot 
more attractive. 
 
Interestingly, as a rule of thumb, the correlation between oil price and 
technological change has been reverse. High oil prices put a premium on 
speedy field development and a correspondingly high price on the delays and 
uncertainty associated with new technology development. Low oil prices, on 
the other hand, fostered creativity. The connection was particularly apparent 
on three occasions. A fall in oil prices in the late 1970s made the Norwegian 
authorities more concerned about industry knowledge, not only jobs, and 
paved the way for new thinking on the role of suppliers. Low oil prices 
following 1985-86 paved the road for a series of new techniques and the 
demise of the large gravity platforms. Low oil prices around 1993-1994 
spurred extensive standardization on the Norwegian shelf, and closer 
collaboration between suppliers and oil companies.  
 
Even before the oil price fall of 1985-1986, Statoil began to modify its 
centralized approach to technology development. The Norwegian Style 
remained intact, but with regard to specific modules, Statoil began 
considering Engineering, Procurement, Contracting (EPC) deals. Inspired by 
the shipping industry, oil companies working out of Norway allowed 
suppliers to take on more responsibilities for system design and system 
integration. The client and the contractor each carried risks, and they carried 
these risks separately by assigning specific responsibilities to the contractors. 
In return for taking on some of the oil companies’ worries, Norwegian 
suppliers gained more enlarged room for discretion, more room for 
innovation, and an enhanced interest in addressing the most pressing 
concerns of their customers. Rather than perfecting the fabrication of a valve 
or a template, the main contractor poured resources into the issues that most 
restricted the subsea systems. The approach allowed a few suppliers, rather 
than many oil companies, to mastermind the design of subsea systems and 
subsea completions changed from a continuous series of development 
projects into an industrial activity. Kongsberg Offshore used its newly 
gained oversight to foster reliable, less-expensive and standardized products.  
 
* * * 
 
A final disintegration, or rather disentanglement, took place on the level of 
the country or politics. Hauge and Johnsen had assembled power and 
initiative in Statoil. The constellation they built was rather too resourceful 
for the common good and its disintegration proved correspondingly 
productive. 
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The diminishing ambitions of Norwegian politicians corresponded with a 
wave of neo-liberal policies that affected most Western governments in the 
1980s. In Norway, these sentiments gained momentum when the 1986 oil 
price collapse triggered a shortfall of government revenues while the 
European Economic Community began its effort to implement a common 
market.834 Politicians of all shades were less intent on dirigisme and more 
concerned about the squandering of resources. In 1986, a Labour 
government refrained form re-financing KV. Governments both left of 
centre and right of centre abandoned some of the policies aimed at national 
preferences and oil companies faced less opposition when suggesting cost-
efficient development solutions. 
 
At first sight, the change affected Kongsberg adversely. Preferential 
treatment had secured many early assignments and helped the company 
secure a dominant position in subsea systems by the mid-1980s. From 1985 
to 1990, however, the Kongsberg people failed to secure a single order for a 
subsea production system. ABB (Vetco), Aker and Kværner emerged as 
subsea suppliers alongside Kongsberg Offshore during these years. Part of 
the explanation had to do with KV’s financial woes, another part was KV’s 
falling out with Cameron, and yet another part was the diminished role of the 
network that KV had relied upon to secure contracts. A string of losses in the 
face of able competitors helped Kongsberg Offshore improve. Arguably, the 
presence of multiple competing providers of subsea systems triggered 
dynamism on the Norwegian shelf from the mid-1980s. Hydro challenged 
the wisdom of the Norwegian Style and rivalry between several providers of 
subsea systems created the kind of competitive pressure that spurred 
innovation and kept costs in check. Large-scale exports of subsea technology 
from 1997 onwards were proof of a viable deepwater industry. 
 
                                                     
834 For an assessment of both national and international developments, cf. Rolf 
Tamnes, Oljealder: 1965-1995, vol. 6, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1997), pp. 221 ff. 
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11 Appendices 
 
11.1  Names and legal structures 
 
ALBATROSS (DYNAMIC POSITIONING) 
Mother 
company 
Owner Name of 
business 
unit 
How business was 
organized 
Year 
Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk 
AS 
Oljedivisjonen O6 Fartøy 
automasjon 
Product group and 
profit centre 
1975-
1979 
Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk 
AS 
Maritim 
Divisjon 
Dynamisk 
posisjonering 
Product group and 
profit centre 
1979-
1982 
Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk 
AS 
 Albatross Semi-independent 
division with 
internal board 
1982-
1984 
Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk 
AS 
KV (ca 95%) Kongsberg 
Albatross AS 
Privately held 
limited liability 
company 
1985-
1987 
Simrad 
Subsea AS 
(100%) 
 Simrad 
Albatross AS 
Division - formally 
a limited liability 
company 
1987-
1988 
Simrad AS 
(100%) 
 Simrad 
Albatross AS 
Division - formally 
a limited liability 
company 
1988-
1995 
Simrad AS  Simrad Norge Dynamisk 
posisjonering 
Business unit in 
matrix organization 
1995 
Kongsberg 
Gruppen 
ASA / 
Kongsberg 
Maritime AS 
Kongsberg 
Simrad AS 
Vessel 
System 
Division 1996-
1999 
Kongsberg 
Gruppen 
ASA 
Kongsberg 
Maritime AS 
Offshore and 
Ocean 
Science - 
2004 
Matrix (product 
specialists serving 
various industry 
specific business 
units) 
2000-
2008 
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KONGSBERG OFFSHORE (SUBSEA SYSTEMS)  
 
Owner Business unit name How business 
was organized 
Year 
Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk 
AS 
O3 Marine systemer 
(part of 
Oljedivisjonen) 
Product group 
and profit centre 
1975-1985 
Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk 
AS 
Kongsberg Offshore 
Systems a.s. 
Privately held 
limited liability 
company 
1985-1986 
Siemens AG Kongsberg Offshore 
Systems a.s. 
Privately held 
limited liability 
company 
1987-1993 
FMC Inc. Kongsberg Offshore 
a.s. 
Privately held 
limited liability 
company 
1993-1999 
FMC 
Technologies 
Inc. 
FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea AS 
Privately held 
limited liability 
company 
1999-2008 
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11.2  Profit and turnover from the Kongsberg family 
Some graphs in this thesis strive to make comparisons across 50 years 
without undue distortion due to mergers, de-mergers, acquisitions and sales. 
These graphs strive to capture organic growth – or decline. Such 
approximations occur e.g. in Figure 33) on page 178, Figure 50) on 
page 259, Figure 51) on page 260, and Figure 52) on page 263. 
 
In order to create these overviews, I have assembled accounts from a number 
of companies that I claim constitutes a family – a going concern based on 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk as if the company had avoided compulsory 
composition in 1987. Included in this “family” are the marine electronics 
companies of Horten: Norcontrol and Simrad. When Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk acquired a company, e.g. Norcontrol back in 1977, I have 
incorporated Norcontrol’s historic accounts dating back to its establishment 
in 1965. Particular care has been taken to incorporate the accounts of 
Simrad, which bought Albatross in 1987, and was itself bought by 
Kongsberg Gruppen in 1997.  
 
As far as possible, I have excluded the turnover and profit of foreign 
subsidiaries (or parent companies). The turnover from Kongsberg Offshore, 
for example, does not include the turnover of Siemens or Siemens’s 
remaining Norwegian subsidiaries. The turnover of FMC Kongsberg Subsea 
does not include the turnover from FMC Technologies (the parent company), 
and the turnover from Kongsberg Automotive does not include the turnover 
from the substantial number of subsidiaries this automotive manufacturer has 
acquired abroad. The turnover from regular sales operations, however, is 
included, e.g. Natco (KV’s North American operation for the sale of gas 
turbines).  
 
As for legal entities, Figure 50) may serve as a point of departure. The 
information in the chart has been drawn from a multitude of sources, mostly 
annual reports and (for KV prior to 1968) memos originating with the 
Norwegian Ministry of industry. The “defence and aerospace” stream 
combines the turnover of KV’s defence division (1957-87), Norsk 
Forsvarsteknologi (1987- 1993), Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace (1993-
2004), the jet engine division of KV (1979-1987), Norsk Jetmotor AS (1987-
1998), Volvo Aero Norge AS (1998-2004) and turnover in the naval division 
of Simrad Subsea AS and Simrad AS (1983-96). 
 
The “Manufacturing industry” stream in the same figure combines the 
estimated turnover of KV’s automotive business (1957-1973), which became 
a division in 1973 before being spun off as Kongsberg Automotive AS in 
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1987 and sold to its staff and management. Following five more changes of 
ownership, the company went public on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The graph 
includes only turnover from the Rollag and Hvittingfoss factories in 
Numedal (less than 25 per cent of Kongsberg Automotive Group’s NOK 
2.18 billion turnover (2004) according to information supplied in connection 
with the initial public offering (2005). Furthermore, the “Manufacturing” 
stream includes turnover from mechanical contract manufacturing at KV and 
NFT from 1987 to the early 1990s and sales at KV’s computer business, 
drawing machine business and numerical control system. The various 
attempts to supply industrial electronics mostly went out of business in the 
early 1980s; the drawing machine business survived for a while with 
SysScan AS (1984-88) and some of the heritage lives on in Esko Graphics 
AS. 
 
The “Petroleum” stream includes the gas turbine business of KV, which has 
been a fully integrated part of Dresser Rand since 1987. Also included is the 
turnover of KV’s oil division and its offspring, Kongsberg Offshore and 
Albatross (cf. appendix 11.1). 
  
The “Maritime industries” stream combines the revenues of Simrad’s 
Horten-based sonar and eco-sounder business from 1957, the turnover at 
Robertson Radio Electro’s Egersund-based autopilots and other equipment 
since 1975 and the ship automation business of Norcontrol in Horten from 
1967, parts of the Trondheim-based Navia/Autronica sensor business from 
1999. These businesses were all part of the offering of Kongsberg Maritime 
in 2005. 
 
Occasionally, the consolidation of accounts creates a challenge. When 
Albatross AS (owned part of KV) bought hydroacoustic position reference 
systems from Simrad Subsea AS in 1984 and incorporated these in the sale 
of dynamic positioning services, the turnover from both transactions will 
occur e.g. in Figure 50) on page 259. Three years later, in 1987, when 
Albatross had been acquired by Simrad, the consolidated accounts would 
report only the sale of the DP system, not transactions internal to the group. 
The same phenomenon (accounting for inputs to a final delivery) is 
obviously important in explaining the quite extraordinary growth in turnover 
from the Kongsberg “family”. These companies shifted to system sales, and 
a large part of the turnover originates with inputs from suppliers (with few 
exceptions, the sale of subsea systems out of Kongsberg consisted mostly of 
components manufactured elsewhere). In this respect, the turnover figures 
are misleading as an indicator of the amount of work that took place at a 
specific location (for that purpose, value added is a better measure) but 
accurate in depicting capacity to serve a customer.  
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An unfortunate consequence of assembling accounts from a dozen 
companies across 50 years is the occasional missing series, particularly when 
splitting the revenue stream of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk into particular 
product lines (e.g. oil or maritime electronics). Occasional missing numbers 
have been smoothed by averages: if 1975 data are missing, that year is 
assumed to be an average of 1974 and 1976. None of the missing inputs 
relates to dynamic positioning or subsea systems. 
 
Most graphs depict turnover in real value, i.e. a number that takes inflation 
into account (not nominal values expressed in contemporary money). The 
basis for conversion is the consumer price index published by the Norwegian 
Bureau of Statistics. Nominal values are identified by (NOK, GBP, USD) 
followed by a year (1997, 2007).  
 
* * * 
 
When citing profit and loss, this thesis usually refers to earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Occasionally, I rely 
on accounts where the method of calculation is not stated. Such numbers 
may include interest payments or the occasional income from selling a 
business. Earnings (EBITDA) from dynamic positioning and subsea systems 
are listed in a consistent manner. 
 
Some particular conditions relate to Figure 33) on page 178. This figure 
shows the financial health of KV and the businesses that originated with the 
armaments factory. It summarized almost four decades of profit and loss. 
Appreciation and depreciation of assets are included in the numbers behind 
the graph, but in a manner that departs from the public accounts. On several 
occasions during the 1980s, KV wrote off the value of various ventures. 
When the assets of the armaments factory were sold or when businesses 
were closed, the asset frequently fetched less than accounted for in the 
books. The official accounts operate with sudden write-offs, most notably in 
gas turbines and jet engines. The market (a consortium in which the 
government participated alongside private firms) valued the jet engine 
factory at NOK 800 million (1986) less then the value that figured in KV’s 
balance sheet. In KV’s accounts, the loss appears as a sudden gigantic write-
off in 1987. Using discretion, I have backdated this and other losses to the 
period in which they actually occurred – in the case of jet engines, the whole 
1977-1986 period. This method does not offer an exact picture of the 
financial health of KV, just a better picture than contemporary accounts. No 
such restating has been necessary for dynamic positioning or subsea systems. 
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As for financial profit and loss, Figure 33) imposes a condition not present in 
accounting standards. I recognize no sunk costs: for calculation purposes, the 
profitable jet engine business of Volvo Aero Norge AS (1998-) still has to 
service the huge debts that KV’s turbine division accumulated in the 1970s 
and 1980s, etc. Conversely, I assume that any sums that Simrad or any other 
company earned in the 1960s are placed in an interest-bearing bank account 
(where they continue to generate earnings). I have accumulated the earnings 
and superimposed a financial income (or loss) each year equal to the interest 
rates on low-risk bonds with yields as listed by the Norwegian Bureau of 
Statistics. Before the 1980s, these were fixed by the government and 
generally ran at values below the rate of inflation.835  This approach produces 
results that are unaffected by share capital increases or the payment of 
dividends. 
 
What are the main findings using this approach? This long-term view on 
profit and shows how the Kongsberg family accumulated profits until the 
mid-1970s, then suffered escalating losses totalling NOK 3.6 billion kroner 
(1998) by 1987. For the first decade after the compulsory composition (1987 
to 1996), the Kongsberg family was sufficiently profitable to service its 
imaginary debt. Kongsberg became cash flow positive by 1987 but provided 
a return on investment only in 2003. In a 35- or 50-year perspective, the 
return on any initial investment has been very low for the Kongsberg family. 
For most of this period, the Kongsberg family consumed scarce resources, 
capital and engineers, without being able to match the return one would 
expect from any bank. 
 
Although the Kongsberg family is no obvious success in the long term, the 
last decade has been very impressive. In the second half of the 1990s, there 
was a surge in profitability and sometime in financial year 2003, the 
accumulated accounts of the Kongsberg family again turned positive. For the 
past decade, the Kongsberg family has been a spectacular success with 4.8 
billion in profits (1995-2004). 
 
                                                     
835 Cf. Sverre Knutsen, "Staten og kapitalen i det 20. Århundre: Regulering, kriser 
og endring i det norske finanssystemet 1900-2000", (Ph.D., University of Oslo, 
2007). 
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11.3  KV’s divisions (1973-1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assembled from annual reports and NOU 1989:2 Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk 
 
1) The Industrial Systems division manufactured numerical control systems, 
drawing machines and other electronics for industrial purpoes. It was 
merged with the computer business (the Data Divsions) 
2) Statex was a seismic survey company founded by KV and Statoil in 1974 – 
following a merger with the seismic survey business of Veritas, the 
company was renamed GECO. The company was listed and KV’s 
shareholding gradually reduced 
3) The Navigation department handled radio navigation, e.g. Decca systems. 
 
 
Defence
Automotive
Gas Turbines
Industrial 
Systems1
Navigation3 1973-80
1973-74
Oil 1975 -1983    
Maritime 1980-83
Air Engines
Data - 1984
IKOSS (Kongsberg 
Engineering) 1974
1985-86
Norsk Forsvarsteknologi AS 1987
Kongsberg Albatross AS 1985
Robertson AS 
Radio-Elektro 1971
Kongsberg Offshore Systems AS ’86
Kongsberg Subsea Controls AS ’86
Noratom 1978
Norcontrol 1978
Norcontrol Automation 1985
Norcontrol Simulation 1985
Norcontrol Produksjon 1985
Norsk 
Vertkøytindstri 1974
CCB Workshop 1975
Kongsberg Lantech AS 1987
Teronor AS 1985 
Kongsberg Navigation 1987
Norcontrol Surveillance Systems 1985
Kongsberg Automotive AS 1987
Norsk Jetmotor AS 1987
Kongsberg Dresser Power Inc. 1985
Robertson Radio-Elektro 1984
Offshore
Turbines
Tegnemaskinavdelingen / ICAN 1987
Statex / Geco2
AS 1974
Kvarto AS 1987
Autocon AS 1986
Kongsberg Engineering AS 1984
Terotech AS 1979
SysScan AS 1982
Kongsberg Data AS 1980
De-mergersAcquisitions
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11.4  Organizational chart for KV’s Oil Division, 1975-1976 
 
 
 
 
Organizational chart as of May 1975, copied from a chart in KV-Cor 242 
 
The division quickly added a group to handle maintenance out of the Costal Center 
Base and a SCADA product group. Apart from the businesses listed on the chart 
above, the division also managed KV’s interests in Statex, a separate legal entity, 
and Kongsberg Ikoss Consultants, a subsidiary that provided engineers for 
Norwegian Petroleum Consultants. 
 
301 
 
11.5  How a Kalman filter works 
A Kalman filter is really an algorithm, for most practical purposes a piece of 
software, designed to provide accurate information out of inaccurate data 
and update a "best" estimate for the state of a system as new, but still 
inaccurate, data pour in. The eye-opening conclusion of Kalman was his 
proposition that the best estimate of a state, together with a covariance 
matrix for the error in the state-vector estimate, can be obtained recursively 
from the previous best estimate and its covariance matrix. In effect, the filter 
uses each new observation to update a probability distribution for the state of 
the system. (The Kalman filter does no more work for the millionth estimate 
than it does for the first.) Such algorithms are very neat for real-time 
applications, where data keep arriving and decisions have to be made on the 
spot.836 
 
To examine how a Kalman filter works, consider yourself lost at sea during 
the night with no idea at all of your location. At a given time (t1), you take a 
star sighting indicating a position z metres north of the equator. Star sighting, 
however, is an inexact technique; because of inherent measuring device 
inaccuracies, human error and the like you are likely to get a different value 
of z if you repeat the same procedure over again. The measurements will 
resemble a probability distribution (ƒx) such as the one on the figure below 
where z1 is the most frequent observation and σz1 is the standard deviation – 
our measure of uncertainty.837  
 
                                                     
836 The paragraph is in effect a digest of certain paragraphs in Maybeck, Stocastic 
models, estimation, and control.  
837 I rely heavily on the very pedagogic introduction in Ibid.  
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Figure 56) Amateur astronomer: conditional density of position based on 
measured value z1 
 
Imagine a trained navigator takes an independent fix right after you, so that 
the true position has not changed at all. Your friend estimates your position 
to be z2. Because he has better skills, his measurements vary less and, the 
probability distribution appears as a narrower peak with a smaller standard 
deviation (see figure below). 
 
Figure 57) Conditional density of position based on measurement z2 
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At this point, you have two sets of measurements available for estimating the 
position, one reliable, and one less reliable. Rather than disregarding the 
least reliable observation, a Kalman filter enabled recursive calculations; the 
algorithm considered all previously given information and all previous 
observations in calculating a probability, creating an eventual probability 
distribution like the one below where your position given both z1 and z2 is a 
Gaussian density with mean μ. 
 
Figure 58) Conditional density of position based on data z1 and z2 
 
 
Now consider the time aspect. When in motion, a recent observation should 
obviously carry more weight than old observations. The Kalman filter 
handles this too. By comparing the most recent probability distribution with 
the previous probability distribution, the filter senses where you are heading 
and at what speed. Your position one minute ago and you position right now 
reveal speed and direction and hence the means to predict where you will be 
in one minute. When the next measurement is taken, the prediction is 
allowed to influence the calculation albeit with due consideration of its 
reduced value as time goes by. The figure below shows graphically what 
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happens: as time progresses, the density travels along the x-axis at the 
nominal speed u, while simultaneously spreading out about its mean.  
 
Figure 59) Propagation of conditional probability density 
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11.6  Accounts 
 
The accounts below are assembled from various sources – annual reports 
where these are available, otherwise company records. Several tables show 
turnover from individual business lines and (more demanding) profits from 
individual business lines. These numbers rarely figure in the accounts 
approved by accountants. The numbers may also depart from official 
accounts inasmuch as they show earnings before interests, tax, deductions 
and amortization. 
 
All figures in nominal NOK millions. 
 
Figures from Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk prior to 1968 (when KV became a 
limited liability company) are based on internal memos written by the 
Ministry of Industry. 
 
Figures from 1968-1987 rely heavily on quarterly reports to KV’s board of 
directors. 
 
Between 1996 and 1998, turnover and profit figures for dynamic positioning 
are based on the recollection of managers.  
 
  
306 
 
ALBATROSS ACCOUNTS 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Turnover 
Total 20 35 51 74 86 141 169 162 233 
Of which DP sales 20 35 51 74 86 141 169 162 233 
Of which integrated control 
Profits & Losses 
Total 0 3 6 9 11 14 10 
Of which DP related 3 6 9 11 14 10 23 
Of which integrated control 
 
 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Turnover 
Total 224 150 137 142 192 244 327 427 388 399 
Of which DP sales 224 144 123 112 120 151 166 188 214 212 
Of which integrated control  3 10 25 45 56 124 190 106 136 
Profits & Losses 
Total 6 0 -3 3 22 30 36 44 44 42 
Of which DP related 6 0 -3 3 16 22 20 22 29 26 
Of which integrated control 6 8 15 22 14 17 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Turnover 
Total 435 564 994 1084 1105 1353 1395 1476 1477 
Of which DP sales 250 350 550 646 544 543 450 506 470 
Of which integrated control 185 214 444 438 561 810 945 970 1000 
Profits & Losses 
Total 33 35 114 184 157 182 179 133 151 
Of which DP related 19 22 63 127 90 121 76 77 75 
Of which integrated control  14 13 51 57 67 61 103 56 76 
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SUBSEA SYSTEM ACCOUNTS 
 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Turnover 0 37 82 125 165 66 87 125 228 226 387 764 
P&L 0 -4 0 1 -34 -18 -18 -3 12 15 14 11 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Turnover 612 253 101 93 90 145 309 416 383 466 1025 1259 
P&L -33 -65 -11 0 5 9 20 0 30 111 83 77 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Turnover 2285 2695 2833 2557 2316 2398 3611 4733 5380 
P&L 146 184 240 92 133 121 191 273 321 
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KV’ OIL DIVISION 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Turnover 
TOTALT  6 10 24 40 72 57 
Related to subsea systems  16 
Related to surveillance  8 
Related to turbine maintenance 0 2 
Related to engineering  17 25 20 24 
Related to maintenance  10 
Profit and loss 
TOTALT  ‐1 na 0 ‐12 ‐7 
Related to subsea systems  ‐2 
Related to surveillance  LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS ‐4 
Related to turbine maintenance 0 ‐1 
Related to engineering  na na 1 3 
Related to maintenance 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985  1986 
Turnover 
TOTALT  89 115 191 211 227 473  406 
Related to subsea systems  35 42 72 100 67 311 
Related to surveillance  na 15 26 25 31 34 
Related to turbine maintenance 7 20 37 35
Related to engineering  28 30 56 51
Related to maintenance  21 9 Na 0
Profit and loss 
TOTALT  ‐9 2 11 12 28 7  ‐22 
Related to subsea systems  na 3 5 6 6 7 
Related to surveillance  LOSS ‐4 1 3 2 3 
Related to turbine maintenance ‐2 1 3 3
Related to engineering  na 3 0 0
Related to maintenance  ‐1 0
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KONGSBERG VÅPENFABRIKK – TURNOVER BY PRODUCT LINE 
 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963  1964 
Turnover / sales 
All military products  na na na na na na na  na 
Small arms  5 6 3 3 1 1 1  1 
Gun  23 20 40 24 28 40 36  46 
Systems  3 13 17 27  18 
Missiles  0 1 0 0 1 8 19  34 
All civillian products  na na na na na na na  na 
Civilian mechanical  8 10 10 8 8,9 10,5 11,6  14,3 
Automotive  1 6 8 10 10 17 13  16 
Industrial 
electronics  
0,7  2 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971  1972 
Turnover / sales 
All military products  na na na na 119 151 151  160 
Small arms  8 22 31 35 34 35 34  36 
Gun  27 27 13 24 41 38 39  47 
Fuzes  2 na na 13 13 9 4  5 
Systems  37 47 50 11 15 27 21  16 
Missiles  37 27 17 9 16 42 53  56 
All civillian products  na na na na 81 93 139  164 
Gas turbines  1 4 18  30 
Martime electronics  2 7 10 14 18  17 
Civilian mechanical  11,3 20 18 14 14 13 14  14 
Automotive  16 20 15 22 29 36 44  53 
Industrial 
electronics  
6,6 8 13 16 27 26 45  50 
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1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979  1980 
Turnover / sales 
All military products  176 168 230 236 217 351 328  497 
Small arms  39 22 7 4 10 11 7  na 
Gun  40 29 80 70 25 19 25  48 
Fuzes  17 19 17 40 25 26 8  11 
Systems  35 64 97 73 51 76 76  69 
Missiles  45 34 29 39 47 77 71  118 
Avionics  10 59 64 127  225 
Jet engines  78 129  155 
All civillian products  194 247 345 420 454 698 951  979 
Gas turbines  45 60 119 155 169 226 376  286 
Martime electronics  19 21 21 24 33 119 178  245 
Oil related  10 24 40 72 57  89 
Civilian mechanical  15 19 19 17 7 15 17  32 
Automotive  58 70 91 91 98 104 151  149 
IT  57 77 85 109 107 162 172  178 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Turnover / sales 
All military products  609 631 531 477 618 630
Small arms  na na na na na na
Gun  50 na na na na na
Fuzes  5,2 na na 37 na 120
Systems  81 na na 120 na 143
Missiles  217 na na 158 na 46
Avionics  239 na na 104 na na
Jet engines  264 288 199 245 243 207
All civillian products  1125 1239 1478 1524 1297 1347
Gas turbines  316 301 413 464 205 16
Martime electronics  325 435 556 322 384 400
Oil related  115 191 211 227 473 406
Civilian mechanical  23 na na 146 na 224
Automotive  164 188 197 221 235 201
IT  182 124 101 144 na 100
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KONGSBERG VÅPENFABRIKK – PROFIT AND LOSS BY DIVISION 
 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Defence division  4,9 7,9 13,6 13,2 13,5 15,2 
Automotive  0 0,4 1,9 1,5 3,4 4,6 
Martime electonics  0,8 1,4 1,8 2,8 2,9 3,3 
Industrial electonics and computers ‐3,6 ‐8,7 ‐6 
Mechanical engineering  ‐0,7 ‐2,7 0 ‐0,6 0,2 0 
Gas turbines  ‐1,9 ‐8,2 ‐9,6 
Jet engines 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Defence division  14,8 17,6 15 15 15 14,5 
Automotive  4,4 4,8 1 ‐1,3 ‐1 9,7 
Oil  ‐1,2 0 0,4 ‐11,9 ‐6,6 
Martime electonics  2,9 3 5 6 5 9,5 
Industrial electonics and computers 1,5 na ‐17,5 ‐8,4 ‐23,5 ‐21,8 
Mechanical engineering  1,4 1,7 na na na na 
Gas turbines  ‐10,3 7,1 ‐8,6 ‐26,3 ‐6,4 ‐7,4 
Jet engines  2,1 
 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985  1986 
Defence division  20,7 22,2 7,6 11,6 10,8 13,8  18,2 
Automotive  8,3 7,1 9,5 8 2,6 ‐1,7  ‐26,9 
Oil  ‐8,5 1,5 11,1 12 28 7,1  ‐22,2 
Martime electonics  11,4 7,8 1,6 ‐16,1
Industrial electonics and 
computers  ‐57,9 ‐59 ‐21,2 ‐10,4 ‐25 ‐6,7 
Mechanical engineering  na na na na na na 
Gas turbines  ‐13,1 ‐66,5 ‐97,5 ‐25,7 ‐68,9 ‐36,3 
Jet engines  5,2 18,8 30,9 2,2 ‐4,2 ‐25  ‐368 
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11.7 Early DP orders 
 
Figure 60) DP orders, 1975 –1979 
 
 
Deli
very 
Vessel System Ref. systems Vessel 
owner 
Type 
Nov
-75 
Dec-
77 
Seaway 
Swan 
ADP 
503 
HPR, Taut wire, 
Artemis, Navigation 
radar 
Stolt-
Nielsen 
Service 
vessel 
Nov
-76 
Apr-
77 
Seaway 
Eagle 
ADP 
501 
HPR Stolt-
Nielsen 
Service 
vessel 
Dec
-76 
Oct-
77 
Capalon
ga 
ADP 
502 
Artemis, Taut wire, 
navigation Rader 
SSOS / 
Talassa 
Service 
vessel 
Oct-
77 
Mar-
78 
Seaway 
Hawk 
ADP 
501 
HPR, Artemis Stolt-
Nielsen 
Service 
vessel 
Nov
-77 
May
-78 
Seaway 
Sand-
piper 
ADP 
502 
Syledis, Puls 8, 
HPR, Artemis 
Stolt-
Nielsen 
Pipe / 
Cable 
Jun-
77 
Apr-
78 
Cobla 1 ADP 
501 
Artemis Costain 
& 
Blanken-
fort 
Service 
vessel 
Jun-
77 
Apr-
78 
Cobla 2 ADP 
501 
Artemis Costain 
& 
Blanken-
fort 
Service 
vessel 
Jun-
77 
Apr-
78 
Cobla 3 ADP 
501 
Artemis Costain 
& 
Blanken-
fort 
Service 
vessel 
Dec
-77 
Nov-
78 
Wild-
rake 
ADP 
501 
Artemis, HPR Wilhelm-
sen 
Service 
vessel 
Spri
ng 
78 
Jun-
79 
BP ESV ADP 
503 
Numerous BP 
Tankers 
Service 
vessel 
Oct-
78 
Apr-
79 
Swan 
Ocean 
ADP 
501 
Artemis, HPR, Taut 
wire 
Swan 
Offshore 
Service 
vessel 
Aug
-78 
1979
-80 
Stena 
Cons-
tructor 
ADP 
503 
MK II 
Artemis, HPR, Taut 
wire 
Stena 
Line 
Service 
vessel 
Aug 1979 Stena ADP Artemis, HPR, Taut Steno Service 
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-78 -80 Sea-
spread 
503 
MK II 
wire Line vessel 
Aug
-78 
1979
-80 
Steno 
Inspec-
tor 
ADP 
503 
MK II 
Artemis, HPR, Taut 
wire 
Steno 
Line 
Service 
vessel 
Aug
-78 
1979
/198
0 
Steno 
Protec-
tor 
ADP 
503 
MK II 
Artemis, HPR, Taut 
wire 
Steno 
Line 
Service 
vessel 
Oct-
78 
Sep-
79 
- ADP 
311 
HPR, Radar, Taut 
wire 
Parley 
Augusts 
son 
Service 
vessel 
Oct-
78 
Mar-
80 
- ADP 
311 
HPR, Radar, Taut 
wire 
Parley 
Augusts 
son 
Service 
vessel 
Oct-
78 
Jul-
80 
- ADP 
311 
HPR, Radar, Taut 
wire 
Parley 
Augusts 
son 
Service 
vessel 
Oct-
78 
Nov-
80 
- ADP 
311 
HPR, Radar, Taut 
wire 
Parley 
Augusts 
son 
Service 
vessel 
Jan-
79 
Apr-
79 
Stand 
Troll 
ADP 
501 
Taut wire, HPR, 
Artemis 
Seamiest 
Stand 
Troll 
- 
Jan-
79 
Apr-
79 
Flexi 
service 2 
ADP 
503 
Artemis, HPR Upland / 
Stub 
Pipe / 
Cable 
Apr-
79 
Jun-
79 
Solar ADP 
503 
Artemis, HPR, Taut 
wire 
BP 
Tankers 
Service 
vessel 
May
-79 
Jan-
80 
Swan 
Suppor-
ter 
ADP 
503 
Artemis, HPR, Taut 
wire 
Shear-
water 
Aqua 
Marine 
Service 
vessel 
Jun-
79 
Dec-
79 
Range 
Due 
ADP 
503 
Numerous Saipan Service 
vessel 
Jul-
79 
Oct-
79 
Eddo 
Sky 
ADP 
503 
Artemis, HPR Stub Service 
vessel 
Jul-
79 
Jan-
80 
Steno 
Sea-
Horse 
ADP 
503 
Artemis, HPR, Taut 
wire 
Steno 
Line 
- 
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11.8  Position reference systems, ca 1980 
 
System Accuracy and reliability Reach / limitations 
Omega (radio 
navigation) 
1-3 nautical miles Global 
Decca (radio 
navigation) 
100-500 metres; reliable Ca 200 nautical miles off 
the Norwegian coast 
during daytime 
Loran C (radio 
navigation) 
100-500 metres; reliable The Norwegian coast 
North of the North Sea 
Pulse/8 (radio 
navigation) 
30 metres; reliable The North Sea out to 300 
nautical miles 
Autotape, Trident 
and other radio 
navigation 
2–10 metres Requires some beacons 
within 50-100 km of the 
vessel 
Arthemis 2-5 metres when within 10 
km of the beacon. 
Requires one beacon 
within 30 km 
Taut wire Depends on depth and tide; 
2.4 metre error margin at 100 
metres depth and 28 metres at 
300 metres depth with tide of 
one knot – less if no tide. 
Depth not much more 
than 300 metres and reach 
no more than 25 per cent 
of water depth or else risk 
drag. 
GPS / Navstar Less than 10 metres error 
margin, but available only 50 
per cent of the time. 
Global – but signals were 
willingly distorted 
Simrad HPR / 
acoustic systems 
Usually within 1-2 per cent of 
water depth, up to 5 per cent 
when far from the transducer; 
somewhat unreliable 
Unacceptable noise when 
the distance from the 
transducer equals 2-3 
times the water depth 
 
Source: Steinar Sælid’s private archive – various reports 
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11.9  The first major standardization drive 
 
 Sub-component Standardized 
   
Permanent guide base  
 Outline in general Already specified by the American 
Petroleum Institute 
 Guideline anchor Operator specific 
  Location of locking 
mechanism  
No  
Wellhead system  
 General Difficult due to secrecy from manufacturers 
 Conductor Housing No (different requirement of impact to 
withstand) 
  Wellhead housing Yes, Vetco H-4 mandrel profile 
Tubing hanger system  
    Standardized on two varieties, less 
expensive slimline and extra security full 
bore 
Christmas tree  
 Layout of block Low for Draugen, regular for the rest 
 Flowline Yes 
 Bore spacing Yes 
 Orientation Yes 
  Valves and actuators Yes, 5000 psi 
Protective structure  
    No 
Control system  
 Arrangements Already standardized by suppliers, different 
systems for templates vs. single satellites 
 Number of systems One module per tree if the tree employed a 
dedicated sensor, otherwise one per 
template 
  What to survey and 
control 
No standardizing 
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Workover and completion system  
 Lower riser package Gate valve for Draugen, BOP outline for 
the rest 
 Emergency disconnect Yes, by standardizing on extreme 
requirements 
 Workover riser No, although savings could be substantial 
especially for reuse of risers 
 Surface flow tree Two different varieties used 
  Workover control No, but possible with some investments 
Intervention System  
 Tie-in tools Yes, mostly 
 Component replacement 
tools 
Yes, mostly 
  Intervention control 
system 
Yes, mostly 
Test requirements Yes, mostly 
 
Source: Tore Halvorsen and and Luis Araujo, Standardization Of Subsea 
Production Systems: Practical Experience From Draugen, Statfjord 
Satellite, And Heidrun Projects, paper presented at the Offshore Technology 
Conference, Houston 1993. 
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11.10 Calculating the price of a subsea system 
Prices on subsea systems are drawn from contemporary sources, frequently 
from newspaper articles or press releases to communicate the awarding of 
contracts. I have simply divided the contract sum by the number of 
Christmas Trees to arrive at the cost for an individual valve tree.  
 
Prices are cited excluding the cost of installing and maintaining the system, 
excluding umbilicals and excluding the cost of pipes (flowlines) to connect 
the subsea system to other installations. This is the most frequent prices 
cited. However, sometimes the costs do not include control systems, 
protective structures (template) or another component. When these prices 
are not cited, I have used the following formula: 
 
 
 
These proportions were said to be representative for a “typical subsea 
system” (Tore Halvorsen, “Havbunnsinnstallasjoner” paper presented at a 
conference “Flytende produsksjonssystemer for Olje og Gass”, 27 October 
1986). The proportions closely resemble the cost structure on TOGI (late 
1980s), Snorre (around 1990) and Statfjord Satellites (early 1990s). For 
those systems involved in the comparison, differences in the depth where 
the higher cost of building systems for deeper waters is not likely to make 
an impact.  
 
 
Wellhead 
foundation
3 %
Christmas 
Tree
23 %
Protective 
template
18 %
Riser control
7 %
Tie‐in
9 %
Control 
system
18 %
Flowlines
9 %
Umbilicals
13 %
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11.11  Kongsberg Offshore’s framework agreements 
 
Figure 61) Kongsberg Offshore’s experience base with framework contracts838 
 
Customer Timeframe 
Statoil Frame Contract 1995 – 2000
Statoil Subsea Service Agreement 2000 – 2002- 
Mobil Enhanced Supplier 
Agreement 
1996 – 1998 
Shell Inc. US 1997 - 
Agip Frame Contract 2000 – 2005 
Norsk Hydro Frame Agreement  2000 – 2003- 
BP GoM Frame Agreement  2001 – 2006- 
Woodside Energy 2003 – 2005- 
Talisman Energy 2003 - 
 
  
                                                     
838 Steenstrup’s private papers. 
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11.12  Sources 
The businesses that have developed dynamic positioning and subsea systems 
have changed names and status several times during the three decades 
covered in this thesis. Appendix 11.1 offers a brief outline. Their records are 
somewhat dispersed. 
 
The collections of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, stored at the Statsarkivet 
[public archives] in Kongsberg, contain documentation up to 1986 on issues 
that concerned board and top management. Numerous documents concerning 
corporate governance also exist in duplicate at the Riksarkivet [national 
archives] where files from the public inquiry into KV’s 1987 collapse are 
stored. The files on operational issues in KV’s various divisions are less 
complete – for example, I have only sporadic documentation from the 1979-
1983 Maritime Division of which Albatross was part.  
 
Figure 62) List of consulted collections in public archives 
Archive 
(location) 
Collection, series and 
boxes 
Contents Abbreviation 
used in 
footnotes 
Statsarkivet 
Kongsberg 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk,  
Hovedserie 1 – Styret, 
Rekke VII 
(Styreprotokoll i orginal) 
Board papers, 
1947-, eight 
boxes in 
chronological 
order 
KV-board 
Statsarkivet 
Kongsberg 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk 
under akkord, del I – 
Korrespondanse, I 
Direktørarkivet, Serie VI 
(virksomheter 1980-87) 
Working papers 
transferred to the 
entity that ran 
KV after the 
company filed 
for protection 
from its creditors 
KV-ex 
Statsarkivet 
Kongsberg 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, 
Hovedserie 5 - 
Drift/produksjon, rekke 
IV  
Plans for the 
overall 
production 
capacity at the 
factory 
KV-operations 
Statsarkivet 
Kongsberg 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, 
Hovedserie 12 - Diverse, 
rekke II, 
(Navigasjonsavdelingen 
1969-1986)  
Archives of the 
navigation 
department 
(marine 
electronics) 
None 
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Statsarkivet 
Kongsberg 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, 
Hovedserie 2 – 
Korrespondanse, C 1 
Direktørkorrespondanse, 
Rekke III (1945-1988) 
Correspondence 
of the managing 
director 
KV-Cor [box] 
Riksarkivet 
Oslo 
Nærings- og 
handelsdepartementets 
arkiv, 
kommisjonsarkivet, 
Arntzenkommisjonen, 
box 42 –43 
 
Board papers 
related to KV’s 
oil-related 
business, copied 
by a commission 
(public enquiry) 
established 18 
December 1987 
RA-Arntzen-
Oil 
 
 
Archival materials on internal company affairs are less easy to come by after 
1986, although both Kongsberg Gruppen and FMC Kongsberg Subsea have 
been forthcoming. Some historic files on Albatross from 1986 to 1995 are 
held by Kongsberg Maritime at the company’s premises in Horten. After 
1995, dynamic positioning and the automation solutions that derived from 
dynamic positioning were product lines in diversified corporate structures. 
The historic projects archives of Albatross remain intact, as do various 
collections of papers, for example papers at the training and information 
departments of Kongsberg Maritime. The author has not consulted board 
papers from the post-1995 period. 
 
The Subsea systems unit was integral to KV’s oil division until 1986. From 
1986, the subsea business was incorporated and remained a distinct legal 
entity albeit with changing names and ownership. The whereabouts of any 
board papers from 1986-1993 are not known. FMC Kongsberg Subsea keeps 
a board archive from 1993 onwards. This author has not had access to 
confidential papers, but the company has been helpful in providing internal 
and external information including annual reports and reference lists such as 
lists of customers and deliveries. 
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Figure 63) List of company archives (private) consulted 
Company 
(location) 
Collection and contents Abbreviation used 
in footnotes 
Kongsberg 
Maritime AS 
(Kongsberg) 
Projects’ archive – where contracts, 
plans, specifications of deliveries and 
other details are stored in folders 
according to delivery project 
CA-KM-hist 
Kongsberg 
Maritime AS 
(Kongsberg) 
Working archive of the support & 
training department – information 
and training materials on various 
products 
CA-KM-sup 
 
Kongsberg 
Simrad (Horten) 
A safe containing board papers and 
official documents related to the 
history of Simrad 
CA-KM-Simrad 
Kongsberg 
Maritime AS 
Working archive of the PR 
department, mostly newspaper 
clippings and newsletters 
CA-KM-info 
FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea 
Working archive of the PR 
department, mostly brochures, 
newspaper clippings, newsletters, 
etc. 
 
FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea 
Annual reports and accounts, archive 
of the board secretary 
 
CA-FMC-board 
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The author conducted some 60 interviews with 50 people. Most of the 
interviews were taped. Several people contributed documents from their 
private archives.  
 
Figure 64) List of private archives consulted 
Owner Contents Abbreviation used in 
footnotes 
Ole Næsset Various speeches and articles by 
Bjarne Hurlen, mostly from the 
1960s 
Næsset’s private 
papers 
Jens Glad 
Balchen 
Papers on cybernetics, articles and 
lecture materials 
Balchen’s private 
papers 
Bjørn Tom 
Jahnsen 
Collection of newspaper clippings, 
news bulletins and public 
communications from Albatross 
Jahnsen’s private 
papers 
Nils Albert 
Jenssen 
Internal company communications 
from Albatross, early 1980s 
Jenssen’s private 
papers 
Tor Berdal Company Whitepapers Berdal’s private 
papers 
Thor Skoland Scrap-books from late 1970s, 
product brochures, articles 
Skoland’s private 
papers 
Steinar Sælid An extensive private archive, 
particularly scientific publishing on 
dynamic positioning, 1974-1984 
Sælid’s private papers 
Knut Sogner Private papers related to his work on 
Simrad’s business history 
Sogner’s private 
papers 
Tore 
Halvorsen 
Internal communication on the 
advance of KV into oil, mid-1970s. 
Halvorsen’s private 
papers 
Ole Magnus 
Smeby 
Extensive private archive with 
reports on subsea technology and 
KV’s approach to the subsea field 
Smeby’s private 
papers 
Carl 
Steenstrup 
Recent files and speeches on 
contract strategy 
Steenstrup’s private 
papers 
Bjørn 
Husemoen 
Memorandum on the history of 
Kongsberg Offshore Systems, 22 
September 1998. 
Husemoen’s private 
papers 
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Figure 65) List of interviews 
Family name Given 
name 
Place Date 
Asphjell Arne Trondhjem September 15, 2004 
Balchen Jens Glad Trondhjem September 15, 2004 
Barth Jacobsen Bjørn Sandvika, 
Bærum 
September 9, 2004 
Barth Jacobsen Bjørn Sandvika, 
Bærum 
March 31, 2005 
Barth Jacobsen Bjørn Nydalen, Oslo November 29, 2005 
Bendigtsten Bjørn Nydalen, Oslo November 21, 2005 
Berdal Olav Kongsberg March 18, 2004 
Berdal Olav Kongsberg November 7, 2003 
Berdal Olav Kongsberg April 1, 2003 
Christiansen Erling Oslo February 19, 2007 
Corneliussen Sverre Kongsberg October 19, 2004 
Daling Ann Kristin Trondhjem September 15, 2004 
Dølsplass Terje Kongsberg January 24, 2006 
Engen Kristoffer Oslo September 13, 2004 
Evensen John Kongsberg June 23, 2004 
Fagerlund Svein Kongsberg October 14, 2004 
Fjelldal Hans 
Henrik 
Kongsberg October 29, 2004 
Fjellin Leif Kongsberg October 4, 2004 
Gotaas Sverre Kongsberg March 27, 2003 
Gulhaugen Nils Willy Kongsberg October 29, 2004 
Halvorsen Tore Kongsberg October 4, 2004 
Helle Hans 
Christian 
Kongsberg April 14, 2005 
Husemoen Bjørn Drammen October 13, 2004 
Jahnsen Bjørn Tom Kongsberg October 11, 2004 
Jahr Dagfinn Bygdø, Oslo September 23, 2004 
Jenssen Nils Albert Kongsberg October 14, 2004 
Jenssen Nils Albert Kongsberg May 16, 2006 
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Jørgensen Jan T. Lysaker September 21, 2004 
Kildal Torfinn Kongsberg October 29, 2004 
Kildal Torfinn Kongsberg January 4, 2006 
Korssjøen Jan Erik Kongsberg March 27, 2003 
Lied Finn Kjeller December 6, 2005 
Løkling Terje Kongsberg October 29, 2004 
Mathisen Eldar Kongsberg October 13, 2004 
Næsset Ole Kongsberg October 11, 2004 
Qvenild Rolf Kongsberg September 29, 2004 
Resaland Ansgar Kongsberg October 21, 2004 
Røkeberg Holger Nydalen, Oslo May 9, 2006 
Skoland Thor Kongsberg January 4, 2006 
Skoland Thor Kongsberg January 24, 2006 
Smeby Ole Magnus Kongsberg September 20, 2004 
Solberg Arne Kongsberg March 27, 2003 
Steenstrup Carl Kongsberg October 14, 2004 
Stensrud Kjell Kongsberg October 21, 2004 
Sælid Steinar Fredrikstad October 12, 2004 
Sælid Steinar Fredrikstad May 22, 2006 
Tveit Martin Oslo October 26, 2004 
Østlid Øyvind Kongsberg October 21, 2004 
 
 
 
A few library databases have been very useful for this project. Atekst 
includes business news from major Norwegian newspapers and news 
agencies, some articles dating back to 1984. As for matters of technology, 
the single most useful database has been OIL, assembled by the library of the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the Norwegian Safety Authority.839 
This citation database stretches back to the mid-1970s. Both “subsea” and 
                                                     
839 The reference database OIL covers petroleum literature of Nordic origin. 
Approximately 25 per cent of the 60,000 articles are in English. Searching the 
database is free of charge. Many newer documents are also available in full text. 
http://www.npd.no/oil/ 
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“dynamic positioning” are searchable terms. The Energy Citations Database 
maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy has a much larger collection 
stretching back to 1948, albeit with less materials on the North Sea. 840 
Finally, all papers presented at the Offshore Technology Conference (OTC), 
the annual gathering of oil people in Houston that has taken place since 
1969, are searchable in full text. Mostly anyone claiming to have made some 
kind of breakthrough in the field will attempt to make this known at the OTC 
along with various industry experts summarizing past, present (and less 
reliably) future trends.841 
 
  
                                                     
840 Energy Citations Database, cf. http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/ 
841 Cf. www.otcnet.org – the collection includes some 10,000 technical papers as of 
2008. On the role of OTC for communicating industry news, cf. Veldman and 
Lagers, 50 years offshore, pp. 86-91. 
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
Acronym English Norwegian name 
CMI Chr. Michelsen Institute Christian Michelsens Institutt 
DNV Norwegian classification society Det Norske Veritas 
FMC US corporation - the full name 
behind the abbreviation is no 
longer in use 
Food Machine and Chemical 
Corp. 
IAE Institute for atomic energy Institutt for atomenergi 
IMR Institute of Marine Research Havforskningsinstituttet 
NDRE Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment 
Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt 
(FFI) 
NTH The Norwegian Institute of 
Technology, merged to form  
NTNU in 1996). NTH was 
primarily a polytechnic institute, 
educating master level 
engineers as well as architects. 
Norges Tekniske Høyskole 
NTNF Government research fund for 
technical research 
Norges Teknisk 
Naturvitenskapelige 
Forskningsråd 
OTC Offshore Technology 
Conference 
Offshore Technology 
Conference 
ROV Remotely operated underwater 
vehicle 
Fjernstyrt undervannsfarkost 
SSB Statistics Norway Statistisk Sentralbyrå 
ÅSV Defunct aluminium melter - The 
company was merged with 
Norsk Hydro in 1986 to create 
the light metal division Hydro 
Aluminium. 
Årdal og Sundal Verk 
 
  
327 
 
Abbreviation Full text 
AIM Albatross Integrated Multifunction System 
BOP blow-out preventer 
Condeep concrete deep water structure 
DP dynamic positioning 
HPR hydro-acoustic position reference system 
LNG Liquid Natural Gas 
NOK Norwegian currency (kroner) 
psi pounds per square inch 
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
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